---
type: source
source_type: governance-proposals
title: "MetaDAO Proposals 1-15 — Full Proposal Text"
date: 2026-03-23
domain: internet-finance
format: governance-document
status: processed
proposed_by: "@m3taversal"
contribution_type: research-direction
tags: [metadao, governance, proposals, decision-markets]
---

# MetaDAO Proposals 1-15

Source: v1.metadao.fi

**Proposal 1: Develop a LST Vote Market?**

Date:

Volume: 

Result: Pass 

**Overview**

The Meta-DAO is awakening.

Given that the Meta-DAO is a fundamentally new kind of organization, it lacks legitimacy. To gain legitimacy, we need to first *prove that the model works*. I believe that the best way to do that is by building profit-turning products under the Meta-DAO umbrella.

Here, we propose the first one: an[[ LST bribe platform]{.underline}](https://twitter.com/durdenwannabe/status/1683150792843464711). This platform would allow MNDE and mSOL holders to earn extra yield by[[ directing their stake]{.underline}](https://docs.marinade.finance/marinade-products/directed-stake#snapshot-system) to validators who pay them. A bribe market already exists, but it\'s fragmented and favors whales. This platform would centralize the market, facilitating open exchange between validators and MNDE / mSOL holders and allowing small holders to earn the same yield as whales.

Executive summary

- The product would exist as a 2-sided marketplace between validators who want more stake and MNDE and mSOL holders who want more yield.

- The platform would likely be structured similar to Votium.

- The platform would monetize by taking 10% of bribes.

- We estimate that this product would generate \$1.5M per year for the Meta-DAO, increasing the Meta-DAO\'s enterprise value by \$10.5M, if executed successfully.

- We are requesting 3,000 META and the promise of retroactively-decided performance-based incentives. If executed, this proposal would transfer the first 1,000 META.

- Three contributors have expressed interest in working on this: Proph3t, for the smart contracts; marie, for the UI; and nicovrg, for the BD with Marinade. Proph3t would be the point person and would be responsible for delivering this project to the Meta-DAO.

**Problem statement**

Validators want more stake. MNDE and mSOL holders want more yield. Since Marinade allows its MNDE and mSOL holders to direct 40% of its stake, this creates an opportunity for mSOL and MNDE to earn higher yield by selling their votes to validators.

Today, this market is fragmented. Trading occurs through one-off locations like Solana Compass\'[[ Turbo Stake]{.underline}](https://solanacompass.com/staking/turbo-staking) and in back-room Telegram chats. This makes it hard for people who don\'t actively follow the Solana ecosystem and small holders to earn the highest yields.

We propose a platform that would centralize this trading. Essentially, this would provide an easy place where validators who want more stake can pay for the votes of MNDE and mSOL holders. In the future, we could expand to other LSTs like bSOL.

**Design**

There are a number ways you could design a bribe platform. After considering a few options, a Votium-style system appears to be the best one.

**Votium**

[[Votium]{.underline}](https://votium.app/) is a bribe platform on Ethereum. Essentially, projects that want liquidity in their token pay veCRV holders to allocate CRV emissions to their token\'s liquidity pool (the veCRV system is fairly complex and out of scope for this proposal). For example, the Frax team might pay veCRV holders to allocate CRV emissions to the FRAX+crvUSD pool.

If you\'re a project that wants to pay for votes, you do so in the following way:

- create a Votium pool

- specify which Curve pool (a different kind of pool, I didn\'t name them :shrug:) you want CRV emissions to be directed to

- allocate some funds to that pool

If you\'re a veCRV-holder, you are eligible to claim from that pool. To do so, you must first vote for the Curve pool specified. Then, once the voting period is done, each person who voted for that Curve pool can claim a pro rata share of the tokens from the Votium pool.

Alternatively, you can delegate to Votium, who will spread your votes among the various pools.

**Our system**

In our case, a Votium-style platform would look like the following:

- Once a month, each participating validator creates a pool, specifying a *price per vote* and depositing SOL to their pool. The amount of SOL deposited in a pool defines the maximum votes bought. For example, if Laine deposits 1,000 SOL to a pool and specifies a price per vote of 0.1 SOL, then this pool can buy up to 10,000 votes

- veMNDE and mSOL holders are given 1 week to join pools, which they do by directing their stake to the respective validator (the bribe platform UI would make this easy)

- after 1 month passes, veMNDE and mSOL holders can claim their SOL bribes from the pools

The main advantage of the Votium approach is that it\'s non-custodial. In other words, *there would be no risk of user fund loss*. In the event of a hack, the only thing that could be stolen are the bribes deposited to the pools.

**Business model**

The Meta-DAO would take a small fee from the rewards that are paid to bribees. Currently, we envision this number being 10%, but that is subject to change.

**Financial projections**

Although any new project has uncertain returns, we can give rough estimates of the returns that this project would generate for the Meta-DAO.

Marinade Finance currently has \$532M of SOL locked in it. Of that, 40% or \$213M is directed by votes. Validators are likely willing to pay up to the marginal revenue that they can gain by bribing. So, at 8% staking rates and 10% comissions, the estimated market for this is \$213M \*0.08 \*0.1, or \$1.7M.

At a 10% fee, the revenue available to the Meta-DAO would be \$170k. The revenue share with Marinade is yet to be negotiated. At a 10% revshare, the Meta-DAO would earn \$150k per year. At a 30% revshare, the Meta-DAO would earn \$120k per year.

We take the average of \$135k per year and multiply  by the[[ typical SaaS valuation multiple]{.underline}](https://aventis-advisors.com/saas-valuation-multiples/#multiples) of 7.8x to achieve the estimate that this product would add \$1.05M to the Meta-DAO\'s enterprise value if executed successfully.

Of course, there is a chance that is not executed successfully. To estimate how much value this would create for the Meta-DAO, you can calculate:

\[(% chance of successful execution / 100) \* (estimated addition to the Meta-DAO\'s enterprise value if successfully executed)\] - up-front costs

For example, if you believe that the chance of us successfully executing is 70% and that this would add \$10.5M to the Meta-DAO\'s enterprise value, you can do (0.7 \* 10.5M) - dillution cost of 3,000 META. Since each META has a book value of \$1 and is probably worth somewhere between \$1 and \$100, this leaves you with \$730k - \$700k of value created by the proposal.

As with any financial projections, these results are highly speculative and sensitive to assumptions. Market participants are encouraged to make their own assumptions and to price the proposal accordingly.

**Proposal request**

We are requesting 3,000 META and retroactively-decided performance-based incentives to fund this project.

This 3,000 META would be split among:

- Proph3t, who would perform the smart contract work

- marie, who would perform the UI/UX work

- nicovrg, who would be the point person to Marinade Finance and submit the grant proposal to the Marinade forums

1,000 META would be paid up-front by the execution of this proposal. 2,000 META would be paid after the proposal is done.

The Meta-DAO is still figuring out how to properly incentivize performance, so we don\'t want to be too specific with how that would done. Still, it is game-theoretically optimal for the Meta-DAO to compensate us fairly because under-paying us would dissuade future builders from contributing to the Meta-DAO. So we\'ll put our trust in the game theory.

**References**

- [[Solana LST Dune Dashboard]{.underline}](https://dune.com/ilemi/solana-lsts)

- [[Marinade Docs]{.underline}](https://docs.marinade.finance/), specifically the pages on -[[ MNDE Directed Stake]{.underline}](https://docs.marinade.finance/the-mnde-token/mnde-directed-stake) and[[ mSOL Directed Stake]{.underline}](https://docs.marinade.finance/marinade-products/directed-stake)

- [[Marinade\'s Validator Dashboard]{.underline}](https://marinade.finance/app/validators/?sorting=score&direction=descending)

- [[MNDE Gauge Profit Calculator]{.underline}](https://cogentcrypto.io/MNDECalculator)

- [[Marinade SDK]{.underline}](https://github.com/marinade-finance/marinade-ts-sdk/blob/bc4d07750776262088239581cac60e651d1b5cf4/src/marinade.ts#L283)

- [[Solana Compass Turbo Staking]{.underline}](https://solanacompass.com/staking/turbo-staking)

- [[Marinade Directed Stake program]{.underline}](https://solscan.io/account/dstK1PDHNoKN9MdmftRzsEbXP5T1FTBiQBm1Ee3meVd#anchorProgramIDL)

**Retrospective Analysis: **

**Proposal 2: Migrate Autocrat Program to v0.1**

Date:

Volume: 

Result: Pass 

I\'ve made some improvements to the autocrat program. You can see these[[ here]{.underline}](https://github.com/metaDAOproject/meta-dao/pull/36/files). Most importantly, I\'ve made the slots per proposal configurable, and changed its default to 3 days to allow for quicker feedback loops.

This proposal migrates the 990,000 META, 10,025 USDC, and 5.5 SOL from the treasury owned by the first program to the treasury owned by the second program.

**Key risks**

**Smart contract risk**

There is a risk that the new program contains an important bug that the first one didn\'t. I consider this risk small given that I didn\'t change that much of autocrat.

**Counter-party risk**

Unfortunately, for reasons I can\'t get into, I was unable to build this new program with[[ solana-verifiable-build]{.underline}](https://github.com/Ellipsis-Labs/solana-verifiable-build). You\'d be placing trust in me that I didn\'t introduce a backdoor, not on the GitHub repo, that allows me to steal the funds.

For future versions, I should always be able to use verifiable builds.

**Retrospective Analysis: **

**Proposal 3: Develop a Saber Vote Market?**

Date:

Volume: 

Result: Pass 

**Overview**

It looks like things are coming full circle. Here, I propose that we build a vote market as we proposed in[[ proposal 0]{.underline}](https://hackmd.io/ammvq88QRtayu7c9VLnHOA?view), only for Saber instead of Marinade. I\'d recommend you read that proposal for the context, but I\'ll summarize briefly here:

- I proposed to build a Marinade vote market

- That proposal passed

- We learned that Marinade was developing an internal solution, we pivoted to supporting them

All of that is still in motion. But recently, I connected with[[ c2yptic]{.underline}](https://twitter.com/c2yptic) from Saber, who happens to be really excited about the Meta-DAO\'s vision. Saber was planning on creating a vote market, but he proposed that the Meta-DAO build it instead. I think that this would be a tremendous opportunity for both parties, which is why I\'m proposing this.

Here\'s the high-level:

- The platform would be funded with \$150,000 by various ecosystem teams that would benefit from the platform\'s existence including UXD, BlazeStake, LP Finance, and Saber.

- veSBR holders would use the market to earn extra yield

- Projects that want liquidity could easily pay for it, saving time and money relative to a bespoke campaign

- The Meta-DAO would own the majority of the platform, with the remaining distributed to the ecosystem teams mentioned above and to users via liquidity mining.

**Why a Saber Vote Market would be good for users and teams**

**Users**

Users would be able to earn extra yield on their SBR (or their veSBR, to be precise).

**Teams**

Teams want liquidity in their tokens. Liquidity is both useful day-to-day - by giving users lower spreads - as well as a backstop against depeg events.

This market would allow teams to more easily and cheaply pay for liquidity. Rather than a bespoke campaign, they would in effect just be placing limit orders in a central market.

**Why a Saber Vote Market would be good for the Meta-DAO**

**Financial projections**

The Meta-DAO is governed by futarchy - an algorithm that optimizes for token-holder value. So it\'s worth looking at how much value this proposal could drive.

Today, Saber has a TVL of \$20M. Since votes are only useful insofar as they direct that TVL, trading volume through a vote market should be proportional to it.

We estimate that there will be approximately \$1 in yearly vote trade volume for every \$50 of Saber TVL. We estimate this using Curve and Aura:

- Today, Curve has a TVL of \$2B. This round of gauge votes - which happen every two weeks -[[ had \$1.25M in tokens exchanged for votes]{.underline}](https://llama.airforce/#/incentives/rounds/votium/cvx-crv/59). This equates to a run rate of \$30M, or \$1 of vote trade volume for every \$67 in TVL.

- Before the Luna depeg, Curve had \$20B in TVL and vote trade volume was averaging between[[ \$15M]{.underline}](https://llama.airforce/#/incentives/rounds/votium/cvx-crv/10) and[[ \$20M]{.underline}](https://llama.airforce/#/incentives/rounds/votium/cvx-crv/8), equivalent to \$1 in yearly vote trade volume for every \$48 in TVL.

- In May, Aura has \$600M in TVL and[[ \$900k]{.underline}](https://llama.airforce/#/incentives/rounds/hh/aura-bal/25) in vote trade volume, equivalent to \$1 in yearly vote trade volume for every \$56 of TVL

The other factor in the model will be our take rate. Based on Convex\'s[[ 7-10% take rate]{.underline}](https://docs.convexfinance.com/convexfinance/faq/fees#convex-for-curve),[[ Votium\'s \~3% take rate]{.underline}](https://docs.votium.app/faq/fees#vlcvx-incentives), and[[ Hidden Hand\'s \~10% take rate]{.underline}](https://docs.redacted.finance/products/pirex/btrfly#is-there-a-fee-for-using-pirex-btrfly), I believe something between 5 and 15% is reasonable. Since we don\'t expect as much volume as those platforms but we still need to pay people, maybe we start at 15% but could shift down as scale economies kick in.

Here\'s a model I put together to help analyze some potential scenarios:

![BlockNote image](media/image1.png){width="6.5in" height="2.4625in"}

The 65% owned by the Meta-DAO would be the case if we distributed an additional 10% of the supply in liquidity incentives / airdrop.

**Legitimacy**

As[[ I\'ve talked about]{.underline}](https://medium.com/@metaproph3t/an-update-on-the-first-proposal-0e9cdf6e7bfa), assuming futarchy works, the most important thing to the Meta-DAO\'s success will be acquiring legitimacy. Legitimacy is what leads people to invest their time + money into the Meta-DAO, which we can invest to generate financially-valuable outputs, which then generates more legitimacy.

![BlockNote image](media/image2.png){width="6.5in" height="4.395833333333333in"}

By partnering with well-known and reputable projects, we increase the Meta-DAO\'s legitimacy.

**How we\'re going to execute**

**Who**

So far, the following people have committed to working on this project:

- [[Marie]{.underline}](https://twitter.com/swagy_marie) to build the UI/UX

- [[Matt / fzzyyti]{.underline}](https://x.com/fzzyyti?s=20) to build the smart contracts

- [[Durden]{.underline}](https://twitter.com/durdenwannabe) to design the platform & tokenomics

- [[Joe]{.underline}](https://twitter.com/joebuild) and[[ r0bre]{.underline}](https://twitter.com/r0bre) to audit the smart contracts

- [[me]{.underline}](https://twitter.com/metaproph3t) to be the[[ accountable party]{.underline}](https://discord.com/channels/1155877543174475859/1172275074565427220/1179750749228519534) / program manager

UXD has also committed to review the contracts.

**Timeline**

December 11th - December 15th

Kickoff, initial discussions around platform design & tokenomics

December 18th - December 22nd

Lower-level platform design, Matt starts on programs, Marie starts on UI design

December 25th - January 5th (2 weeks)

Holiday break

January 8th - January 12th

Continued work on programs, start on UI code

January 15th - January 19th

Continued work on programs & UI

Deliverables on Friday, January 19th:

- Basic version of program deployed to devnet. You should be able to create pools and claim vote rewards. Fine if you can\'t claim \$BRB tokens yet. Fine if tests aren\'t done, or some features aren\'t added yet.

- Basic version of UI. It\'s okay if it\'s a Potemkin village and doesn\'t actually interact with the chain, but you should be able to create pools (as a vote buyer) and pick a pool to sell my vote to.

January 22nd - 26th

Continue work on programs & UI, Matt helps marie integrate devnet program into UI

Deliverables on Friday, January 26th:

- MVP of program

- UI works with the program delivered on January 19th

January 29th - Feburary 2nd

Audit time! Joe and r0bre audit the program this week

UI is updated to work for the MVP, where applicable changes are

February 5th - Febuary 9th

Any updates to the program in accordance with the audit findings

UI done

February 12th - February 16th

GTM readiness week!

Proph3t or Durden adds docs, teams make any final decisions, we collectively write copy to announce the platform

February 19th

Launch day!!! 🎉

Budget

Based on their rates, I\'m budgeting the following for each person:

- \$24,000 to Matt for the smart contracts

- \$12,000 to Marie for the UI

- \$7,000 to Durden for the platform design

- \$7,000 to Proph3t for program management

- \$5,000 to r0bre to audit the program

- \$5,000 to joe to audit the program

- \$1,000 deployment costs

- \$1,000 miscellaneous

That\'s a total of \$62k. As mentioned, the consortium has pledged \$150k to make this happen. The remaining \$90k would be custodied by the Meta-DAO\'s treasury, partially to fund the management / operation / maintenance of the platform.

Terminology

For those who are more familiar with bribe terminology, which I prefer not to use:

- briber = vote buyer

- bribee = vote seller

- bribe platform = vote market / vote market platform

- bribes = vote payments / vote trade volume

References

- [[Solana DeFi Dashboard]{.underline}](https://dune.com/summit/solana-defi)

- [[Hidden Hand Volume]{.underline}](https://dune.com/embeds/675784/1253758)

- [[Curve TVL]{.underline}](https://defillama.com/protocol/curve-finance)

- [[Llama Airforce]{.underline}](https://llama.airforce/#/incentives/rounds/votium/cvx-crv/59)

**Retrospective Analysis: **

**Proposal 4: Create a spot market for Meta?**

Date:

Volume: 

Result: Pass 

Overview

The purpose of this proposal is to initiate the creation of a spot market for \$META tokens, allowing broader public access to the token and establishing liquidity. The proposed market will be funded through the sale of \$META tokens, and the pricing structure will be determined based on the Time-Weighted Average Price (TWAP) of the proposal that passes. The funds raised will be utilized to support the Meta-DAO\'s ongoing initiatives and operations.

Key Components

Token Sale Structure:

The initial token sale will involve the Meta-DAO selling \$META tokens to the public. Anyone can participate.

The sale price per \$META token will be set at the TWAP of the last passing proposal.

In case of this proposal failing, the sale will not proceed and Meta-DAO can\'t raise from public markets till 12 March 2024.

Liquidity Pool Creation:

A liquidity pool (LP) will be established to support the spot market.

Funding for the LP will come from the token sale, with approximately \$35,000 allocated for this purpose.

Token Sale Details:

Hard cap: 75,000usd

Sale Price: TWAP of this passing proposal

Sale Quantity: Hard cap / Sale Price

Spot Market Opening Price: To be determined, potentially higher than the initial public sale price.

Liquidity Pool Allocation:

LP Token Pairing: \$META tokens from treasury paired with approximately \$35,000usd.

Any additional funds raised beyond the LP allocation will be reserved for operational funding in \$SOL tokens.

Next Steps

If approved, initiate the token sale using the most convenient methodology to maximize the event. Proceed with the creation of the SMETA spot market.

In case of failure, Meta-DAO will be unable to raise funds until March 12, 2024.

Conclusion

This proposal aims to enhance the Meta-DAO ecosystem experience by introducing a spot market for \$META tokens.

The proposal invites futards to actively participate in shaping the future of the \$META token.

**Retrospective Analysis: **

**Proposal 5: Develop an AMM Program for Futarchy?**

Date:

Volume: 

Result: Pass 

Overview

In the context of Futarchy, CLOBs have a couple of drawbacks:

Lack of liquidity

Somewhat susceptible to manipulation

Pass/fail market pairs cost 3.75 SOL in state rent, which cannot currently be recouped

Lack of liquidity

Estimating a fair price for the future value of MetaDao under pass/fail conditions is difficult, and most reasonable estimates will have a wide range. This uncertainty discourages people from risking their funds with limit orders near the midpoint price, and has the effect of reducing liquidity (and trading). This is the main reason for switching to AMMs.

Somewhat susceptible to manipulation

With CLOBs there is always a bid/ask spread, and someone with 1 \$META can push the midpoint towards the current best bid/ask. Though this could be countered with a defensive for-profit bot, and as Proph3t puts it: this is a 1/n problem.

Still, users can selectively crank the market of their choosing. Defending against this (cranking markets all the time) would be a bit costly.

Similarly, VWAP can be manipulated by wash trading. An exponential moving average has the same drawbacks in this context as the existing linear-time system.

State rent costs

If we average 3-5 proposals per month, then annual costs for market creation is 135-225 SOL, or \$11475-\$19125 at current prices. AMMs cost almost nothing in state rent.

Solution

An AMM would solve all of the above problems and is a move towards simplicity. We can use the metric: liquidity-weighted price over time. The more liquidity that is on the books, the more weight the current price of the pass or fail market is given. Every time there is a swap, these metrics are updated/aggregated. By setting a high fee (3-5%) we can both: encourage LPs, and aggressively discourage wash-trading and manipulation.

These types of proposals would also require that the proposer lock-up some initial liquidity, and set the starting price for the pass/fail markets.

With this setup, liquidity would start low when the proposal is launched, someone would swap and move the AMM price to their preferred price, and then provide liquidity at that price since the fee incentives are high. Liquidity would increase over the duration of the proposal.

The current CLOB setup requires a minimum order size of 1 META, which is effectively a spam filter against manipulating the midpoint within a wide bid/ask spread. AMMs would not have this restriction, and META could be traded at any desired granularity.

Additional considerations

What if a user wants to provide one-sided liquidity?

The most recent passing proposal will create spot markets outside of the pass/fail markets. There will be an AMM, and there is no reason not to create a CLOB as well. Most motivations for providing one-sided liquidity can be satisfied by regular spot-markets, or by arbitraging between spot markets and pass/fail markets. In the future, it may be possible to setup limit orders similarly to how Jupiter limit orders work with triggers and keepers.

Switching to AMMs is not a perfect solution, but I do believe it is a major improvement over the current low-liquidity and somewhat noisy system that we have now.

Implementation

Program + Review

Frontend

Program + Review

Program changes:

Write a basic AMM, which tracks liquidity-weighted average price over its lifetime

Incorporate the AMM into autocrat + conditional vault

Get feedback to decide if the autocrat and conditional vault should be merged

Feature to permissionlessly pause AMM swaps and send back positions once there is a verdict (and the instructions have been run, in the case of the pass market)

Feature to permissionlessly close the AMMs and return the state rent SOL, once there are no positions

Additional quality-of-life changes:

Loosen time restrictions on when a proposal can be created after the markets are created (currently set to 50 slots, which is very restrictive and has led to extra SOL costs to create redundant markets). Alternatively, bundle these commands in the same function call.

If a proposal instruction does not work, then revert to fail after X number of days (so that funds dont get stuck forever).

Ownership:

joebuild will write the program changes

A review will be done by an expert in MetaDAO with availability

Frontend

The majority of the frontend integration changes will be completed by 0xNalloK.

Timeline

Estimate is 3 weeks from passing proposal, with an additional week of review and minor changes.

Budget and Roles

400 META on passing proposal, with an additional 800 META on completed migration.

program changes (joebuild)

program review (tbd)

frontend work (0xNalloK)

Rollout & Risks

The main program will be deployed before migration of assets. This should allow for some testing of the frontend and the contract on mainnet. We can use a temporary test subdomain.

The risks here include:

Standard smart contract risk

Adoption/available liquidity: similar to an orderbook, available liquidity will be decided by LPs. AMMs will incentivize LP\'ing, though adoption within the DAO is not a certainty.

Section for feedback changes

Any important changes or feedback brought up during the proposal vote will be reflected here, while the text above will remain unchanged.

It was pointed out that there are ways to recoup openbook state rent costs, though it would require a migration of the current autocrat program.

**Retrospective Analysis: **

**Proposal 6: Execute Creation of a Spot Market for META?**

Date:

Volume: 

Result: Pass 

Proposal 3 passed, giving the DAO the remit to raise money and use some of that money to create an LP pool. Since then, Proph3t and Rar3 have ironed out the details and come up with this plan:

People submit their demand into a Google form

Proph3t decides how much allocation to give each person

Proph3t reaches out on Monday, Feb 5th to people with allocations, telling them they have to transfer the USDC by Wednesday, Feb 7th

Some people won\'t complete this step, so Proph3t will reach out to people who didn\'t get their full desired allocation on Thursday, Feb 8th to send more USDC until we reach the full 75,000

On Friday, Feb 9th the multisig will send out META to all participants, create the liquidity pool (likely on Meteora), and disband

We\'ve created the multisig; it\'s a 4/6 containing Proph3t, Dean, Nallok, Durden, Rar3, and BlockchainFixesThis. This proposal will transfer 4,130 META to that multisig. This META will be allocated as follows:

3100 META to send to participants of the sale

1000 META to pair with 35,000 USDC to create the pool (this sets an initial spot price of 35 USDC / META)

30 META to renumerate each multisig member with 5 META

Obviously, there is no algorithmic guarantee that the multisig members will actually perform this, but it\'s unlikely that 4 or more of the multisig members would be willing to tarnish their reputation in order to do something different.

**Retrospective Analysis: **

**Proposal 7: Engage in \$50,000 OTC Trade with Ben Hawkins?**

Date:

Volume: 

Result: Fail

Ben Hawkins is requesting to mint 1500 META to GxHamnPVxsBaWdbUSjR4C5izhMv2snriGyYtjCkAVzze

in exchange for Ben will send 50,000 USDC to be sent to ADCCEAbH8eixGj5t73vb4sKecSKo7ndgDSuWGvER4Loy the treasury to MetaDAO

33.33 usdc per Meta

**Retrospective Analysis: **

This proposal marks the first time the metaDAO's futarchy governance model was tested. Ben bought a huge amount of conditional pass meta to try to push through this deal, but was unsuccessful. 

**Proposal 8: Engage in \$50,000 OTC Trade with Pantera Capital?**

Date: 2/17/2024

Volume: 

Result: Fail

Drafted with support from: Pantera Capital, 0xNallok, 7Layer, and Proph3t

Overview

Pantera Capital wishes to acquire {tbd} META (METADDFL6wWMWEoKTFJwcThTbUmtarRJZjRpzUvkxhr) from The Meta-DAO (ADCCEAbH8eixGj5t73vb4sKecSKo7ndgDSuWGvER4Loy)

The price per META shall be determined upon passing of the proposal and the lesser of the average TWAP price of the pass / fail market and \$100\$\$ ppM = min((twapPass + twapFail) / 2, 100) \$\$

A total of \$50,000 USDC (EPjFWdd5AufqSSqeM2qN1xzybapC8G4wEGGkZwyTDt1v) will be committed by Pantera Capital

The Meta-DAO will transfer 20% of the final allocation of META to the Pantera wallet immediately and place 80% of the final allocation of META into a 12 month, linear vest Streamflow program

Rationale

Pantera views this investment as a strategic partnership and an opportunity to show support for The Meta-DAO, which is spearheading innovation in decentralized governance. Pantera has invested in the blockchain and crypto ecosystem heavily and looks forward to its long term promise. It views its acquisition of META as an opportunity to test futarchy\'s potential as an improved system for decentralized governance and provide meaningful feedback for accelerating its development and adoption across the crypto ecosystem.

There is a specific interest in Solana as a proving ground for innovative products and services for blockchain technology, and Pantera desires more direct exposure to the Solana ecosystem.

With respect to the investment, Pantera holds the perspective that The Meta-DAO may be an ideal community within Solana for soliciting additional deal flow. It also highlights support for innovation in the space of governance, support for Solana projects, and a belief that fundamentally, futarchy has a reasonable chance of success.

Execution

The proposal contains the instruction for a transfer 1,000 META into a multisignature wallet BtNPTBX1XkFCwazDJ6ZkK3hcUsomm1RPcfmtUrP6wd2K with a 5/7 threshold of which the following parties will be members:

Pantera Capital (6S5LQhggSTjm6gGWrTBiQkQbz3F7JB5CtJZZLMZp2XNE)

Pantera Capital (4kjRZzWWRZGBto2iKB6V7dYdWuMRtSFYbiUnE2VfppXw)

0xNallok (4LpE9Lxqb4jYYh8jA8oDhsGDKPNBNkcoXobbAJTa3pWw)

MetaProph3t (65U66fcYuNfqN12vzateJhZ4bgDuxFWN9gMwraeQKByg)

Dodecahedr0x (UuGEwN9aeh676ufphbavfssWVxH7BJCqacq1RYhco8e)

Durden (91NjPFfJxQw2FRJvyuQUQsdh9mBGPeGPuNavt7nMLTQj)

Blockchainfixesthis (HKcXZAkT4ec2VBzGNxazWhpV7BTk3frQpSufpaNoho3D)

The multisig members instructions are as follows:

Accept receipt of META into the multisig as defined by on chain instruction

Accept the full USDC amount of \$50,000 from Pantera Capital into the multisig

Determine and publish the price per META according to the definition above

Confirmation from two parties within The Meta-DAO that the balances exist and are in full

Take \$50,000 / calculated per META and determine final allocation quantity of META

Transfer 20% of the final allocation of META to Pantera\'s address FLzqFMQo2KmsenkMP4Y82kYVnKTJJfahTJUWUDSp2ZX5

Configure a 12 month Streamflow vesting program with a linear vest

Transfer 80% of the final allocation of  META into the Streamflow program

Return any remaining META to the DAO treasury

ROI to META

The proposal evaluates a net increase in value to META by bringing on a strategic partner such as Pantera which would boost visibility and afford some cash holdings. This proposal speculates a \~25% increase in META value due to the high profile of Pantera and their offering of strategic resources to the project.

\| \| \| \| \-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-- \| \-\-\-\-\-\-- \| \| Details \| \| \| META Spot Price 2024-02-17 15:58 UTC \| \$96.93 \| \| META Circulating Supply 2024-02-17 15:58 UTC \| 14,530 \| \| Offer Price \| \${TBD} \| \| Offer META \| {TBD} \| \| Offer USDC \| \$50,000 \| \| META Transfer to Circulation \| {TBD} % \| \| New META Circulating Supply \| {TBD} \|

Here are the pre-money valuations at different prices:

- \$50: \$726,000

- \$60: \$871,800

- \$70: \$1,017,000

- \$80: \$1,162,400

- \$90: \$1,307,700

- \$100: \$1,453,000

**Proposal 9: Engage in \$100,000 OTC Trade with Ben Hawkins? \[2\]**

Date: 2/18/2024

Volume: 

Result: Fail

Drafted with support from: Ben Hawkins and 0xNallok

Responsible Parties

Ben Hawkins (7GmjpH2hpj3A5d6f1LTjXUAy8MR8FDTvZcPY79RDRDhq)

Squads Multi-sig (4/6) Meta-DAO Executor (FpMnruqVCxh3o2oBFZ9uSQmshiyfMqzeJ3YfNQfP9tHy)

The Meta-DAO (metaX99LHn3A7Gr7VAcCfXhpfocvpMpqQ3eyp3PGUUq)

The Markets

Overview

Ben Hawkins (7GmjpH2hpj3A5d6f1LTjXUAy8MR8FDTvZcPY79RDRDhq) wishes to acquire up to 500 META (METADDFL6wWMWEoKTFJwcThTbUmtarRJZjRpzUvkxhr) from The Meta-DAO Treausry (ADCCEAbH8eixGj5t73vb4sKecSKo7ndgDSuWGvER4Loy).

The price per META shall be determined upon passing of the proposal and the greater of the TWAP price of the pass market and \$200.

\$\$ppM = max(twapPass, 200)\$\$

A total of \$100,000 USDC (EPjFWdd5AufqSSqeM2qN1xzybapC8G4wEGGkZwyTDt1v) will be committed by Ben Hawkins

The amount of META shall be determined as the \$100,000 USDC funds sent divided by the price determined above.

\$\$amountMETA = 100,000/ppM\$\$

The Meta-DAO will transfer 20% of the final allocation of META to Ben Hawkin\'s wallet immediately and place 80% of the final allocation of META into a 12 month, linear vest Streamflow program.

The amount of \$100,000 USDC shall be used to create a 50/50 AMM pool with 1% fee matched in META by The Meta-DAO.

Ben will also send \$2,000 USDC in addition to compensate members of The Meta-DAO Executor.

Any META not sent or utilized for liquidity provisioning shall be returned to The Meta-DAO.

Background

The current liquidity within the META markets is proving insufficient to support the demand. This proposal addresses this issue by providing immediate liquidity in a sizable amount which should at least provide a temporary backstop to allow proposals to be constructed addressing the entire demand.

Implementation

The proposal contains the instruction for a transfer 1,000 META into a multisignature wallet FpMnruqVCxh3o2oBFZ9uSQmshiyfMqzeJ3YfNQfP9tHy with a 4/6 threshold of which the following parties are be members:

Proph3t (65U66fcYuNfqN12vzateJhZ4bgDuxFWN9gMwraeQKByg)

Dean (3PKhzE9wuEkGPHHu2sNCvG86xNtDJduAcyBPXpE6cSNt)

0xNallok (4LpE9Lxqb4jYYh8jA8oDhsGDKPNBNkcoXobbAJTa3pWw)

Durden (91NjPFfJxQw2FRJvyuQUQsdh9mBGPeGPuNavt7nMLTQj)

Blockchainfixesthis (HKcXZAkT4ec2VBzGNxazWhpV7BTk3frQpSufpaNoho3D)

Rar3 (BYeFEm6n4rUDpyHzDjt5JF8okGpoZUdS2Y4jJM2dJCm4)

The multisig members instructions are as follows:

Accept the full USDC amount of \$100,000 from Ben Hawkins into the Multi-sig upon launch of proposal

If the proposal passes:

Accept receipt of META into the Multi-sig as defined by on chain instruction

Determine and publish the price per META according to the definition above

Confirmation from two parties within The Meta-DAO that the balances exist and are in full

Take \$100,000 / ppM and determine final allocation quantity of META

Transfer 20% of the final allocation of META to Ben\'s address 7GmjpH2hpj3A5d6f1LTjXUAy8MR8FDTvZcPY79RDRDhq

Configure a 12 month Streamflow vesting program with a linear vest

Transfer 80% of the final allocation of  META into the Streamflow program

Create a 50/50 Meteora LP 1% Volatile Pool META-USDC allocating at ratios determined and able to be executed via Multi-sig

Return any remaining META to the DAO treasury

Make USDC payment to each Multi-sig members

If the proposal fails:

Make USDC payment to each Multi-sig member.

Return 100,000 USDC to 7GmjpH2hpj3A5d6f1LTjXUAy8MR8FDTvZcPY79RDRDhq

Risks

The price is extremely volatile and given the variance there is an unknown amount at the time of proposal launching which would be introduced into circulation. This will be impactful to the price.

Given there are other proposals with active markets, the capacity for accurate pricing and participation of this proposal is unknown.

This is an experiment and largely contains unknown unknowns, IT CONTAINS EXTREME RISK.

Result

The proposal evaluates a net increase in value to META by bringing additional liquidity into the ecosystem. This should also improve the capacity for proposal functionality. The expected increase in value to META is \~15% given the fact that the amounts are yet to be determined, but an increase in circulating supply by \~2-7%.

\| \| \| \| \-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-- \| \-\-\-\-\-\-\-- \| \| Details \| \| \| META Spot Price 2024-02-18 20:20 UTC \| \$695.92 \| \| META Circulating Supply 2024-02-18 20:20 UTC \| 14,530 \| \| Offer Price \| ≥ \$200 \| \| Offer META \| ≤ 500 \| \| Offer USDC \| \$100,000 \| \| META Transfer to Circulation \| {TBD} % \| \| New META Circulating Supply \| {TBD} \|

Here are some post-money valuations at different prices as well total increase in circulation:

\| \| \| \| \| \| \| \-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-- \| \-\-\-\-\-- \| \-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-- \| \-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-- \| \-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-- \| \| Price/META \| Mcap \| Liquidity % of Circulation \| Acquisition/LP Circulation \| Total \| \| \$200 \| \$3.6M \| 6.3% \| 500 META/500 META \~3.4% \| 1000 META \~6.8% \| \| \$350 \| \$5.1M \| 4.8% \| 285 META/285 META \~1.9% \| 570 META \~3.8% \| \| \$700 \| \$10.2M \| 3.8% \| 142 META/142 META \~0.9% \| 284 META \~1.8% \|

References

Proposal 7

Proposal 6

Discord

**Proposal 10: Develop Multi-Option Proposals? **

Date:

Volume: 

Result: Fail

This is a proposal to pay me (agrippa) in META to create multi-modal proposal functionality.

As it stands proposals have two outcomes: Pass or Fail.

A multi-modal proposal is one with multiple mutually-exclusive outcomes, one of which is Fail and the rest of which are other things.

For example, you can imagine a proposal to choose the first place prize of the Solana Scribes contest, where there\'s a conditional market on each applicant\![\^1\] Without multi-modal proposals, a futarchic DAO has basically no mechanism for making choices like this, but multi-modal proposals solve it quite well.

Architecturally speaking there is no need to hard-limit the number of conditions in a conditional vault / number of outcomes in a proposal.

I believe even in the medium term it will prove to be a crucial feature that provides a huge amount of value to the DAO\[\^2\], and I believe the futarchic DAO software is currently far and away the DAO\'s most important asset and worth investing in.

Protocol complexity and risk

Unlike other potential expansions of DAO complexity, multi-modal proposals do not particularly introduce any new security / mechanism design considerations. If you can maliciously get through \"proposal option 12\", you could have also gotten through Pass in a binary proposal because conditional markets do not compete with eachother over liquidity.

\[\^1\]: You\'d probably filter them down at least a little bit, though in principle you don\'t need to. Also, you could award the 2nd and 3rd place prizes to the 2nd and 3rd highest trading contestants 🤔... kinda neat.

\[\^2\]: Down the line, I think multi-modal proposals are really quite interesting. For example, for each proposal anyone makes, you could have a mandatory draft stage where before the conditional vault actually goes live anyone can add more alternatives to the same proposal. I think this would be really effective at cutting out pork and is the primary mechanism for doing so.

About me

I have been leading development on [[https://github.com/solana-labs/governance-ui/]{.underline}](https://github.com/solana-labs/governance-ui/) (aka the Realms frontend) for Solana Labs for the past year. Aside from smart contract dev, I\'m an expert at making web3 frontends performant and developer-ergonomic (hint: it involves using react-query a lot). I started what was probably the very first high-school blockchain club in the world in 2014, with my then-Physics-teacher Jed who now works at Jito. In my undergrad I did research at Cornell\'s Initiative for Cryptocurrency and Contracts and in 2017 I was invited to a smart contract summit in China because of some Sybil resistance work I was doing at the time (Vitalik was there!).

I developed the first conditional tokens vault on Solana as part of a prediction market reference implementation\[\^3\] (grant-funded by FTX of all people, rest in peace 🙏). This has influenced changes to the existing metadao conditional vault, referenced here, which I\'ve been asked to help test and review.

I met Proph3t in Greece this past December and we spent about 3 hours walking and talking in the pouring rain about the Meta-DAO and futarchy. During our conversation I told him what Hanson tells people: futarchy isn\'t used because organizations don\'t actually want it, they\'d rather continue to get fat on organizational inefficiencies. But my thinking has changed!

I\'ve now seen how excited talented builders and teams are about implementing futarchy (as opposed to wanting to cling to control)

I\'ve realized just how fun futarchy is and I want it for myself regardless of anything else

\[\^3\]: I did actually came up with the design myself, but it\'s been invented multiple times including for example Gnosis conditional vaults on Ethereum.

Value

To me these are the main points of value. I have included my own subjective estimates on how much more the DAO is worth if this feature was fully implemented. (Bare in mind we are \"double dipping\" here, these improvements include both the functioning of the Meta-DAO itself and the value of the Meta-DAO\'s best asset, the dao software)

Ability to weigh multiple exclusive alternatives at once literally exponentially increases the DAO\'s decision-making bandwidth in relevant cases (+5%)

Multi-modal proposals with a draft stage are the best solution to the deeply real game-theoretic problem of pork barrel (+5%)

Multi-modal proposals are cool and elegant. Selection among multiple alternatives is a very challenging problem in voting mechanism design, usually solved poorly (see: elections). Multi-modal futarchic proposals are innovative and exciting not just in the context of futarchy, but all of governance! That\'s hype (+2%)

A really kickass conditional vault implementation is useful for other protocols and this one would be the best. It could collect very modest fees for the DAO each time tokens are deposited into it. (yes, protocols can just fork it, but usually this doesn\'t happen: see Serum pre explosion, etc) (+0.1%)

So that is (in my estimation) +12.1% value to the Meta-DAO.

According to [[https://dune.com/metadaohogs/themetadao]{.underline}](https://dune.com/metadaohogs/themetadao) circulating supply is 14,416 META. 14416 \* (100 + 12.1)% = 16160, so this feature set would be worth a dilution of +1744 META. I am proposing you pay me much less than that.

I also believe that I am uniquely positioned to do the work to a very high standard of competence. In particular, I think making the contract work without a limit on \# of alternatives requires a deep level of understanding of Anchor and Solana smart contract design, but is necessary in order to future-proof and fully realize the feature\'s potential.

Compensation and Milestones

I believe in this project and do not want cash. I am asking for 200 META disbursed in 50 META intervals across 4 milestones:

Immediately upon passage of this proposal

Upon completing the (new from scratch) multi-modal conditonal vault program

Upon making futarch work with multi-modal conditional vaults

Upon integrating all related features into the frontend

I think this would take me quite a few weeks to do by myself. I think it\'s premature to establish any concrete timeline because other priorities may take precedence (for example spending some time refactoring querying and state in the FE). However, if that does happen, I won\'t allow this project to get stuck in limbo (if nothing else, consider my incentive to subcontract from my network of talented crypto devs).

Milestone completion would be assessed by a (3/5) Squads multisig comprised of:

Proph3t (65U66fcYuNfqN12vzateJhZ4bgDuxFWN9gMwraeQKByg), who needs no explanation

DeanMachine (3PKhzE9wuEkGPHHu2sNCvG86xNtDJduAcyBPXpE6cSNt), who I believe is well known and trusted by both the Meta-DAO and the broader DAO community.

0xNallok (4LpE9Lxqb4jYYh8jA8oDhsGDKPNBNkcoXobbAJTa3pWw), who is supporting in operations and early organization within The Meta-DAO, and who has committed to being available for review of progress and work.

LegalizeOnionFutures (EyuaQkc2UtC4WveD6JjT37ke6xL2Cxz43jmdCC7QXZQE), who I believe is a sharp and invested member of the Meta-DAO who will hold my work to a high standard.

sapphire (9eJgizx2jWDLbyK7VMMUekRBKY3q5uVwv5LEXhf1jP3s), who has done impactful security related-work with Realms, informal security review of the Meta-DAO contracts, and is an active member of the Meta-DAO.

I selected this council because I wanted to keep it lean to reduce overhead but also diverse and representative of the DAO\'s interests. I will pay each member 2.5 META upon passage as payment for representing the DAO.

I would be very excited to join this futarchic society as a major techinical contributor. Thanks for your consideration :-)

**Proposal 11: Increase META Liquidity via a Dutch Auction? **

Date:

Volume: 

Result: Pass

Responsible Parties

Durden, Ben H, Nico, joebuild, and Dodecahedr0x.

Overview

Sell META via a Dutch auction executed manually through OpenBook, and pair the acquired USDC with META to provide liquidity on Meteora.

Background

Given the currently low volume and high volatility of META, there is little incentive to provide liquidity (low fees, high risk of impermanent loss). Yet there seems to be near-universal agreement in the Meta DAO Discord that greater liquidity would be highly beneficial to the project.

While the DAO has plenty of META, to provide liquidity it needs USDC to pair with it\'s META. This USDC can be acquired by selling META.

There is currently strong demand for META, with an oversubscribed raise (proposal 3), proposals from notable parties attemtpting to purchase META at below market price, and a well-known figure DCAing into META. There is thus no need to sell META for USDC at below market prices; we only need to sell META at a price that would be better than if they were to buy through the market.

This proposal seeks to manually perform a Dutch auction using OpenBook. This serves a few purposes: price discovery through a market that is open to all, low smart contract risk (relative to using a custom Dutch auction program), simplicity (which will result in wider participation), and ease of execution (just place asks on OpenBook).

Implementation

Meta DAO will sell a total of 1,000 META.

The META will be sold in tranches of 100 META by placing asks above the spot price. The first tranche will be placed 50% above the spot price. Every 24 hours, if the ask is more than 6% above the spot price, it will be lowered by 5%.

Whenever an ask is filled, a new ask worth 100 META will be placed 10% above the spot price. In addition, USDC from the filled asks will be paired with META and added to the 4% fee pool.

The multisig currently holding the liquidity in the 4% fee pool will send their LP tokens to this proposal\'s multisig. After the 1,000 META has all been sold, all of Meta DAO\'s liquidity will be moved to the 1% fee pool. The LP tokens will be sent to the treasury to be held as permanent liquidity until Meta DAO decides otherwise.

All operations will be executed through a 3/5 Squads multisig.

Multisig address: LMRVapqnn1LEwKaD8PzYEs4i37whTgeVS41qKqyn1wi

The multisig is composed of the following five members:

Durden: 91NjPFfJxQw2FRJvyuQUQsdh9mBGPeGPuNavt7nMLTQj

Ben H: Hu8qped4Cj7gQ3ChfZvZYrtgy2Ntr6YzfN7vwMZ2SWii

Nico: 6kDGqrP4Wwqe5KBa9zTrgUFykVsv4YhZPDEX22kUsDMP

joebuild: XXXvLz1B89UtcTsg2hT3cL9qUJi5PqEEBTHg57MfNkZ

Dodecahedr0x: UuGEwN9aeh676ufphbavfssWVxH7BJCqacq1RYhco8e

I will be using the SquadsX wallet to propose transactions to interact with OpenBook through Prism\'s UI. Once proposed, I will vote on the proposed transaction and wait for two other multisig members to sign and execute.

If the proposal passes, those with the permissions to make announcements in the Discord and access to the Meta DAO Twitter account will be notified so they can announce this initiative.

Compensation

I am requesting a payment of 5 META to cover the cost of creating the market for this proposal and for the effort of crafting this proposal and carrying it out to completion.

For the compensation of the multisig members other than myself, I performed a sealed-bid auction via Discord DMs for the amount of META that each of the 10 candidates would require to become a member. Those who were willing to join for the least amount of META were selected. Only individuals who were already respectable Meta DAO members were selected as candidates so that regardless of who was chosen we didn\'t end up in a precarious situation. This was done in order to create a competitive dynamic that minimizes the cost incurred by Meta DAO.

The candidates with the lowest asks and their requested amounts were as follows:

Ben H -- 0 META

Nico -- 0 META

joebuild -- 0.2 META

Dodecahedr0x -- 0.25 META

All compensatory payments will be made by the multisig to each individual upon the completion of the proposal.

Total Required META

Since the amount of META needed to be paired for liquidity is unknown until the META is actually sold, we will request double the amount of META to be sold, which leaves a fairly large margin for price to increase and still have enough META. In the event that there is insufficient META to pair with the USDC, the excess USDC will be returned to the treasury. Similarly, any META slated for liquidity that is leftover will be returned to the treasury.

META to be sold: 1,000

META for liquidity: 2,000

META for compensation: 5.45

Total: 3,005.45

Result

This proposal will significantly increase Meta DAO\'s protocol-owned liquidity as well as move its existing liquidity to a more efficient fee tier, addressing recent complaints and concerns regarding META\'s liquidity.

**Proposal 12: Burn 99.3% of META in Treasury? **

Date:

Volume: 

Result: Pass

Authors

doctor.sol & rar3

Overview

Burn \~99.3% 979,000 of treasury-held META tokens to significantly reduce the FDV, with the goal of making META more appealing to investors and enhancing community engagement.

Background

The META DAO is currently perceived to have a high Fully Diluted Valuation (FDV) due to the substantial amount of META tokens in the treasury, approximately 985,000 tokens. This high FDV often discourages potential investors and participants from engaging with META, as they may perceive the investment as less attractive right from the start.

Issue at Hand

The primary concern is that the high FDV and treasury leads to the following problems:

It encourages the use of META for expenses.

It lowers the attractiveness of META as an investment opportunity at face value.

It reduces the number of individuals willing to participate in this futuarchy experiment.

While a high FDV can deter less informed community members, which has its benefits, it also potentially wards off highly valuable community members who could contribute positively.

Examples

[[https://imgur.com/a/KHMjJqo]{.underline}](https://imgur.com/a/KHMjJqo) 

[[https://imgur.com/a/3DH2jcO]{.underline}](https://imgur.com/a/3DH2jcO)

Proposed Solution

We propose burning approximately \~99.3% of the META tokens -99,000 tokens - currently held in the DAO\'s treasury. This action is aimed at achieving the following outcomes:

Elimination of Treasury META Payments: Reduces the propensity to utilize \$META from the treasury for proposal payments, promoting a healthier economic framework.

Market-Based Token Acquisition: Future requirements for \$META tokens will necessitate market purchases, fostering demand and enhancing token value.

Prioritization of \$USDC and Revenue: Shifting towards \$USDC payments and focusing on revenue generation marks a move towards financial sustainability and robustness.

Confidence Boost in META: By significantly reducing the supply of META tokens, we signal a strong commitment to the token\'s value, potentially leading to increased interest and participation in prop 10 execution.

Attracting a Broader Community: Lowering the FDV makes META more attractive at face value, inviting a wider range of participants, including those who conduct thorough research and those attracted by the token\'s perceived tokenomics.

Rundown of Numbers:

Current Treasury: 982,464 META tokens

After Burning: 3,464 META tokens

Post-Proposition 10: An expected 1,000 META tokens should be added back from multisig after prop 10, ranging anywhere from 0 to 3,000 META.

Final Treasury: After burning, the treasury would have around 4,500 META, valued at \$4 million, plus \$2 million in META-USDC LP at todays price \$880 / META.

Total META supply: 20,885

Note

Adopting this proposal does not permanently cap our token supply. The community is currently discussing the possibility of transitioning to a mintable token model, which would provide the flexibility to issue more tokens if the need arises.

**Proposal 13: Develop Futarchy as a Service (FaaS)?**

Date:

Volume: 

Result: Pass

![BlockNote image](media/image3.png){width="6.5in" height="3.595833333333333in"}

Type: Business project

Entrepreneur(s): 0xNallok

A note from 0xNallok: Special thanks are owed to the many parties who\'ve supported the project thus far, to those who\'ve taken massive risk on utilizing the systems and believing in a better crypto. It has been one of the most exciting things, not in attention, but seeing the "aha!" moments and expanding the understanding of what is possible with crypto.

See also: A Vision for Futarchy as a Service

Overview

The appetite for market-driven governance is palpable. We have a tremendous opportunity to take this labor of love and shape it into a prime-time product. Such a product would be a great boon to the Solana ecosystem and to the MetaDAO\'s bottom line.

If passed, this proposal would fund two workstreams:

Minimum viable product: I would coordinate the creation of a minimum viable product: a Realms-like UI that allows people to create and participate in futarchic DAOs. This requires some modifications to the smart contract and UI to allow for more than one DAO.

UI improvements: I\'ve already been working with engineers to add helpful functionality to the UI. This proposal would fund these features, including:

historical charts

improving UX around surfacing information (e.g., showing how much money you have deposited in each proposal)

showing historical trades

showing market volume

The goal would be to onboard some early adopter DAOs to test alongside MetaDAO. A few teams have already expressed interest.

Problem

Most people in crypto agree that the state of governance is abysmal. Teams can loot the treasury without repercussions\[\^1\]. Decentralization theatre abounds\[\^2\]. Even some projects that build DAO tooling don\'t feel comfortable keeping their money in a DAO\[\^3\].

The root cause of this issue is token-voting. One-token-one-vote systems have clear incentive traps\[\^4\] that lead to uninformed and unengaged voters. Delegated voting systems (\'liquid democracy\') don\'t fare much better: most holders don\'t even do enough research to delegate.

Design

![BlockNote image](media/image4.jpeg){width="6.5in" height="3.734722222222222in"}

A possible solution that MetaDAO has been testing out is futarchy. In a futarchy, it\'s markets that make the decisions. Given that markets are empirically better than experts at predicting things, we expect futarchies to perform better than traditional DAOs.

Our objective is to build a product that allows DAOs in the Solana ecosystem to harness the power of the market for their decision-making. This product would look and feel like Realms, only with futarchy instead of voting.

Our short-term goal is to create a minimum viable iteration of this. This iteration would support the following flows:

I, as a DAO creator, can come to a website and create a futarchic DAO

I, as a futarchic trader, can trade in multiple DAOs proposals\' futarchic markets

To monetize this in the long-term, we could:

Collect licensing fees

Collect taker/maker fees in the conditional markets

Provide ancillary consulting services to help DAOs manage their futarchies

The minimum viable product wouldn\'t support these. We would instead work with a few select DAOs and sign agreements with them to migrate to a program with fee collection within 6 months of it being released if they wish to continue to use MetaDAO\'s offering.

Objectives and Key Results

Release a minimum viable product by May 21st, 2024

Extend the smart contract to support multiple DAOs

Generalize the UI to support multiple DAOs

Create docs for interacting with the product

Partner with 3 DAOs to have them use the product at launch-time

Improve the overall UI/UX

Create an indexer and APIs for order and trade history

Improve the user experience for creating proposals

Improve the user experience for trading proposals

Timeline

Phase 1

Initial discussions around implementation, services and visual components

UI design for components

Development of components in React

Program development

Data services / APIs construction

Phase 2

Program deployed on devnet

Data services / APIs linked with devnet

UI deployed on dev branch for use with devnet

Phase 3

Audit and revisions of program

Testing UI, feedback and revisions mainnet with limited beta testers and on devent

Phase 4

Proposal for migration of program

UI live on mainnet

Create documentation and videos

Final

Migrate program

Budget

This project is expected to have deliverables within 30 days with full deployment within two months.

Below is the inclusion of estimated MAXIMUM costs and hours for the following roles\[\^5\]. If costs do incur beyond this estimate the cost is to be borne by the Entrepreneur.

A fair estimate of \$96,000\[\^6\] for the two months including the following:

1 smart contract engineer (\$15,000) (160 hours)

1 auditor (\$10,000) (40 hours)

2 UI / UX (\$32,000) (400 hours)

1 data/services developer (\$13,000) (140 hours)

1 project manager / research / outreach (\$26,000) (320 hours)

The Entrepreneur (0xNallok) would fill in various roles, but primarily the project manager.

This will be funded through:

Transfer of \$40,000 USDC from the existing funds in the multi-sig treasury.

Transfer of 342 META\[\^7\] which will be used when payment is due to convert to USDC.

The funds will be transferred to a 2/3 mult-sig including 0xNallok, Proph3t and Nico.

Payments to the parties will be done weekly.

The reason for overallocation of META is due to the price fluctuation of the asset and necessity for payment in USDC. This takes the cost minus the \$40k USDC (\$56k) divided by the current price of 1 META (\$818.284) multiplied by a factor of 5.

Any remaining META once the project is completed will be transferred back to the MetaDAO treasury.

MetaDAO Executor (FpMnruqVCxh3o2oBFZ9uSQmshiyfMqzeJ3YfNQfP9tHy)

MetaDAO Treasury (ADCCEAbH8eixGj5t73vb4sKecSKo7ndgDSuWGvER4Loy)

FaaS Multi-sig (AHwsoL97vXFdvckVZdXw9rrvnUDcPANCLVQzJan9srWy)

0xNallok (4LpE9Lxqb4jYYh8jA8oDhsGDKPNBNkcoXobbAJTa3pWw)

Proph3t (65U66fcYuNfqN12vzateJhZ4bgDuxFWN9gMwraeQKByg)

Nico (6kDGqrP4Wwqe5KBa9zTrgUFykVsv4YhZPDEX22kUsDMP)

This proposal includes the transfer instruction from the MetaDAO treasury, the additional funds will be transferred from the MetaDAO Executor.

Business

Ultimately, the goal of the MetaDAO is to make money. There are a few ways to monetize FaaS all dependent on what appeals most to DAOs:

Taker fees on markets: we could take 5 - 25 basis points via a taker fee on markets.

Monthly licensing fees: because the code is BSL, we could charge a monthly fee for the code and the site

Support and services: we could also provide consultation services around futarchic governance, like a Gauntlet model.

In general, we should aim for vertical integration. The goal is not to build this product as a primitive and then allow anyone to build front-ends for it: it\'s to own the whole stack.

Financial Projections

Today, 293 DAOs use Realms. Realms is a free platform, so plenty of these DAOs are inactive and wouldn\'t be paying customers. So we estimate that we could acquire 5 - 100 DAOs as customers.

As for estimating ARPU (average revenue per user), we can start by looking at the volume in the MetaDAO\'s markets:

![BlockNote image](media/image5.png){width="6.5in" height="0.9201388888888888in"}

Note that this only includes the volume in the finalized market, as all trades in the other market are reverted and thus wouldn\'t collect fees.

So assuming that proposal 6 - 8 are an appropriate sample, we could earn \~\$50 - \$500 per proposal. If DAOs see between 1 - 2 proposals per month, that\'s \$100 - \$1,000 in taker fee ARPU.

As for monthly licensing fees, Squads charges \$99 / month for SquadsX and \$399 / month for Squads Pro. I suspect that DAOs would be willing to pay a premium for governance. So we can estimate between \$50 - \$1,000 in monthly licensing fees.

Putting these together:

![BlockNote image](media/image6.png){width="6.5in" height="2.3652777777777776in"}

The support & services business is different enough that it deserves its own model. This is because consulting / advisory businesses have non-zero marginal costs (you can\'t earn \$25,000,000 in revenue from one consultant) and have lower defensibility. Both cause them to receive lower valuation multiples.

Here\'s what we project:

![BlockNote image](media/image7.png){width="6.5in" height="2.1756944444444444in"}

Of course, you can use your own numbers if you\'d like to come up with your own estimates.

Footnotes

\[\^1\]: DeFi Project Parrot Holds Contentious Vote on Future of \$70M Treasury. Danny Nelson. Jul 21, 2023. [[https://www.coindesk.com/markets/2023/07/21/defi-project-parrot-puts-fate-of-over-70m-treasury-prt-token-to-vote/]{.underline}](https://www.coindesk.com/markets/2023/07/21/defi-project-parrot-puts-fate-of-over-70m-treasury-prt-token-to-vote/).

\[\^2\]: Crypto's Theater Is Becoming More Surreal. Camila Russo. Aug 14, 2023. [[https://www.coindesk.com/consensus-magazine/2023/08/14/cryptos-theater-is-becoming-more-surreal/]{.underline}](https://www.coindesk.com/consensus-magazine/2023/08/14/cryptos-theater-is-becoming-more-surreal/).

\[\^3\]: Aragon Fires Back at Activist Investors in Early Stages of DAO Governance Fight. Danny Nelson. May 5, 2023. [[https://www.coindesk.com/business/2023/05/05/aragon-fires-back-at-activist-investors-in-early-stages-of-governance-fight/]{.underline}](https://www.coindesk.com/business/2023/05/05/aragon-fires-back-at-activist-investors-in-early-stages-of-governance-fight/).

\[\^4\]: The Logic of Collective Action. Wikipedia. Mar 7, 2024. [[https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Logic_of_Collective_Action]{.underline}](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Logic_of_Collective_Action).

\[\^5\]: As this is an approximation and development and integration depends on a number of factors, inclusion of roles and estimates seems appropriate but may be in flux given changes which arise, however costs would not extend beyond the estimate.

\[\^6\]: This breaks down to an average estimate of \~\$90/hour and 1060 (wo)man hours total.

\[\^7\]: \$\$(56,000/818.284) \* 5 \\approx 342\$\$

**Proposal 14: Engage in \$250,000 OTC Trade with Colosseum**

Date:

Volume: 

Result: Pass

Overview

Colosseum wishes to acquire {tbd} META (METADDFL6wWMWEoKTFJwcThTbUmtarRJZjRpzUvkxhr) from The MetaDAO Treasury (ADCCEAbH8eixGj5t73vb4sKecSKo7ndgDSuWGvER4Loy).

If the proposal passes, the price per META will be the TWAP of the pass market if below \$850. If this proposal is approved and the pass market TWAP surpasses \$850 per META, but is below \$1,200, then the acquisition price per META will be \$850. If the pass market TWAP surpasses \$1,200, then this proposal becomes void and the USDC in the multisig will be returned to Colosseum's wallet.

A total of \$250,000 USDC (EPjFWdd5AufqSSqeM2qN1xzybapC8G4wEGGkZwyTDt1v) will be committed by Colosseum.

The MetaDAO will transfer 20% of the final allocation of META to Colosseum\'s wallet immediately and place 80% of the final allocation of META into a 12 month, linear vest Streamflow program.

Rationale

Colosseum runs Solana's hackathons, supports winning founders through a new accelerator program, and invests in their startups. Our mission is to bolster innovative improvements to technology, economics, and governance in crypto through all 3 pillars of our organization. In line with that mission, we believe MetaDAO is one of the most promising early experiments in crypto and we strongly believe we can help the project grow significantly due to our unique position in the Solana ecosystem.

In addition to the capital infusion provided by Colosseum, our primary value proposition is our ability to bring new entrepreneurs and cyber agents to MetaDAO over the long-term. Given that a majority of the VC-backed startups in the Solana ecosystem started in hackathons, we can utilize both our hackathons and accelerator program to funnel talented developers, founders, and ultimately revenue-generating startups to the DAO.

In practice, there are many ways Colosseum can promote MetaDAO and we want to collaborate with the DAO community around ongoing initiatives. To show our commitment towards future collaborations, we promise that if this proposal passes, the MetaDAO will be the sponsor of the DAO track in the next Solana hackathon after Renaissance, at no additional cost. The next DAO track prize pool will be between \$50,000 - \$80,000.

Execution

The proposal contains the instruction for a transfer {tbd} META into a Squads multisignature wallet \[FhJHnsCGm9JDAe2JuEvqr67WE8mD2PiJMUsmCTD1fDPZ\] with a 5/7 threshold of which the following parties will be members:

Colosseum (REDACTED)

Colosseum (REDACTED)

MetaProph3t (65U66fcYuNfqN12vzateJhZ4bgDuxFWN9gMwraeQKByg)

0xNallok (4LpE9Lxqb4jYYh8jA8oDhsGDKPNBNkcoXobbAJTa3pWw)

Cavemanloverboy (2EvcwLAHvXW71c8d1uEXTCbVZjzMpYUQL5h64PuYUi3T)

Dean (3PKhzE9wuEkGPHHu2sNCvG86xNtDJduAcyBPXpE6cSNt)

Durden (91NjPFfJxQw2FRJvyuQUQsdh9mBGPeGPuNavt7nMLTQj)

The multisig members instructions are as follows:

Accept receipt of META into the multisig as defined by onchain instruction

Accept the full USDC amount of \$250,000 from Colosseum into the multisig

3.Determine and publish the price per META according to the definition above

Confirmation from two parties within The MetaDAO that the balances exist and are in fullTake \$250,000 / calculated per META and determine final allocation quantity of META

Transfer 20% of the final allocation of META to Colosseum's address \[REDACTED\]

Configure a 12 month Streamflow vesting program with a linear vest

Transfer 80% of the final allocation of META into the Streamflow program

Return any remaining META to the DAO treasury

NOTE: The reason for transferring 2,060 META is due to the fact that there is only one transfer and by overallocating we have a wider price range to be able to execute the instructions above. This is due to the fluctuations in the price of META.

For example if the price of TWAP for META is \$250 by the time the proposal passes, the amount of META allocated for the \$250,000/\$250 = 1,000 META. In this case 1,060 META would be returned to the treasury.

ROI to META

We won't speculate on what the exact ROI will be to META in the short to medium-term. However, if this proposal passes, we believe that our strategic partnership will increase the value of META significantly over the long-term due to Colosseum's unique ability to embed MetaDAO as a viable institution that can help future crypto founders grow their businesses.

Details

META Spot Price 2024-03-18 18:09 UTC: \$468.09

META Circulating Supply 2024-03-18 18:09 UTC: 17,421

Circulating supply could change depending on the current dutch auction

Offer Price per 1 META: Any market price up to \$850 per 1 META

Offer USDC: \$250,000

**Proposal 15: Appoint Nallok and Proph3t Benevolent Dictators for Three Months? **

Date:

Volume: 

Result: Pass

Entrepreneur(s)

Proph3t, Nallok

Overview

Today, MetaDAO is not executing as fast as a normal startup would. At the crux of this is that the current proposal process is too slow and costly. We can and will fix that, but in the short-term we need some of MetaDAO\'s key decisions to be made outside of the proposal process.

This proposal would appoint Proph3t and Nallok to be Benevolent Dictators For 3 Months (BDF3M). Their term would be from the finalization of this proposal to June 30th. At that point, either the futarchy will be able to function autonomously or another proposal will need to be raised.

We are requesting 1015 META and 100,000 USDC to handle 4 months of retroactive compensation (December - March) and 3 months of forward-looking compensation (April - June). So an average of 145 META and \$14,000 per month.

Given that this is a critical juncture in MetaDAO\'s timeline, we believe that this proposal failing would decrease the probability of MetaDAO\'s success by more than 20%.

OKRs

Execute faster

Complete 10 issues on GitHub per week

Handle business operations

Perform retroactive compensation for the months of December, January, February, and March within 1 week of the proposal passing

Perform operations compensation for April, May, and June

Oversee the creation of a new kickass landing page

Project

If passed, this proposal would appoint Proph3t and Nallok as interim leaders. The following would fall under their domain:

Retroactive compensation for all contributions to MetaDAO prior to this proposal

Managing ongoing business operations, including:

Steering the off-chain proposal process, including providing proposal and communication guidelines for proposers and compensating proposers when appropriate

Steering MetaDAO-wide project management

Handling any expenses or required activities required to operate effectively

Improving the security and efficacy of the core futarchy mechanism

Providing monthly updates to the MetaDAO community

Compensation for current contributors, including the incentive-based part

The proposal would also allow Nallok or Proph3t to make exceptional use grants for MetaDAO\'s code licenses.

For technical reasons, no META nor USDC would come directly from the DAO\'s treasury. It would instead come from various multisigs.

Although we make no hard commitments, the META would likely be issued in 5-year locked form, as described here.

