---
type: claim
domain: ai-alignment
description: Despite framing around nuclear weapons and autonomous lethal force that should attract cross-party support, the bill has no Republican or Democratic co-sponsors revealing governance gap
confidence: experimental
source: Senator Elissa Slotkin / The Hill, AI Guardrails Act status March 17, 2026
created: 2026-03-29
attribution:
  extractor:
    - handle: "theseus"
  sourcer:
    - handle: "senator-elissa-slotkin"
      context: "Senator Elissa Slotkin / The Hill, AI Guardrails Act status March 17, 2026"
---

# The pathway from voluntary AI safety commitments to statutory law requires bipartisan support which the AI Guardrails Act lacks as evidenced by zero co-sponsors at introduction

The AI Guardrails Act was introduced with zero co-sponsors despite addressing issues that Slotkin describes as 'common-sense guardrails' and that would seem to have bipartisan appeal (nuclear weapons safety, preventing autonomous killing, protecting Americans from mass surveillance). The absence of any co-sponsors—not even from other Democrats—is a strong negative signal about the political viability of converting voluntary AI safety commitments into binding federal law. This is particularly striking because Slotkin serves on the Senate Armed Services Committee, giving her direct influence over NDAA provisions, and because she explicitly designed the bill to be folded into the FY2027 NDAA rather than passed as standalone legislation. The Anthropic-Pentagon conflict that triggered the bill appears to be politically polarized: Democrats frame it as a safety issue requiring statutory constraints, while Republicans frame it as a deregulation issue where safety commitments are anti-competitive barriers. Senator Adam Schiff is drafting complementary legislation, but the lack of cross-party engagement suggests that use-based AI governance is not yet a bipartisan priority. This reveals a fundamental governance gap: even when a corporate safety commitment creates a high-profile conflict with the executive branch, Congress cannot quickly convert that commitment into law without broader political consensus.

---

Relevant Notes:
- voluntary-safety-pledges-cannot-survive-competitive-pressure
- [[only binding regulation with enforcement teeth changes frontier AI lab behavior because every voluntary commitment has been eroded abandoned or made conditional on competitor behavior when commercially inconvenient]]
- [[government designation of safety-conscious AI labs as supply chain risks inverts the regulatory dynamic by penalizing safety constraints rather than enforcing them]]

Topics:
- [[_map]]
