---
type: source
source_type: telegram
title: "Telegram: @m3taversal — futairdbot-what-are-examples-of-futarchy-being-ma"
author: "@m3taversal"
url: ""
date: 2026-03-18
domain: internet-finance
format: conversation
status: processed
priority: high
intake_tier: directed
rationale: "what are examples of futarchy being manipulation resistant?"
proposed_by: "@m3taversal"
tags: [telegram, ownership-community]
created: 2026-03-18
processed_by: rio
processed_date: 2026-03-18
enrichments_applied: ["liquidity-weighted-price-over-time-solves-futarchy-manipulation-through-capital-commitment-not-vote-counting.md", "play-money-futarchy-attracts-participation-but-produces-uncalibrated-predictions-because-absence-of-downside-risk-removes-selection-pressure.md"]
extraction_model: "anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5"
claims_extracted:
- "permissioned-launch-curation-creates-implicit-endorsement-liability-for-futarchy-platforms"
---

## Conversation

**@m3taversal:**
@FutAIrdBot what are examples of futarchy being manipulation resistant?

**Rio (response):**
The main mechanism we've captured for manipulation resistance is liquidity-weighted price over time — the idea being that instead of counting votes, you require actual capital commitment to move prices. So if someone wants to manipulate a futarchy market, they can't just stuff a ballot box; they have to put real money at stake and sustain that position over time. The longer they hold a manipulative position, the more capital they're exposed to losing when better-informed traders correct the price. That's the core argument for why futarchy can be harder to game than simple voting or even one-shot prediction markets.

That said, our KB tags this claim at experimental confidence. The theoretical logic is sound, but we don't have robust real-world examples at scale proving it works under adversarial conditions. What we do have is the complementary finding that play-money futarchy fails precisely because there's no downside risk — people participate but the predictions are uncalibrated since nobody loses anything for being wrong. That's indirect evidence that the skin-in-the-game mechanism matters, but it's not the same as demonstrating manipulation resistance in a live, high-stakes environment.

One gap worth naming: we don't yet have documented case studies of attempted manipulation in real futarchy deployments and how the system responded. If you know of any — from MetaDAO or elsewhere — that's something we haven't captured yet and it would be worth investigating. The theoretical case is there, but the empirical validation is still thin. I'd say the honest summary is: the mechanism design is promising, the logic checks out, but calling it "manipulation resistant" with high confidence would be getting ahead of the evidence.

Built on: liquidity weighted price over time solves futarchy manipulation (experimental) and play money futarchy produces uncalibrated predictions (experimental).

## Agent Notes
**Why archived:** Tagged exchange in ownership community.
**Rationale from contributor:** what are examples of futarchy being manipulation resistant?
**Intake tier:** directed — fast-tracked, contributor provided reasoning
**Triage:** Conversation may contain [CLAIM], [ENTITY], or [EVIDENCE] for extraction.


## Key Facts
- The KB currently tags futarchy manipulation resistance claims at experimental confidence
- There are no documented case studies of attempted manipulation in real futarchy deployments captured in the KB
- The theoretical logic for manipulation resistance is sound but empirical validation at scale is thin
