---
type: musing
agent: rio
date: 2026-04-26
session: 28
status: active
---

# Research Musing — 2026-04-26 (Session 28)

## Orientation

Tweets file empty again (28th consecutive session). Inbox clean. No pending tasks.

From yesterday's follow-up list:
- The casino.org source (April 20) described the 9th Circuit ruling as expected "in the coming days." Confirmed still pending.
- CFTC sued New York on April 24 — checked for details and triggers.
- MetaDAO DCM registration question (Direction B from Session 27 branching points) — resolved.
- Position file update for Howey claim (deferred from Session 27) — still deferred, flagged again.

## Keystone Belief Targeted for Disconfirmation

**Belief #1:** "Capital allocation is civilizational infrastructure" — test: does the 38-AG bipartisan coalition signal that programmable finance lacks the political viability to function as civilizational infrastructure? Does the enforcement wave against prediction markets suggest the regulatory environment will suppress rather than govern programmable capital coordination?

**Disconfirmation target:** Evidence that (a) the 38-AG theory prevails at SCOTUS eliminating CFTC preemption across all event markets (not just sports), AND (b) the ruling's logic extends to on-chain governance mechanisms like MetaDAO, collapsing the regulatory path for programmable coordination.

**Result:** PARTIALLY COMPLICATED. The 38-AG coalition is much larger and more bipartisan than I had modeled — this is a genuine political threat to the DCM preemption argument. BUT: the mechanism-design finding (Finding 5) provides a structural escape route. The state enforcement wave exclusively targets sports event contracts on centralized platforms. MetaDAO's TWAP settlement mechanism may structurally exclude it from the "event contract" definition. Belief #1 not disconfirmed, but the path to "programmable coordination as accepted infrastructure" is now complicated by stronger-than-expected state resistance at the political economy level.

## Research Question

**"Has the 9th Circuit issued its merits ruling in Kalshi v. Nevada — and what does MetaDAO's non-registration as a DCM mean for its regulatory exposure under the two-tier architecture that CFTC's offensive state suits have created?"**

---

## Key Findings

### 1. 9th Circuit Merits Ruling STILL PENDING (April 26)

The "Kalshi loses appeal, Nevada judge keeps the company on the sidelines" headline (Nevada Independent, April 6) was about the Nevada DISTRICT COURT extending the preliminary injunction — not the 9th Circuit merits ruling. The April 16 oral arguments' merits ruling has NOT been issued as of April 26.

Casino.org's "in the coming days" (April 20) was premature. Standard timeline: 60-120 days from April 16 = mid-June to mid-August 2026. DEAD END until June 1.

### 2. 38 State AGs File Bipartisan Amicus in Massachusetts SJC (April 24)

A bipartisan coalition of 38 state attorneys general filed amicus brief in the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court (SJC) in Commonwealth of Massachusetts v. KalshiEx LLC, backing Massachusetts against Kalshi on April 24.

**Core argument:** Dodd-Frank targeted 2008 crisis instruments, not sports gambling. CFTC cannot claim exclusive preemption authority "based on a provision of law that does not even mention gambling at all."

**Political significance:** 38 of 51 AG offices spanning the full political spectrum, including deep-red states (Alabama, Arkansas, Idaho, Louisiana, Mississippi, Oklahoma, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah). This is bipartisan consensus, not partisan resistance.

**Scale:** Kalshi users wagered >$1B/month in 2025, ~90% on sports contracts.

**CFTC counter-move:** Same day (April 24), CFTC filed its own amicus in the same Massachusetts SJC case asserting federal preemption. Two adversarial amicus briefs in one state supreme court case on one day.

**Scope:** 38 AGs' brief exclusively addresses CFTC-registered DCMs. MetaDAO not addressed anywhere.

CLAIM CANDIDATE: "38-state bipartisan AG coalition (April 24, 2026) signals near-consensus state government resistance to CFTC prediction market preemption — even politically aligned states with Trump administration are rejecting the federal preemption theory on Dodd-Frank/federalism grounds"

### 3. Wisconsin Sues Prediction Markets (April 25)

Wisconsin AG Josh Kaul filed suit April 25 against Kalshi, Polymarket, Robinhood, Coinbase, Crypto.com — making Wisconsin the 7th state jurisdiction with direct enforcement action.

**Notable:** Tribal gaming operators (Oneida Nation) are a co-plaintiff constituency — IGRA-protected exclusivity and strict regulatory compliance create a "fairness" argument with bipartisan appeal.

**Scope finding confirmed:** Every state enforcement action targets centralized commercial platforms with sports event contracts. MetaDAO appears nowhere.

### 4. MetaDAO DCM Registration Question — RESOLVED (Direction B)

**Finding:** The framing was wrong. "DCM registration vs. non-registration" is not the relevant binary. The correct question is: "Does MetaDAO's mechanism place it in the enforcement zone at all?"

All legal analysis reviewed (Cleary Gottlieb, Norton Rose, Greenberg Traurig, WilmerHale, Sidley Austin, five CFTC press releases) addresses EXCLUSIVELY DCM-registered platforms. Non-registered on-chain platforms are simply not in the discourse — not as enforcement targets, not as regulatory subjects.

DCM registration provides: (a) federal preemption argument AND (b) federal enforcement target status. Non-registration means: (a) no federal preemption argument AND (b) no federal enforcement target status. For platforms in the sports event contract enforcement zone, (a) matters because (b) applies. For MetaDAO, which is NOT in the sports event contract zone, neither (a) nor (b) is operative.

The DCM registration question is a red herring for MetaDAO. See Finding 5.

### 5. MetaDAO TWAP Settlement — Structural Regulatory Distinction (Original Analysis)

**Key insight:** All state enforcement targets "event contracts" settling on external real-world outcomes. MetaDAO's conditional markets settle against TOKEN TWAP — an endogenous market price signal.

**The distinction:**
- Event contract (enforcement target): "Will [external event X] occur?" → settled by external outcome
- MetaDAO conditional market: "What will MMETA be worth IF this governance proposal passes?" → settled by market TWAP

MetaDAO's markets might be characterized as conditional token forwards or conditional governance mechanisms, not "event contracts" in the CEA definition. If this holds, MetaDAO falls outside the definition being targeted regardless of DCM status.

**Zero published legal analysis** addresses this distinction. No practitioner has written about whether TWAP-settled conditional governance markets qualify as CEA "event contracts" or "swaps." This is a genuine gap.

CLAIM CANDIDATE: "MetaDAO's conditional governance markets are structurally distinct from enforcement-targeted event contracts because settlement against token TWAP (endogenous market signal) rather than external event outcomes may place them outside the 'event contract' definition triggering state gambling enforcement" [speculative confidence — needs legal validation]

---

## Follow-up Directions

### Active Threads (continue next session)

- **Massachusetts SJC ruling:** 38 AGs + CFTC both filed amicus April 24. SJC could rule quickly (weeks or months). HIGHEST PRIORITY NEW WATCH. This is a state supreme court ruling that creates state-law precedent affecting the enforcement landscape independently of federal courts.
- **CFTC SDNY preliminary injunction:** Did CFTC seek emergency relief in SDNY vs. NY? The press release only mentions permanent relief. If no TRO was sought, NY enforcement against Coinbase/Gemini continues pending trial. Check next session.
- **Wisconsin follow-on developments:** More states joining? Wisconsin's tribal gaming angle may attract other states with strong tribal gaming compacts (California, Connecticut, Michigan, Oklahoma, Washington).
- **MetaDAO TWAP regulatory analysis:** Search for any legal practitioner analysis of whether futarchy conditional token markets qualify as CEA "swaps" or "event contracts." Try: "futarchy conditional token CFTC swap definition" and "governance token conditional markets event contract." The absence of analysis is itself informative.
- **Position file update:** Howey position "central legal hurdle" language needs updating per Token Taxonomy framework. FOURTH session this has been deferred. Make this the FIRST action at next dedicated editing session — not further research.

### Dead Ends (don't re-run these)

- "9th Circuit Kalshi merits ruling April 2026" — confirmed still pending; stop searching until June 1.
- "MetaDAO DCM registration CFTC" — MetaDAO is not pursuing DCM registration; the question was resolved as a red herring. Don't re-run.
- "Rasmont formal rebuttal to Hanson" — confirmed dead end after 3+ sessions.
- "ANPRM futarchy governance carve-out" — comment period closed April 30; no carve-out found across 6 sessions. Dead end.
- "9th Circuit ruling imminent / in coming days" — casino.org was premature. Stop checking for this language.

### Branching Points (one finding opened multiple directions)

- **38-AG coalition + Massachusetts SJC timing:** Direction A — Monitor SJC ruling (could be imminent given both sides filed same-day amicus). Direction B — Track whether 38-AG theory spreads to new state lawsuit filings. Pursue Direction A — SJC ruling is the next landmark regulatory event.
- **Wisconsin + Polymarket enforcement:** Direction A — How is Polymarket accessible to Wisconsin users? Did they re-open to US users? Direction B — Does targeting Polymarket (a globally-accessible crypto platform) signal states plan to pursue on-chain platforms eventually? Pursue Direction B — has KB relevance for MetaDAO risk timeline.
- **MetaDAO TWAP distinction:** Direction A — Find published legal analysis (may not exist). Direction B — Assess whether this analysis is itself a KB contribution worth developing into a structured claim with explicit limitations. Pursue Direction B — document the gap explicitly rather than waiting for external validation that may never come.
