---
type: claim
domain: ai-alignment
description: "Unlike nuclear or biotech which are dual-use in specific domains, AI improves capabilities across nearly all domains simultaneously — extending the omni-use pattern of computing and electricity but at a pace and scope that may overwhelm governance frameworks designed for domain-specific technologies"
confidence: likely
source: "Schmachtenberger & Boeree 'Win-Win or Lose-Lose' podcast (2024), Schmachtenberger on Great Simplification #71 and #132"
created: 2026-04-03
related:
  - "AI accelerates existing Molochian dynamics by removing bottlenecks not creating new misalignment because the competitive equilibrium was always catastrophic and friction was the only thing preventing convergence"
  - "technology-governance-coordination-gaps-close-when-four-enabling-conditions-are-present-visible-triggering-events-commercial-network-effects-low-competitive-stakes-at-inception-or-physical-manifestation"
---

# AI is omni-use technology categorically different from dual-use because it improves all capabilities simultaneously meaning anything AI can optimize it can break

The standard framing for dangerous technologies is "dual-use" — nuclear technology produces both energy and weapons, biotechnology produces both medicine and bioweapons, chemistry produces both fertilizer and explosives. Governance frameworks for dual-use technologies restrict specific dangerous applications while permitting beneficial ones.

Schmachtenberger argues AI is omni-use — it improves capabilities across nearly all domains simultaneously rather than having a specific beneficial/harmful dual. Drug discovery AI run in reverse produces novel chemical weapons. Protein-folding AI applied to pathogens produces enhanced bioweapons. Cybersecurity AI identifies vulnerabilities for both defenders and attackers. Persuasion optimization works identically for education and propaganda.

AI is not the first omni-use technology — computing, electricity, and the printing press all improved capabilities across multiple domains. But AI may represent an extreme on the omni-use spectrum: it is meta-cognitive (improves the process of improving things), it operates at the speed of software (not physical infrastructure), and its capabilities compound as models improve. The question is whether this is a difference in degree that existing governance can absorb or a difference in kind that breaks governance frameworks designed for domain-specific technologies.

This distinction matters for governance because:

1. **Domain-specific containment fails.** Nuclear non-proliferation works (imperfectly) because enrichment facilities are physically identifiable and export-controllable. AI capabilities are software — they copy at zero marginal cost, require no physical infrastructure visible to satellites, and improve continuously through publicly available research.

2. **Use-restriction is unenforceable.** Restricting "dangerous uses" of AI requires distinguishing beneficial from harmful applications of the same capability. The same language model that tutors students can generate social engineering attacks. The same computer vision that diagnoses cancer can guide autonomous weapons. The capability is use-neutral in a way that enriched uranium is not.

3. **Capability improvements cascade across all applications simultaneously.** A breakthrough in reasoning capability improves medical diagnosis AND strategic deception AND drug discovery AND cyber offense. Governance frameworks that evaluate technologies application-by-application cannot keep pace with improvements that propagate across all applications at once.

The practical implication: AI governance that follows the dual-use template (restrict specific applications, monitor specific facilities) will fail because the template assumes domain-specific containability. Effective AI governance requires addressing the capability itself, not its applications — which means either restricting capability development (politically impossible given competitive dynamics) or building coordination infrastructure that aligns capability deployment across all domains simultaneously.

## Challenges

- "Omni-use" may overstate the case. Many AI capabilities ARE domain-specific in practice — a protein-folding model doesn't automatically generate cyber exploits. The convergence toward general-purpose AI is real but not complete; governance may still have domain-specific leverage points.
- The "anything AI can optimize it can break" framing conflates capability with intent. In practice, weaponizing beneficial AI requires specific additional steps, expertise, and resources that governance can target.
- Governance frameworks for general-purpose technologies exist (computing hardware export controls, internet governance). AI may be more analogous to computing than to nuclear — governed through infrastructure rather than application.

---

Relevant Notes:
- [[AI accelerates existing Molochian dynamics by removing bottlenecks not creating new misalignment because the competitive equilibrium was always catastrophic and friction was the only thing preventing convergence]] — omni-use nature is the mechanism by which AI accelerates ALL Molochian dynamics simultaneously
- [[technology-governance-coordination-gaps-close-when-four-enabling-conditions-are-present-visible-triggering-events-commercial-network-effects-low-competitive-stakes-at-inception-or-physical-manifestation]] — AI fails to meet the enabling conditions precisely because it is omni-use rather than domain-specific

Topics:
- [[_map]]
