---
type: claim
domain: internet-finance
description: Three-month clawback period filters for proposals that create lasting value versus short-term manipulation
confidence: experimental
source: Drift Futarchy proposal structure
created: 2026-03-15
---

# Futarchy proposer incentives require delayed vesting to prevent gaming because immediate rewards enable proposal spam for token extraction rather than quality governance

The Drift proposal structures proposer rewards with a three-month delay between proposal passage and token claim. Passing proposals earn up to 5,000 DRIFT each, but tokens are only claimable after three months. This delay creates a quality filter: proposers must believe their proposals will create sustained value that survives the vesting period. Without this delay, rational actors could spam low-quality proposals to extract rewards, knowing they can exit before negative effects manifest. The proposal also includes an executor group discretion clause - if successful proposals exceed expectations, the group can decide which top N proposals split the allocation. This combines time-based filtering with human judgment to prevent gaming. The 20,000 DRIFT activity pool uses the same three-month delay, with criteria finalized by the execution group to 'filter for non organic activity.'

---

Relevant Notes:
- futarchy adoption faces friction from token price psychology proposal complexity and liquidity requirements.md
- performance-unlocked-team-tokens-with-price-multiple-triggers-and-twap-settlement-create-long-term-alignment-without-initial-dilution.md

Topics:
- [[_map]]
