---
type: source
title: "Futard.io Platform Statistics April 2026: Bimodal Distribution, 53 Launches, Two Outliers"
author: "futard.io"
url: https://www.futard.io/
date: 2026-04-11
domain: internet-finance
secondary_domains: []
format: data
status: processed
processed_by: rio
processed_date: 2026-04-11
priority: medium
tags: [metadao, futardio, futarchy, solana, platform-stats, mechanism-design]
extraction_model: "anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5"
---

## Content

**Aggregate platform stats (as of April 11, 2026):**
- Total launches: 53
- Total committed: $17.9M
- Total funders: 1,035
- Active launches: 1 (Solar — see separate archive)

**Distribution pattern:** Most completed launches in REFUNDING status. Two extreme outliers:
- **Superclaw** (autonomous self-improving AI agent infrastructure): $6.0M committed on $50k target = 11,902% overraise
- **Futardio cult** (first futarchy-governed meme coin): $11.4M committed on $50k target = 22,806% overraise

**P2P.me governance controversy (approximately April 5, 2026):**
- P2P.me team admitted to trading on their own ICO outcome
- MetaDAO extended refund windows (March 30-31, 2026)
- P2P.me buyback proposal (up to $500k USDC of P2P tokens) subsequently passed
- This is an insider trading case within a futarchy-governed fundraise

## Agent Notes

**Why this matters:** The bimodal distribution — most projects refund, two 100x+ overraises — is the clearest empirical picture of MetaDAO's selection mechanism to date. Futarchy is selecting for viral community-fit projects, not just credentialed teams. The mechanism rewards projects that can generate signal within the futarchy community.

**What surprised me:** The P2P.me team trading case is a concrete instance of the "reflexivity is not manipulation" blindspot explicitly named in Rio's identity file. The identity file notes: "Drafted a post defending team members betting on their own fundraise outcome on Polymarket. Framed it as 'reflexivity, not manipulation.' m3ta killed it — anyone leading a raise has material non-public info about demand, full stop." P2P.me's team did exactly this and the buyback passed anyway — MetaDAO's futarchy mechanism did not self-police the insider trading. This is a relevant governance failure test.

**What I expected but didn't find:** Evidence that futarchy mechanically prevented or penalized the insider trading. The mechanism allowed the buyback to pass post-controversy. Whether the futarchy market priced the controversy correctly or whether the buyback passing was itself a rational futarchy decision is unclear.

**KB connections:**
- `MetaDAO empirical results show smaller participants gaining influence through futarchy` — the outlier distribution is consistent with this but also shows the mechanism may be selecting for meme/hype rather than governance quality
- `Legacy ICOs failed because team treasury control created extraction incentives` — P2P.me controversy is a partial analog: the team had information advantages within the futarchy framework
- `futarchy is manipulation-resistant because attack attempts create profitable opportunities for arbitrageurs` — P2P.me case tests this: did the insider trading create an arbitrage that corrected the market, or did it distort the outcome?

**Extraction hints:**
- CLAIM: "Futardio platform shows bimodal launch distribution where most projects refund but viral community-resonant projects raise 100x+ targets, indicating futarchy selects for community signal rather than team credentials"
- P2P.me case: archive separately if evidence is confirmed (single source, low confidence per Session 16 notes)
- The insider trading case warrants a divergence consideration with `futarchy is manipulation-resistant`

## Curator Notes

PRIMARY CONNECTION: `MetaDAO empirical results show smaller participants gaining influence through futarchy`
WHY ARCHIVED: Platform-level empirical distribution data — first aggregate stats picture of the entire futard.io ecosystem. P2P.me insider trading case is a direct test of `futarchy is manipulation-resistant`.
EXTRACTION HINT: Two extractions: (1) bimodal distribution as a mechanism claim, (2) P2P.me insider trading as a manipulation-resistance test case requiring a potential divergence
