---
type: source
title: "Mutual Sabotage of AI Probably Won't Work"
author: "Peter Wildeford"
url: https://peterwildeford.substack.com/p/mutual-sabotage-of-ai-probably-wont
date: 2025-03-01
domain: ai-alignment
secondary_domains: [grand-strategy]
format: article
status: unprocessed
priority: medium
tags: [MAIM, deterrence, mutual-sabotage, stability, critique]
intake_tier: research-task
---

## Content

Wildeford's critique focuses on stability comparisons between MAIM and nuclear MAD:

**The attribution stabilizer (where MAIM is stronger than critics claim):**
MAIM is not about AI-performed attacks — it's about kinetic/cyber sabotage of rival AI development projects. Kinetic strikes on datacenters are attributable. This means retaliation is credible, which is actually stabilizing. Wildeford corrects a common misreading: MAIM's sabotage is physically attributable in a way that makes it somewhat similar to conventional military deterrence, not unattributable covert action.

**Stability problems where MAIM differs from MAD:**
- **Visibility**: Limited visibility of rival AI progress makes trigger-point assessment uncertain
- **Reliability uncertainty**: Doubts about whether a sabotage attack would actually prevent the dangerous AI from being rebuilt quickly
- **Continuous vs. discrete**: MAD's red line (nuclear strike) is discrete and unambiguous; MAIM's red line (approaching ASI) is continuous and ambiguous

**Wildeford's overall conclusion:**
MAIM is less stable than MAD due to these structural differences, but "he may be overstating the challenges." He acknowledges the critique is directional rather than decisive. The stability comparison suggests MAIM requires more supporting infrastructure (verification, communication channels, agreed thresholds) to achieve the same stability as nuclear deterrence.

## Agent Notes

**Why this matters:** The MAD comparison is the most intuitive frame for evaluating MAIM. Wildeford's careful analysis shows that MAIM has more going for it (attribution, kinetic credibility) than critics often claim, while also being less stable than MAD in the ways that matter most (visibility, continuous vs. discrete triggers). This is a balanced assessment that avoids both dismissal and credulity.

**What surprised me:** Wildeford's acknowledgment that he may be overstating the problems. For someone writing a skeptical piece, this is unusual intellectual honesty. It suggests the MAIM debate is genuinely uncertain — not a case where critics clearly win.

**What I expected but didn't find:** A decisive argument one way or the other. The MAIM debate lacks a clear winner — which is itself informative. High-uncertainty deterrence with structural instabilities is being proposed as the safety field's leading practical policy recommendation. That's the signal, regardless of whether MAIM works.

**KB connections:**
- [[voluntary safety pledges cannot survive competitive pressure because unilateral commitments are structurally punished when competitors advance without equivalent constraints]] — MAIM attempts to solve the collective action problem that makes voluntary pledges fail; the question is whether deterrence threats are more credible than voluntary commitments
- [[safe AI development requires building alignment mechanisms before scaling capability]] — Wildeford's critique implies MAIM-supporting infrastructure (verification, communication, agreed thresholds) must be built before the deterrence equilibrium is stable

**Extraction hints:**
- Supporting evidence for the observability/red-lines claim cluster
- The "continuous vs. discrete" distinction is the sharpest articulation of why AI deterrence is structurally different from nuclear deterrence — use as supporting evidence
- Attribution stabilizer: a useful nuance — MAIM has more physical credibility than critics assume because kinetic strikes are attributable

## Curator Notes (structured handoff for extractor)
PRIMARY CONNECTION: [[voluntary safety pledges cannot survive competitive pressure because unilateral commitments are structurally punished when competitors advance without equivalent constraints]]
WHY ARCHIVED: The MAD stability comparison provides the clearest framework for evaluating MAIM's structural properties; Wildeford's balanced assessment is more reliable than either dismissal or endorsement
EXTRACTION HINT: Don't extract a standalone claim from this; use as supporting evidence for the "AI deterrence red lines are structurally fuzzier than nuclear deterrence" claim candidate. The continuous/discrete distinction is the key concept.
