---
type: source
title: "CISA doesn't have access to Anthropic's Mythos"
author: "Axios Technology (@Axios)"
url: https://www.axios.com/2026/04/21/cisa-anthropic-mythos-ai-security
date: 2026-04-21
domain: grand-strategy
secondary_domains: [ai-alignment]
format: article
status: unprocessed
priority: high
tags: [cisa, anthropic, mythos, access-restriction, offensive-defensive-asymmetry, cyber-governance, national-security]
---

## Content

Despite other government agencies (including the NSA) using Anthropic's Mythos model, CISA — the federal agency specifically charged with cybersecurity defense — does NOT have Mythos access.

Reason: Anthropic decided against public release of Mythos due to its "unprecedented ability to quickly discover and exploit security vulnerabilities." CISA was not given access as part of the restricted testing cohort (40+ companies/organizations).

Context: Mythos's AISI evaluation found it capable of completing 32-step enterprise attack chains. Anthropic provided Mythos Preview access to select organizations — primarily for defensive testing and shoring up security. CISA apparently did not qualify or was not included in that cohort.

The NSA — which handles offensive cyber capabilities — has Mythos. CISA — which handles defensive cyber posture for civilian government — does not.

## Agent Notes
**Why this matters:** The offensive/defensive inversion in Mythos access is a concrete manifestation of the AI-enabled offense-defense asymmetry thesis. The most capable AI attack tool is accessible to offensive operators (NSA) but not the civilian defense operator (CISA). This is not an accident — it reflects Anthropic's access decisions, but the pattern reveals the governance gap: there is no mechanism ensuring that the defensive operator gets access commensurate with the threat the offensive capability creates.
**What surprised me:** That CISA was excluded while NSA was included. CISA's mission is precisely the civilian infrastructure defense that Mythos threatens. Anthropic's restricted access decisions — made privately, based on commercial and security considerations — are effectively making cyber governance decisions without accountability structures.
**What I expected but didn't find:** Whether there's any government process for ensuring CISA gets access to AI capabilities that create threats to its mandate. There doesn't appear to be one. This is governance vacuum through omission.
**KB connections:** [[voluntary-ai-safety-constraints-lack-legal-enforcement-mechanism-when-primary-customer-demands-safety-unconstrained-alternatives]], [[three-track-corporate-safety-governance-stack-reveals-sequential-ceiling-architecture]]
**Extraction hints:** The offensive/defensive access asymmetry pattern may be a standalone claim: "Private AI labs' unilateral access restriction decisions are creating offense-defense imbalances in government cyber capability without any accountability structure." This is distinct from voluntary safety constraints — it's about information asymmetry within the government created by private deployment decisions.
**Context:** Axios is breaking news; this is a brief but credible report. April 21 — same day as Trump's "deal possible" statement, suggesting active information environment around the Anthropic/Pentagon situation.

## Curator Notes (structured handoff for extractor)
PRIMARY CONNECTION: [[voluntary-ai-safety-constraints-lack-legal-enforcement-mechanism-when-primary-customer-demands-safety-unconstrained-alternatives]]
WHY ARCHIVED: The CISA/NSA access asymmetry is the clearest evidence yet that private AI deployment decisions create government cyber governance gaps. Combined with Bloomberg Mythos access source, this paints the full picture: OMB routes around DOD designation, NSA gets access, CISA doesn't, no accountability structure for any of these decisions.
EXTRACTION HINT: Combine with Bloomberg Mythos federal access source and CNBC Trump deal source for the full Mythos governance paradox picture. Don't extract in isolation.
