---
type: claim
domain: internet-finance
description: "Purchase friction (technical barriers, bridging requirements, OTC-only access) filters for conviction via time/effort cost rather than capital cost, producing a qualitatively different holder base than price-based mechanisms like Dutch auctions — ordinals OTC and Hyperliquid pre-CEX are the strongest empirical cases"
confidence: experimental
source: "Rio via @CryptoTomYT friction-is-bullish thesis; ordinals OTC market data; Hyperliquid pre-CEX trading data"
created: 2026-03-16
secondary_domains:
  - mechanisms
depends_on:
- early-conviction pricing is an unsolved mechanism design problem because systems that reward early believers attract extractive speculators while systems that prevent speculation penalize genuine supporters
- token launches are hybrid-value auctions where common-value price discovery and private-value community alignment require different mechanisms because auction theory optimized for one degrades the other
challenged_by:
- "Survivorship bias: we only observe the friction-gated assets that succeeded. The majority of friction-gated assets (ordinals that went to zero, early DeFi protocols) produced terrible outcomes."
- Access friction may simply correlate with early timing, and early timing in bull markets produces outsized returns regardless of friction mechanism.
related:
- social-login-and-embedded-fiat-on-ramps-target-the-two-structural-barriers-to-mainstream-crypto-adoption
reweave_edges:
- social-login-and-embedded-fiat-on-ramps-target-the-two-structural-barriers-to-mainstream-crypto-adoption|related|2026-04-19
sourced_from:
- inbox/archive/internet-finance/2026-03-16-cryptotomyt-friction-is-bullish.md
---

# Access friction functions as a natural conviction filter in token launches because process difficulty selects for genuine believers while price friction selects for wealthy speculators

The early-conviction pricing trilemma identifies three properties no single mechanism achieves simultaneously: shill-proof, community-aligned, and price-discovering. The existing analysis focuses on **price friction** — mechanisms where the cost of participation is denominated in capital (Dutch auctions, bonding curves, batch auctions). But there is a fourth variable the trilemma framework doesn't capture: **access friction**, where the cost of participation is denominated in time, effort, and technical knowledge.

Access friction and price friction filter for different populations:

| Friction type | Cost denominated in | Filters for | Filters against |
|---------------|--------------------|--------------|-----------------|
| **Price friction** (Dutch auction) | Capital | Wealthy participants with high valuation | True believers who are capital-poor but conviction-rich |
| **Access friction** (OTC-only, bridging, technical barriers) | Time, effort, knowledge | Genuine conviction (willingness to invest effort) | Extractive speculators (effort isn't scalable like capital) |

**Empirical cases:**

**Ordinals OTC (2023-2024):** Early Bitcoin ordinals required running a Bitcoin node, understanding the UTXO model, and negotiating OTC deals through Discord or Telegram — no marketplaces existed. This created extreme access friction. The population that navigated this friction was overwhelmingly high-conviction Bitcoin-native holders, not extractive speculators. Outcome: 6-figure single NFT sales became common among early OTC participants. When marketplaces later reduced friction (Magic Eden, Ordinals Wallet), the speculative population arrived — and returns for new entrants declined sharply.

**Hyperliquid pre-CEX (2024-2025):** HYPE was only available on Hyperliquid's native platform, requiring users to bridge assets to Arbitrum and learn a new trading interface. This access friction meant early HYPE holders had already demonstrated commitment by using the product. When CEX listings eventually removed the friction, the early cohort held positions that had appreciated to 7-8 figure values. The access friction didn't prevent price discovery — Hyperliquid's own order book provided that — but it did ensure the initial holder base was product users, not pure speculators.

**Why access friction is mechanistically distinct from price friction:**

1. **Effort doesn't scale like capital.** A bot can deploy $10M in a Dutch auction. A bot cannot navigate an OTC negotiation requiring trust-building over Discord. Access friction resists automation in ways that price friction does not.

2. **Access friction is temporarily self-limiting.** Friction decreases as infrastructure improves (marketplaces, CEX listings, bridges). This creates a natural time window where conviction-filtered holders accumulate before the friction-free speculators arrive. Price friction is permanent by design (Dutch auctions always start high).

3. **Access friction doesn't penalize true believers.** In a Dutch auction, the highest-conviction buyer pays the highest price. With access friction, the highest-conviction buyer pays the same price as others who clear the access barrier — the cost is effort, not capital. This is more community-aligned.

**Where access friction fails:**

- **It's not a designable mechanism.** Access friction is typically accidental (early infrastructure limitations), not intentional. Once infrastructure improves, the friction disappears. You can't keep a token permanently friction-gated without killing liquidity.
- **Survivorship bias is severe.** We observe ordinals and Hyperliquid because they succeeded. The hundreds of friction-gated assets that went to zero are invisible in this analysis.
- **Access friction may simply proxy for timing.** Early buyers in any bull market asset tend to outperform. The friction may be incidental to the timing, not causal.

**Connection to the trilemma:** Access friction suggests a possible **fourth mechanism layer** in the layered launch architecture thesis: a time-limited access-friction phase (product-only access, no CEX listings, technical barriers) that precedes the price-discovery phase. This would let conviction-filtered holders accumulate before the broader market prices the asset. The sequence: access-friction phase → price-discovery phase → open market. Effectively what Hyperliquid did accidentally.

---

### Additional Evidence (extend)
*Source: 2026-03-25-telegram-m3taversal-futairdbot-https-x-com-sjdedic-status-203424109 | Added: 2026-03-25*

P2P's XP-tiered allocation system creates process friction that filters for users who actually used the product rather than capital allocators showing up for the ICO. This is a deliberate filter mechanism where the people who get the biggest allocations are those who already demonstrated they're the target userbase, validating that process friction can select for genuine users over speculators.

### Additional Evidence (extend)
*Source: [[2026-03-25-x-research-p2p-me-allocation]] | Added: 2026-03-25*

P2P.me implements XP-based allocation multipliers (Tier 3: 1.5x, Tier 2: 2x, Tier 1: 3x) that reward prior participation across their dApp ecosystem during oversubscription, creating process friction that selects for existing users rather than capital-only participants. All users enter at the same valuation with no hidden discounts, meaning allocation differences are purely based on demonstrated prior engagement, not wealth.

### Additional Evidence (challenge)
*Source: [[2026-03-27-tg-source-m3taversal-jussy-world-thread-on-p2p-me-ico-concentration-1]] | Added: 2026-03-28*

P2P.me ICO raised $5.3M with 336 contributors, but 10 wallets filled 93% of the raise. This extreme concentration suggests that access friction (if present) failed to filter for genuine believers and instead created plutocratic outcomes where wealthy participants dominated. The team's response calling this 'early conviction' frames concentration as a feature, but the data shows that process friction alone doesn't prevent whale dominance.




Relevant Notes:
- [[early-conviction pricing is an unsolved mechanism design problem because systems that reward early believers attract extractive speculators while systems that prevent speculation penalize genuine supporters]] — the trilemma this claim extends with access-friction as a fourth variable
- [[optimal token launch architecture is layered not monolithic because separating quality governance from price discovery from liquidity bootstrapping from community rewards lets each layer use the mechanism best suited to its objective]] — access friction as a possible additional layer
- [[dutch-auction dynamic bonding curves solve the token launch pricing problem by combining descending price discovery with ascending supply curves eliminating the instantaneous arbitrage that has cost token deployers over 100 million dollars on Ethereum]] — price-friction approach that access friction complements
- [[futardio-cult-raised-11-4-million-in-one-day-through-futarchy-governed-meme-coin-launch]] — did Futardio Cult succeed partly because futard.io itself had access friction? Testable hypothesis.
- [[consumer-crypto-adoption-requires-apps-optimized-for-earning-and-belonging-not-speculation]] — tension: access friction contradicts the adoption thesis. Long-term these can't coexist — friction must be temporary.

Topics:
- [[maps/internet finance and decision markets]]
- [[maps/coordination mechanisms]]