---
type: decision
entity_type: decision_market
name: 'MetaDAO: Migrate Autocrat Program to v0.1'
domain: internet-finance
status: passed
tracked_by: rio
created: '2026-03-24'
last_updated: '2026-03-24'
parent_entity: '[[metadao]]'
platform: metadao
proposer: HfFi634cyurmVVDr9frwu4MjGLJzz9XbAJz981HdVaNz
proposal_url: https://www.futard.io/proposal/AkLsnieYpCU2UsSqUNrbMrQNi9bvdnjxx75mZbJns9zi
proposal_date: '2023-12-03'
resolution_date: '2023-12-13'
category: governance
summary: This proposal migrated 990,000 META, 10,025 USDC, and 5.5 SOL from the original
  autocrat program treasury to an upgraded v0.1 program that makes proposal duration
  configurable with a new 3-day default (down from longer periods). The upgrade aimed
  to enable faster feedback loops in MetaDAO's futarchy governance process, though
  it notably lacked verifiable builds and required trust in the proposer.
tags:
- futardio
- metadao
- futarchy
- solana
- governance
- metadao
source_archive: "inbox/archive/2023-12-03-futardio-proposal-migrate-autocrat-program-to-v01.md"
supports:
- metadao-autocrat-migration-accepted-counterparty-risk-from-unverifiable-builds-prioritizing-iteration-speed-over-security-guarantees
- metadao-autocrat-v01-reduces-proposal-duration-to-three-days-enabling-faster-governance-iteration
- "{'MetaDAO': 'Migrate Autocrat Program to v0.1'}"
- "MetaDAO: Migrate Autocrat Program to v0.1"
related:
- "{'Futardio': 'Proposal'}"
- metadao-governance-migration-2026-03
- "{'MetaDAO': 'Migrate Autocrat Program to v0.2'}"
- "futardio-proposal-1"
- "MetaDAO: Migrate Autocrat Program to v0.2"
- "Omnipair: OMFG-003 — Migrate to V0.6"
reweave_edges:
- "{'Futardio': 'Proposal'}"
- metadao-autocrat-migration-accepted-counterparty-risk-from-unverifiable-builds-prioritizing-iteration-speed-over-security-guarantees|supports|2026-04-18
- metadao-autocrat-v01-reduces-proposal-duration-to-three-days-enabling-faster-governance-iteration|supports|2026-04-18
- metadao-governance-migration-2026-03|related|2026-04-18
- "{'MetaDAO': 'Migrate Autocrat Program to v0.1|supports|2026-04-18'}"
- "{'MetaDAO': 'Migrate Autocrat Program to v0.2|related|2026-04-18'}"
- "Futardio: Proposal #1|related|2026-04-19"
- "MetaDAO: Migrate Autocrat Program to v0.1|supports|2026-04-19"
- "MetaDAO: Migrate Autocrat Program to v0.2|related|2026-04-19"
- "Omnipair: OMFG-003 — Migrate to V0.6|related|2026-04-19"
---

# MetaDAO: Migrate Autocrat Program to v0.1

## Summary

This proposal migrated 990,000 META, 10,025 USDC, and 5.5 SOL from the original autocrat program treasury to an upgraded v0.1 program that makes proposal duration configurable with a new 3-day default (down from longer periods). The upgrade aimed to enable faster feedback loops in MetaDAO's futarchy governance process, though it notably lacked verifiable builds and required trust in the proposer.

## Market Data

- Proposal: Migrate Autocrat Program to v0.1?
- Status: Passed
- Proposal account: `AkLsnieYpCU2UsSqUNrbMrQNi9bvdnjxx75mZbJns9zi`
- DAO account: `3wDJ5g73ABaDsL1qofF5jJqEJU4RnRQrvzRLkSnFc5di`
- Proposer: `HfFi634cyurmVVDr9frwu4MjGLJzz9XbAJz981HdVaNz`
- Autocrat version: 0

## Significance

This proposal represents a critical early test of MetaDAO's ability to upgrade its own core governance infrastructure through futarchy markets. The migration to v0.1 with configurable 3-day proposal windows demonstrates the DAO's willingness to experiment with faster decision cycles, a key parameter in futarchy system design that balances market information aggregation against operational speed.

The passage of this proposal despite acknowledged counter-party risk (non-verifiable builds requiring trust in the proposer) reveals important tensions in early-stage futarchy governance. Token holders accepted significant security trade-offs to achieve operational improvements, suggesting that in practice, futarchy DAOs may prioritize iteration speed over cryptographic guarantees during bootstrap phases. This creates a precedent where governance upgrades can pass even when they temporarily compromise the trustless properties that theoretically justify blockchain governance.

The focus on "quicker feedback loops" as the primary justification highlights a meta-governance concern: futarchy systems must tune their own temporal parameters to remain viable. Three-day proposal windows represent a hypothesis that faster cycles improve governance quality, but this also compresses the time available for market participants to research, trade, and price in information. This proposal thus tests whether MetaDAO's market depth and participant sophistication could support accelerated decision-making without sacrificing prediction accuracy.

## Full Proposal Text

## Proposal Details
- Project: MetaDAO
- Proposal: Migrate Autocrat Program to v0.1?
- Status: Passed
- Created: 2023-12-03
- URL: https://www.futard.io/proposal/AkLsnieYpCU2UsSqUNrbMrQNi9bvdnjxx75mZbJns9zi
- Description: Most importantly, I’ve made the slots per proposal configurable, and changed its default to 3 days to allow for quicker feedback loops.

## Summary

### 🎯 Key Points  
The proposal aims to migrate assets (990,000 META, 10,025 USDC, and 5.5 SOL) from the treasury of the first autocrat program to the second program, while introducing configurable proposal slots and a default duration of 3 days for quicker feedback.

### 📊 Impact Analysis  
#### 👥 Stakeholder Impact  
Stakeholders may benefit from enhanced feedback efficiency and asset management through the upgraded autocrat program.

#### 📈 Upside Potential  
The changes could lead to faster decision-making processes and improved overall program functionality.

#### 📉 Risk Factors  
There is a risk of potential bugs in the new program and trust issues regarding the absence of verifiable builds, which could jeopardize the security of the funds.

## Content

## Overview

I've made some improvements to the autocrat program. You can see these [here](https://github.com/metaDAOproject/meta-dao/pull/36/files). Most importantly, I've made the slots per proposal configurable, and changed its default to 3 days to allow for quicker feedback loops.

This proposal migrates the 990,000 META, 10,025 USDC, and 5.5 SOL from the treasury owned by the first program to the treasury owned by the second program.

## Key risks

### Smart contract risk

There is a risk that the new program contains an important bug that the first one didn't. I consider this risk small given that I didn't change that much of autocrat.

### Counter-party risk

Unfortunately, for reasons I can't get into, I was unable to build this new program with [solana-verifiable-build](https://github.com/Ellipsis-Labs/solana-verifiable-build). You'd be placing trust in me that I didn't introduce a backdoor, not on the GitHub repo, that allows me to steal the funds.

For future versions, I should always be able to use verifiable builds.

## Raw Data

- Proposal account: `AkLsnieYpCU2UsSqUNrbMrQNi9bvdnjxx75mZbJns9zi`
- Proposal number: 1
- DAO account: `3wDJ5g73ABaDsL1qofF5jJqEJU4RnRQrvzRLkSnFc5di`
- Proposer: `HfFi634cyurmVVDr9frwu4MjGLJzz9XbAJz981HdVaNz`
- Autocrat version: 0
- Completed: 2023-12-13
- Ended: 2023-12-13

## Relationship to KB

- [[futarchy-implementations-prioritize-operational-iteration-speed-over-security-guarantees-during-early-development-phases]]
- [[futarchy-governed-daos-face-inherent-tensions-between-trustless-verification-requirements-and-the-need-for-rapid-governance-system-upgrades]]
- [[shorter-proposal-durations-in-futarchy-markets-trade-information-aggregation-quality-for-operational-velocity]]
- [[futarchy-daos-must-continuously-tune-their-own-temporal-parameters-through-self-referential-governance-proposals]]
- [[early-stage-futarchy-adoption-requires-accepting-counter-party-risk-that-contradicts-the-trustless-premises-of-blockchain-governance]]

---

Relevant Entities:
- [[metadao]] — parent organization

Topics:
- [[maps/internet finance and decision markets]]