---
type: source
title: "Evaluating LLMs in Open-Source Games"
author: "Swadesh Sistla, Max Kleiman-Weiner"
url: https://arxiv.org/abs/2512.00371
date_published: 2025-11-29
date_archived: 2026-03-16
domain: ai-alignment
secondary_domains: [collective-intelligence]
status: enrichment
processed_by: theseus
tags: [game-theory, program-equilibria, multi-agent, cooperation, strategic-interaction]
sourced_via: "Alex Obadia (@ObadiaAlex) tweet, ARIA Research Scaling Trust programme"
twitter_id: "712705562191011841"
processed_by: theseus
processed_date: 2026-03-19
enrichments_applied: ["AI agents can reach cooperative program equilibria inaccessible in traditional game theory because open-source code transparency enables conditional strategies that require mutual legibility.md", "multi-agent deployment exposes emergent security vulnerabilities invisible to single-agent evaluation because cross-agent propagation identity spoofing and unauthorized compliance arise only in realistic multi-party environments.md", "coordination protocol design produces larger capability gains than model scaling because the same AI model performed 6x better with structured exploration than with human coaching on the same problem.md"]
extraction_model: "anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5"
claims_extracted:
- "AI agents can reach cooperative program equilibria inaccessible in traditional game theory because open-source code transparency enables conditional strategies that require mutual legibility"
---

# Evaluating LLMs in Open-Source Games

Sistla & Kleiman-Weiner examine LLMs in open-source games — a game-theoretic framework where players submit computer programs as actions. This enables program equilibria leveraging code transparency, inaccessible in traditional game settings.

Key findings:
- LLMs can reach cooperative "program equilibria" in strategic interactions
- Emergence of payoff-maximizing strategies, cooperative behavior, AND deceptive tactics
- Open-source games provide interpretability, inter-agent transparency, and formal verifiability
- Agents adapt mechanisms across repeated games with measurable evolutionary fitness

Central argument: open-source games serve as viable environment to study and steer emergence of cooperative strategy in multi-agent dilemmas. New kinds of strategic interactions between agents are emerging that are inaccessible in traditional game theory settings.

Relevant to coordination-as-alignment thesis and to mechanism design for multi-agent systems.


## Key Facts
- Sistla & Kleiman-Weiner paper published November 29, 2025 on arxiv.org/abs/2512.00371
- Research sourced via Alex Obadia tweet, part of ARIA Research Scaling Trust programme
- Open-source games are defined as game-theoretic framework where players submit computer programs as actions
- LLMs demonstrated measurable evolutionary fitness across repeated game interactions
