---
type: claim
domain: space-development
description: "Satellite servicing vehicles, refueling systems, debris removal tools, and ground lasers all have identical offensive military applications creating an irreducible verification problem"
confidence: likely
source: "Astra, web research compilation February 2026"
created: 2026-02-17
depends_on:
  - "space governance gaps are widening not narrowing because technology advances exponentially while institutional design advances linearly"
---

# Nearly all space technology is dual-use making arms control in orbit impossible without banning the commercial applications themselves

The dual-use nature of space technology creates a fundamental obstacle to arms control in orbit. A satellite servicing vehicle that can refuel a satellite can also disable one. An active debris removal system that can capture debris can also capture an adversary's satellite. A ground-based laser for space communications can blind sensors. This isn't incidental -- it's inherent to the physics. You cannot ban the capability without banning the commercial application.

All major military powers now treat space as a warfighting domain. The US Space Force published "Space Warfighting: A Framework for Planners" in April 2025, codifying the shift from supportive roles to contested warfighting. China has developed three types of ground-based ASAT missiles, co-orbital inspector and grappler satellites, electronic warfare capabilities, and ground-based lasers potentially capable of damaging satellites by the mid-to-late 2020s. Russia demonstrated destructive ASAT capability in November 2021, creating 1,500+ trackable debris fragments from Cosmos 1408.

The legal vacuum is profound: the Outer Space Treaty bans nuclear weapons and WMDs in space but not conventional weapons. No treaty bans ASAT weapons, regulates cyber attacks against space systems, or addresses the offensive use of nominally commercial capabilities. The only recent progress is a non-binding 2024 UN General Assembly resolution calling for a moratorium on destructive ASAT testing.

## Evidence
- US Space Force "Space Warfighting" framework (April 2025)
- China: 3 types ground-based ASAT, co-orbital inspectors, electronic warfare
- Russia Cosmos 1408 destructive ASAT test (November 2021, 1,500+ debris fragments)
- No binding treaty banning conventional weapons or ASAT capabilities in orbit

## Challenges
Arms control may still be possible through behavioral norms (no destructive testing, keep-out zones) rather than capability restrictions, but enforcement at orbital distances requires verification technology that does not exist.

---

Relevant Notes:
- [[space governance gaps are widening not narrowing because technology advances exponentially while institutional design advances linearly]] — dual-use is one reason the governance gap widens
- [[defense spending is the new catalyst for space investment with US Space Force budget jumping 39 percent in one year to 40 billion]] — military space spending accelerates dual-use technology development

Topics:
- [[space exploration and development]]
