auto-fix: strip 15 broken wiki links

Pipeline auto-fixer: removed [[ ]] brackets from links
that don't resolve to existing claims in the knowledge base.

agents/rio/musings/research-2026-03-20.md

@@ -131,10 +131,10 @@ Condition (d) is new. Airdrop farming systematically corrupts the selection sign
 **[[speculative markets aggregate information through incentive and selection effects not wisdom of crowds]]:**
 - NEEDS ENRICHMENT: airdrop farming is a specific mechanism by which the incentive and selection effects run backward — participants who stand to gain from airdrop extraction bid up TVL, creating a false signal. The "selection effect" in pre-TGE markets selects for airdrop farmers, not quality evaluators.
 
-**[[Community ownership accelerates growth through aligned evangelism not passive holding]]:**
+**Community ownership accelerates growth through aligned evangelism not passive holding:**
 - NEEDS SCOPING: PURR evidence suggests community airdrop creates "sticky holder" dynamics through survivor-bias psychology (weak hands exit, conviction OGs remain), which is distinct from product evangelism. The claim needs to distinguish between: (a) ownership alignment creating active evangelism for the product, vs. (b) ownership creating reflexive holding behavior through cost-basis psychology. Both are "aligned" in the sense of not selling — but only (a) supports growth through evangelism.
 
-**[[Futarchy is manipulation-resistant because attack attempts create profitable opportunities for defenders]]:**
+**Futarchy is manipulation-resistant because attack attempts create profitable opportunities for defenders:**
 - SCOPING CONTINUING: The airdrop farming mechanism shows that by the time futarchy governance begins (post-TGE), the participant pool has already been corrupted by pre-TGE incentive farming. The defenders who should resist bad governance proposals are diluted by farmers who are already planning to exit.
 
 **CLAIM CANDIDATE: Airdrop Farming as Quality Filter Corruption**

inbox/queue/2026-03-20-futardio-permissionless-futarchy-launchpad.md

@@ -43,7 +43,7 @@ tags: [futarchy, metadao-ecosystem, permissionless-launchpad, governance, capita
 **What I expected but didn't find:** I expected to find $OMFG token data (permissionless leverage protocol). Futard.io does not appear to be the OMFG leverage protocol — it's a separate launchpad. OMFG remains unidentified in accessible sources.
 
 **KB connections:**
-- [[Teleocap makes capital formation permissionless by letting anyone propose investment terms while AI agents evaluate debate and futarchy determines funding]] — Futard.io is a competing vision of this with simpler mechanics
+- Teleocap makes capital formation permissionless by letting anyone propose investment terms while AI agents evaluate debate and futarchy determines funding — Futard.io is a competing vision of this with simpler mechanics
 - [[permissionless leverage on metaDAO ecosystem tokens catalyzes trading volume and price discovery that strengthens governance by making futarchy markets more liquid]] — this may be a different protocol from futard.io
 - [[agents create dozens of proposals but only those attracting minimum stake become live futarchic decisions creating a permissionless attention market for capital formation]] — futard.io's filtering mechanism
 
@@ -55,6 +55,6 @@ tags: [futarchy, metadao-ecosystem, permissionless-launchpad, governance, capita
 **Context:** @futarddotio is listed in Rio's tweet feed. The name "futaRdIO" is the derivation of Rio's own name (per identity.md), indicating deep association. This is the platform Rio should be tracking most closely.
 
 ## Curator Notes (structured handoff for extractor)
-PRIMARY CONNECTION: [[Teleocap makes capital formation permissionless by letting anyone propose investment terms while AI agents evaluate debate and futarchy determines funding]]
+PRIMARY CONNECTION: Teleocap makes capital formation permissionless by letting anyone propose investment terms while AI agents evaluate debate and futarchy determines funding
 WHY ARCHIVED: Futard.io is a direct competitor or ecosystem parallel to the MetaDAO futarchy launchpad, with substantially different capital formation patterns ($17.9M committed vs MetaDAO's $3.8M governance volume) — the ecosystem bifurcation is a KB gap
 EXTRACTION HINT: Focus on the concentration problem (67% in platform governance token) and the "experimental technology" self-assessment — both scope the permissionless capital formation thesis

inbox/queue/2026-03-20-p2pme-business-model-website.md

@@ -62,8 +62,8 @@ tags: [p2p-ico, metadao, stablecoin, on-ramp, india, brazil, indonesia, vc-backe
 **What I expected but didn't find:** Team vesting terms, existing VC allocation at the ICO, or any disclosure of what the previous $2M buys in equity vs token allocation. This is a material gap for evaluating the ICO.
 
 **KB connections:**
-- [[MetaDAO empirical results show smaller participants gaining influence through futarchy]] — if P2P.me passes at 182x gross profit multiple, that challenges whether MetaDAO's futarchy correctly prices early-stage companies
-- [[Futarchy is manipulation-resistant because attack attempts create profitable opportunities for defenders]] — who are the "defenders" when the ICO is VC-backed and the seller is the team + existing VCs? The dynamic may be inverted from the canonical case.
+- MetaDAO empirical results show smaller participants gaining influence through futarchy — if P2P.me passes at 182x gross profit multiple, that challenges whether MetaDAO's futarchy correctly prices early-stage companies
+- Futarchy is manipulation-resistant because attack attempts create profitable opportunities for defenders — who are the "defenders" when the ICO is VC-backed and the seller is the team + existing VCs? The dynamic may be inverted from the canonical case.
 
 **Extraction hints:**
 - Live test result (after March 26): If P2P.me passes, record as evidence that VC imprimatur + growth narrative overrides valuation discipline. If it fails/gets rejected, record as evidence quality filtering is improving post-FairScale.
@@ -72,6 +72,6 @@ tags: [p2p-ico, metadao, stablecoin, on-ramp, india, brazil, indonesia, vc-backe
 **Context:** P2P.me addresses the India crypto payment gap — genuine problem (bank freezes for USDC transactions are a known friction for crypto adoption in India). The product is solving a real problem. The question is whether $15.5M FDV is the right price for where they are.
 
 ## Curator Notes (structured handoff for extractor)
-PRIMARY CONNECTION: [[MetaDAO empirical results show smaller participants gaining influence through futarchy]]
+PRIMARY CONNECTION: MetaDAO empirical results show smaller participants gaining influence through futarchy
 WHY ARCHIVED: P2P.me (March 26 ICO) is the live test of MetaDAO's quality filter — VC-backed project at 182x gross profit multiple with 50% liquid at TGE. Wait for March 26 result before extracting; the outcome is the data point.
 EXTRACTION HINT: Pair this source with the Pine P2P analysis (2026-03-19-pineanalytics-p2p-metadao-ico-analysis.md) and the March 26 result to assess whether futarchy corrects or endorses the valuation stretch

inbox/queue/2026-03-20-pineanalytics-bank-ico-dilution.md

@@ -44,9 +44,9 @@ tags: [metadao, ico, tokenomics, dilution, quality-filter, poker-staking, commun
 **What I expected but didn't find:** Whether $BANK was actually funded (passed futarchy governance) or rejected. Without the outcome, the quality filter question remains open. This is the critical missing data point.
 
 **KB connections:**
-- [[Legacy ICOs failed because team treasury control created extraction incentives that scaled with success]] — $BANK exhibits the EXACT failure mode this claim describes: team retained 95%, public got 5%
-- [[Community ownership accelerates growth through aligned evangelism not passive holding]] — $BANK directly contradicts this: 5% public ownership can't create aligned evangelism
-- [[Token economics replacing management fees and carried interest creates natural meritocracy in investment governance]] — $BANK shows the failure mode: token economics can also replicate traditional fund extraction
+- Legacy ICOs failed because team treasury control created extraction incentives that scaled with success — $BANK exhibits the EXACT failure mode this claim describes: team retained 95%, public got 5%
+- Community ownership accelerates growth through aligned evangelism not passive holding — $BANK directly contradicts this: 5% public ownership can't create aligned evangelism
+- Token economics replacing management fees and carried interest creates natural meritocracy in investment governance — $BANK shows the failure mode: token economics can also replicate traditional fund extraction
 
 **Extraction hints:**
 - Enrichment to Legacy ICO failure claim: "$BANK (March 2026) represents a contemporaneous example of the legacy ICO failure mode — 95% insider allocation with 5% public float, exactly the treasury control structure that futarchy is supposed to prevent"
@@ -56,6 +56,6 @@ tags: [metadao, ico, tokenomics, dilution, quality-filter, poker-staking, commun
 **Context:** Pine Analytics' March 2026 review track record: $UP (AVOID, Binance Wallet), $BANK (AVOID, MetaDAO ecosystem), $P2P (CAUTIOUS, MetaDAO). Three consecutive negative recommendations suggests either Pine is consistently bearish (selection bias) or March 2026 ICO quality has declined.
 
 ## Curator Notes (structured handoff for extractor)
-PRIMARY CONNECTION: [[Legacy ICOs failed because team treasury control created extraction incentives that scaled with success]]
+PRIMARY CONNECTION: Legacy ICOs failed because team treasury control created extraction incentives that scaled with success
 WHY ARCHIVED: $BANK (5% public allocation, March 2026) is a live example of the extraction pattern the futarchy ecosystem was designed to correct — documents whether MetaDAO's governance filter catches structural alignment failures
 EXTRACTION HINT: Focus on the 5% public allocation as a data point against the community ownership thesis, and on the missing outcome data (did it pass or fail futarchy governance?)

inbox/queue/2026-03-20-pineanalytics-purr-hyperliquid-memecoin.md

@@ -43,18 +43,18 @@ tags: [hyperliquid, memecoin, purr, community-airdrop, ownership-alignment, spec
 **What surprised me:** The explicit admission that PURR has "no revenue, no product, no team" combined with a bullish recommendation. This is intellectually honest but represents a capitulation to the "vibes are alpha" thesis. If even Pine is recommending based on wealth effect narrative rather than fundamentals, the quality signal from analysts may be degrading.
 
 **KB connections:**
-- [[Community ownership accelerates growth through aligned evangelism not passive holding]] — PURR is a test case. Zero VC allocation + community hold → sticky holding behavior. BUT: the wealth effect thesis (holding because HYPE goes up) is different from "aligned evangelism for the product." PURR holders aren't evangelizing a product; they're holding an ecosystem beta play.
-- [[Ownership alignment turns network effects from extractive to generative]] — PURR's community distribution is aligned on paper (no VC dump) but the alignment is speculative, not productive. Holders benefit from HYPE appreciation, not from making PURR useful.
+- Community ownership accelerates growth through aligned evangelism not passive holding — PURR is a test case. Zero VC allocation + community hold → sticky holding behavior. BUT: the wealth effect thesis (holding because HYPE goes up) is different from "aligned evangelism for the product." PURR holders aren't evangelizing a product; they're holding an ecosystem beta play.
+- Ownership alignment turns network effects from extractive to generative — PURR's community distribution is aligned on paper (no VC dump) but the alignment is speculative, not productive. Holders benefit from HYPE appreciation, not from making PURR useful.
 
 **What I expected but didn't find:** Any comparison between PURR and actual ownership coin theses (Ethereum pre-PoS community, Hyperliquid HYPE itself). The cleaner comparison would be HYPE → PURR vs ETH → ecosystem L2 tokens: in both cases the second-layer community asset captures ecosystem momentum without productive alignment.
 
 **Extraction hints:**
 - Claim candidate: "Community airdrop creates 'sticky holder' dynamics through survivor bias — early sellers exit, leaving conviction holders whose high basis creates reflexive demand during momentum phases"
-- Potential challenge: to [[Community ownership accelerates growth through aligned evangelism not passive holding]] — PURR holders demonstrate sticky behavior without product evangelism; the stickiness may be about cost basis psychology rather than genuine alignment
+- Potential challenge: to Community ownership accelerates growth through aligned evangelism not passive holding — PURR holders demonstrate sticky behavior without product evangelism; the stickiness may be about cost basis psychology rather than genuine alignment
 
 **Context:** Pine's pivot to memecoin recommendations after three consecutive AVOID calls (on fundamentally analyzed ICOs) suggests a tactical shift: when fundamental analysis keeps finding overvalued products, the rational move is to switch to purely sentiment-driven plays where there are no fundamentals to misrepresent. This is a meta-signal about the current state of on-chain ICO market quality.
 
 ## Curator Notes (structured handoff for extractor)
-PRIMARY CONNECTION: [[Community ownership accelerates growth through aligned evangelism not passive holding]]
+PRIMARY CONNECTION: Community ownership accelerates growth through aligned evangelism not passive holding
 WHY ARCHIVED: PURR tests whether community ownership creates growth through product evangelism (claim) or merely through survivor-bias stickiness (alternative mechanism) — the distinction matters for Living Capital thesis, which relies on ownership alignment producing informed defenders, not just stubborn holders
 EXTRACTION HINT: The survivor-bias mechanism (conviction OGs remain after weak hands exit) is a distinct mechanism from product evangelism; flag whether the KB claim can distinguish between these two ownership dynamics