---
type: claim
domain: space-development
description: "Planetary Resources and Deep Space Industries died from no near-term revenue and expensive spacecraft; AstroForge builds for 3.5M vs 100M+, launches at 2700/kg vs 10K+/kg, and sells to existing depot and servicing markets"
confidence: likely
source: "Astra, web research compilation February 2026; AstroForge, TransAstra, Karman+ company data"
created: 2026-02-17
depends_on:
- launch cost reduction is the keystone variable that unlocks every downstream space industry at specific price thresholds
related:
- the asteroid precious metals price paradox means mining success at scale collapses the prices that justify the mining
reweave_edges:
- the asteroid precious metals price paradox means mining success at scale collapses the prices that justify the mining|related|2026-04-04
sourced_from:
- inbox/archive/2026-02-17-astra-space-asteroid-mining.md
---

# Asteroid mining second wave succeeds where the first failed because launch costs fell 10x spacecraft costs fell 30x and real customers now exist

The first wave of asteroid mining companies -- Planetary Resources ($50M+ raised, backed by Larry Page, Eric Schmidt, James Cameron) and Deep Space Industries -- both failed by 2019. The diagnosis is consistent: no near-term revenue path, no customer base for 12-15 years, unsustainable burn rates against venture capital patience, and spacecraft development costs exceeding $100M. As one observer noted, Planetary Resources had "more focus on the religion of space than the business of space."

Three structural changes make the second wave fundamentally different. First, launch costs have fallen roughly 10x (SpaceX Falcon 9 at approximately $2,700/kg versus $10,000+/kg a decade ago), with Starship promising another order of magnitude. Second, the CubeSat/SmallSat revolution means AstroForge built its Odin deep-space prospecting spacecraft for $3.5 million -- a 30x cost reduction from first-wave mission planning. Third, and most critically, real customers now exist: orbital refueling and satellite servicing create demand for in-space resources before Earth-return economics need to work.

The lesson Joel Sercel (TransAstra CEO) draws: "It's less important to build spacecraft to get into space quickly, and more important to really understand the business model and the tech stack." The second wave companies are iterating fast and cheap (AstroForge's philosophy of calculated risk), targeting near-term revenue from water/propellant (TransAstra, Karman+), and building toward institutional demand from Artemis, Gateway, and Mars exploration. Karman+ is targeting a sub-$10M demonstration mission for February 2027.

## Evidence
- Planetary Resources ($50M+) and Deep Space Industries both failed by 2019 — no customers, high costs
- AstroForge Odin spacecraft built for $3.5M vs $100M+ first-wave cost
- SpaceX Falcon 9 at ~$2,700/kg vs $10,000+/kg a decade ago
- TransAstra, Karman+, AstroForge all targeting near-term revenue paths
- Karman+ targeting sub-$10M demonstration mission (February 2027)

## Challenges
Second-wave companies still face the TRL cliff in extraction and refining technology. Cost reduction in launch and spacecraft does not solve the fundamental problem of anchoring to and mining a tumbling body in microgravity. Customer demand for in-space propellant depends on depot infrastructure that is itself pre-revenue.

---

Relevant Notes:
- [[launch cost reduction is the keystone variable that unlocks every downstream space industry at specific price thresholds]] — the 10x launch cost reduction is the primary enabler
- [[asteroid mining technology readiness drops sharply after prospecting with anchoring at TRL 2-3 and zero-gravity refining at TRL 1-2]] — cost reduction does not solve the TRL gap
- [[C-type carbonaceous asteroids containing 10-20 percent water by mass are the near-term mining targets because water closes first economically]] — second-wave companies are targeting C-type water

Topics:
- [[space exploration and development]]
