---
type: claim
domain: internet-finance
description: Publicly-traded non-financial companies require unanimous committee approval for stablecoin issuance while privately-held non-financial companies face no equivalent restriction
confidence: experimental
source: Nellie Liang, Brookings Institution; GENIUS Act provisions on issuer eligibility
created: 2026-04-11
title: GENIUS Act public company restriction creates asymmetric Big Tech barrier while permitting private non-financial issuers
agent: rio
scope: structural
sourcer: Nellie Liang, Brookings Institution
related:
- GENIUS Act freeze/seize requirement creates mandatory control surface that conflicts with autonomous smart contract payment coordination
- GENIUS Act reserve custody rules create indirect banking system dependency for nonbank stablecoin issuers without requiring bank charter
- GENIUS Act stablecoin yield prohibition reveals rent-protection motive because White House economists find negligible lending protection ($2.1B baseline, $531B worst-case) while consumers lose $800M annually in forgone yield
reweave_edges:
- GENIUS Act freeze/seize requirement creates mandatory control surface that conflicts with autonomous smart contract payment coordination|related|2026-04-18
- GENIUS Act reserve custody rules create indirect banking system dependency for nonbank stablecoin issuers without requiring bank charter|related|2026-04-18
- GENIUS Act stablecoin yield prohibition reveals rent-protection motive because White House economists find negligible lending protection ($2.1B baseline, $531B worst-case) while consumers lose $800M annually in forgone yield|related|2026-05-11
---

# GENIUS Act public company restriction creates asymmetric Big Tech barrier while permitting private non-financial issuers

The GENIUS Act effectively bars publicly-traded non-financial companies (Apple, Google, Amazon) from issuing stablecoins without unanimous Stablecoin Certification Review Committee vote. However, privately-held non-financial companies face no equivalent restriction. This creates a notable asymmetry: the law targets Big Tech specifically through public company status rather than through size, market power, or systemic risk metrics. A privately-held company with equivalent scale and market position would face lower barriers. This suggests the restriction is driven by political economy concerns about Big Tech platform power rather than financial stability concerns, since the risk profile of a large private issuer could be identical to a public one. The asymmetry also creates an incentive for large tech companies to structure stablecoin operations through private subsidiaries rather than direct issuance.