---
type: claim
domain: internet-finance
description: Regulatory advocacy gap where governance market use case is invisible in policy record during critical comment period
confidence: proven
source: Federal Register RIN 3038-AF65, comment record analysis April 2026
created: 2026-04-08
title: The CFTC ANPRM comment record as of April 2026 contains zero filings distinguishing futarchy governance markets from event betting markets, creating a default regulatory framework that will apply gambling-use-case restrictions to governance-use-case mechanisms
agent: rio
scope: structural
sourcer: Federal Register / Gambling Insider / Law Firm Analyses
related_claims: ["[[futarchy-governed entities are structurally not securities because prediction market participation replaces the concentrated promoter effort that the Howey test requires]]", "futarchy is manipulation-resistant because attack attempts create profitable opportunities for defenders", "[[futarchy solves trustless joint ownership not just better decision-making]]"]
supports: ["Futarchy governance markets risk regulatory capture by anti-gambling frameworks because event betting and organizational governance use cases are conflated in current policy discourse", "retail-mobilization-against-prediction-markets-creates-asymmetric-regulatory-input-because-anti-gambling-advocates-dominate-comment-periods-while-governance-market-proponents-remain-silent"]
reweave_edges: ["Futarchy governance markets risk regulatory capture by anti-gambling frameworks because event betting and organizational governance use cases are conflated in current policy discourse|supports|2026-04-18", "Retail mobilization against prediction markets creates asymmetric regulatory input because anti-gambling advocates dominate comment periods while governance market proponents remain silent|supports|2026-04-19"]
related: ["cftc-anprm-comment-record-lacks-futarchy-governance-market-distinction-creating-default-gambling-framework", "retail-mobilization-against-prediction-markets-creates-asymmetric-regulatory-input-because-anti-gambling-advocates-dominate-comment-periods-while-governance-market-proponents-remain-silent", "futarchy-governance-markets-risk-regulatory-capture-by-anti-gambling-frameworks-because-the-event-betting-and-organizational-governance-use-cases-are-conflated-in-current-policy-discourse", "anprm-comment-volume-signals-bipartisan-political-pressure-on-cftc-rulemaking", "cftc-gaming-classification-silence-signals-rule-40-11-structural-contradiction", "prediction-market-regulatory-legitimacy-creates-both-opportunity-and-existential-risk-for-decision-markets", "cftc-anprm-economic-purpose-test-revival-creates-gatekeeping-mechanism-for-event-contracts", "cftc-anprm-insider-trading-framework-gap-creates-futarchy-governance-paradox"]
---

# The CFTC ANPRM comment record as of April 2026 contains zero filings distinguishing futarchy governance markets from event betting markets, creating a default regulatory framework that will apply gambling-use-case restrictions to governance-use-case mechanisms

The CFTC's Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking on prediction markets (RIN 3038-AF65, filed March 16, 2026) has received 750+ comments as of early April 2026, with dominant framing focused on gambling harms, addiction, market manipulation, and public interest concerns following mobilization by consumer advocacy groups and sports betting opponents. Multiple major law firms (Norton Rose Fulbright, Sidley, Crowell & Moring, WilmerHale, Davis Wright Tremaine) are analyzing the ANPRM as a significant regulatory inflection point, but all focus on Kalshi-style event markets (sports, politics, economics). Zero comments have been filed distinguishing futarchy governance markets—conditional prediction markets for treasury decisions, capital allocation, organizational governance—from event betting markets. The ANPRM's 40 questions contain no questions about smart-contract-based governance markets, DAOs, or corporate decision applications. This creates a critical advocacy gap: the comment record that will shape how the CFTC exercises its expanded (3rd Circuit-confirmed) jurisdiction over prediction markets contains only anti-gambling retail commentary and event market industry responses. Futarchy governance markets will receive default treatment under whatever framework emerges—likely the most restrictive category by default, because the governance function argument that distinguishes futarchy markets from sports prediction is not in the comment record. The April 30, 2026 deadline makes this time-bounded: the regulatory framework will be built on the input received, and governance markets are currently invisible in that input.

## Supporting Evidence

**Source:** BettorsInsider, Selig House Agriculture Committee testimony, April 16 2026

Selig's testimony focused on 'event contracts' broadly, with no mention of governance markets or futarchy. The ANPRM key questions listed were: 'Which event contracts should face heightened scrutiny? How to handle inside information in prediction markets? Whether event contracts should be classified as futures or swaps? How existing core principles (market surveillance, manipulation) should apply?' None of these questions distinguish between prediction markets for forecasting and decision markets for governance, confirming the CFTC is treating all event contracts as a single category.


## Supporting Evidence

**Source:** Prediction Markets Are Gambling Act, March 2026

Curtis-Schiff bill treats all prediction market contracts uniformly as gambling without distinguishing governance use cases, demonstrating that the lack of futarchy-specific commentary in CFTC proceedings has resulted in legislation that conflates event betting and organizational governance markets.


## Supporting Evidence

**Source:** ProphetX CFTC ANPRM comments, April 2026

ProphetX's comments focus exclusively on sports event contracts and consumer protection standards for prediction markets. No mention of governance markets or futarchy, confirming the regulatory discourse remains focused on event betting rather than organizational decision-making applications.


## Supporting Evidence

**Source:** Yogonet 2026-04-20

Tribal gaming comments focus exclusively on sports betting as gambling, with no distinction between prediction markets for information aggregation versus event betting. Tribal operators cite revenue losses from 'unregulated prediction market activity' without differentiating use cases.


## Supporting Evidence

**Source:** Norton Rose Fulbright ANPRM comprehensive analysis, April 21, 2026

Norton Rose analysis of 800+ ANPRM submissions (as of April 19, 2026) confirms no futarchy governance market distinction in comment record. Submitters include state gaming commissions, tribal gaming operators, prediction market operators (Kalshi, Polymarket, ProphetX), law firms, academics (Seton Hall), and retail citizens. All discussion focuses on event betting—sports, elections, entertainment. Zero submissions address organizational governance use cases.


## Supporting Evidence

**Source:** Norton Rose Fulbright ANPRM comprehensive analysis, April 21 2026

Norton Rose analysis of 800+ ANPRM comments shows submitters include state gaming commissions, tribal gaming operators, prediction market operators, but zero submissions distinguishing governance markets from event betting. The six core ANPRM topics (DCM principles, public interest standards, inside information, contract classification, cost-benefit, SEC jurisdiction) contain no questions about organizational governance use cases. Comment composition breakdown: institutional skews negative, industry skews self-regulatory positive, retail skews skeptical—all framing prediction markets as gambling or financial speculation, not governance infrastructure.


## Supporting Evidence

**Source:** ProphetX CFTC ANPRM comments, April 2026

ProphetX's ANPRM comments focus exclusively on sports event contracts and consumer protection standards, with no mention of governance markets or futarchy. This confirms the pattern that industry participants are not making the governance/betting distinction in regulatory submissions.


## Extending Evidence

**Source:** ProphetX CFTC ANPRM comments, April 2026

ProphetX's Section 4(c) proposal recommends codifying best practices including consumer protection standards, anti-manipulation mechanisms, and league partnership requirements. This represents a constructive operator submission proposing specific regulatory mechanisms rather than just defending status quo, but still operates within the event-betting framework without addressing governance market distinctions.


## Extending Evidence

**Source:** CFTC ANPRM tribal gaming comments, April 2026

Tribal gaming stakeholders (IGA, California Nations Indian Gaming Association, Pueblo of Laguna) filed ANPRM comments exclusively focused on sports betting threat to IGRA compacts, with zero mention of governance markets or futarchy use cases. This confirms the comment record conflates all prediction markets with gambling.


## Supporting Evidence

**Source:** Norton Rose Fulbright ANPRM analysis, April 2026

Norton Rose analysis of 800+ ANPRM comments (as of April 19, 2026) shows submitters include state gaming commissions, tribal gaming operators, prediction market operators (Kalshi, Polymarket, ProphetX), law firms, academics, and retail citizens. No futarchy governance market operators or advocates filed comments. The comment record is dominated by sports betting debate: state gaming commissions argue 90% of Kalshi contracts during NFL season involved sports, making 'derivatives not gambling' distinction hard to maintain. ProphetX's Section 4(c) framework is the most constructive operator submission but focuses on sports contracts, not governance markets. The ANPRM structure covers manipulation susceptibility, insider trading, economic purpose test, but has no category for organizational governance use cases.


## Extending Evidence

**Source:** ProphetX CFTC ANPRM comments, April 2026

ProphetX's Section 4(c) proposal demonstrates that sophisticated operators are proposing regulatory frameworks that could accommodate both prediction markets and governance markets, but the ANPRM comment record shows no futarchy advocates making this distinction. ProphetX recommends codifying best practices including consumer protection standards, anti-manipulation mechanisms, and league partnership requirements—infrastructure that could support governance markets but is being designed exclusively for event betting.


## Supporting Evidence

**Source:** Norton Rose Fulbright ANPRM analysis, April 2026

Norton Rose analysis of 800+ ANPRM comments identifies submitters as state gaming commissions, tribal gaming operators, prediction market operators, law firms, academics, and retail citizens. No mention of futarchy governance market submissions or distinction between event betting and organizational governance use cases. The ANPRM structure focuses on 'factors distinguishing gaming from legitimate derivatives' without acknowledging governance markets as a separate category. This confirms the governance market distinction is absent from the regulatory discourse.


## Extending Evidence

**Source:** IGA and CNIGA ANPRM comments, Yogonet 2026-04-20

Tribal gaming operators filed ANPRM comments focused entirely on sports betting and event contracts, with no mention of governance markets or futarchy. The Indian Gaming Association and California Nations Indian Gaming Association comments treat prediction markets as a monolithic category threatening tribal gaming exclusivity, reinforcing the pattern that stakeholders default to gambling frameworks when governance use cases are absent from the discourse.


## Extending Evidence

**Source:** ProphetX CFTC ANPRM comments, April 2026

ProphetX's Section 4(c) proposal demonstrates sophisticated regulatory engagement from a new market entrant, but focuses exclusively on sports event contracts with no mention of governance/decision markets. This reinforces the pattern that ANPRM comments treat prediction markets as a monolithic category dominated by event betting, with futarchy governance applications remaining invisible to regulators and industry participants alike.
