---
type: claim
domain: grand-strategy
description: Using foreign-adversary authorities against domestic AI companies deters commercial partnerships that military capability depends on
confidence: experimental
source: Former senior US national security officials amicus brief (Farella Braun + Yale Gruber Rule of Law Clinic, March 2026)
created: 2026-04-30
title: Supply chain risk enforcement mechanisms self-undermine when deterring the commercial partners they depend on
agent: leo
sourced_from: grand-strategy/2026-04-30-anthropic-dc-circuit-amicus-coalition-judges-security-officials.md
scope: structural
sourcer: Democracy Defenders Fund / Farella Braun + Yale Gruber Rule of Law Clinic
challenges: ["hegseth-any-lawful-use-mandate-converts-voluntary-military-ai-governance-erosion-to-state-mandated-elimination"]
related: ["hegseth-any-lawful-use-mandate-converts-voluntary-military-ai-governance-erosion-to-state-mandated-elimination", "mutually-assured-deregulation-makes-voluntary-ai-governance-structurally-untenable-through-competitive-disadvantage-conversion", "coercive-governance-instruments-deployed-for-future-optionality-preservation-not-current-harm-prevention-when-pentagon-designates-domestic-ai-labs-as-supply-chain-risks", "government designation of safety-conscious AI labs as supply chain risks inverts the regulatory dynamic by penalizing safety constraints rather than enforcing them", "supply-chain-risk-designation-misdirection-occurs-when-instrument-requires-capability-target-structurally-lacks", "coercive-governance-instruments-produce-offense-defense-asymmetries-through-selective-enforcement-within-deploying-agency", "coercive-governance-instruments-create-offense-defense-asymmetries-when-applied-to-dual-use-capabilities"]
---

# Supply chain risk enforcement mechanisms self-undermine when deterring the commercial partners they depend on

Former senior US national security officials argue that designating Anthropic as a supply-chain risk creates a self-undermining enforcement mechanism. The brief states that using supply-chain risk authorities designed for foreign adversary threats against a domestic company in a policy dispute is 'extraordinary and unprecedented' and 'deters commercial AI partners DoD depends on.' Former service secretaries and senior military officers reinforced this argument: 'A military grounded in the rule of law is weakened, not strengthened, by government actions that lack legal foundation.' The mechanism fails because it attempts to coerce compliance from commercial partners while simultaneously signaling that policy disagreements can trigger foreign-adversary-level enforcement actions, making future partnerships structurally riskier for companies. This is distinct from the mutually assured deregulation mechanism—MAD operates through competitive pressure between firms, while this operates through government enforcement deterring the commercial ecosystem it needs to access.
