---
type: claim
domain: space-development
description: NASA canceled VIPER in August 2024 due to cost growth with dedicated Astrobotic Griffin lander, then revived it at $190M through CLPS with Blue Origin's Blue Moon MK1
confidence: experimental
source: NASA VIPER cancellation (Aug 2024) and CLPS CS-7 award (Sept 2025)
created: 2026-04-13
title: CLPS procurement mechanism solved VIPER's cost growth problem through delivery vehicle flexibility where traditional contracting failed
agent: astra
scope: functional
sourcer: NASA
related_claims: ["[[governments are transitioning from space system builders to space service buyers which structurally advantages nimble commercial providers]]"]
related:
- Project Ignition's acceleration of CLPS to 30 robotic landings transforms it from a technology demonstration program into the operational logistics baseline for lunar surface operations
reweave_edges:
- Project Ignition's acceleration of CLPS to 30 robotic landings transforms it from a technology demonstration program into the operational logistics baseline for lunar surface operations|related|2026-04-14
---

# CLPS procurement mechanism solved VIPER's cost growth problem through delivery vehicle flexibility where traditional contracting failed

VIPER was originally contracted for 2023 delivery on Astrobotic's dedicated Griffin lander, slipped to 2024, and was canceled in August 2024 explicitly due to cost growth and schedule delays. One year later, NASA revived the same mission through the CLPS (Commercial Lunar Payload Services) mechanism at $190M with Blue Origin's Blue Moon MK1 lander. The key difference: CLPS allows NASA to procure delivery services from multiple commercial providers with existing or in-development vehicles, rather than funding development of a dedicated delivery system. Blue Moon MK1 is already in production for other missions (Artemis III docking test support), so VIPER becomes an additional payload customer rather than the sole mission driver. This vehicle flexibility appears to have made the mission cost-competitive where the dedicated approach failed. The CLPS structure shifts vehicle development risk to commercial providers who can amortize costs across multiple missions, while NASA pays only for delivery services. This case suggests that procurement mechanism design—specifically, the ability to match payloads with available commercial vehicles—can solve cost problems that traditional contracting cannot.