diff --git a/domains/internet-finance/MetaDAO is the futarchy launchpad on Solana where projects raise capital through unruggable ICOs governed by conditional markets creating the first platform for ownership coins at scale.md b/domains/internet-finance/MetaDAO is the futarchy launchpad on Solana where projects raise capital through unruggable ICOs governed by conditional markets creating the first platform for ownership coins at scale.md
index b2124043e..27904900c 100644
--- a/domains/internet-finance/MetaDAO is the futarchy launchpad on Solana where projects raise capital through unruggable ICOs governed by conditional markets creating the first platform for ownership coins at scale.md	
+++ b/domains/internet-finance/MetaDAO is the futarchy launchpad on Solana where projects raise capital through unruggable ICOs governed by conditional markets creating the first platform for ownership coins at scale.md	
@@ -64,6 +64,12 @@ Raises include: Ranger ($6M minimum, uncapped), Solomon ($102.9M committed, $8M
 
 **Three-tier dispute resolution:** Protocol decisions via futarchy (on-chain), technical disputes via review panel, legal disputes via JAMS arbitration (Cayman Islands). The layered approach means on-chain governance handles day-to-day decisions while legal mechanisms provide fallback. Since [[MetaDAOs three-layer legal hierarchy separates formation agreements from contractual relationships from regulatory armor with each layer using different enforcement mechanisms]], the governance and legal structures are designed to work together.
 
+
+### Additional Evidence (extend)
+*Source: [[2024-12-30-futardio-proposal-fund-deans-list-dao-website-redesign]] | Added: 2026-03-10 | Extractor: anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5*
+
+DeansListDAO demonstrates MetaDAO's Autocrat mechanism supporting ongoing operational governance beyond initial fundraising. The DAO has existing treasury ($115,000) and revenue model (5% tax on member contracts generating $150,000 annually) and used futarchy to govern spending decisions like a $3,500 website redesign (proposal 5V5MFN69yB2w82QWcWXyW84L3x881w5TanLpLnKAKyK4, passed 2025-01-03). This shows MetaDAO's platform supporting post-launch governance operations, not just capital formation at launch.
+
 ---
 
 Relevant Notes:
diff --git a/domains/internet-finance/MetaDAOs Autocrat program implements futarchy through conditional token markets where proposals create parallel pass and fail universes settled by time-weighted average price over a three-day window.md b/domains/internet-finance/MetaDAOs Autocrat program implements futarchy through conditional token markets where proposals create parallel pass and fail universes settled by time-weighted average price over a three-day window.md
index 4d7b92bb2..567daeaeb 100644
--- a/domains/internet-finance/MetaDAOs Autocrat program implements futarchy through conditional token markets where proposals create parallel pass and fail universes settled by time-weighted average price over a three-day window.md	
+++ b/domains/internet-finance/MetaDAOs Autocrat program implements futarchy through conditional token markets where proposals create parallel pass and fail universes settled by time-weighted average price over a three-day window.md	
@@ -53,6 +53,12 @@ Autocrat is MetaDAO's core governance program on Solana -- the on-chain implemen
 
 **Limitations.** [[MetaDAOs futarchy implementation shows limited trading volume in uncontested decisions]] -- when proposals are clearly good or clearly bad, few traders participate because the expected profit from trading in a consensus market is near zero. This is a structural feature, not a bug: contested decisions get more participation precisely because they're uncertain, which is when you most need information aggregation. But it does mean uncontested proposals can pass or fail with very thin markets, making the TWAP potentially noisy.
 
+
+### Additional Evidence (extend)
+*Source: [[2024-12-30-futardio-proposal-fund-deans-list-dao-website-redesign]] | Added: 2026-03-10 | Extractor: anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5*
+
+DeansListDAO proposal 5V5MFN69yB2w82QWcWXyW84L3x881w5TanLpLnKAKyK4 demonstrates Autocrat being used for operational spending decisions with specific TWAP thresholds. The proposal required market cap to reach $489,250 (current $475,000 + 3%) for passage, with a 5% discount applied to current MCAP at proposal time to account for volatility between written proposal and on-chain creation. The proposal passed on 2025-01-03, demonstrating the mechanism operating on a $3,500 budget decision with detailed ROI projections (30-50% contract growth, $4,750-$6,250 treasury expansion). This shows Autocrat supporting operational governance beyond abstract policy questions.
+
 ---
 
 Relevant Notes:
diff --git a/domains/internet-finance/dao-revenue-model-using-member-contract-tax-creates-treasury-growth-tied-to-member-success.md b/domains/internet-finance/dao-revenue-model-using-member-contract-tax-creates-treasury-growth-tied-to-member-success.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..d70e3419d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/domains/internet-finance/dao-revenue-model-using-member-contract-tax-creates-treasury-growth-tied-to-member-success.md
@@ -0,0 +1,50 @@
+---
+type: claim
+domain: internet-finance
+description: "DeansListDAO's 5% tax on member contract revenue aligns treasury growth with member success rather than token sales"
+confidence: experimental
+source: "DeansListDAO proposal 5V5MFN69yB2w82QWcWXyW84L3x881w5TanLpLnKAKyK4, 2024-12-30"
+created: 2024-12-30
+---
+
+# DAO revenue model using member contract tax creates treasury growth tied to member success rather than token appreciation
+
+DeansListDAO generates revenue by retaining a 5% tax on contracts completed by its members in the Solana ecosystem, creating a revenue model where treasury growth depends on member productivity rather than token appreciation or external fundraising.
+
+## Evidence
+
+From the DeansListDAO website redesign proposal:
+- Revenue model: 5% tax on revenue generated by members completing contracts
+- Current annual revenue from contracts: $150,000
+- Current treasury: $115,000 in various assets
+- Projected revenue growth from improved visibility: Additional $45,000-$75,000 annually
+- Treasury tax from growth: $2,250-$3,750 additional annual revenue
+
+The proposal's financial modeling explicitly tied website improvements to contract volume:
+- 50% increase in website engagement → 30-50% growth in inbound contract opportunities
+- Improved clarity of mission and services → attract new clients and larger contracts
+- 10% average increase in contract size justified by enhanced branding
+
+## Mechanism
+
+This model differs from typical DAO treasury strategies:
+1. Revenue comes from member productivity, not token sales or protocol fees
+2. Treasury growth is proportional to member success (5% of their contract revenue)
+3. DAO investments (like website redesign) are evaluated on their impact on member contract volume
+4. Members retain 95% of contract revenue, creating alignment between individual and collective success
+
+## Implications
+
+The tax-on-member-revenue model creates different incentive dynamics than protocol fee models:
+- DAO has direct incentive to increase member contract opportunities (marketing, reputation, tooling)
+- Members have incentive to complete more/larger contracts (95% retention)
+- Treasury growth is tied to real economic activity (contracts delivered) not speculative token trading
+- This structure is specific to service DAOs; applicability to other DAO types is unclear
+
+---
+
+Relevant Notes:
+- [[ownership coin treasuries should be actively managed through buybacks and token sales as continuous capital calibration not treated as static war chests]]
+
+Topics:
+- [[internet-finance]]
diff --git a/domains/internet-finance/futarchy adoption faces friction from token price psychology proposal complexity and liquidity requirements.md b/domains/internet-finance/futarchy adoption faces friction from token price psychology proposal complexity and liquidity requirements.md
index 1c7c1ce7a..7e7702640 100644
--- a/domains/internet-finance/futarchy adoption faces friction from token price psychology proposal complexity and liquidity requirements.md	
+++ b/domains/internet-finance/futarchy adoption faces friction from token price psychology proposal complexity and liquidity requirements.md	
@@ -22,6 +22,12 @@ The Hurupay raise on MetaDAO (Feb 2026) provides direct evidence of these compou
 
 Yet [[MetaDAOs futarchy implementation shows limited trading volume in uncontested decisions]] suggests these barriers might be solvable through better tooling, token splits, and proposal templates rather than fundamental mechanism changes. The observation that [[optimal governance requires mixing mechanisms because different decisions have different manipulation risk profiles]] implies futarchy could focus on high-stakes decisions where the benefits justify the complexity.
 
+
+### Additional Evidence (extend)
+*Source: [[2024-12-30-futardio-proposal-fund-deans-list-dao-website-redesign]] | Added: 2026-03-10 | Extractor: anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5*
+
+DeansListDAO's website redesign proposal demonstrates proposal complexity in practice: the proposal included detailed financial modeling (current revenue $150,000, projected growth 30-50%, treasury impact $4,750-$6,250, valuation projections from $450,000 to $468,000-$543,375), TWAP threshold calculations with volatility adjustments (-5% discount), and vesting schedules (80% upfront, 20% monthly over one year). This level of detail may be necessary for informed market participation but creates significant proposal preparation overhead, supporting the claim that proposal complexity is a friction point for futarchy adoption.
+
 ---
 
 Relevant Notes:
diff --git a/domains/internet-finance/futarchy-governed-website-redesign-proposal-passed-with-3500-budget-and-projected-30-50-percent-contract-growth.md b/domains/internet-finance/futarchy-governed-website-redesign-proposal-passed-with-3500-budget-and-projected-30-50-percent-contract-growth.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..5c098ce41
--- /dev/null
+++ b/domains/internet-finance/futarchy-governed-website-redesign-proposal-passed-with-3500-budget-and-projected-30-50-percent-contract-growth.md
@@ -0,0 +1,50 @@
+---
+type: claim
+domain: internet-finance
+description: "DeansListDAO used futarchy to approve a $3,500 website redesign with projected 30-50% contract growth and treasury expansion"
+confidence: experimental
+source: "DeansListDAO proposal 5V5MFN69yB2w82QWcWXyW84L3x881w5TanLpLnKAKyK4, passed 2025-01-03"
+created: 2024-12-30
+depends_on: ["MetaDAOs Autocrat program implements futarchy through conditional token markets where proposals create parallel pass and fail universes settled by time-weighted average price over a three-day window"]
+---
+
+# Futarchy-governed operational spending decisions include detailed financial projections and ROI modeling
+
+DeansListDAO's website redesign proposal demonstrates futarchy applied to operational spending (not just governance philosophy) with quantified financial projections, suggesting market participants demand measurable outcome claims rather than qualitative improvement assertions.
+
+## Evidence
+
+The proposal specified:
+- Total budget: $3,500 (80% upfront, 20% vested monthly over one year)
+- Projected outcomes: 50% increase in website engagement, 30% reduction in onboarding friction
+- Revenue impact: 30-50% growth in inbound contract opportunities
+- Treasury growth: Additional $4,750-$6,250 annually from 5% tax on increased contract revenue
+- Valuation projection: From $450,000 to $468,000-$543,375 within 12 months
+
+Financial modeling included:
+- Current annual revenue from contracts: $150,000
+- Projected additional revenue: $45,000-$75,000 annually
+- DAO treasury tax (5% of revenue): $2,250-$3,750 additional annual revenue
+- Contract size increase: 10% average (adding $50,000 total revenue across 10 contracts)
+
+The TWAP mechanism required:
+- Pass threshold: $489,250 market cap (current $475,000 + 3%)
+- Fail threshold: Below $475,000 market cap
+- Current MCAP discounted 5% from proposal time to account for volatility
+
+The proposal passed on 2025-01-03, indicating market participants accepted the financial modeling and ROI projections as sufficient justification for the $3,500 expenditure.
+
+## Significance
+
+This case demonstrates futarchy applied to operational spending decisions with specific financial projections rather than abstract governance questions. The detailed financial modeling (treasury growth, contract volume projections, valuation impact) suggests futarchy participants demand quantified outcomes rather than qualitative improvement claims.
+
+The proposal's passage indicates market confidence in the redesign's ability to generate positive ROI sufficient to justify the cost, but does not confirm the projected outcomes will materialize.
+
+---
+
+Relevant Notes:
+- [[MetaDAOs Autocrat program implements futarchy through conditional token markets where proposals create parallel pass and fail universes settled by time-weighted average price over a three-day window]]
+- [[futarchy adoption faces friction from token price psychology proposal complexity and liquidity requirements]]
+
+Topics:
+- [[internet-finance]]
diff --git a/inbox/archive/2024-12-30-futardio-proposal-fund-deans-list-dao-website-redesign.md b/inbox/archive/2024-12-30-futardio-proposal-fund-deans-list-dao-website-redesign.md
index 34eb2ece6..b183465e3 100644
--- a/inbox/archive/2024-12-30-futardio-proposal-fund-deans-list-dao-website-redesign.md
+++ b/inbox/archive/2024-12-30-futardio-proposal-fund-deans-list-dao-website-redesign.md
@@ -6,9 +6,15 @@ url: "https://www.futard.io/proposal/5V5MFN69yB2w82QWcWXyW84L3x881w5TanLpLnKAKyK
 date: 2024-12-30
 domain: internet-finance
 format: data
-status: unprocessed
+status: processed
 tags: [futardio, metadao, futarchy, solana, governance]
 event_type: proposal
+processed_by: rio
+processed_date: 2024-12-30
+claims_extracted: ["futarchy-governed-website-redesign-proposal-passed-with-3500-budget-and-projected-30-50-percent-contract-growth.md", "dao-revenue-model-using-member-contract-tax-creates-treasury-growth-tied-to-member-success.md"]
+enrichments_applied: ["MetaDAOs Autocrat program implements futarchy through conditional token markets where proposals create parallel pass and fail universes settled by time-weighted average price over a three-day window.md", "futarchy adoption faces friction from token price psychology proposal complexity and liquidity requirements.md", "MetaDAO is the futarchy launchpad on Solana where projects raise capital through unruggable ICOs governed by conditional markets creating the first platform for ownership coins at scale.md"]
+extraction_model: "anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5"
+extraction_notes: "Extracted two new claims: (1) specific case study of futarchy governing operational spending with detailed ROI projections, and (2) novel DAO revenue model based on taxing member contract revenue rather than protocol fees or token sales. Enriched three existing claims with evidence of MetaDAO Autocrat in operational use, proposal complexity requirements, and ongoing governance beyond fundraising phase."
 ---
 
 ## Proposal Details
@@ -172,3 +178,14 @@ Current MCAP will be -5% of the MCAP at the time of the proposal to account for
 - Autocrat version: 0.3
 - Completed: 2025-01-03
 - Ended: 2025-01-03
+
+
+## Key Facts
+- DeansListDAO proposal 5V5MFN69yB2w82QWcWXyW84L3x881w5TanLpLnKAKyK4 passed on 2025-01-03
+- DeansListDAO current treasury: $115,000
+- DeansListDAO current annual revenue: $150,000 from member contracts
+- DeansListDAO revenue model: 5% tax on member contract revenue
+- Website redesign budget: $3,500 (80% upfront, 20% vested monthly)
+- TWAP pass threshold: $489,250 market cap
+- Current market cap (discounted): $475,000
+- DeansListDAO has regional network states in Nigeria and Brazil