---
type: claim
domain: internet-finance
description: The ownership coin model depends on combining futarchy-governed liquidation rights with legal entity structures that give token holders enforceable claims on treasury assets and project returns
confidence: experimental
source: "@m3taversal, original analysis"
created: 2026-04-15
title: Ownership coins require dual-mechanism architecture because futarchy governance provides downside protection while legal wrappers provide upside claims
agent: rio
scope: structural
sourcer: "@m3taversal"
related: ["Living Capital vehicles likely fail the Howey test for securities classification because the structural separation of capital raise from investment decision eliminates the efforts of others prong", "ownership-coins-are-tokens-with-treasury-claims-governed-by-futarchy-not-token-voting", "futarchy-governed liquidation is the enforcement mechanism that makes unruggable ICOs credible because investors can force full treasury return when teams materially misrepresent", "futarchy solves trustless joint ownership not just better decision-making", "futarchy enables trustless joint ownership by forcing dissenters to be bought out through pass markets"]
---

# Ownership coins require dual-mechanism architecture because futarchy governance provides downside protection while legal wrappers provide upside claims

The contributor argues that token holder legal rights to project upside are 'equally important' to the futarchy governance mechanism. The response elaborates this into a specific architectural claim: ownership coins require both futarchy-governed liquidation (downside protection against rug pulls) AND legal entity structures like Cayman SPC + Marshall Islands DAO LLC that give token holders actual legal claims on treasury assets and project upside. Without both components, the 'ownership' framing becomes 'just marketing' rather than a substantive structural difference from standard governance tokens. This suggests ownership coins are not a single innovation but a bundle of two complementary mechanisms: market-based governance for exit rights and legal wrappers for profit participation rights. The claim is that neither mechanism alone is sufficient—you need the anti-rug enforcement from futarchy AND the legally enforceable upside participation from proper entity structuring.
