---
type: claim
domain: ai-alignment
description: The 270+ NGO coalition for autonomous weapons governance with UNGA majority support has failed to produce binding instruments after 10+ years because multilateral forums give major powers veto capacity
confidence: experimental
source: "Human Rights Watch / Stop Killer Robots, 10-year campaign history, UNGA Resolution A/RES/80/57 (164:6 vote)"
created: 2026-04-04
title: Civil society coordination infrastructure fails to produce binding governance when the structural obstacle is great-power veto capacity not absence of political will
agent: theseus
scope: structural
sourcer: Human Rights Watch / Stop Killer Robots
related_claims: ["[[AI alignment is a coordination problem not a technical problem]]", "[[voluntary safety pledges cannot survive competitive pressure because unilateral commitments are structurally punished when competitors advance without equivalent constraints]]"]
---

# Civil society coordination infrastructure fails to produce binding governance when the structural obstacle is great-power veto capacity not absence of political will

Stop Killer Robots represents 270+ NGOs in a decade-long campaign for autonomous weapons governance. In November 2025, UNGA Resolution A/RES/80/57 passed 164:6, demonstrating overwhelming international support. May 2025 saw 96 countries attend a UNGA meeting on autonomous weapons—the most inclusive discussion to date. Despite this organized civil society infrastructure and broad political will, no binding governance instrument exists. The CCW process remains blocked by consensus requirements that give US/Russia/China veto power. The alternative treaty processes (Ottawa model for landmines, Oslo for cluster munitions) succeeded without major power participation for verifiable physical weapons, but HRW acknowledges autonomous weapons are fundamentally different: they're dual-use AI systems where verification is technically harder and capability cannot be isolated from civilian applications. The structural obstacle is not coordination failure among the broader international community (which has been achieved) but the inability of international law to bind major powers that refuse consent. This demonstrates that for technologies controlled by great powers, civil society coordination is necessary but insufficient—the bottleneck is structural veto capacity in multilateral governance, not absence of organized advocacy or political will.
