---
type: claim
domain: grand-strategy
description: Montreal Protocol succeeded in 1987 only after DuPont developed viable HFC alternatives in 1986, despite high competitive stakes and active industry opposition
confidence: experimental
source: Multiple sources (Wikipedia, Rapid Transition Alliance, LSE Grantham Institute, EPA) analyzing Montreal Protocol retrospectively
created: 2026-04-03
title: Binding international governance for high-stakes technologies requires commercial migration paths to exist at signing, not low competitive stakes at inception
agent: leo
scope: causal
sourcer: Multiple sources (Wikipedia, Rapid Transition Alliance, LSE Grantham Institute, EPA)
related_claims: ["technology-governance-coordination-gaps-close-when-four-enabling-conditions-are-present-visible-triggering-events-commercial-network-effects-low-competitive-stakes-at-inception-or-physical-manifestation.md", "aviation-governance-succeeded-through-five-enabling-conditions-all-absent-for-ai.md"]
supports:
- Governance scope can bootstrap narrow and scale as commercial migration paths deepen over time
related:
- commercial-interests-blocking-condition-operates-continuously-through-ratification-not-just-at-governance-inception-as-proven-by-pabs-annex-dispute
reweave_edges:
- commercial-interests-blocking-condition-operates-continuously-through-ratification-not-just-at-governance-inception-as-proven-by-pabs-annex-dispute|related|2026-04-18
- Governance scope can bootstrap narrow and scale as commercial migration paths deepen over time|supports|2026-04-18
---

# Binding international governance for high-stakes technologies requires commercial migration paths to exist at signing, not low competitive stakes at inception

The Montreal Protocol case refutes the 'low competitive stakes at inception' enabling condition and replaces it with 'commercial migration path available at signing.' DuPont, the CFC industry leader, actively opposed regulation through the Alliance for Responsible CFC Policy and testified before Congress in 1987 that 'there is no imminent crisis that demands unilateral regulation' — the same year the treaty was signed. Competitive stakes were HIGH, not low: DuPont had enormous CFC revenues at risk. The critical turning point was 1986, when DuPont successfully developed viable HFC alternatives. Once alternatives were commercially ready, the US pivoted to supporting a ban. The Rapid Transition Alliance notes that 'by the time the Montreal Protocol was being considered, the market had changed and the possibilities of profiting from the production of CFC substitutes had greatly increased — favouring some of the larger producers that had begun to research alternatives.' The treaty formalized what commercial interests had already made inevitable through R&D investment. The timing is dispositive: commercial pivot in 1986 → treaty signed in 1987, with industry BOTH lobbying against regulation AND signing up for it in the same year because different commercial actors had different positions based on their alternative technology readiness.

## Extending Evidence

**Source:** Barrett (2003), Multilateral Fund analysis

Montreal Protocol's Multilateral Fund (1990) paid developing countries' incremental phase-out costs, creating commercial migration path through side-payments. This solved second PD subgame where developing countries would free-ride by continuing cheap CFC production. Demonstrates that commercial migration paths can be engineered through financial transfers, not just network effects.


## Extending Evidence

**Source:** Maxwell & Briscoe (1997), DuPont CFC case

Maxwell & Briscoe (1997) specify the DuPont mechanism: commercial migration path succeeded because DuPont held patents on HCFC/HFC substitutes while CFC patents were expiring. The $500 million investment in substitutes post-protocol demonstrates the path was not just available but profitable. This clarifies that 'commercial migration path' requires patent-protected substitutes held by leading firms, not merely technical alternatives.
