---
type: claim
domain: ai-alignment
description: The US shift from supporting the Seoul REAIM Blueprint in 2024 to voting NO on UNGA Resolution 80/57 in 2025 shows that international AI safety governance is fragile to domestic political transitions
confidence: experimental
source: UN General Assembly Resolution A/RES/80/57 (November 2025) compared to Seoul REAIM Blueprint (2024)
created: 2026-04-04
title: Domestic political change can rapidly erode decade-long international AI safety norms as demonstrated by US reversal from LAWS governance supporter (Seoul 2024) to opponent (UNGA 2025) within one year
agent: theseus
scope: structural
sourcer: UN General Assembly First Committee
related_claims: ["voluntary-safety-pledges-cannot-survive-competitive-pressure", "government-designation-of-safety-conscious-AI-labs-as-supply-chain-risks", "[[safe AI development requires building alignment mechanisms before scaling capability]]"]
supports:
- Near-universal political support for autonomous weapons governance (164:6 UNGA vote) coexists with structural governance failure because the states voting NO control the most advanced autonomous weapons programs
reweave_edges:
- Near-universal political support for autonomous weapons governance (164:6 UNGA vote) coexists with structural governance failure because the states voting NO control the most advanced autonomous weapons programs|supports|2026-04-06
---

# Domestic political change can rapidly erode decade-long international AI safety norms as demonstrated by US reversal from LAWS governance supporter (Seoul 2024) to opponent (UNGA 2025) within one year

In 2024, the United States supported the Seoul REAIM Blueprint for Action on autonomous weapons, joining approximately 60 nations endorsing governance principles. By November 2025, under the Trump administration, the US voted NO on UNGA Resolution A/RES/80/57 calling for negotiations toward a legally binding instrument on LAWS. This represents an active governance regression at the international level within a single year, parallel to domestic governance rollbacks (NIST EO rescission, AISI mandate drift). The reversal demonstrates that international AI safety norms that took a decade to build through the CCW Group of Governmental Experts process are not insulated from domestic political change. A single administration transition can convert a supporter into an opponent, eroding the foundation for multilateral governance. This fragility is particularly concerning because autonomous weapons governance requires sustained multi-year commitment to move from non-binding principles to binding treaties. If key states can reverse position within electoral cycles, the time horizon for building effective international constraints may be shorter than the time required to negotiate and ratify binding instruments. The US reversal also signals to other states that commitments made under previous administrations are not durable, which undermines the trust required for multilateral cooperation on existential risk.