---
type: source
source_type: telegram
title: "Telegram: @m3taversal — futairdbot-do-yo-ubelieve-that-metadao-launches-a"
author: "@m3taversal"
url: ""
date: 2026-04-05
domain: internet-finance
format: conversation
status: processed
processed_by: rio
processed_date: 2026-04-15
priority: high
intake_tier: directed
rationale: "do yo ubelieve that metaDAO launches are securities"
proposed_by: "@m3taversal"
tags: [telegram, ownership-community]
extraction_model: "anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5"
claims_extracted:
- "permissioned-launch-curation-creates-implicit-endorsement-liability-for-futarchy-platforms"
---

## Conversation

**@m3taversal:**
@futairdbot do yo ubelieve that metaDAO launches are securities

**Rio (response):**
Here's the real picture:

The central legal question is whether futarchy participation counts as "active management" under Howey. The SEC's 2017 DAO Report explicitly rejected token voting as active management because pseudonymous holders and scale made real coordination impractical. Futarchy has to prove it's mechanistically different from voting, not just fancier.

There are three arguments that futarchy might clear the hurdle. First, it requires skin in the game — you put capital at risk on conditional tokens, unlike costless voting. Second, it aggregates information rather than expressing preferences. Third, participation is continuous over the TWAP window, not a one-shot vote. These are real structural differences, not just branding.

But the SEC could easily argue from a distance that trading conditional tokens is just a more sophisticated way of expressing preference about proposal outcomes. And the Ooki DAO case showed regulators will impose traditional legal categories on novel structures — that DAO got hit with general partnership liability and a $643K penalty for not having a legal wrapper.

My actual take: the permissioned ICOs on Futardio are almost certainly securities at the point of sale. Money goes in, tokens come out, there's an expectation of profit, and at launch the team is doing most of the work. The more interesting argument is that these tokens might transition OUT of securities classification over time as the futarchy mechanism matures and governance genuinely decentralizes. The SEC's investment contract termination doctrine allows for this — assets can shift from securities to commodities once promises are fulfilled or sufficient decentralization is achieved.

The Theia OTC deal that just passed actually allocated funds specifically for legal advisory on exactly this question. Proph3t noted that "futarchy has garnered attention of organizations and its use and risk of use have brought up questions no one has answered yet." So MetaDAO itself knows this is unresolved.

Bottom line: at launch, yes, probably securities. The question is whether futarchy creates a faster path to decentralization than traditional token governance, which would let them escape that classification sooner. I think the mechanism is genuinely different enough to make that argument, but nobody's tested it with the SEC yet.

CONFIDENCE: 0.85

## Agent Notes
**Why archived:** Tagged exchange in ownership community.
**Rationale from contributor:** do yo ubelieve that metaDAO launches are securities
**Intake tier:** directed — fast-tracked, contributor provided reasoning
**Triage:** Conversation may contain [CLAIM], [ENTITY], or [EVIDENCE] for extraction.
