---
type: claim
domain: internet-finance
description: Human judgment layer resolves ambiguity in automated reward systems while maintaining credible commitment
confidence: experimental
source: Drift Futarchy proposal execution structure
created: 2026-03-15
supports:
- "drift-futarchy-proposal-welcome-the-futarchs"
- "drift-futarchy-proposal-welcome-the-futarchs"
related:
- futarchy-proposer-incentives-require-delayed-vesting-to-prevent-gaming
- futarchy-retroactive-rewards-bootstrap-participation-through-endowment-effect
reweave_edges:
- "drift-futarchy-proposal-welcome-the-futarchs|supports|2026-04-18'}"
- futarchy-proposer-incentives-require-delayed-vesting-to-prevent-gaming|related|2026-04-18
- futarchy-retroactive-rewards-bootstrap-participation-through-endowment-effect|related|2026-04-18
- "Drift: Futarchy Proposal - Welcome the Futarchs|supports|2026-04-19"
---

# Futarchy incentive programs use multisig execution groups as discretionary override because pure algorithmic distribution cannot handle edge cases or gaming attempts

The Drift proposal establishes a 2/3 multisig execution group (metaprophet, Sumatt, Lmvdzande) to distribute the 50,000 DRIFT budget according to the outlined rules. Critically, the proposal grants this group discretion in two areas: (1) determining 'exact criteria' for the activity pool to filter non-organic participation, and (2) deciding which proposals qualify if successful proposals exceed the budget. The group also receives 3,000 DRIFT for their work and has authority to return excess funds to the treasury. This structure acknowledges that pure algorithmic distribution fails when faced with gaming, ambiguous cases, or unforeseen circumstances. The multisig provides a credible commitment mechanism - the proposal passes based on general principles, but execution requires human judgment. The group composition (known futarchy advocates) provides reputational accountability.


### Additional Evidence (confirm)
*Source: [[2024-12-19-futardio-proposal-allocate-50000-drift-to-fund-the-drift-ai-agent-request-for]] | Added: 2026-03-16*

The Drift proposal explicitly states 'All grant decisions are at the discretion of the decision council and any such decisions made by the decision council are final.' This creates a hybrid structure where futarchy approves the program budget but a committee controls individual allocations, demonstrating the pattern of discretionary override for operational decisions.


### Additional Evidence (confirm)
*Source: [[2024-05-30-futardio-proposal-drift-futarchy-proposal-welcome-the-futarchs]] | Added: 2026-03-16*

Drift proposal uses 2/3 multisig execution group (metaprophet, Sumatt, Lmvdzande) with explicit discretion: 'exact criteria for this shall be finalized by the execution group' for activity filtering, and 'if successful proposals exceed two, executor group can decide top N proposals to split.' Multisig receives 3,000 DRIFT allocation and has authority to 'distribute their allocation as they see fit' or return excess funds.

---

Relevant Notes:
- futarchy-governed DAOs converge on traditional corporate governance scaffolding for treasury operations because market mechanisms alone cannot provide operational security and legal compliance.md

Topics:
- [[_map]]