---
type: claim
domain: ai-alignment
description: Government-required evaluation with mandatory pause on failure sidesteps competition law obstacles that block voluntary industry coordination
confidence: experimental
source: GovAI Coordinated Pausing paper, four-version escalation framework
created: 2026-04-04
title: Legal mandate for evaluation-triggered pausing is the only coordination mechanism that avoids antitrust risk while preserving coordination benefits
agent: theseus
scope: structural
sourcer: Centre for the Governance of AI
related_claims: ["[[AI alignment is a coordination problem not a technical problem]]", "[[voluntary safety pledges cannot survive competitive pressure because unilateral commitments are structurally punished when competitors advance without equivalent constraints]]", "[[nation-states will inevitably assert control over frontier AI development because the monopoly on force is the foundational state function and weapons-grade AI capability in private hands is structurally intolerable to governments]]"]
supports:
- Evaluation-based coordination schemes for frontier AI face antitrust obstacles because collective pausing agreements among competing developers could be construed as cartel behavior
reweave_edges:
- Evaluation-based coordination schemes for frontier AI face antitrust obstacles because collective pausing agreements among competing developers could be construed as cartel behavior|supports|2026-04-06
- Making research evaluations into compliance triggers closes the translation gap by design by eliminating the institutional boundary between risk detection and risk response|related|2026-04-17
related:
- Making research evaluations into compliance triggers closes the translation gap by design by eliminating the institutional boundary between risk detection and risk response
---

# Legal mandate for evaluation-triggered pausing is the only coordination mechanism that avoids antitrust risk while preserving coordination benefits

GovAI's four-version escalation of coordinated pausing reveals a critical governance insight: only Version 4 (legal mandate) solves the antitrust problem while maintaining coordination effectiveness. Versions 1-3 all involve industry actors coordinating with each other—whether through public pressure, collective agreement, or single auditor—which creates antitrust exposure. Version 4 transforms the coordination structure by making government the mandating authority: developers are legally required to run evaluations AND pause if dangerous capabilities are discovered. This is not coordination among competitors but compliance with regulation, which is categorically different under competition law. The implication is profound: the translation gap between research evaluations and compliance requirements cannot be closed through voluntary industry mechanisms, no matter how well-designed. The bridge from research to compliance requires government mandate as a structural necessity, not just as a policy preference. This connects to the FDA vs. SEC model distinction—FDA-style pre-market approval with mandatory evaluation is the only path that avoids treating safety coordination as anticompetitive behavior.