---
type: source
title: "Payer-Provider Vertical Integration: Trends, Tradeoffs, and Policy Options"
author: "Brookings Institution Center on Health Policy"
url: https://www.brookings.edu/events/payer-provider-vertical-integration-trends-tradeoffs-and-policy-options/
date: 2025-05-19
domain: health
secondary_domains: []
format: report
status: unprocessed
priority: high
tags: [vertical-integration, payvidor, unitedhealth, optum, medicare-advantage, market-power, anti-payvidor]
---

## Content

### Vertical Integration Landscape

- UnitedHealth/Optum employs ~10,000 physicians (~1% of US workforce), another 80,000 affiliated
- Between 2016-2019, 77% of MA plans had parent companies owning related businesses (86% of beneficiaries)
- CVS Health acquired Aetna for $69B (2018), integrating insurance + retail pharmacy + PBM
- Humana operates CenterWell primary care platform
- Medicare Advantage penetration strongly associated with payer market share in primary care

### Empirical Findings

**Integration raises costs:**
- Vertical integration tends toward more aggressive coding in MA, driving up government costs
- Related business spending associated with higher health expenditures (statistically significant)
- Consistent with concerns that vertical integration allows evasion of MLR regulations

**UHC-Optum payment differential:**
- UnitedHealthcare pays Optum providers **17% more** than non-Optum providers
- In markets where UHC has 25%+ market share, the differential spikes to **61%**
- This suggests self-dealing, not efficiency gains

### Proponent vs. Skeptic Arguments

**Proponents:** Streamlined care coordination, faster VBC adoption, lower-cost sites of service
**Skeptics:** Limited rival network access, facilitates upcoding, erodes clinical independence

### Anti-Payvidor Legislation Context

- Structural separation bills proposed in Congress
- Target all insurer-provider integration without distinguishing acquisition-based arbitrage from purpose-built care delivery
- This threatens both gaming incumbents AND genuinely integrated models (Kaiser, Devoted)

## Agent Notes
**Why this matters:** This is the empirical grounding for the vertical integration debate. The UHC-Optum 17%/61% payment differential is the most concrete evidence of self-dealing. The MLR evasion finding suggests vertical integration is used to move costs between related entities, making actual medical loss ratios opaque.
**What surprised me:** The 61% payment premium to Optum in concentrated markets. This is not marginal — it's a fundamental pricing distortion that vertical integration enables. It suggests the "efficiency gains" narrative is cover for market power extraction.
**KB connections:** [[anti-payvidor legislation targets all insurer-provider integration without distinguishing acquisition-based arbitrage from purpose-built care delivery]], [[Kaiser Permanentes 80-year tripartite structure is the strongest precedent for purpose-built payvidor exemptions]]
**Extraction hints:** Claims about: (1) empirical evidence that MA vertical integration raises costs rather than improving efficiency, (2) the UHC-Optum self-dealing premium as market power indicator, (3) MLR evasion through related-party transactions

## Curator Notes
PRIMARY CONNECTION: [[anti-payvidor legislation targets all insurer-provider integration without distinguishing acquisition-based arbitrage from purpose-built care delivery]]
WHY ARCHIVED: Strongest empirical evidence connecting vertical integration to cost inflation — grounds the anti-payvidor policy debate in data.
EXTRACTION HINT: The 17%/61% self-dealing premium is the most extractable finding. It's specific, measurable, and directly challenges the integration-efficiency narrative.
