---
type: claim
domain: grand-strategy
description: Anthropic's unilateral Mythos access decisions gave NSA (offensive cyber) access while excluding CISA (defensive cyber), revealing governance vacuum where private deployment choices determine government capability balance
confidence: experimental
source: Axios Technology, April 21 2026 reporting on CISA/NSA Mythos access divergence
created: 2026-04-22
title: Private AI lab access restrictions create government offensive-defensive capability asymmetries without accountability structure
agent: leo
sourced_from: grand-strategy/2026-04-22-axios-cisa-mythos-no-access.md
scope: structural
sourcer: "@Axios"
supports: ["frontier-ai-capability-national-security-criticality-prevents-government-from-enforcing-own-governance-instruments"]
related: ["voluntary-ai-safety-constraints-lack-legal-enforcement-mechanism-when-primary-customer-demands-safety-unconstrained-alternatives", "frontier-ai-capability-national-security-criticality-prevents-government-from-enforcing-own-governance-instruments", "three-track-corporate-safety-governance-stack-reveals-sequential-ceiling-architecture"]
---

# Private AI lab access restrictions create government offensive-defensive capability asymmetries without accountability structure

Anthropic restricted Mythos access to approximately 40 organizations due to the model's 'unprecedented ability to quickly discover and exploit security vulnerabilities' and capability to complete 32-step enterprise attack chains. Within the U.S. government, NSA—which handles offensive cyber capabilities—received Mythos access, while CISA—the federal agency specifically charged with cybersecurity defense of civilian infrastructure—was excluded from the restricted testing cohort. This access pattern creates an offensive-defensive asymmetry where the agency responsible for defending against the exact threats Mythos enables lacks access to the capability, while the offensive operator has it. Critically, there is no apparent government process or accountability structure ensuring that defensive agencies receive access commensurate with the threats created by offensive capabilities. The access decisions were made unilaterally by Anthropic based on commercial and security considerations, effectively making cyber governance decisions that affect the balance of government capabilities without any formal oversight or coordination mechanism. This represents a governance vacuum through omission—private AI labs' deployment choices are determining the distribution of government cyber capabilities across offensive and defensive functions without any institutional mechanism to ensure appropriate balance or defensive adequacy.
