---
description: The three ancient enemies of humanity emerged from specific conditions of the agricultural revolution -- dense populations dependent on staple crops domestic animals and sedentary property -- and increasing specialization has ameliorated all three within the last century
type: claim
domain: health
source: "Architectural Investing, Ch. Burden of Agriculture; Diamond (Guns Germs and Steel); Harari (Sapiens; Homo Deus)"
confidence: likely
created: 2026-02-28
---

# famine disease and war are products of the agricultural revolution not immutable features of human existence and specialization has converted all three from unforeseeable catastrophes into preventable problems

For most of recorded history, thinkers concluded that famine, plague, and war "must be an integral part of God's cosmic plan or of our imperfect nature." But these three enemies were completely unknown for the vast majority of our species' two-million-year evolutionary history. They are unintended byproducts of the agricultural revolution, not features of the human condition.

**Famine** requires large populations dependent on a few staple crops. Hunter-gatherers relied on dozens of wild food sources and could switch between them when one failed -- famines were structurally impossible. Agricultural societies dependent on a single staple crop (wheat, rice, potatoes) faced catastrophic failure from a single drought, flood, or locust swarm. The Great Bengal Famine and Mao's Great Leap Forward could not have existed before food production created the preconditions. The agricultural revolution both enabled larger populations and made those populations existentially vulnerable to harvest failure.

**Epidemic disease** requires large dense populations to sustain itself -- "crowd diseases" like smallpox, measles, and tuberculosis spread quickly, immunize survivors, and die out unless they can jump to new populations. Before agriculture, human populations were too dispersed. Moreover, most epidemic diseases evolved from our domesticated animals: as farmers developed closer relationships with livestock -- drinking their milk, eating their meat, spreading their manure -- microbial invaders jumped species and were winnowed by natural selection into the uniquely human diseases of history. The first attested dates are surprisingly recent: smallpox ~1600 BC, mumps ~400 BC, leprosy ~200 BC.

**Large-scale war** requires sedentary populations with property worth seizing, food surpluses to feed armies, and centralized governance capable of prosecuting campaigns. Before agriculture, conflicts between nomadic bands were personal or tribal -- the losing group could always migrate. Sedentary farming created immovable property, food stores worth plundering, and population densities that rewarded centralized power structures. The same governance structures that solved the internal problems of larger societies also created political bodies capable of conquest.

These three risks formed the risk landscape that drove human progress for 10,000 years. Trade, religion, and empire -- Harari's three engines of human development -- are effective *because of the nature of the agricultural-era problems*, not because they are inherent features of civilization. The motive power for all three was supplied by the risk landscape itself.

The extraordinary development is that increasing economic specialization has effectively ameliorated all three within the last century:
- **Famine:** In 1500, 80+ percent of the population farmed yet lived near the biological subsistence line. Today, 1.3 percent of the US population feeds 300+ million while exporting surplus. The world produces more food than needed. Famine is now a logistics and governance failure, not a resource constraint.
- **Epidemic disease:** Pneumonia is the only infectious disease still among the leading causes of death in developed nations, and usually as a complication of underlying chronic disease. Life expectancy rose from ~30 years globally in 1800 to ~73 in 2019.
- **Large-scale war:** Increasing specialization made wealth knowledge-based rather than resource-based, making conquest economically irrational among developed nations. War is now concentrated in regions where wealth is still primarily embodied in physical assets.

But the same specialization that solved these ancient problems created an entirely new risk landscape. Since existential risk breaks trial and error because the first failure is the last event, the new risks -- nuclear weapons, climate change, AI, bioengineering -- are products of the extreme specialization that defeated famine, disease, and war. Since [[the epidemiological transition marks the shift from material scarcity to social disadvantage as the primary driver of health outcomes in developed nations]], the individual health burden has shifted from infectious disease to chronic noncommunicable disease and mental health crises. The solutions to the old problems are the sources of the new ones.

---

Relevant Notes:
- existential risk breaks trial and error because the first failure is the last event -- the new risk landscape created by specialization permits no second chances, unlike the old one
- [[the epidemiological transition marks the shift from material scarcity to social disadvantage as the primary driver of health outcomes in developed nations]] -- the individual-health analog of this civilizational-risk shift
- specialization and value form an autocatalytic feedback loop where each amplifies the other exponentially -- specialization is the single force that both solved the old risks and created the new ones
- [[Americas declining life expectancy is driven by deaths of despair concentrated in populations and regions most damaged by economic restructuring since the 1980s]] -- the US life expectancy reversal is the most visible symptom of the new risk landscape
- [[Big Food companies engineer addictive products by hacking evolutionary reward pathways creating a noncommunicable disease epidemic more deadly than the famines specialization eliminated]] -- the noncommunicable disease epidemic is the food-system instance of the new risk landscape replacing the old
- capital reallocation toward civilizational problem-solving is autocatalytic because excess returns attract more capital -- solving the new risk landscape creates the same autocatalytic dynamic that solved the old one but now requires deliberate direction rather than trial and error

Topics:
- historical transitions
- health and wellness
- livingip overview
