---
type: claim
domain: ai-alignment
description: When governments blacklist companies for refusing military contracts on safety grounds while accepting those who comply, the regulatory structure creates negative selection pressure against voluntary safety commitments
confidence: experimental
source: OpenAI blog post (Feb 27, 2026), CEO Altman public statements
created: 2026-03-29
attribution:
  extractor:
    - handle: "theseus"
  sourcer:
    - handle: "openai"
      context: "OpenAI blog post (Feb 27, 2026), CEO Altman public statements"
related:
- voluntary-safety-constraints-without-external-enforcement-are-statements-of-intent-not-binding-governance
reweave_edges:
- voluntary-safety-constraints-without-external-enforcement-are-statements-of-intent-not-binding-governance|related|2026-03-31
- multilateral-verification-mechanisms-can-substitute-for-failed-voluntary-commitments-when-binding-enforcement-replaces-unilateral-sacrifice|supports|2026-04-03
supports:
- multilateral-verification-mechanisms-can-substitute-for-failed-voluntary-commitments-when-binding-enforcement-replaces-unilateral-sacrifice
---

# Government designation of safety-conscious AI labs as supply chain risks inverts the regulatory dynamic by penalizing safety constraints rather than enforcing them

OpenAI's February 2026 Pentagon agreement provides direct evidence that government procurement policy can invert safety incentives. Hours after Anthropic was blacklisted for maintaining use restrictions, OpenAI accepted 'any lawful purpose' language despite CEO Altman publicly calling the blacklisting 'a very bad decision' and 'a scary precedent.' The structural asymmetry is revealing: OpenAI conceded on the central issue (use restrictions) and received only aspirational language in return ('shall not be intentionally used' rather than contractual bans). The title choice—'Our Agreement with the Department of War' using the pre-1947 name—signals awareness and discomfort while complying. This creates a coordination trap where safety-conscious actors face commercial punishment (blacklisting, lost contracts) for maintaining constraints, while those who accept weaker terms gain market access. The mechanism is not that companies don't care about safety, but that unilateral safety commitments become structurally untenable when government policy penalizes them. Altman's simultaneous statements (hoping DoD reverses the decision) and actions (accepting the deal immediately) document the bind: genuine safety preferences exist but cannot survive the competitive pressure when the regulatory environment punishes rather than rewards them.

---

Relevant Notes:
- voluntary-safety-pledges-cannot-survive-competitive-pressure
- government-designation-of-safety-conscious-AI-labs-as-supply-chain-risks-inverts-the-regulatory-dynamic-by-penalizing-safety-constraints-rather-than-enforcing-them
- only-binding-regulation-with-enforcement-teeth-changes-frontier-AI-lab-behavior-because-every-voluntary-commitment-has-been-eroded-abandoned-or-made-conditional-on-competitor-behavior-when-commercially-inconvenient

Topics:
- [[_map]]
