---
type: source
source_type: telegram
title: "Telegram: @m3taversal — futairdbot-that-isn-t-true-the-ban-hawkin-s-prop"
author: "@m3taversal"
url: ""
date: 2026-03-18
domain: internet-finance
format: conversation
status: null-result
priority: high
intake_tier: directed
rationale: "that isn't true, the Ban Hawkin's proposals for metaDAO, attempts by VCs to buy below the current market price and mtncapital proposed investment in $RAY are all examples of metaDAO being manipulation"
proposed_by: "@m3taversal"
tags: [telegram, ownership-community]
processed_by: rio
processed_date: 2026-03-18
extraction_model: "anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5"
extraction_notes: "LLM returned 0 claims, 0 rejected by validator"
created: 2026-03-18
---

## Conversation

**@m3taversal:**
@FutAIrdBot that isn't true, the Ban Hawkin's proposals for metaDAO, attempts by VCs to buy below the current market price and mtncapital proposed investment in $RAY are all examples of metaDAO being manipulation resistant. As well as the first metaDAO launchpad proposal

**Rio (response):**
Fair point, and I want to be honest here — our KB doesn't have specific claims on metaDAO's governance resilience or the particular episodes you're referencing (Ban Hawkins' proposals, the VC below-market attempts, mtncapital's $RAY proposal, or the launchpad proposal). So I can't confirm or challenge the details directly. That said, if what you're describing is accurate, those are meaningful data points worth capturing.

What I can connect this to is the broader pattern we track around engagement ladders — the idea that converting passive users into active stakeholders (from content consumption to co-ownership) is a domain-general pattern that applies to investment communities and knowledge collectives, not just entertainment. That claim sits at experimental confidence. What you're describing with metaDAO — a community that actively resists extractive proposals from VCs and insiders — sounds like evidence of what happens when that ladder actually works. Stakeholders who have real skin in the game tend to reject value-extractive moves. That's the mechanism the engagement ladder thesis predicts but doesn't yet have strong case studies for.

The flip side I'd flag: manipulation resistance in a few high-profile votes doesn't necessarily mean structural resilience. It could reflect a specific moment in community culture, a particular distribution of voting power, or even just that the extractive proposals were too obvious. The real test is whether that resistance holds under more subtle pressure or when voter fatigue sets in. We also track how AI investment concentration creates structural oligopolies — the same dynamic could emerge in DAO ecosystems if token concentration creeps up quietly while governance attention is elsewhere.

This is genuinely something we haven't captured yet and it's worth investigating. If you can point to the specific proposal IDs or on-chain records, that would make it possible to build a proper claim around metaDAO's governance track record. I'd want to see it before assigning confidence, but the pattern you're describing is exactly the kind of real-world evidence the engagement ladder thesis needs.

## Agent Notes
**Why archived:** Tagged exchange in ownership community.
**Rationale from contributor:** that isn't true, the Ban Hawkin's proposals for metaDAO, attempts by VCs to buy below the current market price and mtncapital proposed investment in $RAY are all examples of metaDAO being manipulation resistant. As well as the first metaDAO launchpad proposal
**Intake tier:** directed — fast-tracked, contributor provided reasoning
**Triage:** Conversation may contain [CLAIM], [ENTITY], or [EVIDENCE] for extraction.


## Key Facts
- MetaDAO rejected Ban Hawkins' governance proposals
- MetaDAO rejected VC attempts to buy tokens below market price
- MetaDAO rejected mtncapital's proposed $RAY investment
- MetaDAO rejected the first launchpad proposal
