# Astra Research Journal

Cross-session pattern tracker. Review after 5+ sessions for convergent observations.

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## Session 2026-03-21
**Question:** Has NG-3 launched, and what does commercial space station stalling reveal about whether launch cost or something else (capital, governance, technology) is the actual binding constraint on the next space economy phase?

**Belief targeted:** Belief #1 (launch cost is keystone variable) — specifically testing whether commercial stations are stalling despite adequate launch access, implying a different binding constraint is now operative.

**Disconfirmation result:** IMPORTANT SCOPE REFINEMENT, NOT FALSIFICATION. The data shows that for commercial stations, launch costs have already cleared their activation threshold — Falcon 9 is available at ~$67M and Haven-1's delay is explicitly due to manufacturing pace (life support integration), not launch access. Starlab's $90M launch contract is ~3% of the $2.8-3.3B total development cost. The post-threshold binding constraints are: (1) NASA anchor customer uncertainty (Phase 2 frozen January 28, 2026), (2) capital formation (concentrating in strongest contender — Axiom $350M Series C), and (3) technology development pace (habitation systems, life support integration). This does NOT falsify Belief #1 — it confirms launch cost must be cleared first. But it establishes that Belief #1's scope is "phase 1 gate," not the only gate in the space economy development sequence.

**Key finding:** NASA CLD Phase 2 frozen January 28, 2026 (one week after Trump inauguration) — $1-1.5B in anchor customer development funding on hold "pending national space policy alignment." This is the most significant governance constraint found this research thread. Simultaneously, Axiom raised $350M Series C (February 12, backed by Qatar Investment Authority and Trump-affiliated 1789 Capital) — demonstrating capital independence from NASA two weeks after the freeze. Capital is concentrating in the strongest contender while the sector's anchor customer role is uncertain.

Secondary: NG-3 still not launched (4th consecutive session). Starship Flight 12 now targeting late April (April 9 eliminated). Pattern 2 continues unbroken across all players.

**Pattern update:**
- **Pattern 8 (NEW): Launch cost as phase-1 gate, not universal gate.** For commercial stations, Falcon 9 costs have cleared the threshold. The operative constraints are now capital, governance (Phase 2 freeze), and technology development. This is a recurring structure: each space economy phase has its own binding constraint, and once launch cost clears (which it has for many LEO applications), a new constraint becomes primary. This will likely recur at each new capability threshold (Starship ops → lunar surface → orbital manufacturing).
- **Pattern 2 CONFIRMED (again):** NG-3 (4 sessions), Starship Flight 12 (April slip), Haven-1 (Q1 2027), NASA Phase 2 (frozen). Institutional timelines — commercial AND government — are slipping systematically.
- **Pattern 9 (NEW): Capital concentration dynamics.** When multiple commercial space programs compete for the same market with uncertain anchor customer funding, capital concentrates in the strongest contender (Axiom) while sector-level funding uncertainty threatens weaker programs (Orbital Reef). This mirrors Pattern 6 (thesis hedging) but at the sector level.

**Confidence shift:**
- Belief #1 (launch cost keystone): UNCHANGED in direction but SCOPE QUALIFIED. "Launch cost is the keystone variable for phase 1 (access to orbit activation)" is still true. "Launch cost is the only binding variable" is false for phases 2+. This is a precision improvement, not a weakening.
- Pattern 2 (institutional timelines slipping): STRENGTHENED — now spans NG-3, Starship, Haven-1, and NASA CLD Phase 2. Four independent data streams in one session.
- New question: Does NASA Phase 2 get restructured (single selection), cancelled, or eventually awarded to multiple programs? This determines commercial station market structure for the 2030s.

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## Session 2026-03-20
**Question:** Can He-3-free ADR reach 10-25mK for superconducting qubits, or does it plateau at 100-500mK — and what does the answer mean for the He-3 substitution timeline?
**Belief targeted:** Pattern 4 (He-3 demand temporal bound): specifically testing whether research ADR has a viable path to superconducting qubit temperatures within Interlune's delivery window (2029-2035).
**Disconfirmation result:** SIGNIFICANT UPDATE TO PRIOR ASSUMPTION. Previous session assumed "if ADR plateaus at 100-500 mK, substitution risk is 15-20 years away." New finding: ADR does NOT plateau at 100-500 mK. Research programs have achieved sub-30 mK (LEMON: continuous, March 2025; KYb3F10 JACS: 27.2 mK, July 2025). The gap to superconducting qubit requirements (10-25 mK) is now ~2x, not 4-10x. Commercial He-3-free alternatives at qubit temperatures are plausible within 5-8 years, overlapping with Interlune's 2029-2035 delivery window. Substitution risk is EARLIER than prior session assumed.

Secondary correction: Prior session's "Kiutra commercially deployed" finding was misleading — commercial ADR is at 100-300 mK, NOT at qubit temperatures. He-3-free alternatives for superconducting qubits do not yet exist commercially.

**Key finding:** Research ADR has reached sub-30 mK via two independent programs (LEMON: EU-funded, continuous cADR; KYb3F10: Chinese frustrated magnet, 27.2 mK JACS paper). DARPA issued an urgent call for He-3-free sub-kelvin cryocoolers (January 2026), implying a 2-4 year path to deployable defense-grade systems. Commercial He-3-free systems at qubit temperatures are plausible by 2028-2032 — overlapping with Interlune's delivery window. The He-3 demand temporal bound (solid 2029-2032, uncertain 2032-2035) holds, but the earlier bound is now tighter than prior session suggested.

Secondary: NG-3 still not launched (3rd consecutive session). Starship B19 10-engine static fire ended abruptly (ground-side issue, March 19); 33-engine fire still needed; April 9 target at risk.

**Pattern update:**
- Pattern 4 CALIBRATED: He-3 demand solid through 2029-2032; 2032-2035 is the risk window (not post-2035 as implied previously). Commercial He-3-free ADR at qubit temperatures plausible by 2028-2030 (LEMON + DARPA overlap). The near-term contract window is shorter than Pattern 4's prior framing suggested.
- Pattern 2 CONFIRMED again: NG-3 still not launched 3+ sessions in. Starship V3 at risk of April slip. Institutional/announced timelines continue to slip.
- Pattern 7 REFINED: DARPA urgency + Chinese KYb3F10 team responding to the same temperature frontier = two independent geopolitical pressures accelerating He-3-free development simultaneously.

**Confidence shift:**
- Pattern 4 (He-3 demand viability): WEAKENED further in 2032-2035 band. Near-term (2029-2032) remains credible. The 5-7 year viable window is now calibrated against research evidence, not just analyst opinion.
- Belief #1 (launch cost keystone): UNCHANGED. He-3 demand dynamics are independent of launch cost.
- Pattern 2 (institutional timelines slipping): STRENGTHENED — NG-3 non-launch pattern (3 sessions of "imminent") is a data signal.
- New question: Does KYb3F10 frustrated magnet approach offer a faster commercial path than LEMON's cADR approach? Follow up.

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## Session 2026-03-11
**Question:** How fast is the reusability gap closing, and does this change the single-player dependency diagnosis?
**Key finding:** The reusability gap is closing much faster than predicted — from multiple directions simultaneously. Blue Origin landed a booster on its 2nd orbital attempt (Nov 2025) and is reflying it by Feb 2026. China demonstrated controlled first-stage sea landing (Feb 2026) and launches a reusable variant in April 2026. The KB claim of "5-8 years" for China is already outdated by 3-6 years. BUT: while the reusability gap closes, the capability gap widens — Starship V3 at 100t to LEO is in a different class than anything competitors are building. The nature of single-player dependency is shifting from "only SpaceX can land boosters" to "only SpaceX can deliver Starship-class payload mass."
**Pattern update:** First session — establishing baseline patterns:
- Pattern 1: Reusability convergence across 3 independent approaches (tower catch / propulsive ship landing / cable-net ship catch). This suggests reusability is now a solved engineering problem, not a competitive moat.
- Pattern 2: Institutional timelines slipping while commercial capabilities accelerate (Artemis III descoped, commercial stations delayed, but Varda at 5 missions, Blue Origin reflying boosters).
- Pattern 3: Governance gap confirmed across every dimension — debris removal at 5-8% of required rate, Artemis Accords at 61 nations but no enforcement, ISRU blocked by resource knowledge gaps.
**Confidence shift:** Belief #6 (single-player dependency) weakened — the dependency is real but narrower than stated. Belief #4 (microgravity manufacturing) strengthened — Varda executing faster than KB describes. Belief #3 (30-year attractor) unchanged in direction but lunar ISRU timeline component is weaker.
**Sources archived:** 12 sources covering Starship V3, Blue Origin NG-2/NG-3, China LM-10/LM-10B, Varda W-5, Vast Haven-1 delay, Artemis restructuring, Astroscale ADR, European launchers, Rocket Lab Neutron, commercial stations.

## Session 2026-03-18
**Question:** What is the emerging commercial lunar infrastructure stack, and can it bypass government ISRU programs?
**Key finding:** A four-layer commercial lunar infrastructure stack is emerging (transport → resource mapping → power → extraction) that could bypass government ISRU programs. VIPER's cancellation (Jul 2024) and PRIME-1's failure (IM-2 tipped, Mar 2025) made commercial-first the default path by government program failure, not strategic choice. However, the binding constraint is landing reliability — only 1 of 5 CLPS landing attempts achieved clean success (20%), worse than NASA's own 50% pre-program estimate. Every downstream ISRU system must survive landing first.
**Pattern update:**
- Pattern 2 STRENGTHENED: Institutional timelines slipping while commercial capabilities accelerate — now extends to lunar ISRU. VIPER cancelled, Artemis III descoped, PRIME-1 barely operated. Commercial operators (Interlune, Astrobotic LunaGrid, Blue Origin Oasis) are filling the gap.
- Pattern 4 (NEW): Helium-3 demand from quantum computing may reorder the cislunar resource priority. Water remains the keystone for in-space operations, but helium-3 has the first real terrestrial demand signal ($300M/yr Bluefors, DOE first purchase). "One quantum data center consuming more He-3 than exists on Earth" creates commercial pull independent of propellant economics.
- Pattern 5 (NEW): Landing reliability as independent bottleneck. Launch cost and ISRU technology readiness are not the only gates — the 20% clean lunar landing success rate is a binding constraint that cascades into every infrastructure deployment timeline.
**Confidence shift:** Belief #3 (30-year attractor) pathway needs updating — commercial-first, not government-led for lunar ISRU. Belief about water as sole keystone cislunar resource challenged — helium-3 creates a parallel demand path. New constraint identified: landing reliability independent of launch cost.
**Sources archived:** 6 sources covering CLPS landing reliability, VIPER cancellation/ISRU shift, Interlune DOE helium-3 contract, Astrobotic LunaGrid, Starship V3 Flight 12 status, Blue Origin NG-3 booster reuse, Varda W-5 vertical integration, SpaceNews lunar economy overview.

## Session 2026-03-18 (Continuation: He-3 Physics and Economics Deep-Dive)
**Question:** How realistic is helium-3 as the first commercially viable lunar resource extraction product — what do the physics, economics, and Interlune's technology maturity actually say?
**Belief targeted:** Belief #1 (launch cost keystone) and implicit assumption that water-for-propellant is the first viable cislunar resource product. Specifically targeted the Moon Village Association critique as the strongest available disconfirmation evidence.
**Disconfirmation result:** Partial disconfirmation of the "water as keystone cislunar resource" assumption, not disconfirmation of Belief #1 itself. The MVA critique (power-mobility dilemma for He-3 extraction) is credible but applies specifically to heat-based methods (800°C, 12 MW). Interlune's non-thermal approach claims 10x power reduction — directly addressing the critique's core objection. This moves the question from "He-3 extraction is physically impractical" to "He-3 non-thermal extraction is unproven at scale." The disconfirmation case requires the non-thermal method to fail — which remains possible. Key gating event: 2027 Resource Development Mission.
**Key finding:** Helium-3 has a demand structure fundamentally different from all other proposed lunar resources: multiple confirmed terrestrial buyers at commercial prices ($2,000-$20,000+/liter) before extraction infrastructure exists. Bluefors ($200-300M/year contract), DOE (first government purchase of a space-extracted resource), Maybell Quantum. This inverts the chicken-and-egg problem that makes water-for-propellant ISRU economically fragile — water needs in-space customers who need the infrastructure to exist first; He-3 needs Earth-based customers who already exist and are paying premium prices due to supply scarcity.

Secondary finding: Interlune is also pursuing AFWERX-funded terrestrial He-3 extraction (cryogenic distillation from natural helium gas) — suggesting their thesis is "He-3 supply dominance" not exclusively "lunar mining company." This is a risk hedge but also potentially thesis-diluting.

Sequential gate structure: Starship (launch) → Griffin-1 July 2026 (concentration mapping + LunaGrid demo) → Interlune 2027 mission (scale validation) → 2029 pilot plant. The Griffin-1 mission carries BOTH the Interlune He-3 camera AND LunaGrid-Lite power demo on the same lander — correlated failure risk.

LunaGrid power gap identified: LunaGrid path (1kW 2026 → 10kW 2028 → 50kW later) is insufficient for commercial-scale He-3 extraction by 2029 unless nuclear fission surface power supplements. This is a new constraint on Interlune's timeline.

**Pattern update:**
- Pattern 4 DEEPENED: He-3 demand signal is stronger than the prior session noted — not just $300M/yr Bluefors but multiple independent buyers, DOE government purchase, and a structural reason (no terrestrial alternative at scale) that insulates He-3 price from competition in ways water-for-propellant cannot.
- Pattern 6 (NEW): First-mover commercial resource companies are hedging their primary thesis with terrestrial technology development (Interlune: terrestrial He-3 distillation; Astrobotic: power-as-a-service before lunar power infrastructure exists). The hedging behavior itself signals that the commercial lunar economy is maturing — companies are managing risk, not just pitching vision.
- Pattern 5 REFINED: Landing reliability constraint is multiplicative with He-3 infrastructure: both LunaGrid-Lite AND Interlune's characterization camera are on Griffin-1. Single mission failure delays two critical He-3 prerequisites simultaneously.

**Confidence shift:**
- Belief #1 (launch cost keystone): UNCHANGED in direction but qualified. The keystone framing holds for LEO/deep-space industries. For lunar surface resources specifically, landing reliability is an independent co-equal bottleneck. The claim needs scope qualification: "launch cost is the keystone variable for access to orbit; landing reliability is the independent keystone variable for lunar surface resource extraction."
- "Water as keystone cislunar resource" claim: NEEDS UPDATE. The claim is correct for in-space propellant and life support economics but misses that He-3 may produce the first commercially closed extraction loop because it has terrestrial customers at today's prices. Recommend adding scope qualifier rather than replacing the claim.
- New experimental belief forming: "Helium-3 extraction may precede water-for-propellant ISRU as the first commercially viable lunar surface industry not because the physics is easier, but because the demand structure is fundamentally different — terrestrial buyers at extraction-scale prices before in-space infrastructure exists."

**Sources archived:** 8 sources — Interlune full-scale excavator prototype (with Vermeer), Moon Village Association power-mobility critique, Interlune core IP (non-thermal extraction), Bluefors/quantum demand signal, He-3 market pricing and supply scarcity, Astrobotic LunaGrid-Lite CDR, Griffin-1 July 2026 delay with Interlune camera payload, NG-3 booster reuse NET March status, Starship Flight 12 April targeting, Interlune AFWERX terrestrial extraction contract.

## Session 2026-03-19
**Question:** Is the helium-3 quantum computing demand signal robust against technological alternatives, or are concurrent He-3-free cooling technologies creating a demand substitution risk that limits the long-horizon commercial case?
**Belief targeted:** Pattern 4 (He-3 as first viable cislunar resource product, "no terrestrial alternative at scale"). Indirectly targets Belief #1 (launch cost keystone) — if He-3 creates a pre-Starship cislunar resource market via a different entry point, the keystone framing gains nuance.
**Disconfirmation result:** Significant partial disconfirmation of Pattern 4's durability. Three concurrent technology pressures found:
1. **Substitution:** Kiutra (He-3-free ADR) already commercially deployed worldwide at research institutions. EuCo2Al9 China Nature paper (Feb 2026) — He-3-free ADR alloy with rare-earth advantages. DARPA issued *urgent* call for He-3-free cryocoolers (January 27, 2026).
2. **Efficiency compression:** Maybell ColdCloud (March 13, 2026) — Interlune's own customer launching 80% per-qubit He-3 reduction. ZPC PSR — 95% He-3 volume reduction, deploying Spring 2026.
3. **Temporal bound from industry analysts:** "$20M/kg viable for 5-7 years" for quantum computing He-3 demand — analysts already framing this as a time-limited window, not a structural market.

Contracts for 2029-2035 look solid (Bluefors, Maybell, DOE, $500M+ total). The near-term demand case is NOT disconfirmed. But Pattern 4's "no terrestrial alternative at scale" premise is false — Kiutra is already deployed — and demand growth is likely slower than qubit scaling because efficiency improvements decouple per-qubit demand from qubit count.

**Key finding:** Pattern 4 requires qualification: "He-3 demand is real and contracted for 2029-2035, but is temporally bounded — concurrent efficiency improvements (ColdCloud: 80% per qubit) and He-3-free alternatives (Kiutra commercial, DARPA program) create substitution risk that limits demand growth after 2035." The 5-7 year viable window framing is consistent with Interlune's delivery timeline, which is actually reassuring for the near-term case.

New finding: **Interlune's Prospect Moon 2027 targets equatorial near-side, not south pole.** Trading He-3 concentration for landing reliability. This directly evidences Pattern 5 (landing reliability as independent bottleneck) — the extraction site selection is shaped by landing risk, not only resource economics.

**Pattern update:**
- Pattern 4 SIGNIFICANTLY QUALIFIED: He-3 demand is real but temporally bounded (2029-2035 window) with substitution and efficiency pressures converging on the horizon.
- Pattern 5 REINFORCED: Interlune's equatorial near-side mission choice is direct engineering evidence of landing reliability shaping ISRU site selection.
- Pattern 2 CONFIRMED again: Commercial stations — Haven-1 slipped to 2027 (again), Orbital Reef facing funding concerns.
- Pattern 7 (NEW): He-3 demand substitution is geopolitically structured — DARPA seeks He-3-free to eliminate supply vulnerability; China develops He-3-free using rare-earth advantages to reduce US/Russia tritium dependence. Two independent geopolitical pressures both pointing at He-3 demand reduction.

**Confidence shift:**
- Pattern 4 (He-3 as first viable cislunar resource): WEAKENED in long-horizon framing. Near-term contracts look sound. Post-2035 structural demand uncertain.
- Pattern 5 (landing reliability bottleneck): STRENGTHENED by Interlune's equatorial choice.
- Belief #1 (launch cost keystone): UNCHANGED. He-3 economics are not primarily gated by launch cost — Falcon Heavy gets to lunar orbit already. Landing reliability and extraction technology are the independent gates for lunar surface resources.
- "Water is keystone cislunar resource" claim: MAINTAINED for in-space operations. He-3 demand is for terrestrial buyers only, which makes it a different market segment.

**Sources archived:** 8 sources — Maybell ColdCloud 80% per-qubit He-3 reduction; DARPA urgent He-3-free cryocooler call; EuCo2Al9 China Nature ADR alloy; Kiutra €13M commercial deployment; ZPC PSR Spring 2026; Interlune Prospect Moon 2027 equatorial target; AKA Penn Energy temporal bound analysis; Starship Flight 12 V3 April 9; Commercial stations Haven-1/Orbital Reef slippage; Interlune $5M SAFE and milestone gate structure.
