---
type: decision
entity_type: decision_market
name: "MetaDAO: Migrate Autocrat Program to v0.1"
domain: internet-finance
status: passed
parent_entity: "[[metadao]]"
platform: "futardio"
proposer: "HfFi634cyurmVVDr9frwu4MjGLJzz9XbAJz981HdVaNz"
proposal_url: "https://v1.metadao.fi/metadao/trade/AkLsnieYpCU2UsSqUNrbMrQNi9bvdnjxx75mZbJns9zi"
proposal_date: 2023-12-03
resolution_date: 2023-12-13
category: "mechanism"
summary: "Upgrade Autocrat program to v0.1 with configurable proposal durations (default 3 days) and migrate 990K META, 10K USDC, 5.5 SOL to new treasury"
tracked_by: rio
created: 2026-03-11
supports:
- metadao-autocrat-migration-accepted-counterparty-risk-from-unverifiable-builds-prioritizing-iteration-speed-over-security-guarantees
- metadao-autocrat-v01-reduces-proposal-duration-to-three-days-enabling-faster-governance-iteration
- "{'MetaDAO': 'Migrate Autocrat Program to v0.1'}"
- "MetaDAO: Migrate Autocrat Program to v0.1"
related:
- "{'MetaDAO': 'Migrate Autocrat Program to v0.2'}"
- "MetaDAO: Migrate Autocrat Program to v0.2"
reweave_edges:
- metadao-autocrat-migration-accepted-counterparty-risk-from-unverifiable-builds-prioritizing-iteration-speed-over-security-guarantees|supports|2026-04-18
- metadao-autocrat-v01-reduces-proposal-duration-to-three-days-enabling-faster-governance-iteration|supports|2026-04-18
- "{'MetaDAO': 'Migrate Autocrat Program to v0.2|related|2026-04-18'}"
- "{'MetaDAO': 'Migrate Autocrat Program to v0.1|supports|2026-04-18'}"
- "MetaDAO: Migrate Autocrat Program to v0.2|related|2026-04-19"
- "MetaDAO: Migrate Autocrat Program to v0.1|supports|2026-04-19"
---

# MetaDAO: Migrate Autocrat Program to v0.1

## Summary
This proposal upgraded MetaDAO's Autocrat futarchy implementation to v0.1, introducing configurable proposal slot durations with a new 3-day default (down from an unspecified longer period) to enable faster governance iteration. The migration transferred 990,000 META, 10,025 USDC, and 5.5 SOL from the v0.0 treasury to the v0.1 program's treasury.

## Market Data
- **Outcome:** Passed
- **Proposer:** HfFi634cyurmVVDr9frwu4MjGLJzz9XbAJz981HdVaNz
- **Proposal Account:** AkLsnieYpCU2UsSqUNrbMrQNi9bvdnjxx75mZbJns9zi
- **DAO Account:** 3wDJ5g73ABaDsL1qofF5jJqEJU4RnRQrvzRLkSnFc5di
- **Completed:** 2023-12-13

## Significance
This was MetaDAO's first major governance mechanism upgrade, establishing the pattern of iterative futarchy refinement. The shift to configurable and shorter proposal durations reflected a production learning: faster feedback loops matter more than theoretical purity in early-stage futarchy adoption.

The proposal also highlighted a key production tradeoff: the upgrade was deployed without verifiable builds due to unspecified constraints, accepting counterparty trust risk to ship the improvement faster. The proposer acknowledged this as temporary, noting future versions would use verifiable builds.

## Key Risks Acknowledged
- **Smart contract risk:** Potential bugs in v0.1 not present in v0.0 (assessed as low given limited code changes)
- **Counterparty risk:** Non-verifiable build required trust in proposer not introducing backdoors

## Relationship to KB
- [[metadao]] - first major mechanism upgrade
- [[MetaDAOs Autocrat program implements futarchy through conditional token markets where proposals create parallel pass and fail universes settled by time-weighted average price over a three-day window]] - configurable duration feature
- [[futarchy implementations must simplify theoretical mechanisms for production adoption because original designs include impractical elements that academics tolerate but users reject]] - verifiable build tradeoff

## Full Proposal Text

*Source: futard.io, tabled 2023-12-03*

## Overview

I've made some improvements to the autocrat program. You can see these [here](https://github.com/metaDAOproject/meta-dao/pull/36/files). Most importantly, I've made the slots per proposal configurable, and changed its default to 3 days to allow for quicker feedback loops.

This proposal migrates the 990,000 META, 10,025 USDC, and 5.5 SOL from the treasury owned by the first program to the treasury owned by the second program.

## Key risks

### Smart contract risk

There is a risk that the new program contains an important bug that the first one didn't. I consider this risk small given that I didn't change that much of autocrat.

### Counter-party risk

Unfortunately, for reasons I can't get into, I was unable to build this new program with [solana-verifiable-build](https://github.com/Ellipsis-Labs/solana-verifiable-build). You'd be placing trust in me that I didn't introduce a backdoor, not on the GitHub repo, that allows me to steal the funds.

For future versions, I should always be able to use verifiable builds.