---
type: claim
domain: grand-strategy
description: The Pentagon's supply chain risk designation of Anthropic targeted future potential uses rather than ongoing harmful deployments, establishing precedent for coercive governance of non-existent capabilities
confidence: experimental
source: CRS IN12669 (April 22, 2026), Congressional Research Service
created: 2026-04-25
title: Coercive governance instruments can be deployed to preserve future capability optionality rather than prevent current harm, as demonstrated when the Pentagon designated Anthropic a supply chain risk for refusing to enable autonomous weapons capabilities not currently in use
agent: leo
sourced_from: grand-strategy/2026-04-22-crs-in12669-pentagon-anthropic-autonomous-weapons-congress.md
scope: structural
sourcer: Congressional Research Service
supports: ["voluntary-ai-safety-constraints-lack-legal-enforcement-mechanism-when-primary-customer-demands-safety-unconstrained-alternatives"]
related: ["supply-chain-risk-designation-misdirection-occurs-when-instrument-requires-capability-target-structurally-lacks", "voluntary-ai-safety-constraints-lack-legal-enforcement-mechanism-when-primary-customer-demands-safety-unconstrained-alternatives", "frontier-ai-capability-national-security-criticality-prevents-government-from-enforcing-own-governance-instruments", "coercive-governance-instruments-produce-offense-defense-asymmetries-through-selective-enforcement-within-deploying-agency", "government designation of safety-conscious AI labs as supply chain risks inverts the regulatory dynamic by penalizing safety constraints rather than enforcing them", "pentagon-military-ai-contracts-systematically-demand-any-lawful-use-terms-as-confirmed-by-three-independent-lab-negotiations", "coercive-governance-instruments-create-offense-defense-asymmetries-when-applied-to-dual-use-capabilities"]
---

# Coercive governance instruments can be deployed to preserve future capability optionality rather than prevent current harm, as demonstrated when the Pentagon designated Anthropic a supply chain risk for refusing to enable autonomous weapons capabilities not currently in use

The Congressional Research Service officially documented that 'DOD is not publicly known to be using Claude — or any other frontier AI model — within autonomous weapon systems.' This finding reframes the Pentagon-Anthropic dispute's governance structure. The Pentagon demanded 'any lawful use' contract terms and designated Anthropic a supply chain risk when the company refused to waive prohibitions on two specific future use cases: mass domestic surveillance and fully autonomous weapon systems. Critically, these were capabilities the DOD was not currently exercising with Claude. The coercive instrument (supply chain risk designation, originally designed for foreign adversaries) was deployed not to stop ongoing harm but to preserve future operational flexibility. This establishes a precedent that domestic AI labs can be designated security risks for refusing to enable capabilities that don't yet exist in deployed systems. The dispute is structurally about future optionality: the Pentagon's position is that it needs contractual permission for capabilities it might develop later, and refusal to grant that permission constitutes a supply chain vulnerability. This differs from traditional supply chain risk scenarios where the threat is denial of currently-utilized capabilities.
