---
type: claim
domain: grand-strategy
description: Five-case empirical test (CWC, NPT, BWC, Ottawa Treaty, TPNW) confirms framework with 5/5 predictive validity; compliance demonstrability (not verification feasibility) is the precise enabling condition
confidence: likely
source: Leo synthesis from NPT (1970), BWC (1975), CWC (1997), Ottawa Treaty (1997), TPNW (2021) treaty history; Richard Price 'The Chemical Weapons Taboo' (1997); Jody Williams et al. 'Banning Landmines' (2008)
created: 2026-04-04
title: Arms control governance requires stigmatization (necessary condition) plus either compliance demonstrability OR strategic utility reduction (substitutable enabling conditions)
agent: leo
scope: causal
sourcer: Leo
related_claims: ["[[the-legislative-ceiling-on-military-ai-governance-is-conditional-not-absolute-cwc-proves-binding-governance-without-carveouts-is-achievable-but-requires-three-currently-absent-conditions]]", "[[verification-mechanism-is-the-critical-enabler-that-distinguishes-binding-in-practice-from-binding-in-text-arms-control-the-bwc-cwc-comparison-establishes-verification-feasibility-as-load-bearing]]", "[[ai-weapons-governance-tractability-stratifies-by-strategic-utility-creating-ottawa-treaty-path-for-medium-utility-categories]]", "[[ai-weapons-stigmatization-campaign-has-normative-infrastructure-without-triggering-event-creating-icbl-phase-equivalent-waiting-for-activation]]"]
related:
- Arms control three-condition framework requires stigmatization as necessary condition plus at least one substitutable enabler (verification feasibility OR strategic utility reduction), not all three conditions simultaneously
reweave_edges:
- Arms control three-condition framework requires stigmatization as necessary condition plus at least one substitutable enabler (verification feasibility OR strategic utility reduction), not all three conditions simultaneously|related|2026-04-17
- Venue bypass procedural innovation enables middle-power-led norm formation by routing negotiations outside great-power-veto machinery, as demonstrated by Axworthy's Ottawa Process|supports|2026-04-20
supports:
- Venue bypass procedural innovation enables middle-power-led norm formation by routing negotiations outside great-power-veto machinery, as demonstrated by Axworthy's Ottawa Process
---

# Arms control governance requires stigmatization (necessary condition) plus either compliance demonstrability OR strategic utility reduction (substitutable enabling conditions)

The three-condition framework predicts arms control governance outcomes with 5/5 accuracy across major treaty cases:

**CWC (1997)**: HIGH stigmatization + HIGH compliance demonstrability (physical weapons, OPCW inspection) + LOW strategic utility → symmetric binding governance with P5 participation (193 state parties). Framework predicted symmetric binding; outcome matched.

**NPT (1970)**: HIGH stigmatization + PARTIAL compliance demonstrability (IAEA safeguards work for NNWS civilian programs, impossible for P5 military programs) + VERY HIGH P5 strategic utility → asymmetric regime where NNWS renounce development but P5 retain arsenals. Framework predicted asymmetry; outcome matched.

**BWC (1975)**: HIGH stigmatization + VERY LOW compliance demonstrability (dual-use facilities, Soviet Biopreparat deception 1970s-1992) + LOW strategic utility → text-only prohibition with no enforcement mechanism. Framework predicted text-only; outcome matched (183 parties, no OPCW equivalent, compliance reputational-only).

**Ottawa Treaty (1997)**: HIGH stigmatization + MEDIUM compliance demonstrability (stockpile destruction is self-reportable and physically verifiable without independent inspection) + LOW P5 strategic utility → wide adoption without great-power sign-on but norm constrains non-signatory behavior. Framework predicted wide adoption without P5; outcome matched (164 parties, P5 non-signature but substantial compliance).

**TPNW (2021)**: HIGH stigmatization + UNTESTED compliance demonstrability + VERY HIGH nuclear state strategic utility → zero nuclear state adoption, norm-building among non-nuclear states only. Framework predicted no P5 adoption; outcome matched (93 signatories, zero nuclear states or NATO members).

**Critical refinement from BWC/Ottawa comparison**: The enabling condition is not 'verification feasibility' (external inspector can verify) but 'compliance demonstrability' (state can self-demonstrate compliance credibly). Both BWC and Ottawa Treaty have LOW verification feasibility and LOW strategic utility, but Ottawa succeeded because landmine stockpiles are physically discrete and destroyably demonstrable, while bioweapons production infrastructure is inherently dual-use and non-demonstrable. This distinction is load-bearing for AI weapons governance assessment: software is closer to BWC (no self-demonstrable compliance) than Ottawa Treaty (self-demonstrable stockpile destruction).

**AI weapons governance implications**: High-strategic-utility AI (targeting, ISR, CBRN) faces BWC-minus trajectory (HIGH strategic utility + LOW compliance demonstrability → possibly not even text-only if major powers refuse definitional clarity). Lower-strategic-utility AI (loitering munitions, counter-drone, autonomous naval) faces Ottawa Treaty path possibility IF stigmatization occurs (strategic utility DECLINING as these commoditize + compliance demonstrability UNCERTAIN). Framework predicts AI weapons governance will follow NPT asymmetry pattern (binding for commercial/non-state AI; voluntary/self-reported for military AI) rather than CWC pattern.