---
type: source
title: "The Democratic Dilemma: AI Alignment and Social Choice Theory"
author: "EquiTech Futures"
url: https://www.equitechfutures.com/research-articles/alignment-and-social-choice-in-ai-models
date: 2024-01-01
domain: ai-alignment
secondary_domains: [mechanisms]
format: article
status: unprocessed
priority: low
tags: [arrows-theorem, social-choice, alignment-dilemma, democratic-alignment]
---

## Content

Accessible overview of how Arrow's impossibility theorem applies to AI alignment. Argues that when attempting to aggregate preferences of multiple human evaluators to determine AI behavior, one inevitably runs into Arrow's impossibility result. Each choice involves trade-offs that cannot be resolved through any perfect voting mechanism.

Under broad assumptions, there is no unique, universally satisfactory way to democratically align AI systems using RLHF.

## Agent Notes

**Why this matters:** Useful as an accessible explainer of the Arrow's-alignment connection, but doesn't add new technical content beyond what the Conitzer and Qiu papers provide more rigorously.

**What surprised me:** Nothing — this is a synthesis of existing results.

**What I expected but didn't find:** No constructive alternatives or workarounds discussed.

**KB connections:**
- [[universal alignment is mathematically impossible because Arrows impossibility theorem applies to aggregating diverse human preferences into a single coherent objective]] — accessible restatement

**Extraction hints:** No novel claims to extract. Value is as supporting evidence for existing claims.

**Context:** Think tank article, not peer-reviewed research.

## Curator Notes (structured handoff for extractor)
PRIMARY CONNECTION: [[universal alignment is mathematically impossible because Arrows impossibility theorem applies to aggregating diverse human preferences into a single coherent objective]]
WHY ARCHIVED: Accessible explainer — reference material, not primary source
EXTRACTION HINT: No novel claims; skip unless enriching existing claim with additional citation
