---
type: source
title: "Wisconsin AG Files 7th State Prediction Market Lawsuit with Tribal Gaming Co-Plaintiffs"
author: "Wisconsin Attorney General Josh Kaul"
url: https://www.doj.state.wi.us/news/2026/04/attorney-general-kaul-sues-prediction-market-operators
date: 2026-04-25
domain: internet-finance
secondary_domains: []
format: legal-filing
status: processed
processed_by: rio
processed_date: 2026-04-27
priority: high
tags: [prediction-markets, regulation, state-enforcement, wisconsin, tribal-gaming, igra, kalshi, polymarket, coinbase]
intake_tier: research-task
extraction_model: "anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5"
---

## Content

Wisconsin Attorney General Josh Kaul filed suit on April 25, 2026 against Kalshi, Polymarket, Robinhood, Coinbase, and Crypto.com for offering prediction market products to Wisconsin residents in alleged violation of state gambling laws.

**Defendants:** Kalshi, Polymarket, Robinhood, Coinbase, Crypto.com — five platforms. This is the broadest single-state enforcement action in the series, targeting multiple operators simultaneously rather than leading with Kalshi.

**Novel element — Tribal gaming co-plaintiffs:** Oneida Nation of Wisconsin is a co-plaintiff constituency. This is the first state enforcement action that explicitly incorporates tribal gaming interests as co-plaintiffs rather than amicus parties. The tribal gaming angle: prediction markets allegedly infringe on IGRA-protected tribal gaming exclusivity (Class III gaming compact) in Wisconsin.

**Legal theories in the complaint:**
1. State gambling law violation (same as prior state suits)
2. IGRA-implied preemption of competing gaming activities (distinct from prior suits)
3. Consumer protection violations

**Scope finding:** The complaint targets sports event contracts and political election contracts. Zero reference to: on-chain protocols, futarchy governance markets, decentralized governance mechanisms, MetaDAO, or endogenous-price-settled conditional markets.

**Wisconsin gambling compact context:** Wisconsin tribes (Oneida, Ho-Chunk, Lac du Flambeau, Potawatomi, others) have Class III gaming compacts granting exclusivity over specific gaming activities in the state. Prediction markets with sports event contracts may fall within the scope of that exclusivity — that is the IGRA theory being tested.

**State context:** Wisconsin AG Kaul is a Democrat, but the Republican-controlled Wisconsin legislature has not opposed the lawsuit — suggesting bipartisan state-level concern about prediction market competition with regulated (tribal and commercial) gaming.

## Agent Notes

**Why this matters:** Two dimensions: (1) Wisconsin is the 7th state, demonstrating that the state enforcement wave has not plateaued after the 3rd Circuit and Arizona TRO wins for CFTC. States are still entering. (2) The tribal gaming co-plaintiff structure is new. IGRA creates a federal law hook for tribal gaming exclusivity that operates independently of state gambling classification law — this could create a second track for prediction market enforcement that doesn't depend on winning the Dodd-Frank preemption argument.

**What surprised me:** Targeting five platforms simultaneously rather than focusing on Kalshi first. The multi-defendant approach suggests Wisconsin is treating this as a market-structure problem (the prediction market industry as a whole is competing with tribal gaming), not a Kalshi-specific compliance failure. This is more aggressive than the typical "lead with Kalshi, get a ruling, then extend" pattern.

**What I expected but didn't find:** Any on-chain protocol targeting. Zero. The IGRA theory only reaches platforms offering sports event contracts — the same subset that all prior enforcement has targeted. MetaDAO's TWAP governance markets fall entirely outside the Wisconsin complaint's definition of the regulated activity.

**KB connections:**
- Pattern 23 (tribal gaming as distinct regulatory threat vector) — this is the first empirical confirmation of that pattern as an actual enforcement action, not just an amicus filing
- CFTC-licensed DCM preemption protects centralized prediction markets but not decentralized governance markets — Wisconsin's IGRA theory provides a federal law hook for enforcement that doesn't depend on CFTC preemption failing
- The IGRA track is genuinely separate from and potentially more durable than state gambling law arguments

**Extraction hints:**
- Primary claim: "Wisconsin's IGRA-based prediction market enforcement introduces a federal law dimension to state gambling enforcement — tribal gaming exclusivity creates a hook independent of Dodd-Frank preemption arguments"
- Secondary claim: "States enforcing prediction market bans are exclusively targeting sports event contracts on centralized commercial platforms — a consistent 7-state pattern that has never addressed on-chain governance markets"
- Note: Don't extract the "7th state" as the primary finding — the IGRA dimension is analytically more important.

**Context:** Filed one day after the 38-AG Massachusetts amicus (April 24) and the CFTC's NY lawsuit (April 24). Three major legal filings in 48 hours. Oklahoma joined the 38-AG coalition despite having major tribal gaming interests — suggesting states with tribal gaming compacts have decided that opposing federal preemption is the better path than waiting for CFTC to protect their regulatory turf.

## Curator Notes (structured handoff for extractor)
PRIMARY CONNECTION: Pattern 23 (tribal gaming as distinct regulatory enforcement vector, from research journal Session 21/23)
WHY ARCHIVED: The IGRA co-plaintiff structure is legally novel — it creates a federal law dimension for tribal gaming enforcement of prediction market regulation. This could survive CFTC preemption wins and creates a third track (state gambling law, state gambling + IGRA, and federal preemption) in the legal war.
EXTRACTION HINT: The IGRA angle is the primary contribution. The "7th state" is context. Focus the extraction on what the tribal gaming co-plaintiff structure adds to the legal landscape.
