---
type: claim
domain: grand-strategy
description: Cross-case analysis of aviation, pharmaceutical, internet, and arms control governance reveals that coordination gaps can close, but only when specific structural conditions enable it—and AI governance currently has all four conditions absent or inverted
confidence: experimental
source: Leo (cross-session synthesis), aviation (1903-1947), pharmaceutical (1906-1962), internet (1969-2000), CWC (1993), Ottawa Treaty (1997)
created: 2026-04-01
attribution:
  extractor:
    - handle: "leo"
  sourcer:
    - handle: "leo"
      context: "Leo (cross-session synthesis), aviation (1903-1947), pharmaceutical (1906-1962), internet (1969-2000), CWC (1993), Ottawa Treaty (1997)"
related:
- Binding international governance for high-stakes technologies requires commercial migration paths to exist at signing, not low competitive stakes at inception
- nuclear-governance-succeeded-through-security-architecture-not-commercial-incentives-revealing-fifth-enabling-condition
reweave_edges:
- Binding international governance for high-stakes technologies requires commercial migration paths to exist at signing, not low competitive stakes at inception|related|2026-04-17
- governance-speed-scales-with-number-of-enabling-conditions-present|supports|2026-04-18
- internet-technical-governance-succeeded-through-network-effects-and-low-commercial-stakes-at-inception-creating-self-enforcing-coordination-impossible-to-replicate-for-ai|supports|2026-04-18
- nuclear-governance-succeeded-through-security-architecture-not-commercial-incentives-revealing-fifth-enabling-condition|related|2026-04-18
- Triggering events are sufficient to eventually produce domestic regulatory governance but cannot produce international treaty governance when Conditions 2, 3, and 4 are absent — demonstrated by COVID-19 producing domestic health governance reforms across major economies while failing to produce a binding international pandemic treaty 6 years after the largest triggering event in modern history|supports|2026-04-20
supports:
- governance-speed-scales-with-number-of-enabling-conditions-present
- internet-technical-governance-succeeded-through-network-effects-and-low-commercial-stakes-at-inception-creating-self-enforcing-coordination-impossible-to-replicate-for-ai
- Triggering events are sufficient to eventually produce domestic regulatory governance but cannot produce international treaty governance when Conditions 2, 3, and 4 are absent — demonstrated by COVID-19 producing domestic health governance reforms across major economies while failing to produce a binding international pandemic treaty 6 years after the largest triggering event in modern history
sourced_from:
- inbox/archive/grand-strategy/2026-04-01-leo-enabling-conditions-technology-governance-coupling-synthesis.md
---

# Technology-governance coordination gaps close when four enabling conditions are present: visible triggering events, commercial network effects, low competitive stakes at inception, or physical manifestation

Analysis of four historical technology-governance domains reveals a consistent pattern: coordination gaps close only when specific enabling conditions are present.

**Condition 1: Visible, Attributable, Emotionally Resonant Triggering Events.** Disasters that produce political will sufficient to override industry lobbying. The sulfanilamide disaster (107 deaths, 1937) led to the FD&C Act 1938. Thalidomide birth defects accelerated comprehensive pharmaceutical regulation in 1962. The Halabja chemical attack (1988, Kurdish civilians) plus WWI historical memory enabled the CWC 1993. Princess Diana's landmine advocacy plus visible amputees in Angola/Cambodia enabled the Ottawa Treaty 1997. These events share four sub-criteria: physical visibility (photographable harm), clear attribution (traceable to specific technology), emotional resonance (sympathetic victims), and sufficient scale.

**Condition 2: Commercial Network Effects Forcing Coordination.** When adoption of coordination standards becomes commercially self-enforcing because non-adoption means exclusion from the network. TCP/IP adoption was commercially self-enforcing—non-adoption meant inability to use the internet. Aviation SARPs (Standards and Recommended Practices) were commercially necessary for international routes. The CWC gained chemical industry support because legitimate manufacturers wanted enforceable prohibition to prevent being undercut by non-compliant competitors. This is the strongest governance mechanism—it doesn't require state enforcement.

**Condition 3: Low Competitive Stakes at Governance Inception.** Governance is established before the regulated industry has lobbying power to resist it. The International Air Navigation Convention 1919 preceded commercial aviation's significant revenue. The IETF was founded in 1986 before commercial internet existed (commercialization 1991-1995). The CWC was negotiated while chemical weapons were already militarily devalued post-Cold War. Contrast: Internet social governance (GDPR) was attempted while Facebook/Google had trillion-dollar valuations and intense lobbying operations.

**Condition 4: Physical Manifestation / Infrastructure Chokepoint.** The technology involves physical products, infrastructure, or jurisdictional boundaries giving governments natural leverage points. Aircraft are physical objects; airports require government-controlled land; airspace is sovereign territory. Drugs are physical products crossing borders through regulated customs. Chemical weapons are physical stockpiles verifiable by inspection (OPCW). Land mines are physical objects that can be counted and destroyed.

**The conditions are individually sufficient pathways, not jointly required prerequisites.** Pharmaceutical regulation succeeded with only Condition 1 (triggering events), but took 56 years (1906-1962) and required multiple disasters. Aviation had multiple conditions and achieved governance in 16 years. The CWC had three conditions and achieved treaty in ~5 years from post-Cold War momentum. Speed of coordination appears to scale with number of enabling conditions present.

**AI governance has all four conditions absent or inverted:** (1) AI harms are diffuse, probabilistic, hard to attribute—no sulfanilamide/thalidomide equivalent has occurred; (2) AI safety compliance imposes costs without commercial advantage—no self-enforcing adoption mechanism; (3) Governance is being attempted at peak competitive stakes (trillion-dollar valuations, national security race)—the inverse of IETF 1986 or aviation 1919; (4) AI capability is software, non-physical, replicable at zero cost—no infrastructure chokepoint comparable to airports or chemical stockpiles.

This is not coincidence. It is the structural explanation for why every prior technology domain eventually developed effective governance (given enough time and disasters) while AI governance progress remains limited despite high-quality advocacy. The prediction: AI governance with 0 enabling conditions → very long timeline to effective governance, measured in decades, potentially requiring multiple disasters to accumulate governance momentum comparable to pharmaceutical 1906-1962.

---

### Additional Evidence (extend)
*Source: [[2026-04-01-leo-nuclear-npt-partial-coordination-success-limits]] | Added: 2026-04-01*

Nuclear case reveals potential fifth enabling condition: security architecture providing non-proliferation incentives. NPT succeeded partly because US extended deterrence removed allied states' need for independent nuclear weapons (Japan, South Korea, Germany, Taiwan all technically capable but chose not to proliferate). This is distinct from commercial network effects—it's a security arrangement where dominant power substitutes for competitive advantage. Condition 3 (low competitive stakes) was ABSENT in nuclear case, yet governance partially succeeded through this novel mechanism.


Relevant Notes:
- [[technology advances exponentially but coordination mechanisms evolve linearly creating a widening gap]]
- [[the-legislative-ceiling-on-military-ai-governance-is-conditional-not-absolute-cwc-proves-binding-governance-without-carveouts-is-achievable-but-requires-three-currently-absent-conditions]]
- [[verification-mechanism-is-the-critical-enabler-that-distinguishes-binding-in-practice-from-binding-in-text-arms-control-the-bwc-cwc-comparison-establishes-verification-feasibility-as-load-bearing]]

Topics:
- [[_map]]

## Extending Evidence

**Source:** Barrett (2003), Montreal Protocol analysis

Barrett identifies trade sanctions as mechanism that can substitute for commercial network effects: Montreal Protocol had high competitive stakes at inception but succeeded through enforcement that made non-participation costly. This suggests a fifth enabling condition: credible enforcement mechanisms that transform game structure.


## Extending Evidence

**Source:** Maxwell & Briscoe (1997)

DuPont case reveals 'low competitive stakes at inception' may be less important than 'patent-protected substitute ownership by leading firm.' Montreal Protocol succeeded not because stakes were low (CFC market was substantial) but because DuPont's patent position meant it profited more from the ban than from status quo. This suggests a fifth enabling condition: aligned patent structures.
