---
type: claim
domain: internet-finance
description: "AMM metric aggregates price weighted by on-chain liquidity making manipulation require sustained capital lock rather than single trades"
confidence: experimental
source: "MetaDAO AMM proposal CF9QUBS251FnNGZHLJ4WbB2CVRi5BtqJbCqMi47NX1PG, 2024-01-24"
created: 2026-03-11
---

# Liquidity-weighted price over time solves futarchy manipulation through capital commitment not vote counting

The proposed AMM metric for MetaDAO futarchy uses "liquidity-weighted price over time" where "the more liquidity that is on the books, the more weight the current price of the pass or fail market is given." This shifts manipulation cost from single-trade price impact (CLOBs) to sustained capital commitment.

In CLOB futarchy, "someone with 1 $META can push the midpoint towards the current best bid/ask" when spreads are wide. The proposal notes this creates vulnerability to selective market cranking and VWAP manipulation through wash trading.

The AMM approach makes manipulation expensive through two mechanisms:
1. **High fees (3-5%)** that "aggressively discourage wash-trading and manipulation"
2. **Liquidity weighting** that requires attackers to provide substantial liquidity at manipulated prices, not just execute trades

The proposal acknowledges CLOB manipulation is "a 1/n problem" addressable by defensive bots, but argues AMMs provide structural resistance rather than requiring active defense.

## Evidence
- Liquidity-weighted price metric described in proposal
- CLOB vulnerability: 1 META can move midpoint in wide spreads
- Proposed 3-5% fee structure
- Wash trading and selective cranking identified as CLOB attack vectors

## Challenges
- Untested in production futarchy (experimental confidence)
- No empirical data on manipulation resistance
- High fees may reduce legitimate trading volume


### Additional Evidence (extend)
*Source: 2024-01-24-futardio-proposal-develop-amm-program-for-futarchy | Added: 2026-03-16*

The proposal specifies the implementation: 'liquidity-weighted price over time. The more liquidity that is on the books, the more weight the current price of the pass or fail market is given. Every time there is a swap, these metrics are updated/aggregated.' This creates a continuous aggregation mechanism rather than point-in-time measurement.


### Additional Evidence (extend)
*Source: [[2026-03-18-telegram-m3taversal-futairdbot-what-are-examples-of-futarchy-being-ma]] | Added: 2026-03-18*

The mechanism requires actual capital commitment sustained over time rather than vote counting. Manipulators cannot simply stuff a ballot box - they must put real money at stake and maintain that position over the duration needed to move time-weighted prices. However, this remains at experimental confidence as there are no documented case studies of attempted manipulation in real futarchy deployments and how the system responded.

---

Relevant Notes:
- [[futarchy is manipulation-resistant because attack attempts create profitable opportunities for defenders]]
- [[MetaDAOs Autocrat program implements futarchy through conditional token markets where proposals create parallel pass and fail universes settled by time-weighted average price over a three-day window]]
- metadao.md

Topics:
- domains/internet-finance/_map
- core/mechanisms/_map