# Research Musing — 2026-04-03

**Research question:** Does the domestic/international governance split have counter-examples? Specifically: are there cases of successful binding international governance for dual-use or existential-risk technologies WITHOUT the four enabling conditions?

**Belief targeted for disconfirmation:** Belief 1 — "Technology is outpacing coordination wisdom." Specifically the grounding claim that COVID proved humanity cannot coordinate even when the threat is visible and universal, and the broader framework that triggering events are insufficient for binding international governance without enabling conditions (2-4: commercial network effects, low competitive stakes, physical manifestation).

**Disconfirmation target:** Find a case where international binding governance was achieved for a high-stakes technology with ABSENT enabling conditions — particularly without commercial interests aligning and without low competitive stakes at inception.

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## What I Searched

1. Montreal Protocol (1987) — the canonical "successful international environmental governance" case, often cited as the model for climate/AI governance
2. Council of Europe AI Framework Convention (2024-2025) — the first binding international AI treaty, entered into force November 2025
3. Paris AI Action Summit (February 2025) — the most recent major international AI governance event
4. WHO Pandemic Agreement — COVID governance status, testing whether the maximum triggering event eventually produced binding governance

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## What I Found

### Finding 1: Montreal Protocol — Commercial pivot CONFIRMS the framework

DuPont actively lobbied AGAINST regulation until 1986, when it had already developed viable HFC alternatives. The US then switched to PUSHING for a treaty once DuPont had a commercial interest in the new governance framework.

Key details:
- 1986: DuPont develops viable CFC alternatives
- 1987: DuPont testifies before Congress against regulation — but the treaty is signed the same year
- The treaty started as a 50% phasedown (not a full ban) and scaled up as alternatives became more cost-effective
- Success came from industry pivoting BEFORE signing, not from low competitive stakes at inception

**Framework refinement:** The enabling condition should be reframed from "low competitive stakes at governance inception" to "commercial migration path available at time of signing." Montreal Protocol succeeded not because stakes were low but because the largest commercial actor had already made the migration. This is a subtler but more accurate condition.

CLAIM CANDIDATE: "Binding international environmental governance requires commercial migration paths to be available at signing, not low competitive stakes at inception — as evidenced by the Montreal Protocol's success only after DuPont developed viable CFC alternatives in 1986." (confidence: likely, domain: grand-strategy)

**What this means for AI:** No commercial migration path exists for frontier AI development. Stopping or radically constraining AI development would destroy the business models of every major AI lab. The Montreal Protocol model doesn't apply.

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### Finding 2: Council of Europe AI Framework Convention — Scope stratification CONFIRMS the framework

The first binding international AI treaty entered into force November 1, 2025. At first glance this appears to be a disconfirmation: binding international AI governance DID emerge.

On closer inspection, it confirms the framework through scope stratification:
- **National security activities: COMPLETELY EXEMPT** — parties "not required to apply provisions to activities related to the protection of their national security interests"
- **National defense: EXPLICITLY EXCLUDED** — R&D activities excluded unless AI testing "may interfere with human rights, democracy, or the rule of law"
- **Private sector: OPT-IN** — each state party decides whether to apply treaty obligations to private companies
- US signed (Biden, September 2024) but will NOT ratify under Trump
- China did NOT participate in negotiations

The treaty succeeded by SCOPING DOWN to the low-stakes domain (human rights, democracy, rule of law) and carving out everything else. This is the same structural pattern as the EU AI Act Article 2.3 national security carve-out: binding governance applies where the competitive stakes are absent.

CLAIM CANDIDATE: "The Council of Europe AI Framework Convention (in force November 2025) confirms the scope stratification pattern: binding international AI governance was achieved by explicitly excluding national security, defense applications, and making private sector obligations optional — the treaty binds only where it excludes the highest-stakes AI deployments." (confidence: likely, domain: grand-strategy)

**Structural implication:** There is now a two-tier international AI governance architecture. Tier 1 (the CoE treaty): binding for civil AI applications, state activities, human rights/democracy layer. Tier 2 (everything else): entirely ungoverned internationally. The same scope limitation that limited EU AI Act effectiveness is now replicated at the international treaty level.

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### Finding 3: Paris AI Action Summit — US/UK opt-out confirms strategic actor exemption

February 10-11, 2025, Paris. 100+ countries participated. 60 countries signed the declaration.

**The US and UK did not sign.**

The UK stated the declaration didn't "provide enough practical clarity on global governance" and didn't "sufficiently address harder questions around national security."

No new binding commitments emerged. The summit noted voluntary commitments from Bletchley Park and Seoul summits rather than creating new binding frameworks.

CLAIM CANDIDATE: "The Paris AI Action Summit (February 2025) confirmed that the two countries with the most advanced frontier AI development (US and UK) will not commit to international governance frameworks even at the non-binding level — the pattern of strategic actor opt-out applies not just to binding treaties but to voluntary declarations." (confidence: likely, domain: grand-strategy)

**Significance:** This closes a potential escape route from the legislative ceiling analysis. One might argue that non-binding voluntary frameworks are a stepping stone to binding governance. The Paris Summit evidence suggests the stepping stone doesn't work when the key actors won't even step on it.

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### Finding 4: WHO Pandemic Agreement — Maximum triggering event confirms structural legitimacy gap

The WHO Pandemic Agreement was adopted by the World Health Assembly on May 20, 2025 — 5.5 years after COVID. 120 countries voted in favor. 11 abstained (Russia, Iran, Israel, Italy, Poland).

But:
- **The US withdrew from WHO entirely** (Executive Order 14155, January 20, 2025; formal exit January 22, 2026)
- The US rejected the 2024 International Health Regulations amendments
- The agreement is NOT YET OPEN FOR SIGNATURE — pending the PABS (Pathogen Access and Benefit Sharing) annex, expected at May 2026 World Health Assembly
- Commercial interests (the PABS dispute between wealthy nations wanting pathogen access vs. developing nations wanting vaccine profit shares) are the blocking condition

CLAIM CANDIDATE: "The WHO Pandemic Agreement (adopted May 2025) demonstrates the maximum triggering event principle: the largest infectious disease event in a century (COVID-19, ~7M deaths) produced broad international adoption (120 countries) in 5.5 years but could not force participation from the most powerful actor (US), and commercial interests (PABS) remain the blocking condition for ratification 6+ years post-event." (confidence: likely, domain: grand-strategy)

**The structural legitimacy gap:** The actors whose behavior most needs governing are precisely those who opt out. The US is both the country with the most advanced AI development and the country that has now left the international pandemic governance framework. If COVID with 7M deaths doesn't force the US into binding international frameworks, what triggering event would?

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## Synthesis: Framework STRONGER, One Key Refinement

**Disconfirmation result:** FAILED to find a counter-example. Every candidate case confirmed the framework with one important refinement.

**The refinement:** The enabling condition "low competitive stakes at governance inception" should be reframed as "commercial migration path available at signing." This is more precise and opens a new analytical question: when do commercial interests develop a migration path?

Montreal Protocol answer: when a major commercial actor has already made the investment in alternatives before governance (DuPont 1986 → treaty 1987). The governance then extends and formalizes what commercial interests already made inevitable.

AI governance implication: This migration path does not exist. Frontier AI development has no commercially viable governance-compatible alternative. The labs cannot profit from slowing AI development. The compute manufacturers cannot profit from export controls. The national security establishments cannot accept strategic disadvantage.

**The deeper pattern emerging across sessions:**

The CoE AI treaty confirms what the EU AI Act Article 2.3 analysis found: binding governance is achievable for the low-stakes layer of AI (civil rights, democracy, human rights applications). The high-stakes layer (military AI, frontier model development, existential risk prevention) is systematically carved out of every governance framework that actually gets adopted.

This creates a new structural observation: **governance laundering** — the appearance of binding international AI governance while systematically exempting the applications that matter most. The CoE treaty is legally binding but doesn't touch anything that would constrain frontier AI competition or military AI development.

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## Carry-Forward Items (overdue — requires extraction)

The following items have been flagged for multiple consecutive sessions and are now URGENT:

1. **"Great filter is coordination threshold"** — Session 03-18 through 04-03 (10+ consecutive carry-forwards). This is cited in beliefs.md. MUST extract.

2. **"Formal mechanisms require narrative objective function"** — Session 03-24 onwards (8+ consecutive carry-forwards). Flagged for Clay coordination.

3. **Layer 0 governance architecture error** — Session 03-26 onwards (7+ consecutive carry-forwards). Flagged for Theseus coordination.

4. **Full legislative ceiling arc** — Six connected claims built from sessions 03-27 through 04-03:
   - Governance instrument asymmetry with legislative ceiling scope qualifier
   - Three-track corporate strategy pattern (Anthropic case)
   - Conditional legislative ceiling (CWC pathway exists but conditions absent)
   - Three-condition arms control framework (Ottawa Treaty refinement)
   - Domestic/international governance split (COVID/cybersecurity evidence)
   - Scope stratification as dominant AI governance mechanism (CoE treaty evidence)

5. **Commercial migration path as enabling condition** (NEW from this session) — Refinement of the enabling conditions framework from Montreal Protocol analysis.

6. **Strategic actor opt-out pattern** (NEW from this session) — US/UK opt-out from Paris AI Summit even at non-binding level; US departure from WHO.

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## Follow-up Directions

### Active Threads (continue next session)

- **Commercial migration path analysis**: When do commercial interests develop a migration path to governance? What conditions led to DuPont's 1986 pivot? Does any AI governance scenario offer a commercial migration path? Look at: METR's commercial interpretability products, the RSP-as-liability framework, insurance market development.

- **Governance laundering as systemic pattern**: The CoE treaty binds only where it doesn't matter. Is this deliberate (states protect their strategic interests) or emergent (easy governance crowds out hard governance)? Look at arms control literature on "symbolic governance" and whether it makes substantive governance harder or easier.

- **PABS annex as case study**: The WHO Pandemic Agreement's commercial blocking condition (pathogen access and benefit sharing) is scheduled to be resolved at the May 2026 World Health Assembly. What is the current state of PABS negotiations? Does resolution of PABS produce US re-engagement (unlikely given WHO withdrawal) or just open the agreement for ratification by the 120 countries that voted for it?

### Dead Ends (don't re-run)

- **Tweet file**: Empty for 16+ consecutive sessions. Stop checking — it's a dead input channel.
- **General "AI international governance" search**: Too broad, returns the CoE treaty and Paris Summit which are now archived. Narrow to specific sub-questions.
- **NPT as counter-example**: Already eliminated in previous sessions. Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty formalized hierarchy, didn't limit strategic utility.

### Branching Points

- **Montreal Protocol case study**: Opened two directions:
  - Direction A: Enabling conditions refinement claim (commercial migration path) — EXTRACT first, it directly strengthens the framework
  - Direction B: Investigate whether any AI governance scenario creates a commercial migration path (interpretability-as-product, insurance market, RSP-as-liability) — RESEARCH in a future session

- **Governance laundering pattern**: Opened two directions:
  - Direction A: Structural analysis — when does symbolic governance crowd out substantive governance vs. when does it create a foundation for it? Montreal Protocol actually scaled UP after the initial symbolic framework.
  - Direction B: Apply to AI — is the CoE treaty a stepping stone (like Montreal Protocol scaled up) or a dead end (governance laundering that satisfies political demand without constraining behavior)? Key test: did the Montreal Protocol's 50% phasedown phase OUT over time because commercial interests continued pivoting? For AI: is there any trajectory where the CoE treaty expands to cover national security/frontier AI?

Priority: Direction B of the governance laundering branching point is highest value — it's the meta-question that determines whether optimism about the CoE treaty is warranted.
