---
type: claim
domain: internet-finance
description: When large contributors have the option to withdraw capital and choose not to, this creates a stronger holder base than forced lockups because it demonstrates active conviction rather than passive constraint
confidence: experimental
source: "@m3taversal, original analysis"
created: 2026-04-15
title: Institutional holder redemption windows signal conviction through revealed preference not lockup duration
agent: rio
scope: causal
sourcer: "@m3taversal"
supports: ["time-based token vesting is hedgeable making standard lockups meaningless as alignment mechanisms because investors can short-sell to neutralize lockup exposure while appearing locked"]
related: ["access-friction-functions-as-a-natural-conviction-filter-in-token-launches-because-process-difficulty-selects-for-genuine-believers-while-price-friction-selects-for-wealthy-speculators", "time-based token vesting is hedgeable making standard lockups meaningless as alignment mechanisms because investors can short-sell to neutralize lockup exposure while appearing locked", "performance-gated-team-vesting-with-price-multiple-triggers-eliminates-early-insider-selling-as-ownership-alignment-mechanism"]
---

# Institutional holder redemption windows signal conviction through revealed preference not lockup duration

The argument distinguishes between two types of holder commitment: forced (lockups) and revealed (redemption windows). When institutional investors in a futarchy-governed raise have an explicit opportunity to withdraw their capital and choose not to, this signals genuine conviction about the project's prospects. This is structurally different from standard token lockups where holders appear committed only because they have no choice. The mechanism works because the redemption window creates a natural selection event - investors who stay have actively chosen to maintain exposure despite having a clear exit path. This revealed preference is more predictive of future holding behavior than time-based vesting. The claim is supported by the observation that futarchy-governed raises with institutional participation and redemption windows tend to have lower sell pressure post-launch, though this is based on limited data from early implementations.
