---
type: source
title: "Aviation Week: Blue Origin Eyes BE-3U Thrust Deficiency in New Glenn Launch Failure"
author: "Aviation Week Network"
url: https://aviationweek.com/space/launch-vehicles-propulsion/blue-origin-eyes-be-3u-thrust-deficiency-new-glenn-launch-failure
date: 2026-04-28
domain: space-development
secondary_domains: []
format: article
status: null-result
priority: medium
tags: [New-Glenn, Blue-Origin, BE-3U, launch-failure, investigation, return-to-flight, VIPER, Blue-Moon]
intake_tier: research-task
extraction_model: "anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5"
---

## Content

Aviation Week's technical coverage of the New Glenn NG-3 failure (April 19, 2026). Preliminary investigation finding: one of the two BE-3U engines on the second stage produced insufficient thrust during the GS2 burn, causing AST SpaceMobile's BlueBird 7 satellite to be delivered to a lower-than-planned orbit and ultimately deorbit.

The second stage has two BE-3U engines. If only one failed, questions center on: (a) systematic design flaw shared across both units vs. (b) isolated manufacturing/component defect in the specific engine.

FAA is supervising the investigation. Blue Origin leads the investigation but must submit a final report with corrective actions for FAA approval before return to flight is authorized.

The Register confirms FAA grounds New Glenn following the satellite mishap. TechCrunch confirms FAA ordered investigation. Aviation Week provides the technical framing: "thrust deficiency" is the observable symptom; root cause (combustion instability, injector issues, turbopump anomaly) remains unidentified as of late April 2026.

For comparison: SpaceX Falcon 9 was grounded for 15 days after a similar upper-stage anomaly in 2024. New Glenn NG-3 investigation is expected to take longer given vehicle immaturity (only third flight) and the more consequential outcome (satellite loss vs. payload delay).

Blue Moon MK1 first mission ("Endurance") was planned for late summer 2026. VIPER is on the second Blue Moon MK1 mission (originally late 2027). Root cause determination determines whether summer 2026 Blue Moon MK1 is viable.

## Agent Notes

**Why this matters:** This is the investigation status update I was watching from 2026-04-27. Still at preliminary stage — "thrust deficiency" identified but mechanism unknown. The critical fork in the investigation: if root cause is a shared design flaw in the BE-3U design (affecting both second-stage engines), the grounding is likely months and ground testing must precede any return to flight. If it's an isolated manufacturing defect in one engine, the grounding could be weeks. Blue Moon MK1 summer 2026 viability hangs on this distinction.

**What surprised me:** No root cause after ~9 days of investigation. For a rocket with only 3 flights of history, this isn't surprising, but it confirms the investigation will not close quickly.

**What I expected but didn't find:** Any speculation about whether the second BE-3U engine was commanded to compensate (in which case it might show whether there was a real-time attempt at thrust augmentation that failed). No information on this.

**KB connections:** Directly relevant to [[China is the only credible peer competitor in space with comprehensive capabilities and state-directed acceleration closing the reusability gap in 5-8 years]] — Blue Origin's failure indirectly strengthens SpaceX's market position. Also relevant to [[SpaceX vertical integration across launch broadband and manufacturing creates compounding cost advantages that no competitor can replicate piecemeal]] — Blue Origin's three-flight track record (NG-1 success, NG-2 partial success with booster recovery, NG-3 upper stage failure) shows the SpaceX flywheel advantage is not being closed.

**Extraction hints:** This source supports a pattern claim: "New launch vehicles face systematic single-bidder fragility — when programs require capabilities beyond commercial incumbents, new entrants become single points of failure before establishing track records." The NG-3 failure combined with the Blue Moon MK1 single-bidder situation is the empirical case.

**Context:** Aviation Week's technical framing ("thrust deficiency") is careful — it's the observable symptom, not the diagnosis. The investigation needs to determine WHY there was thrust deficiency. BE-3U is a pressure-fed LOX/LH2 engine (different from SpaceX's full-flow staged combustion Raptor). LH2 propulsion is harder — hydrogen leaks, embrittlement, mixture ratio sensitivity. The technical challenge of the BE-3U is distinct from the Raptor failure modes.

## Curator Notes (structured handoff for extractor)

PRIMARY CONNECTION: [[SpaceX vertical integration across launch broadband and manufacturing creates compounding cost advantages that no competitor can replicate piecemeal]]

WHY ARCHIVED: Provides technical detail on the NG-3 failure mechanism (thrust deficiency, one of two BE-3U engines) and investigation status. Combined with previous session's VIPER single-bidder analysis, this is the operational evidence for the "single-bidder fragility" pattern candidate.

EXTRACTION HINT: Don't extract as a one-off failure. Extract as evidence for the structural pattern: Pattern 14 candidate ("Single-Bidder Fragility") is now supported by NG-3 failure + VIPER sole-source + investigation timeline uncertainty. The claim is systemic, not anecdotal.
