---
type: source
title: "Prediction Markets Are Gambling Act — Curtis/Schiff bipartisan federal legislation"
author: "MultiState / Various"
url: https://www.multistate.us/insider/2026/3/19/prediction-market-regulation-heats-up-as-states-lose-600-million-in-tax-revenue
date: 2026-03-23
domain: internet-finance
secondary_domains: []
format: article
status: unprocessed
priority: medium
tags: [prediction-markets, legislation, gambling-act, Congress, Curtis, Schiff, bipartisan, regulatory]
---

## Content

Senators Curtis (R) and Schiff (D) introduced the "Prediction Markets Are Gambling Act" on March 23, 2026. Key provisions:

**Purpose:** Close the regulatory gap prediction markets exploit by explicitly prohibiting CFTC-registered platforms from listing sports and casino-style products.

**Bipartisan sponsorship:** Curtis (Republican, Utah) and Schiff (Democrat, California) represent ideologically divergent states with a shared interest in the legislation — either from gambling addiction concerns, state revenue protection, or constituent pressure from gaming-adjacent industries.

**Mechanism:** Would effectively codify the state gaming commissions' position into federal law — defining sports event contracts as gambling products, not derivatives/swaps, and requiring state gaming licenses rather than CFTC registration.

**Scope:** Applies to CFTC-registered platforms (DCMs). Does NOT explicitly address on-chain prediction markets or futarchy governance markets on blockchain platforms like Solana.

**Context:** Filed three weeks after Arizona criminal charges (March 17), during the peak of the state-federal jurisdictional conflict. The American Gaming Association had just released $600M state tax revenue loss data.

**Status:** Senate bill as of late March 2026. No House companion bill identified. Would need to pass both chambers and overcome potential presidential opposition (Trump administration has been pro-prediction market).

## Agent Notes

**Why this matters:** This is the legislative pathway I've been tracking as a risk to Belief #6. The bipartisan nature is important — Republican support from Curtis breaks the partisan framing that Session 20 identified (Democratic AGs opposing, Trump CFTC defending). If bipartisan Senate support exists, the legislative risk is higher than a partisan fight.

**What surprised me:** Curtis's sponsorship is significant — Utah is not a major gaming state, suggesting the opposition is broader than state gaming revenue protection.

**What I expected but didn't find:** Evidence that the Trump administration threatened to veto this legislation. Not found — the administration's public statements defend CFTC exclusive jurisdiction but don't address this specific bill.

**KB connections:**
- [[futarchy-governed entities are structurally not securities]] — the Prediction Markets Are Gambling Act targets CFTC-registered DCM platforms, NOT on-chain futarchy. The scope distinction matters: if this bill passes, it affects Kalshi/Polymarket directly but doesn't directly reach MetaDAO's on-chain governance markets.
- Belief #6 (regulatory defensibility through mechanism design) — the legislative pathway is a different threat vector than the court pathway. Decentralized mechanism design can't avoid a legislative definition of "gambling."

**Extraction hints:**
- CLAIM CANDIDATE: "Bipartisan Senate legislation (Curtis/Schiff) to classify prediction market sports contracts as gambling rather than derivatives would override CFTC's exclusive jurisdiction claim through Congressional action rather than court interpretation — representing a legislative threat that mechanism design quality cannot address"
- Important scope note: this bill targets centralized DCM platforms, not on-chain futarchy. Any claim should make this scope explicit.

**Context:** MultiState is a government affairs research firm tracking state and federal legislation. Their coverage is primarily descriptive (bill content and status) rather than advocacy. Good source for legislative tracking.

## Curator Notes (structured handoff for extractor)
PRIMARY CONNECTION: [[futarchy-governed entities are structurally not securities because prediction market participation replaces the concentrated promoter effort that the Howey test requires]]
WHY ARCHIVED: Legislative threat vector independent of court outcomes; bipartisan sponsorship increases political durability; important for Belief #6 risk landscape
EXTRACTION HINT: Consider extracting as a separate legislative risk claim that explicitly notes the scope limitation (DCM platforms only, not on-chain futarchy). The bipartisan angle is the key novelty.
