# Blockchain Infrastructure & Coordination

Navigation hub for claims about blockchain as coordination infrastructure — the technical and economic substrate that enables futarchy, permissionless capital formation, and token-governed organizations.

## The Attractor State
- [[the blockchain coordination attractor state is programmable trust infrastructure where verifiable protocols ownership alignment and market-tested governance enable coordination that scales with complexity rather than requiring trusted intermediaries]]

## Capital Formation
- [[cryptos primary use case is capital formation not payments or store of value because permissionless token issuance solves the fundraising bottleneck that solo founders and small teams face]]
- [[internet capital markets compress fundraising from months to days because permissionless raises eliminate gatekeepers while futarchy replaces due diligence bottlenecks with real-time market pricing]]

## DeFi Mechanisms
- [[Omnipair enables permissionless margin trading on long-tail assets through a generalized AMM that combines constant-product swaps with isolated lending in a single oracle-less immutable pool]]
- [[permissionless leverage on metaDAO ecosystem tokens catalyzes trading volume and price discovery that strengthens governance by making futarchy markets more liquid]]
- [[dynamic performance-based token minting replaces fixed emission schedules by tying new token creation to measurable outcomes creating algorithmic meritocracy in token distribution]]
- [[ownership coin treasuries should be actively managed through buybacks and token sales as continuous capital calibration not treated as static war chests]]

## Governance On-Chain
- [[MetaDAOs Autocrat program implements futarchy through conditional token markets where proposals create parallel pass and fail universes settled by time-weighted average price over a three-day window]]
- [[futarchy-governed liquidation is the enforcement mechanism that makes unruggable ICOs credible because investors can force full treasury return when teams materially misrepresent]]
- [[futarchy can override its own prior decisions when new evidence emerges because conditional markets re-evaluate proposals against current information not historical commitments]]

## Legal Entity Structures
- [[Ooki DAO proved that DAOs without legal wrappers face general partnership liability making entity structure a prerequisite for any futarchy-governed vehicle]]
- [[futarchy-governed DAOs converge on traditional corporate governance scaffolding for treasury operations because market mechanisms alone cannot provide operational security and legal compliance]]

## Related Maps
- [[internet finance and decision markets]] — the broader domain
- [[core/mechanisms/_map]] — governance mechanism details
- [[core/living-capital/_map]] — investment vehicle design
