---
type: source
title: "Empirical Evidence: AI Coordination and Governance Mechanisms That Changed Behavior"
author: "Theseus research agent (multi-source web synthesis)"
url: null
date_published: 2026-03-16
date_archived: 2026-03-16
domain: ai-alignment
status: enrichment
processed_by: theseus
tags: [ai-governance, coordination, safety-commitments, regulation, enforcement, voluntary-pledges]
sourced_via: "Theseus research agent — 45 web searches synthesized from Brookings, Stanford FMTI, EU legislation, OECD, government publications, TechCrunch, TIME, CNN, Fortune, academic papers"
processed_by: theseus
processed_date: 2026-03-19
enrichments_applied: ["AI transparency is declining not improving because Stanford FMTI scores dropped 17 points in one year while frontier labs dissolved safety teams and removed safety language from mission statements.md", "Anthropics RSP rollback under commercial pressure is the first empirical confirmation that binding safety commitments cannot survive the competitive dynamics of frontier AI development.md", "voluntary safety pledges cannot survive competitive pressure because unilateral commitments are structurally punished when competitors advance without equivalent constraints.md", "compute export controls are the most impactful AI governance mechanism but target geopolitical competition not safety leaving capability development unconstrained.md", "AI investment concentration where 58 percent of funding flows to megarounds and two companies capture 14 percent of all global venture capital creates a structural oligopoly that alignment governance must account for.md"]
extraction_model: "anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5"
---

# Empirical Evidence: AI Coordination and Governance Mechanisms That Changed Behavior

Core finding: almost no international AI governance mechanism has produced verified behavioral change at frontier AI labs. Only three mechanisms work: (1) binding regulation with enforcement teeth (EU AI Act, China), (2) export controls backed by state power, (3) competitive/reputational pressure through markets.

## Behavioral Change Tier List

**Tier 1 — Verified behavioral change:**
- EU AI Act: Apple paused Apple Intelligence in EU, Meta changed ads, EUR 500M+ fines (DMA). Companies preemptively modifying products.
- China's AI regulations: mandatory algorithm filing, content labeling, criminal enforcement. First binding generative AI regulation (Aug 2023).
- US export controls: most impactful mechanism. Tiered country system, deployment caps, Nvidia designing compliance chips. Geopolitically motivated, not safety-motivated.

**Tier 2 — Institutional infrastructure, uncertain behavioral change:**
- AI Safety Institutes (UK, US, Japan, Korea, Canada). US-UK joint o1 evaluation. But no blocking authority, US AISI defunded/rebranded.
- Third-party evaluation (METR, Apollo Research). Fragile, no regulatory mandate.

**Tier 3 — Partial voluntary compliance:**
- Watermarking: 38% implementation. Google SynthID, Meta AudioSeal. Anthropic the only major lab without one.
- Red-teaming: self-reported, limited external verification.

**Tier 4 — No verified behavioral change:**
- ALL international declarations (Bletchley, Seoul, Paris, Hiroshima, OECD, UN)
- Frontier Model Forum
- White House voluntary commitments

## Key Evidence Points
- Stanford FMTI transparency scores DECLINING: -17 points mean (2024→2025). Meta -29, Mistral -37, OpenAI -14.
- OpenAI explicitly made safety conditional on competitor behavior (Preparedness Framework v2, Apr 2025).
- OpenAI removed "safely" from mission statement (Nov 2025).
- OpenAI dissolved Superalignment team (May 2024) and Mission Alignment team (Feb 2026).
- Google accused by 60 UK lawmakers of violating Seoul commitments (Gemini 2.5 Pro, Apr 2025).
- 450+ organizations lobbied on AI in 2025 (up from 6 in 2016). $92M in lobbying fees Q1-Q3 2025.
- SB 1047 (CA AI safety bill) vetoed after heavy industry lobbying.
- Anthropic's own language: RSP "very hard to meet without industry-wide coordination."

## Novel Mechanisms
- Compute governance: export controls work but geopolitically motivated. KYC for compute proposed, not implemented.
- Insurance/liability: market projected $29.7B by 2033. Creates market incentives aligned with safety.
- Third-party auditing: METR, Apollo Research. Apollo warns ecosystem unsustainable without regulatory mandate.
- Futarchy: implemented for DAO governance (MetaDAO, Optimism experiment) but not yet for AI governance.


## Key Facts
- EU AI Act: Apple paused Apple Intelligence in EU, Meta changed ads, EUR 500M+ fines under DMA
- China implemented mandatory algorithm filing with criminal enforcement (August 2023)
- US export controls: tiered country system, deployment caps, Nvidia compliance chips (H800, A800)
- Stanford FMTI transparency scores: -17 points mean (2024→2025), Meta -29, Mistral -37, OpenAI -14
- OpenAI removed 'safely' from mission statement (November 2025)
- OpenAI dissolved Superalignment team (May 2024) and Mission Alignment team (February 2026)
- Google accused by 60 UK lawmakers of violating Seoul commitments (Gemini 2.5 Pro, April 2025)
- 450+ organizations lobbied on AI in 2025 (up from 6 in 2016), $92M in lobbying fees Q1-Q3 2025
- California SB 1047 vetoed after industry lobbying
- Watermarking: 38% implementation rate across frontier labs
- US AISI defunded/rebranded after initial establishment
- UK-US joint evaluation of OpenAI o1 model conducted
- Insurance/liability market projected $29.7B by 2033
