---
description: Prolonged economic expansion decreases perceived disaster probability through disaster myopia causing lenders to compete by lowering standards and increasing leverage which creates actual fragility making crises endogenous not exogenous
type: claim
domain: critical-systems
created: 2026-02-16
source: "Teleological Investing / TeleoHumanity book"
confidence: likely
tradition: "Minsky, Guttentag and Herring, financial instability hypothesis"
---

Minsky's key insight is that financial markets endogenously generate the forces that create boom-bust cycles rather than simply responding to external shocks. Each phase of the cycle creates the conditions for the next through a dynamic where "over a period of apparently stable behavior, the underlying financial conditions evolve so that the likelihood of financial instability increases." This occurs through two mechanisms: regulatory circumvention and the disaster myopia hypothesis.

The disaster myopia mechanism is particularly insidious. During economic expansions, each year without crisis decreases the subjective probability that market participants assign to disaster. This perceived probability—which drives actual lending behavior—falls below the actual probability of crisis. Lenders who maintain prudent standards lose market share to more aggressive competitors who discount or disregard disaster risk. Loan officers evaluated on short-term performance without adjustment for long-term losses are incentivized to maximize volume. The mobility of these officers means they can book bonuses on risky loans and move on before defaults materialize.

As expansion continues, selection pressures in the marketplace reward ever-more optimistic expectations. Firms that aggressively borrow and invest, confident that future growth will validate their decisions, gain market share over cautious competitors. Late in the cycle, lenders relax lending standards, reduce capital requirements, and make covenant-lite loans with minimal protection. This competition to the bottom fragilizes the financial system to shocks—the perceived risk falls while actual vulnerability rises. Market dynamics systematically drive the gap between subjective and objective disaster probability.

When a shock finally occurs—often non-trivial but less than crisis-level—perceptions can jump sharply. The same disaster myopia that drove excessive optimism during expansion now operates in reverse. Recent crisis experience is vivid in memory; subjective disaster probability can overshoot actual probability. Lenders tighten standards dramatically. Borrowers with weak capital positions find themselves rationed out of credit markets entirely. Others face sharply higher risk premiums. The resulting credit contraction decreases spending and investment, worsening the financial crisis and validating the increased pessimism.

The critical insight is that this instability is structural, not behavioral. Even perfectly rational actors responding to market incentives will be pushed toward excessive risk-taking during booms and excessive caution during busts. Policy makers share the same disaster myopia—falling subjective disaster probability during good times leads to relaxation of prudential regulation and supervision, further increasing systemic fragility. The system self-organizes into waves of credit expansion and asset inflation followed by credit contraction and asset deflation.

This dynamic has profound implications for market efficiency. If intrinsic value depends on market conditions and sentiment—as demonstrated by Cisco's P/E ratio falling from 137 to 26 even as earnings growth accelerated from 53% to 35% annually—then the concept of stable intrinsic value becomes incoherent. All value is relative in a complex dynamic economy. The question is not whether markets occasionally deviate from equilibrium but whether equilibrium exists as a meaningful concept when the system's internal dynamics continuously undermine whatever stability temporarily emerges.

Importantly, each cycle does produce something valuable: increased financial robustness. Crashes force deleveraging, strengthen capital positions, tighten lending standards, and enhance regulatory oversight. The heightened caution and stronger balance sheets characteristic of post-crisis periods make the system genuinely less vulnerable to shocks. Eventually some lenders recognize this improved robustness and begin undercutting competitors to gain market share, initiating the next credit expansion. The floors and ceilings to economic cycles emerge from this dynamic -- stability creates instability which creates robustness which enables the next cycle of instability.

This cycle mirrors the dynamics of [[punctuated equilibrium emerges from darwinian microevolution without additional principles because extremal dynamics on coupled fitness landscapes self-organize to criticality]] -- both display long periods of apparent stability (economic expansion, evolutionary stasis) punctuated by sudden cascading disruption (financial crisis, mass extinction) driven by endogenous dynamics rather than external shocks. And just as [[the self-organized critical state is the most efficient state dynamically achievable even though a perfectly engineered state would perform better]], the boom-bust cycle may be the most efficient financial dynamic achievable -- each crisis produces learning that a permanently stable system would never generate.

---

Relevant Notes:
- [[financial markets are inherently unstable at the system level because debt financing and mark to market accounting create self-reinforcing positive feedback loops]] -- provides the mechanism through which Minsky's stability-breeds-instability dynamic operates
- [[power laws in financial returns indicate self-organized criticality not statistical anomalies because markets tune themselves to maximize information processing and adaptability]] -- explains why this instability may be optimal for long-term learning despite short-term fragility
- [[the efficient market hypothesis fails because its three core assumptions rational investors independence and normal distributions all fail empirically]] -- Minsky's endogenous cycles directly contradict EMH's assumption of equilibrium stability
- [[complex systems drive themselves to the critical state without external tuning because energy input and dissipation naturally select for the critical slope]] -- Minsky's mechanism is a specific economic pathway to the critical attractor
- [[punctuated equilibrium emerges from darwinian microevolution without additional principles because extremal dynamics on coupled fitness landscapes self-organize to criticality]] -- credit cycles display the same punctuated equilibrium pattern as biological evolution
- [[the self-organized critical state is the most efficient state dynamically achievable even though a perfectly engineered state would perform better]] -- boom-bust cycles may be the most efficient financial dynamics achievable, analogous to the critical state in physical systems
- [[equilibrium models of complex systems are fundamentally misleading because systems in balance cannot exhibit catastrophes fractals or history]] -- Minsky shows why economic equilibrium is unreachable, not merely unattained
- [[large catastrophic events in critical systems require no special cause because the same dynamics that produce small events occasionally produce enormous ones]] -- financial crises need no special external trigger; they emerge from the same dynamics that produce normal market fluctuations
- [[hill climbing gets trapped at local maxima because it can only accept improvements and has no way to see beyond the nearest peak]] -- banks are hill-climbing algorithms: each quarter of increased leverage is an uphill step, invisible to the cliff on the other side
- [[companies and people are greedy algorithms that hill-climb toward local optima and require external perturbation to escape suboptimal equilibria]] -- Minsky's cycle IS random-restart hill climbing: crisis throws the system off its local peak, restart begins from deleveraged position
- [[information cascades produce rational bubbles where every individual acts reasonably but the group outcome is catastrophic]] -- disaster myopia is an information cascade: each lender sees others lending aggressively and rationally follows
- [[simulated annealing maps the physics of cooling onto optimization by starting with high randomness and gradually reducing it]] -- financial regulation attempts to provide calibrated perturbation rather than relying on catastrophic random restarts
- [[five errors behind systemic financial failures are engineering overreach smooth-sailing fallacy risk-seeking incentives social herding and inside view bias]] -- Rumelt names the micro-level cognitive mechanisms driving Minsky's macro instability dynamic

### Additional Evidence (extend)
*Source: Karl Friston active inference framework, Per Bak self-organized criticality, Abdalla manuscript self-organized criticality section | Added: 2026-04-02 | Extractor: Theseus*

Friston's concept of "autovitiation" — systems that destroy their own fixed points as a feature, not a bug — provides the formal generalization of Minsky's mechanism. Minsky's financial instability is a specific instance of autovitiation: the stable economic regime generates the conditions (increasing leverage, declining standards, disaster myopia) that destroy the stability of that regime. The system does not merely respond to external shocks; it internally generates the forces that undermine its own equilibrium. This connects Minsky's financial-specific observation to a broader principle: complex adaptive systems at criticality do not have stable fixed points because the dynamics that produce apparent stability simultaneously erode the foundations of that stability. The manuscript's analysis of supply chain fragility (efficiency optimization creating systemic vulnerability), healthcare fragility (private equity reducing hospital beds to increase profitability), and energy infrastructure fragility (deferred maintenance by investor-owned utilities) all demonstrate autovitiation in non-financial domains — optimization for short-term performance that destroys the long-term conditions for that performance.

Topics:
- [[livingip overview]]
- [[systemic risk]]
- [[market dynamics]]