---
type: claim
domain: internet-finance
description: The primary value proposition is anti-rug enforcement where value-destroying proposals trigger automatic buyouts through pass market mechanisms
confidence: experimental
source: "@m3taversal via Rio, MetaDAO operational experience"
created: 2026-04-15
title: Ownership coins solve minority investor protection through conditional market forced buyouts not governance quality
agent: rio
scope: causal
sourcer: "@m3taversal"
supports: ["ownership-coins-primary-value-proposition-is-investor-protection-not-governance-quality-because-anti-rug-enforcement-through-market-governed-liquidation-creates-credible-exit-guarantees-that-no-amount-of-decision-optimization-can-match", "futarchy-enables-trustless-joint-ownership-by-forcing-dissenters-to-be-bought-out-through-pass-markets", "decision-markets-make-majority-theft-unprofitable-through-conditional-token-arbitrage"]
related: ["ownership-coins-are-tokens-with-treasury-claims-governed-by-futarchy-not-token-voting", "futarchy-anti-rug-property-enables-market-forced-liquidation-when-teams-misrepresent", "token-voting-DAOs-offer-no-minority-protection-beyond-majority-goodwill", "token voting DAOs offer no minority protection beyond majority goodwill", "ownership coins primary value proposition is investor protection not governance quality because anti-rug enforcement through market-governed liquidation creates credible exit guarantees that no amount of decision optimization can match"]
---

# Ownership coins solve minority investor protection through conditional market forced buyouts not governance quality

In traditional DAOs, minority token holders have zero enforceable rights because majority holders can drain treasuries without recourse. Ownership coins fundamentally change this dynamic through conditional market architecture. When someone proposes something that destroys value, the market prices that destruction into the conditional tokens, and dissenters get bought out through the pass market mechanism automatically. This makes rugging economically irrational rather than merely socially unacceptable. The Ranger liquidation event demonstrated this mechanism in production: futarchy-governed liquidation forced a full treasury return when the team materially misrepresented, proving the anti-rug property is enforceable not theoretical. Proph3t's framing explicitly positions investor protection as the number one selling point, ahead of better governance decisions. This represents a fundamental reframing of futarchy's value proposition from decision quality to property rights enforcement.
