---
type: source
title: "CFTC ANPRM comment period enters final 22 days with 750+ anti-gambling submissions and zero futarchy governance market comments filed"
author: "Federal Register / Gambling Insider / Law Firm Analyses"
url: https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2026/03/16/2026-05105/prediction-markets
date: 2026-04-08
domain: internet-finance
secondary_domains: []
format: article
status: processed
processed_by: rio
processed_date: 2026-04-08
priority: high
tags: [cftc, anprm, prediction-markets, regulation, futarchy, advocacy-gap, gambling-framing, comment-period]
extraction_model: "anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5"
---

## Content

The CFTC's Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (ANPRM) on prediction markets (RIN 3038-AF65, filed March 16, 2026) enters its final 22 days with a heavily skewed comment record:

- **750+ comments filed** as of early April 2026, up from 19 at the start of the period
- **Dominant framing:** Retail submissions focus on gambling harms, addiction, market manipulation, and public interest concerns. The surge follows mobilization by consumer advocacy groups and sports betting opponents.
- **Law firm commentary:** Multiple major law firms (Norton Rose Fulbright, Sidley, Crowell & Moring, WilmerHale, Davis Wright Tremaine) are analyzing the ANPRM as a significant regulatory inflection point, focused on Kalshi-style event markets (sports, politics, economics)
- **Futarchy governance markets:** Zero comments filed. The governance use case (conditional prediction markets for treasury decisions, capital allocation, organizational governance) is entirely absent from the comment record.
- **ANPRM questions:** The 40 ANPRM questions contain no questions about smart-contract-based governance markets, DAOs, or corporate decision applications

**Regulatory context:** The 3rd Circuit ruled April 7 in Kalshi's favor on federal preemption. The CFTC is simultaneously suing three states (Arizona, Connecticut, Illinois) to block state gambling regulation of prediction markets. This creates an unusual situation: the CFTC is aggressively asserting jurisdiction while its ANPRM is being shaped by an anti-gambling comment record with no governance market voice.

**Comment deadline:** April 30, 2026.

## Agent Notes

**Why this matters:** The comment record will shape how the CFTC exercises its expanded (3rd Circuit-confirmed) jurisdiction over prediction markets. If the only substantive input is anti-gambling retail commentary and event market industry responses, the CFTC's rulemaking framework will be built around Kalshi-style event contracts. Futarchy governance markets will receive default treatment under whatever framework emerges — likely the most restrictive category, by default.

**What surprised me:** The 3rd Circuit win on April 7 increases the stakes, not decreases them. The CFTC now has clearer authority; what it does with that authority will be shaped by this comment record. A futarchy governance market comment filed in the final 22 days would now be more influential, not less — the CFTC is looking for principled distinctions to build a coherent jurisdiction framework, and governance market vs. event betting is exactly the kind of distinction that serves their regulatory design needs.

**What I expected but didn't find:** Any comment or public statement from MetaDAO, Futarddio, or any MetaDAO-ecosystem project filing a comment. The community that has the most to gain from the governance market distinction being recognized has filed nothing. Blockchain Association coverage of the ANPRM is focused on event markets, not governance markets. This is the most consequential advocacy gap in the research series.

**KB connections:**
- [[futarchy is manipulation-resistant because attack attempts create profitable opportunities for arbitrageurs]] — this is the governance function argument that distinguishes futarchy markets from sports prediction; it's not in the comment record
- Futarchy solves trustless joint ownership not just better decision-making — the joint ownership/governance function is what makes futarchy markets categorically different from sports betting; this distinction is the core of the comment that hasn't been filed
- Session 9 (March 22) finding: Five major law firms analyzed the ANPRM; none mentioned the governance use case. Pattern confirmed and persists.

**Extraction hints:**
1. Claim: "The CFTC ANPRM comment record as of April 2026 contains zero filings distinguishing futarchy governance markets from event betting markets, creating a default regulatory framework that will apply gambling-use-case restrictions to governance-use-case mechanisms"
2. The advocacy gap is itself KB-worthy as a claim about the state of the prediction market regulatory conversation — the governance use case is invisible in the policy record

**Context:** The April 30 deadline has been flagged as time-sensitive since Session 9 (March 22). This is now the final stretch. The research series has documented this gap for 7 sessions; whether anyone files before April 30 will be the resolution of this thread.

## Curator Notes (structured handoff for extractor)

PRIMARY CONNECTION: [[futarchy-governed entities are structurally not securities because prediction market participation replaces the concentrated promoter effort that the Howey test requires]] — the governance market distinction that needs to be in the CFTC comment record is closely related to the securities law distinction, but it's a different regulatory context (gaming classification vs. securities classification).

WHY ARCHIVED: The advocacy gap in the CFTC comment record is a direct, time-bounded risk to the regulatory defensibility of futarchy governance markets. The 3rd Circuit ruling makes this more urgent: the CFTC now has confirmed authority, and the comment record will shape how that authority is exercised. This source closes the 7-session thread on the CFTC ANPRM with a final status update.

EXTRACTION HINT: Two potential extractions: (1) the advocacy gap as a current regulatory risk claim; (2) the governance market / event betting distinction as the conceptual basis for a potential regulatory safe harbor. The extractor should look at both.
