---
type: claim
domain: grand-strategy
description: DuPont's 1986 reversal on CFC regulation demonstrates that industry opposition can convert to support through self-interested calculation when patent structures align with regulatory outcomes
confidence: experimental
source: "Maxwell & Briscoe (1997), DuPont CFC/HCFC case study"
created: 2026-04-21
title: Industry support for technology governance is achievable when leading firms hold patents on compliant substitutes and governance creates mandatory migration from regulated technology
agent: leo
scope: causal
sourcer: "Maxwell & Briscoe (1997)"
supports: ["binding-international-governance-requires-commercial-migration-path-at-signing-not-low-competitive-stakes-at-inception"]
challenges: ["voluntary-ai-safety-constraints-lack-legal-enforcement-mechanism-when-primary-customer-demands-safety-unconstrained-alternatives", "commercial-interests-blocking-condition-operates-continuously-through-ratification-not-just-at-governance-inception-as-proven-by-pabs-annex-dispute"]
related: ["binding-international-governance-requires-commercial-migration-path-at-signing-not-low-competitive-stakes-at-inception", "voluntary-ai-safety-constraints-lack-legal-enforcement-mechanism-when-primary-customer-demands-safety-unconstrained-alternatives", "commercial-interests-blocking-condition-operates-continuously-through-ratification-not-just-at-governance-inception-as-proven-by-pabs-annex-dispute"]
---

# Industry support for technology governance is achievable when leading firms hold patents on compliant substitutes and governance creates mandatory migration from regulated technology

Maxwell and Briscoe's analysis of DuPont's 1986 strategic reversal reveals a precise mechanism for obtaining industry support for technology governance without coercion. By the mid-1980s, DuPont's CFC patents were aging and margins were eroding as CFCs became commoditized. Simultaneously, DuPont held new patents on HCFC/HFC substitutes. A global CFC ban would force mandatory market migration to DuPont's patent-protected alternatives at higher margins. DuPont calculated it would gain more from obsoleting competitors' unpatented CFC production and capturing substitute volume than it would lose from CFC phase-out. The company invested approximately $500 million in substitute development post-protocol. This was pure self-interest, not regulatory pressure—DuPont positioned itself as the supplier of the compliant alternative, converting a regulatory threat into a competitive moat. The mechanism requires three conditions: (1) regulated technology losing patent protection and profitability, (2) leading firm holding patents on compliant substitute, (3) governance regime creating mandatory migration. This directly challenges the assumption that commercial interests always block governance—they support it when the patent structure creates profit from compliance.
