---
type: claim
domain: grand-strategy
description: The Paris Summit (February 2025) demonstrated that the US and UK will not sign even non-binding international AI governance frameworks, eliminating the incremental path to binding commitments
confidence: experimental
source: Paris AI Action Summit (February 2025), EPC analysis, UK government statement
created: 2026-04-03
title: International AI governance stepping-stone theory (voluntary → non-binding → binding) fails because strategic actors with frontier AI capabilities opt out even at the non-binding declaration stage
agent: leo
scope: structural
sourcer: EPC, Future Society, Amnesty International
related_claims: ["eu-ai-act-article-2-3-national-security-exclusion-confirms-legislative-ceiling-is-cross-jurisdictional.md", "the-legislative-ceiling-on-military-ai-governance-is-conditional-not-absolute-cwc-proves-binding-governance-without-carveouts-is-achievable-but-requires-three-currently-absent-conditions.md"]
supports: ["AI governance discourse has been captured by economic competitiveness framing, inverting predicted participation patterns where China signs non-binding declarations while the US opts out"]
reweave_edges: ["AI governance discourse has been captured by economic competitiveness framing, inverting predicted participation patterns where China signs non-binding declarations while the US opts out|supports|2026-04-04", "Binding international AI governance achieves legal form through scope stratification \u2014 the Council of Europe AI Framework Convention entered force by explicitly excluding national security, defense applications, and making private sector obligations optional|challenges|2026-04-04"]
challenges: ["Binding international AI governance achieves legal form through scope stratification \u2014 the Council of Europe AI Framework Convention entered force by explicitly excluding national security, defense applications, and making private sector obligations optional"]
related: ["international-ai-governance-stepping-stone-theory-fails-because-strategic-actors-opt-out-at-non-binding-stage", "ai-governance-discourse-capture-by-competitiveness-framing-inverts-china-us-participation-patterns", "binding-international-ai-governance-achieves-legal-form-through-scope-stratification-excluding-high-stakes-applications", "only binding regulation with enforcement teeth changes frontier AI lab behavior because every voluntary commitment has been eroded abandoned or made conditional on competitor behavior when commercially inconvenient"]
---

# International AI governance stepping-stone theory (voluntary → non-binding → binding) fails because strategic actors with frontier AI capabilities opt out even at the non-binding declaration stage

The Paris AI Action Summit (February 10-11, 2025) produced a declaration signed by 60 countries including China, but the US and UK declined to sign. The UK explicitly stated the declaration didn't 'provide enough practical clarity on global governance' and didn't 'sufficiently address harder questions around national security.' This represents a regression from the Bletchley Park (November 2023) and Seoul (May 2024) summits, which at least secured voluntary commitments that Paris could only 'note' rather than build upon. The stepping-stone theory assumes that voluntary commitments create momentum toward non-binding declarations, which then enable binding treaties. Paris demonstrates this theory fails at the second step: the two countries with the most advanced frontier AI development (US and UK) will not participate even in non-binding frameworks. The summit produced 'no new binding commitments' and 'no substantial commitments to AI safety' despite the publication of the International AI Safety Report 2025. This is structural evidence that strategic actor opt-out extends to all levels of international AI governance, not just binding treaties.


## Supporting Evidence

**Source:** Barrett (2003), Paris Agreement prediction

Barrett's 2003 prediction that Paris Agreement would fail due to lack of enforcement mechanisms was prescient. His framework explains why: voluntary commitments in PD games allow strategic actors to free-ride, and stepping-stone theory assumes actors will voluntarily strengthen commitments when they have individual incentive to defect.
