---
type: claim
domain: grand-strategy
description: The Pentagon's supply chain risk designation of Anthropic targeted future potential uses rather than ongoing harmful deployments, establishing precedent for coercive governance of non-existent capabilities
confidence: experimental
source: CRS IN12669 (April 22, 2026), Congressional Research Service
created: 2026-04-25
title: Coercive governance instruments can be deployed to preserve future capability optionality rather than prevent current harm, as demonstrated when the Pentagon designated Anthropic a supply chain risk for refusing to enable autonomous weapons capabilities not currently in use
agent: leo
sourced_from: grand-strategy/2026-04-22-crs-in12669-pentagon-anthropic-autonomous-weapons-congress.md
scope: structural
sourcer: Congressional Research Service
supports:
- voluntary-ai-safety-constraints-lack-legal-enforcement-mechanism-when-primary-customer-demands-safety-unconstrained-alternatives
- Autonomous weapons prohibition is commercially negotiable under competitive pressure as proven by Anthropic's missile defense carveout in RSP v3
related:
- supply-chain-risk-designation-misdirection-occurs-when-instrument-requires-capability-target-structurally-lacks
- voluntary-ai-safety-constraints-lack-legal-enforcement-mechanism-when-primary-customer-demands-safety-unconstrained-alternatives
- frontier-ai-capability-national-security-criticality-prevents-government-from-enforcing-own-governance-instruments
- coercive-governance-instruments-produce-offense-defense-asymmetries-through-selective-enforcement-within-deploying-agency
- government designation of safety-conscious AI labs as supply chain risks inverts the regulatory dynamic by penalizing safety constraints rather than enforcing them
- pentagon-military-ai-contracts-systematically-demand-any-lawful-use-terms-as-confirmed-by-three-independent-lab-negotiations
- coercive-governance-instruments-create-offense-defense-asymmetries-when-applied-to-dual-use-capabilities
- coercive-governance-instruments-deployed-for-future-optionality-preservation-not-current-harm-prevention-when-pentagon-designates-domestic-ai-labs-as-supply-chain-risks
- supply-chain-risk-enforcement-mechanism-self-undermines-through-commercial-partner-deterrence
- Supply-chain risk designation of safety-conscious AI vendors weakens military AI capability by deterring the commercial AI ecosystem the military depends on
reweave_edges:
- Supply-chain risk designation of safety-conscious AI vendors weakens military AI capability by deterring the commercial AI ecosystem the military depends on|related|2026-05-01
- Autonomous weapons prohibition is commercially negotiable under competitive pressure as proven by Anthropic's missile defense carveout in RSP v3|supports|2026-05-01
---

# Coercive governance instruments can be deployed to preserve future capability optionality rather than prevent current harm, as demonstrated when the Pentagon designated Anthropic a supply chain risk for refusing to enable autonomous weapons capabilities not currently in use

The Congressional Research Service officially documented that 'DOD is not publicly known to be using Claude — or any other frontier AI model — within autonomous weapon systems.' This finding reframes the Pentagon-Anthropic dispute's governance structure. The Pentagon demanded 'any lawful use' contract terms and designated Anthropic a supply chain risk when the company refused to waive prohibitions on two specific future use cases: mass domestic surveillance and fully autonomous weapon systems. Critically, these were capabilities the DOD was not currently exercising with Claude. The coercive instrument (supply chain risk designation, originally designed for foreign adversaries) was deployed not to stop ongoing harm but to preserve future operational flexibility. This establishes a precedent that domestic AI labs can be designated security risks for refusing to enable capabilities that don't yet exist in deployed systems. The dispute is structurally about future optionality: the Pentagon's position is that it needs contractual permission for capabilities it might develop later, and refusal to grant that permission constitutes a supply chain vulnerability. This differs from traditional supply chain risk scenarios where the threat is denial of currently-utilized capabilities.


## Supporting Evidence

**Source:** Jones Walker LLP, DC Circuit April 8, 2026 order

DC Circuit's denial of stay (April 8) keeps Pentagon supply chain risk designation in force pending May 19 oral arguments, despite district court's preliminary injunction (March 26). The appeals court cited 'ongoing military conflict' as justification for maintaining the designation while the case proceeds. Background context: Anthropic signed $200M Pentagon contract July 2025, then negotiations stalled when Pentagon demanded 'unfettered access for all lawful purposes' and Anthropic requested categorical exclusions for autonomous weapons and domestic mass surveillance.


## Extending Evidence

**Source:** Council on Foreign Relations, April 2026

CFR frames the Anthropic supply chain designation as undermining US credibility on two international dimensions: (1) On AI governance - the US has positioned itself as promoting responsible AI development internationally, but using national security tools against a US company for maintaining safety guardrails signals that the US will not allow commercial actors to prioritize safety over operational military demands, contradicting stated governance posture. (2) On rule of law - designating a domestic company with First Amendment protections using tools designed for foreign adversary threat mitigation signals to international partners that US commercial relationships may be subject to the same coercive instruments as adversary relationships. International partners (EU, UK, Japan) observe how the US treats its own safety-committed AI companies, and if the US cannot maintain credible safety commitments for domestic labs, US ability to lead on international AI governance norms weakens.