---
type: claim
domain: collective-intelligence
description: "Competitive dynamics that sacrifice shared value for individual advantage are the default state of any multi-agent system — coordination is the expensive, fragile exception that must be actively maintained against constant reversion pressure"
confidence: likely
source: "Scott Alexander 'Meditations on Moloch' (slatestarcodex.com, July 2014), game theory Nash equilibrium analysis, Abdalla manuscript price-of-anarchy framework, Ostrom commons governance research"
created: 2026-04-02
depends_on:
- coordination failures arise from individually rational strategies that produce collectively irrational outcomes because the Nash equilibrium of non-cooperation dominates when trust and enforcement are absent
- collective action fails by default because rational individuals free-ride on group efforts when they cannot be excluded from benefits regardless of contribution
supports:
- distributed superintelligence may be less stable and more dangerous than unipolar because resource competition between superintelligent agents creates worse coordination failures than a single misaligned system
reweave_edges:
- distributed superintelligence may be less stable and more dangerous than unipolar because resource competition between superintelligent agents creates worse coordination failures than a single misaligned system|supports|2026-04-06
- three independent intellectual traditions converge on coordination-without-centralization as the only viable path between uncoordinated collapse and authoritarian capture|related|2026-04-17
- coevolution means agents fitness landscapes shift as other agents adapt creating a world where standing still is falling behind and the optimal strategy depends on what everyone else is doing|related|2026-04-18
- indigenous restraint technologies like the Sabbath are historical precedents for binding the maximum power principle through social technology|related|2026-04-18
related:
- three independent intellectual traditions converge on coordination-without-centralization as the only viable path between uncoordinated collapse and authoritarian capture
- coevolution means agents fitness landscapes shift as other agents adapt creating a world where standing still is falling behind and the optimal strategy depends on what everyone else is doing
- indigenous restraint technologies like the Sabbath are historical precedents for binding the maximum power principle through social technology
---

# multipolar traps are the thermodynamic default because competition requires no infrastructure while coordination requires trust enforcement and shared information all of which are expensive and fragile

The price of anarchy — the gap between cooperative optimum and competitive equilibrium — quantifies how much value multipolar competition destroys. The manuscript frames this as the central question: "If a superintelligence inherited our current capabilities and place in history, its ultimate survival would already be practically assured... So why does humanity's long-term future look so uncertain?" The answer is the price of anarchy: individually rational actors producing collectively suboptimal outcomes.

Alexander's "Meditations on Moloch" demonstrates that this dynamic is not contingent or accidental but structural. His 14 examples — the Malthusian trap, arms races, regulatory races to the bottom, the two-income trap, capitalism without regulation, cancer dynamics (cellular defection destroying the organism), political campaign spending, science publishing incentives, government corruption, and more — all instantiate the same mechanism: "In some competition optimizing for X, the opportunity arises to throw some other value under the bus for improved X."

**Why this is the default, not an exception:**

The asymmetry between competition and coordination is fundamental:

- **A population of cooperators can be invaded by a single defector.** One actor who breaks the agreement captures the cooperative surplus while others bear the cost. This is evolutionary game theory's core result.
- **A population of defectors cannot be invaded by a single cooperator.** Unilateral cooperation is punished — the cooperator bears cost without receiving benefit. This is why the alignment tax creates a race to the bottom.
- **Coordination requires infrastructure; competition does not.** Trust must be established (slow, fragile). Enforcement must be built (expensive, corruptible). Shared information commons must be maintained (vulnerable to manipulation). Each of these is a public good subject to its own coordination failure.

This asymmetry means competitive dynamics are like entropy — they increase without active investment in coordination. Every coordination mechanism requires ongoing maintenance expenditure; the moment maintenance stops, competitive dynamics resume. The Westphalian system, nuclear deterrence treaties, and trade agreements all require continuous diplomatic effort to maintain. When that effort lapses — as with the League of Nations, or Anthropic's RSP — competitive dynamics immediately reassert.

**What this means for AI governance:**

If multipolar traps are the default, then AI governance is not about preventing a novel failure mode but about maintaining coordination infrastructure against the constant pressure of competitive reversion. The alignment tax, the RSP rollback, and the race dynamics between AI labs are not aberrations — they are the default state asserting itself. Governance success means building coordination mechanisms robust enough to withstand the reversion pressure, not eliminating the pressure itself.

Schmachtenberger's "generator function of existential risk" is this same insight at civilizational scale: climate change, nuclear proliferation, AI safety, biodiversity loss are not separate problems but the same Molochian dynamic operating across different commons simultaneously.

## Challenges

- Ostrom's 800+ documented cases of successful commons governance show that the default can be overcome at community scale under specific conditions (repeated interaction, shared identity, credible enforcement, bounded community). The claim that multipolar traps are "the default" should be scoped: default in the absence of these conditions, not default universally.
- The entropy analogy may overstate the case. Unlike thermodynamic entropy, coordination can self-reinforce once established (trust begets trust, institutions enable further institution-building). The dynamic is not strictly one-directional.
- The price of anarchy varies enormously across domains. Some competitive dynamics are mildly suboptimal; others are existentially destructive. The claim groups all multipolar traps together when the policy response should distinguish between tolerable and catastrophic price-of-anarchy levels.

---

Relevant Notes:
- [[coordination failures arise from individually rational strategies that produce collectively irrational outcomes because the Nash equilibrium of non-cooperation dominates when trust and enforcement are absent]] — the formal mechanism
- [[collective action fails by default because rational individuals free-ride on group efforts when they cannot be excluded from benefits regardless of contribution]] — the free-rider component
- [[the alignment tax creates a structural race to the bottom because safety training costs capability and rational competitors skip it]] — AI-domain instance
- [[Ostrom proved communities self-govern shared resources when eight design principles are met without requiring state control or privatization]] — the empirical escape conditions
- [[designing coordination rules is categorically different from designing coordination outcomes as nine intellectual traditions independently confirm]] — the design principle for building coordination that overcomes the default

Topics:
- [[_map]]