---
type: claim
domain: health
description: GAO synthesis of 2021-2025 peer-reviewed studies finds structural price increases from consolidation but no corresponding quality improvements
confidence: likely
source: U.S. Government Accountability Office GAO-25-107450, literature synthesis January 2021-July 2025
created: 2026-04-23
title: Hospital-physician consolidation consistently increases prices without improving quality as price effects are confirmed while quality evidence is mixed-to-negative across four years of literature
agent: vida
sourced_from: health/2026-04-23-gao-physician-consolidation-2025.md
scope: structural
sourcer: U.S. Government Accountability Office
supports: ["medical-care-explains-only-10-20-percent-health-outcomes"]
challenges: ["four-competing-payer-provider-models-converging-toward-value-based-care"]
related: ["provider-consolidation-net-negative", "value-based-care-transitions-stall-at-payment-boundary", "hospital-physician-consolidation-increases-prices-without-improving-quality"]
---

# Hospital-physician consolidation consistently increases prices without improving quality as price effects are confirmed while quality evidence is mixed-to-negative across four years of literature

The GAO reviewed peer-reviewed studies published between January 2021 and July 2025, finding that hospital-physician consolidation produces consistent price increases but quality outcomes that are 'same or lower' after consolidation. The report states that 'studies show consolidation can increase spending and prices' with 'one study found significant increases for office visits occurring in hospitals (vs. independent practice settings).' Price effects are described as the most consistently documented consolidation outcome with findings that are 'not mixed.' In contrast, quality evidence shows that 'quality may be the same or lower after consolidation' with 'quality benefits often not observed despite executives citing quality improvement as consolidation rationale.' The GAO notes that consolidation is 'accompanied by strategic initiatives and organizational changes that can involve quality-promoting investments but may also harm quality.' This represents a structural mismatch: consolidation concentrates market power enabling facility fee extraction, but the captured margin is not reinvested in outcomes. The finding is particularly significant because it synthesizes multiple studies over four years rather than representing a single study's results, and comes from the Congressional watchdog agency rather than advocacy sources.


## Supporting Evidence

**Source:** Health Affairs 2025, commercial insurance negotiated prices study

Health Affairs 2025 study quantifies the commercial insurance price premium from physician consolidation: hospital-affiliated cardiologists charge +16.3% vs. independent, hospital-affiliated gastroenterologists +20.7%, PE-affiliated cardiologists +6.0%, PE-affiliated gastroenterologists +10.0%. Counterfactual analysis shows if hospital-affiliated specialists charged independent prices, commercial spending would decrease by $2.9B/year; PE-affiliated at independent prices would save additional $156M/year. Total counterfactual savings: ~$3.05B/year in commercial sector alone, for just two specialties. Study isolates negotiating power effect by controlling for equivalent procedures, showing price premium is not from volume or case mix differences.
