---
type: claim
confidence: likely
source: Ranger Finance liquidation proposal, MetaDAO, 2026-03-03
tags: [futarchy, decision-markets, governance-reversibility, conditional-markets]

### Additional Evidence (confirm)
*Source: [[2026-03-03-ranger-finance-liquidation-proposal]] | Added: 2026-03-10 | Extractor: anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5*

Ranger Finance liquidation proposal nullifies a prior 90-day restriction on buybacks/liquidations that was previously passed through futarchy governance. The new proposal explicitly overrides the earlier decision based on allegations of material misrepresentation that emerged after the initial restriction was approved. Market shows 97% pass likelihood with $581K volume, demonstrating strong consensus that new evidence (misrepresentation allegations with specific on-chain data and team quotes) justifies reversing the prior commitment. This is direct production evidence that futarchy treats prior decisions as conditional on information available at the time, not as binding commitments that override new evidence.

---

# Futarchy can override its own prior decisions when new evidence emerges because conditional markets re-evaluate proposals against current information not historical commitments

Futarchy treats prior decisions as conditional on information available at the time of the original decision, not as binding commitments that override new evidence. When material new information emerges, conditional markets can reverse prior governance outcomes through new proposal cycles.

## Evidence

Ranger Finance liquidation proposal (Mar 3, 2026) demonstrates this mechanism in production. The proposal explicitly nullifies a prior 90-day restriction on buybacks/liquidations that was previously approved through futarchy governance. The reversal was triggered by allegations of material misrepresentation that emerged after the initial restriction passed:

- **Original decision**: 90-day restriction on liquidations approved through futarchy markets
- **New evidence**: Co-founder FA2 claimed "$5 billion in volume this year" and showed "$2m revenue" on slides; on-chain analysis revealed 2025 volume was ~$2B (not $5B) and revenue was ~$500K (not $2M)
- **Market response**: 97% pass likelihood with $581K trading volume supporting liquidation reversal, demonstrating strong consensus that new evidence justifies overriding the prior commitment
- **Mechanism**: Conditional markets re-evaluated the original restriction against current information (misrepresentation allegations with specific on-chain data and team quotes) rather than treating the prior decision as binding

This is direct production evidence that futarchy governance is reversible when conditional markets receive new information that materially changes the decision calculus. The mechanism depends on:

1. **Conditional pricing**: Pass/Fail markets price the same proposal against current information, not historical precedent
2. **Evidence integration**: Markets incorporate new data (on-chain metrics, team communications) into updated price signals
3. **Reversal capability**: Prior decisions can be explicitly nullified if new evidence crosses a sufficient confidence threshold (97% pass likelihood in this case)

## Implications

This distinguishes futarchy from rigid governance systems where prior decisions create path-dependent lock-in. The mechanism enables course correction when fundamental premises prove false, but also creates governance volatility if evidence quality is poor or markets are thin.

## Related Claims

[[futarchy-governed-liquidation-is-the-enforcement-mechanism-that-makes-unruggable-ICOs-credible-because-investors-can-force-full-treasury-return-when-teams-materially-misrepresent.md]]
[[decision-markets-make-majority-theft-unprofitable-through-conditional-token-arbitrage.md]]


## Supporting Evidence

**Source:** Blockworks, January 6, 2026

The MetaDAO omnibus proposal itself passed through futarchy governance, demonstrating the mechanism successfully governing its own strategic reset including fee restructure, liquidity migration, and token burn decisions.


## Supporting Evidence

**Source:** Blockworks, January 6, 2026

The omnibus proposal retroactively changed the fee structure from 50/50 split to 100% MetaDAO retention, with mutual agreement from project teams. This demonstrates futarchy's ability to revise prior economic arrangements when new information (revenue decline from ICO cadence slowdown) emerges.
