diff --git a/domains/internet-finance/amm-futarchy-reduces-state-rent-costs-from-135-225-sol-annually-to-near-zero-by-replacing-clob-market-pairs.md b/domains/internet-finance/amm-futarchy-reduces-state-rent-costs-from-135-225-sol-annually-to-near-zero-by-replacing-clob-market-pairs.md index f59aec22..2f98e69a 100644 --- a/domains/internet-finance/amm-futarchy-reduces-state-rent-costs-from-135-225-sol-annually-to-near-zero-by-replacing-clob-market-pairs.md +++ b/domains/internet-finance/amm-futarchy-reduces-state-rent-costs-from-135-225-sol-annually-to-near-zero-by-replacing-clob-market-pairs.md @@ -15,6 +15,12 @@ This cost reduction is structural, not marginal—the CLOB architecture requires The 94-99% cost reduction (from 135-225 SOL to near-zero) makes futarchy economically viable at higher proposal frequencies, removing a constraint on governance throughput. + +### Additional Evidence (confirm) +*Source: [[2024-01-24-futardio-proposal-develop-amm-program-for-futarchy]] | Added: 2026-03-15* + +Proposal provides specific cost calculation: 'If we average 3-5 proposals per month, then annual costs for market creation is 135-225 SOL, or $11475-$19125 at current prices. AMMs cost almost nothing in state rent.' Each pass/fail market pair costs 3.75 SOL in state rent that cannot currently be recouped. + --- Relevant Notes: diff --git a/domains/internet-finance/futarchy-clob-liquidity-fragmentation-creates-wide-spreads-because-pricing-counterfactual-governance-outcomes-has-inherent-uncertainty.md b/domains/internet-finance/futarchy-clob-liquidity-fragmentation-creates-wide-spreads-because-pricing-counterfactual-governance-outcomes-has-inherent-uncertainty.md index 4bbe0ebf..72dc2ed0 100644 --- a/domains/internet-finance/futarchy-clob-liquidity-fragmentation-creates-wide-spreads-because-pricing-counterfactual-governance-outcomes-has-inherent-uncertainty.md +++ b/domains/internet-finance/futarchy-clob-liquidity-fragmentation-creates-wide-spreads-because-pricing-counterfactual-governance-outcomes-has-inherent-uncertainty.md @@ -23,6 +23,12 @@ This connects to [[MetaDAOs futarchy implementation shows limited trading volume - Expected pattern: liquidity increases as proposal duration progresses - CLOB minimum order size (1 META) acts as spam filter but fragments liquidity further + +### Additional Evidence (confirm) +*Source: [[2024-01-24-futardio-proposal-develop-amm-program-for-futarchy]] | Added: 2026-03-15* + +MetaDAO's AMM migration proposal explicitly identifies lack of liquidity as the main reason for switching from CLOBs: 'Estimating a fair price for the future value of MetaDao under pass/fail conditions is difficult, and most reasonable estimates will have a wide range. This uncertainty discourages people from risking their funds with limit orders near the midpoint price, and has the effect of reducing liquidity (and trading).' + --- Relevant Notes: diff --git a/domains/internet-finance/high-fee-amms-create-lp-incentive-and-manipulation-deterrent-simultaneously-by-making-passive-provision-profitable-and-active-trading-expensive.md b/domains/internet-finance/high-fee-amms-create-lp-incentive-and-manipulation-deterrent-simultaneously-by-making-passive-provision-profitable-and-active-trading-expensive.md index 6f0e27b3..5c74c1bf 100644 --- a/domains/internet-finance/high-fee-amms-create-lp-incentive-and-manipulation-deterrent-simultaneously-by-making-passive-provision-profitable-and-active-trading-expensive.md +++ b/domains/internet-finance/high-fee-amms-create-lp-incentive-and-manipulation-deterrent-simultaneously-by-making-passive-provision-profitable-and-active-trading-expensive.md @@ -36,6 +36,12 @@ The mechanism depends on futarchy-specific conditions (short duration, governanc - May reduce legitimate trading volume - LP attraction depends on base trading activity + +### Additional Evidence (confirm) +*Source: [[2024-01-24-futardio-proposal-develop-amm-program-for-futarchy]] | Added: 2026-03-15* + +Proposal specifies 3-5% fee structure with dual purpose: 'By setting a high fee (3-5%) we can both: encourage LPs, and aggressively discourage wash-trading and manipulation.' The high fee makes liquidity provision profitable while making repeated trading for manipulation purposes expensive. + --- Relevant Notes: diff --git a/inbox/archive/.extraction-debug/2024-01-24-futardio-proposal-develop-amm-program-for-futarchy.json b/inbox/archive/.extraction-debug/2024-01-24-futardio-proposal-develop-amm-program-for-futarchy.json new file mode 100644 index 00000000..7e0cc470 --- /dev/null +++ b/inbox/archive/.extraction-debug/2024-01-24-futardio-proposal-develop-amm-program-for-futarchy.json @@ -0,0 +1,53 @@ +{ + "rejected_claims": [ + { + "filename": "amm-futarchy-uses-liquidity-weighted-price-over-time-as-settlement-metric-eliminating-midpoint-manipulation-vulnerability.md", + "issues": [ + "missing_attribution_extractor" + ] + }, + { + "filename": "amm-futarchy-proposer-liquidity-lockup-requirement-bootstraps-initial-market-depth-and-filters-spam-proposals.md", + "issues": [ + "missing_attribution_extractor" + ] + }, + { + "filename": "amm-futarchy-enables-granular-trading-below-minimum-order-sizes-that-clob-spam-filters-require.md", + "issues": [ + "missing_attribution_extractor" + ] + }, + { + "filename": "amm-futarchy-permissionless-market-closure-returns-state-rent-after-positions-are-withdrawn.md", + "issues": [ + "missing_attribution_extractor" + ] + } + ], + "validation_stats": { + "total": 4, + "kept": 0, + "fixed": 9, + "rejected": 4, + "fixes_applied": [ + "amm-futarchy-uses-liquidity-weighted-price-over-time-as-settlement-metric-eliminating-midpoint-manipulation-vulnerability.md:set_created:2026-03-15", + "amm-futarchy-uses-liquidity-weighted-price-over-time-as-settlement-metric-eliminating-midpoint-manipulation-vulnerability.md:stripped_wiki_link:liquidity-weighted-price-over-time-solves-futarchy-manipulat", + "amm-futarchy-uses-liquidity-weighted-price-over-time-as-settlement-metric-eliminating-midpoint-manipulation-vulnerability.md:stripped_wiki_link:high-fee-amms-create-lp-incentive-and-manipulation-deterrent", + "amm-futarchy-proposer-liquidity-lockup-requirement-bootstraps-initial-market-depth-and-filters-spam-proposals.md:set_created:2026-03-15", + "amm-futarchy-proposer-liquidity-lockup-requirement-bootstraps-initial-market-depth-and-filters-spam-proposals.md:stripped_wiki_link:amm-futarchy-bootstraps-liquidity-through-high-fee-incentive", + "amm-futarchy-enables-granular-trading-below-minimum-order-sizes-that-clob-spam-filters-require.md:set_created:2026-03-15", + "amm-futarchy-enables-granular-trading-below-minimum-order-sizes-that-clob-spam-filters-require.md:stripped_wiki_link:amm-futarchy-uses-liquidity-weighted-price-over-time-as-sett", + "amm-futarchy-permissionless-market-closure-returns-state-rent-after-positions-are-withdrawn.md:set_created:2026-03-15", + "amm-futarchy-permissionless-market-closure-returns-state-rent-after-positions-are-withdrawn.md:stripped_wiki_link:amm-futarchy-reduces-state-rent-costs-by-99-percent-versus-c" + ], + "rejections": [ + "amm-futarchy-uses-liquidity-weighted-price-over-time-as-settlement-metric-eliminating-midpoint-manipulation-vulnerability.md:missing_attribution_extractor", + "amm-futarchy-proposer-liquidity-lockup-requirement-bootstraps-initial-market-depth-and-filters-spam-proposals.md:missing_attribution_extractor", + "amm-futarchy-enables-granular-trading-below-minimum-order-sizes-that-clob-spam-filters-require.md:missing_attribution_extractor", + "amm-futarchy-permissionless-market-closure-returns-state-rent-after-positions-are-withdrawn.md:missing_attribution_extractor" + ] + }, + "model": "anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5", + "date": "2026-03-15" +} \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/inbox/archive/2024-01-24-futardio-proposal-develop-amm-program-for-futarchy.md b/inbox/archive/2024-01-24-futardio-proposal-develop-amm-program-for-futarchy.md index 20e65cf5..9f0aa017 100644 --- a/inbox/archive/2024-01-24-futardio-proposal-develop-amm-program-for-futarchy.md +++ b/inbox/archive/2024-01-24-futardio-proposal-develop-amm-program-for-futarchy.md @@ -6,9 +6,13 @@ url: "https://www.futard.io/proposal/CF9QUBS251FnNGZHLJ4WbB2CVRi5BtqJbCqMi47NX1P date: 2024-01-24 domain: internet-finance format: data -status: unprocessed +status: enrichment tags: [futardio, metadao, futarchy, solana, governance] event_type: proposal +processed_by: rio +processed_date: 2026-03-15 +enrichments_applied: ["futarchy-clob-liquidity-fragmentation-creates-wide-spreads-because-pricing-counterfactual-governance-outcomes-has-inherent-uncertainty.md", "amm-futarchy-reduces-state-rent-costs-from-135-225-sol-annually-to-near-zero-by-replacing-clob-market-pairs.md", "high-fee-amms-create-lp-incentive-and-manipulation-deterrent-simultaneously-by-making-passive-provision-profitable-and-active-trading-expensive.md"] +extraction_model: "anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5" --- ## Proposal Details @@ -128,3 +132,14 @@ Any important changes or feedback brought up during the proposal vote will be re - Autocrat version: 0.1 - Completed: 2024-01-29 - Ended: 2024-01-29 + + +## Key Facts +- MetaDAO proposal CF9QUBS251FnNGZHLJ4WbB2CVRi5BtqJbCqMi47NX1PG passed on 2024-01-29 +- Budget was 400 META on passing proposal plus 800 META on completed migration +- Implementation timeline estimated at 3 weeks from passing plus 1 week review +- joebuild wrote program changes, 0xNalloK handled frontend integration +- MetaDAO Autocrat version 0.1 was in use at time of proposal +- Current CLOB minimum order size is 1 META +- Pass/fail market pairs cost 3.75 SOL in state rent under CLOB system +- Proposal included feature to revert to fail after X days if proposal instruction does not work