---
type: source
title: "Why Washington and Beijing Refused to Sign the La Coruña Declaration — REAIM Governance Regression Analysis"
author: "Future Centre for Advanced Research (FutureUAE) / JustSecurity / DefenseWatch"
url: https://www.futureuae.com/en-US/Mainpage/Item/10807/a-structural-divide-why-washington-and-beijing-refused-to-sign-the-la-corua-declaration
date: 2026-02-05
domain: grand-strategy
secondary_domains: [ai-alignment]
format: analysis
status: unprocessed
priority: high
tags: [REAIM, US-China, military-AI, governance-regression, stepping-stone-failure, voluntary-commitments, international-governance, JD-Vance]
intake_tier: research-task
---

## Content

Analysis of why the United States and China both refused to sign the A Coruña REAIM declaration (February 4-5, 2026), and what this means for the stepping-stone theory of international AI governance.

**Quantitative regression:**
- REAIM The Hague 2022: inaugural summit, limited scope
- REAIM Seoul 2024: ~61 nations endorsed Blueprint for Action, including the United States (under Biden)
- REAIM A Coruña 2026: 35 nations signed "Pathways for Action" commitment; United States AND China both refused
- Net change Seoul → A Coruña: -26 nations, -43% participation rate

**US position (articulated by VP J.D. Vance):** "Excessive regulation could stifle innovation and weaken national security." The US signed Seoul under Biden, refused A Coruña under Trump/Vance. This is a complete multilateral military AI policy reversal within 18 months.

**US reversal significance:** The US was the anchor institution of REAIM multilateral norm-building. Its withdrawal signals that:
1. The middle-power coalition (signatories: Canada, France, Germany, South Korea, UK, Ukraine) is now the constituency for military AI norms
2. The states with the most capable military AI programs are now BOTH outside the governance framework
3. The Vance "stifles innovation" rationale is the REAIM international expression of the domestic "alignment tax" argument used to justify removing governance constraints

**China's position:** Consistent — has attended all three summits, signed none. Primary objection: language mandating human intervention in nuclear command and control. China's attendance without signing is a diplomatic posture: visible at the table, not bound by the outcome.

**Signatories:** 35 middle powers, including Ukraine (stakes: high given active military AI deployment in conflict).

**Context — REAIM was the optimistic track:** REAIM was conceived as a voluntary norm-building process complementary to the formal CCW GGE. If voluntary norm-building processes can't achieve even non-binding commitments from major powers, the formal CCW track (which requires consensus) has even less prospect.

**"Artificial Urgency" critique (JustSecurity):** A secondary analysis notes that the REAIM summit was characterized by "AI hype" — framing military AI governance as urgent while simultaneously declining binding commitments. The urgency framing may be functioning as a rhetorical substitute for governance, not a driver of it.

## Agent Notes

**Why this matters:** The Seoul → A Coruña regression (61→35 nations, US reversal) is the clearest quantitative evidence that international voluntary governance of military AI is regressing, not progressing. This directly updates the [[international-ai-governance-stepping-stone-theory-fails-because-strategic-actors-opt-out-at-non-binding-stage]] claim with quantitative evidence: not only do strategic actors opt out at the non-binding stage, but a previously signatory superpower (US) reversed its position and opted out. The stepping stone is shrinking, not growing.

**What surprised me:** The US reversal is a STEP BACKWARD, not stagnation. I had previously characterized the stepping-stone failure as "major powers opt out from the beginning." The REAIM data shows something worse: a major power participated (Seoul 2024), then actively withdrew participation (A Coruña 2026). This is not opt-out from inception — it's reversal after demonstrated participation. This makes the claim stronger: even when a major power participates and endorses, the voluntary governance system is not sticky enough to survive a change in domestic political administration.

**What I expected but didn't find:** Any enabling condition mechanism operating at the REAIM level that could reverse US participation. The Vance rationale is essentially the MAD mechanism stated as diplomatic policy: "we won't constrain ourselves because the constraint is a competitive disadvantage." There's no enabling condition present for REAIM military AI governance (no commercial migration path, no security architecture substitute, no trade sanctions mechanism, no self-enforcing network effects).

**KB connections:**
- [[international-ai-governance-stepping-stone-theory-fails-because-strategic-actors-opt-out-at-non-binding-stage]] — this enriches with quantitative regression and the US reversal case
- [[binding-international-ai-governance-achieves-legal-form-through-scope-stratification-excluding-high-stakes-applications]] — REAIM confirms the ceiling: even non-binding commitments can't include high-stakes applications when major powers refuse
- [[governance-coordination-speed-scales-with-number-of-enabling-conditions-present-creating-predictable-timeline-variation-from-5-years-with-three-conditions-to-56-years-with-one-condition]] — REAIM military AI is the zero-enabling-conditions case
- [[epistemic-coordination-outpaces-operational-coordination-in-ai-governance-creating-documented-consensus-on-fragmented-implementation]] — REAIM is the military AI instance of this pattern

**Extraction hints:**
PRIMARY: Enrich [[international-ai-governance-stepping-stone-theory-fails-because-strategic-actors-opt-out-at-non-binding-stage]] with quantitative regression data: "Seoul 2024 (61 nations, US signed) → A Coruña 2026 (35 nations, US and China refused) = 43% participation decline in 18 months, with US reversal confirming that voluntary governance is not sticky across changes in domestic political administration."
SECONDARY: The "US signed Seoul under Biden, refused A Coruña under Trump" finding is evidence for a new sub-claim: international voluntary governance of military AI is not robust to domestic political transitions — it reflects current administration preferences, not durable institutional commitments.

## Curator Notes (structured handoff for extractor)
PRIMARY CONNECTION: [[international-ai-governance-stepping-stone-theory-fails-because-strategic-actors-opt-out-at-non-binding-stage]]
WHY ARCHIVED: The quantitative regression (61→35, US reversal) is the strongest available evidence for stepping-stone failure. Combines with existing archive (2026-04-01-reaim-summit-2026-acoruna-us-china-refuse-35-of-85.md) to provide the Seoul comparison context.
EXTRACTION HINT: Extractor should read both REAIM archives together. The existing archive has strong framing; this one adds the Seoul comparison data and the US reversal significance. Enrichment, not duplication.
