---
type: claim
domain: internet-finance
description: "MetaDAO's Mint Governor smart contract in audit as of Feb 2026 would dynamically mint tokens based on performance metrics rather than predetermined schedules, extending the meritocratic principle from governance participation to token supply itself"
confidence: speculative
source: "rio, based on @metaproph3t 'Learning, Fast' (Feb 2026) mentioning Mint Governor in audit"
created: 2026-03-05
depends_on:
  - "[[token economics replacing management fees and carried interest creates natural meritocracy in investment governance]]"
  - "[[MetaDAOs Autocrat program implements futarchy through conditional token markets where proposals create parallel pass and fail universes settled by time-weighted average price over a three-day window]]"
---

# Dynamic performance-based token minting replaces fixed emission schedules by tying new token creation to measurable outcomes creating algorithmic meritocracy in token distribution

Fixed token emission schedules — X tokens per block/epoch regardless of what happened — are the default in crypto. They're simple, predictable, and completely disconnected from value creation. A protocol that ships nothing and a protocol that doubles its TVL receive the same emissions. This creates a structural misalignment: token supply expands on schedule while value creation is irregular and unpredictable.

MetaDAO's Mint Governor (in audit as of February 2026) proposes an alternative: smart contract-governed dynamic minting where new tokens are created based on measurable performance outcomes. The details are sparse — the system is in audit, not production — but the mechanism concept is clear: tie token supply expansion to demonstrated results rather than calendar time.

If implemented correctly, this extends the meritocratic principle that since [[token economics replacing management fees and carried interest creates natural meritocracy in investment governance]] from the governance layer to the supply layer itself. Current token meritocracy works through relative accumulation — good decision-makers accumulate more of a fixed supply. Dynamic minting goes further: the supply itself responds to performance, meaning the pie grows when and because value is created.

The connection to futarchy governance is important. Since [[MetaDAOs Autocrat program implements futarchy through conditional token markets where proposals create parallel pass and fail universes settled by time-weighted average price over a three-day window]], a Mint Governor could be governed by futarchy — the market decides not just what proposals pass but whether performance warrants new token creation. This closes the loop between governance quality, value creation, and token supply.

## Evidence

- @metaproph3t "Learning, Fast" (Feb 17 2026) — Mint Governor smart contract described as "in audit" for dynamic performance-based token minting

## Challenges

- "Performance-based" requires defining measurable outcomes — and every metric can be gamed. TVL can be wash-traded, volume can be inflated, revenue can be manufactured through circular flows
- Dynamic minting adds complexity to token economics that may deter participation — fixed schedules are simple precisely because they're predictable
- The mechanism is in audit, not production — speculative confidence until it ships and operates
- If performance metrics are poorly chosen, dynamic minting could be more inflationary than fixed schedules, diluting holders during periods of metric gaming
- Without robust oracle or futarchy verification of performance claims, this reduces to governance theater with extra steps

---

Relevant Notes:
- [[token economics replacing management fees and carried interest creates natural meritocracy in investment governance]] — Mint Governor extends meritocracy from governance to supply
- [[MetaDAOs Autocrat program implements futarchy through conditional token markets where proposals create parallel pass and fail universes settled by time-weighted average price over a three-day window]] — the governance mechanism that could govern dynamic minting decisions
- [[speculative markets aggregate information through incentive and selection effects not wisdom of crowds]] — market-verified performance metrics would be more robust than self-reported ones

Topics:
- [[internet finance and decision markets]]
