diff --git a/domains/internet-finance/MetaDAOs Autocrat program implements futarchy through conditional token markets where proposals create parallel pass and fail universes settled by time-weighted average price over a three-day window.md b/domains/internet-finance/MetaDAOs Autocrat program implements futarchy through conditional token markets where proposals create parallel pass and fail universes settled by time-weighted average price over a three-day window.md
index 4d7b92bb..5e5b6c54 100644
--- a/domains/internet-finance/MetaDAOs Autocrat program implements futarchy through conditional token markets where proposals create parallel pass and fail universes settled by time-weighted average price over a three-day window.md	
+++ b/domains/internet-finance/MetaDAOs Autocrat program implements futarchy through conditional token markets where proposals create parallel pass and fail universes settled by time-weighted average price over a three-day window.md	
@@ -53,6 +53,12 @@ Autocrat is MetaDAO's core governance program on Solana -- the on-chain implemen
 
 **Limitations.** [[MetaDAOs futarchy implementation shows limited trading volume in uncontested decisions]] -- when proposals are clearly good or clearly bad, few traders participate because the expected profit from trading in a consensus market is near zero. This is a structural feature, not a bug: contested decisions get more participation precisely because they're uncertain, which is when you most need information aggregation. But it does mean uncontested proposals can pass or fail with very thin markets, making the TWAP potentially noisy.
 
+
+### Additional Evidence (extend)
+*Source: [[2024-02-20-futardio-proposal-develop-multi-option-proposals]] | Added: 2026-03-12 | Extractor: anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5*
+
+(extend) The binary Pass/Fail architecture is a simplification of the theoretical design space. Architecturally, there is no need to hard-limit the number of conditions in a conditional vault or outcomes in a proposal. Multi-option proposals do not introduce new security or mechanism design considerations beyond binary proposals—conditional markets do not compete with each other over liquidity, so if you can maliciously manipulate one option, you could have manipulated Pass/Fail in the binary case. This suggests Autocrat's current binary design is a production simplification rather than a fundamental constraint. (Source: agrippa, MetaDAO proposal 2024-02-20)
+
 ---
 
 Relevant Notes:
diff --git a/domains/internet-finance/futarchy adoption faces friction from token price psychology proposal complexity and liquidity requirements.md b/domains/internet-finance/futarchy adoption faces friction from token price psychology proposal complexity and liquidity requirements.md
index cea44c3f..2e6f1025 100644
--- a/domains/internet-finance/futarchy adoption faces friction from token price psychology proposal complexity and liquidity requirements.md	
+++ b/domains/internet-finance/futarchy adoption faces friction from token price psychology proposal complexity and liquidity requirements.md	
@@ -34,6 +34,12 @@ MycoRealms implementation reveals operational friction points: monthly $10,000 a
 
 Optimism futarchy achieved 430 active forecasters and 88.6% first-time governance participants by using play money, demonstrating that removing capital requirements can dramatically lower participation barriers. However, this came at the cost of prediction accuracy (8x overshoot on magnitude estimates), revealing a new friction: the play-money vs real-money tradeoff. Play money enables permissionless participation but sacrifices calibration; real money provides calibration but creates regulatory and capital barriers. This suggests futarchy adoption faces a structural dilemma between accessibility and accuracy that liquidity requirements alone don't capture. The tradeoff is not merely about quantity of liquidity but the fundamental difference between incentive structures that attract participants vs incentive structures that produce accurate predictions.
 
+
+### Additional Evidence (extend)
+*Source: [[2024-02-20-futardio-proposal-develop-multi-option-proposals]] | Added: 2026-03-12 | Extractor: anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5*
+
+(extend) Multi-option proposals add architectural complexity but may not increase security risk. The main friction point is liquidity distribution: conditional markets do not compete with each other over liquidity, but spreading capital across N options instead of 2 may reduce depth per market. This suggests the complexity-friction tradeoff is primarily about capital efficiency rather than mechanism design difficulty. (Source: agrippa, MetaDAO proposal 2024-02-20)
+
 ---
 
 Relevant Notes:
diff --git a/domains/internet-finance/multi-option-proposals-exponentially-increase-futarchy-bandwidth-by-enabling-parallel-evaluation-of-mutually-exclusive-alternatives.md b/domains/internet-finance/multi-option-proposals-exponentially-increase-futarchy-bandwidth-by-enabling-parallel-evaluation-of-mutually-exclusive-alternatives.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..09bfaf3b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/domains/internet-finance/multi-option-proposals-exponentially-increase-futarchy-bandwidth-by-enabling-parallel-evaluation-of-mutually-exclusive-alternatives.md
@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
+---
+type: claim
+domain: internet-finance
+description: "Multi-option proposals allow futarchy DAOs to evaluate multiple exclusive alternatives simultaneously rather than sequentially through binary votes"
+confidence: speculative
+source: "agrippa (futard.io proposal), 2024-02-20"
+created: 2024-02-20
+---
+
+# Multi-option proposals increase futarchy decision-making bandwidth by enabling parallel evaluation of mutually-exclusive alternatives
+
+Futarchy implementations currently force binary Pass/Fail decisions, requiring sequential proposals to evaluate multiple alternatives. Multi-option proposals create conditional markets for each alternative simultaneously, allowing the market to price all options in parallel. This architectural change transforms futarchy from a yes/no mechanism into a selection mechanism.
+
+The proposal author (agrippa) estimates this increases decision-making bandwidth by +5% to DAO value through the ability to weigh exclusive alternatives at once. Example use case: selecting first place prize winner from multiple contest applicants, where each applicant gets a conditional market and the highest-trading option wins.
+
+Architecturally, there is no need to hard-limit the number of conditions in a conditional vault or outcomes in a proposal. The mechanism does not introduce new security or mechanism design considerations beyond binary proposals—if you can maliciously manipulate "proposal option 12", you could have manipulated Pass in a binary proposal, since conditional markets do not compete with each other over liquidity.
+
+## Evidence
+- Proposal author developed first conditional tokens vault on Solana as part of prediction market reference implementation (FTX-funded)
+- Author estimates +5% DAO value from bandwidth increase alone
+- No existing multi-option proposal implementation in production—this is a proposed feature, not an observed mechanism
+- The +12.1% total value estimate combines bandwidth (+5%), pork barrel solution (+5%), and governance innovation (+2%)
+
+## Limitations
+- This is a design proposal, not an implemented system. The bandwidth increase is theoretical.
+- Assumes sufficient liquidity can be distributed across N conditional markets without reducing depth per market below functional thresholds
+- No empirical data on whether parallel markets actually produce better outcomes than sequential binary votes
+
+---
+
+Relevant Notes:
+- [[MetaDAO is the futarchy launchpad on Solana where projects raise capital through unruggable ICOs governed by conditional markets creating the first platform for ownership coins at scale]]
+- [[futarchy-excels-at-relative-selection-but-fails-at-absolute-prediction-because-ordinal-ranking-works-while-cardinal-estimation-requires-calibration]]
+- [[optimal governance requires mixing mechanisms because different decisions have different manipulation risk profiles]]
+
+Topics:
+- [[domains/internet-finance/_map]]
+- [[core/mechanisms/_map]]
diff --git a/domains/internet-finance/multi-option-proposals-with-draft-stage-solve-pork-barrel-problem-by-allowing-alternative-proposals-before-markets-go-live.md b/domains/internet-finance/multi-option-proposals-with-draft-stage-solve-pork-barrel-problem-by-allowing-alternative-proposals-before-markets-go-live.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..41b5e2ec
--- /dev/null
+++ b/domains/internet-finance/multi-option-proposals-with-draft-stage-solve-pork-barrel-problem-by-allowing-alternative-proposals-before-markets-go-live.md
@@ -0,0 +1,39 @@
+---
+type: claim
+domain: internet-finance
+description: "Mandatory draft stage where anyone can add alternatives to a proposal before conditional markets activate could reduce pork barrel spending through competitive proposal design"
+confidence: speculative
+source: "agrippa (futard.io proposal), 2024-02-20"
+created: 2024-02-20
+---
+
+# Multi-option proposals with draft stage could reduce pork barrel spending by enabling competitive alternatives before market activation
+
+Pork barrel spending—where proposals include unnecessary spending to gain support—is a fundamental game-theoretic problem in governance. The proposal author suggests multi-option proposals with a mandatory draft stage could address this by allowing anyone to propose alternatives to the same decision before conditional markets activate.
+
+The mechanism would work by forcing proposals through a draft phase where the community can add competing options. Once the draft period ends, all alternatives go to market simultaneously. This creates competitive pressure: a proposal with pork must compete directly against a leaner alternative serving the same purpose. The market prices both options, and the pork-laden version trades at a discount.
+
+The proposal author identifies this as "the primary mechanism" for cutting pork and estimates it adds +5% to DAO value. However, this is a theoretical mechanism design claim without empirical validation—no futarchy DAO has implemented draft-stage multi-option proposals yet.
+
+## Evidence
+- Proposal describes draft stage architecture: "before the conditional vault actually goes live anyone can add more alternatives to the same proposal"
+- Author claims this "would be really effective at cutting out pork"
+- Author's background: developed first conditional tokens vault on Solana, led Realms frontend development for Solana Labs
+- No existing implementation or empirical data on effectiveness
+
+## Mechanism Assumptions (unvalidated)
+- Market participants can accurately price the impact of pork spending on token value
+- Sufficient liquidity exists across multiple conditional markets to produce reliable price signals
+- Draft stage latency cost is lower than pork prevention benefit
+- Proposers cannot collude to suppress alternatives during draft phase
+
+---
+
+Relevant Notes:
+- [[optimal governance requires mixing mechanisms because different decisions have different manipulation risk profiles]]
+- [[futarchy-excels-at-relative-selection-but-fails-at-absolute-prediction-because-ordinal-ranking-works-while-cardinal-estimation-requires-calibration]]
+- [[token voting DAOs offer no minority protection beyond majority goodwill]]
+
+Topics:
+- [[domains/internet-finance/_map]]
+- [[core/mechanisms/_map]]
diff --git a/entities/internet-finance/agrippa.md b/entities/internet-finance/agrippa.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..5232d919
--- /dev/null
+++ b/entities/internet-finance/agrippa.md
@@ -0,0 +1,44 @@
+---
+type: entity
+entity_type: person
+name: "agrippa"
+domain: internet-finance
+status: active
+roles:
+  - "Solana governance developer"
+  - "Conditional tokens architect"
+affiliations:
+  - "[[metadao]]"
+  - "Solana Labs (former)"
+  - "Cornell Initiative for Cryptocurrency and Contracts (former)"
+key_contributions:
+  - "Led development on Solana Labs governance-ui (Realms frontend)"
+  - "Developed first conditional tokens vault on Solana (precogparty)"
+tracked_by: rio
+created: 2026-03-11
+---
+
+# agrippa
+
+## Overview
+agrippa is a Solana governance infrastructure developer who led development on Solana Labs' governance-ui (Realms frontend) and built the first conditional tokens vault on Solana. Proposed multi-option proposal functionality to MetaDAO in February 2024.
+
+## Timeline
+- **2014** — Started one of the first high-school blockchain clubs with physics teacher Jed (now at Jito)
+- **2017** — Invited to smart contract summit in China (attended by Vitalik) for Sybil resistance work
+- **2017-2018** — Research at Cornell's Initiative for Cryptocurrency and Contracts
+- **2022-2023** — Led development on Solana Labs governance-ui (Realms frontend) for one year
+- **2023** — Developed first conditional tokens vault on Solana as part of precogparty prediction market (FTX-funded grant)
+- **2023-12** — Met Proph3t in Greece, discussed MetaDAO and futarchy for 3 hours
+- **2024-02-20** — [[metadao-develop-multi-option-proposals]] proposed to MetaDAO; failed 2024-02-25
+
+## Technical Contributions
+- **Conditional Tokens Architecture:** Designed and implemented first conditional tokens vault on Solana, influencing MetaDAO's conditional vault design
+- **Governance UI:** Led Realms frontend development, focusing on web3 performance and developer ergonomics (react-query patterns)
+- **Multi-option Proposals:** Proposed architectural extension to futarchy enabling multiple mutually-exclusive outcomes
+
+## Relationship to KB
+- [[metadao]] — proposed multi-option functionality
+- [[futardio]] — platform where proposal was submitted
+- [[proph3t]] — collaborator on futarchy design
+- [[MetaDAOs Autocrat program implements futarchy through conditional token markets where proposals create parallel pass and fail universes settled by time-weighted average price over a three-day window]] — influenced conditional vault design
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/entities/internet-finance/metadao-develop-multi-option-proposals.md b/entities/internet-finance/metadao-develop-multi-option-proposals.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..4569ada8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/entities/internet-finance/metadao-develop-multi-option-proposals.md
@@ -0,0 +1,66 @@
+---
+type: entity
+entity_type: decision_market
+name: "MetaDAO: Develop Multi-Option Proposals?"
+domain: internet-finance
+status: failed
+parent_entity: "[[metadao]]"
+platform: "futardio"
+proposer: "agrippa"
+proposal_url: "https://www.futard.io/proposal/J7dWFgSSuMg3BNZBAKYp3AD5D2yuaaLUmyKqvxBZgHht"
+proposal_date: 2024-02-20
+resolution_date: 2024-02-25
+category: "mechanism"
+summary: "Proposal to develop multi-option proposal functionality for MetaDAO, allowing multiple mutually-exclusive outcomes beyond binary Pass/Fail, with 200 META compensation across four milestones"
+tracked_by: rio
+created: 2026-03-11
+---
+
+# MetaDAO: Develop Multi-Option Proposals?
+
+## Summary
+Proposal by agrippa to build multi-option proposal functionality for MetaDAO's futarchy implementation, enabling proposals with multiple mutually-exclusive outcomes rather than binary Pass/Fail. Requested 200 META distributed across four development milestones. The proposal failed despite the proposer's technical credentials and detailed value argument.
+
+## Market Data
+- **Outcome:** Failed
+- **Proposer:** agrippa (99dZcXhrYgEmHeMKAb9ezPaBqgMdg1RjCGSfHa7BeQEX)
+- **Proposal account:** J7dWFgSSuMg3BNZBAKYp3AD5D2yuaaLUmyKqvxBZgHht
+- **Created:** 2024-02-20
+- **Completed:** 2024-02-25
+
+## Compensation Structure
+- **Total:** 200 META across 4 milestones
+- **Milestone 1:** 50 META upon passage
+- **Milestone 2:** 50 META upon completing multi-modal conditional vault program
+- **Milestone 3:** 50 META upon integrating futarch with multi-modal vaults
+- **Milestone 4:** 50 META upon frontend integration
+- **Oversight:** 3/5 multisig (Proph3t, DeanMachine, 0xNallok, LegalizeOnionFutures, sapphire)
+- **Multisig compensation:** 2.5 META per member upon passage
+
+## Proposer Background
+- Led development on Solana Labs governance-ui (Realms frontend) for one year
+- Developed first conditional tokens vault on Solana (FTX-funded precogparty project)
+- Started one of the first high-school blockchain clubs (2014)
+- Research at Cornell's Initiative for Cryptocurrency and Contracts
+- Invited to 2017 smart contract summit in China (with Vitalik)
+
+## Value Argument
+Proposer estimated +12.1% value to MetaDAO from:
+- +5% from exponential increase in decision-making bandwidth
+- +5% from solving pork barrel problem through draft-stage alternatives
+- +2% from governance innovation hype
+- +0.1% from fee revenue on conditional vault usage by other protocols
+
+With 14,416 META circulating supply, proposer calculated feature worth 1,744 META dilution, requesting 200 META (11.5% of estimated value).
+
+## Significance
+This proposal is significant for mechanism design evolution in futarchy. It represents an attempt to expand futarchy from binary decisions to multi-option selection, addressing a fundamental limitation in the original Hanson design. The failure suggests either market skepticism about the value proposition, concerns about execution risk, or liquidity constraints in the conditional markets.
+
+The detailed technical specification and value quantification represent a high-quality proposal format that became a template for later MetaDAO proposals.
+
+## Relationship to KB
+- [[metadao]] — parent organization
+- [[futardio]] — platform where proposal was submitted
+- [[MetaDAOs Autocrat program implements futarchy through conditional token markets where proposals create parallel pass and fail universes settled by time-weighted average price over a three-day window]] — current binary architecture this proposal aimed to extend
+- [[proph3t]] — multisig member
+- [[nallok]] — multisig member
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/entities/internet-finance/metadao.md b/entities/internet-finance/metadao.md
index 9f0ae560..58be792b 100644
--- a/entities/internet-finance/metadao.md
+++ b/entities/internet-finance/metadao.md
@@ -54,6 +54,7 @@ The futarchy governance protocol on Solana. Implements decision markets through
 - **2026-03** — Pine Analytics Q4 2025 quarterly report published
 
 - **2024-02-18** — [[metadao-otc-trade-pantera-capital]] failed: Pantera Capital's $50,000 OTC purchase proposal rejected by futarchy markets
+- **2024-02-20** — [[metadao-develop-multi-option-proposals]] proposed by agrippa: develop multi-option proposal functionality for 200 META across 4 milestones; failed 2024-02-25
 ## Key Decisions
 | Date | Proposal | Proposer | Category | Outcome |
 |------|----------|----------|----------|---------|
diff --git a/inbox/archive/2024-02-20-futardio-proposal-develop-multi-option-proposals.md b/inbox/archive/2024-02-20-futardio-proposal-develop-multi-option-proposals.md
index ba495350..eda077ac 100644
--- a/inbox/archive/2024-02-20-futardio-proposal-develop-multi-option-proposals.md
+++ b/inbox/archive/2024-02-20-futardio-proposal-develop-multi-option-proposals.md
@@ -6,9 +6,15 @@ url: "https://www.futard.io/proposal/J7dWFgSSuMg3BNZBAKYp3AD5D2yuaaLUmyKqvxBZgHh
 date: 2024-02-20
 domain: internet-finance
 format: data
-status: unprocessed
+status: processed
 tags: [futardio, metadao, futarchy, solana, governance]
 event_type: proposal
+processed_by: rio
+processed_date: 2026-03-11
+claims_extracted: ["multi-option-proposals-exponentially-increase-futarchy-bandwidth-by-enabling-parallel-evaluation-of-mutually-exclusive-alternatives.md", "multi-option-proposals-with-draft-stage-solve-pork-barrel-problem-by-allowing-alternative-proposals-before-markets-go-live.md"]
+enrichments_applied: ["MetaDAOs Autocrat program implements futarchy through conditional token markets where proposals create parallel pass and fail universes settled by time-weighted average price over a three-day window.md", "futarchy adoption faces friction from token price psychology proposal complexity and liquidity requirements.md"]
+extraction_model: "anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5"
+extraction_notes: "Extracted 2 mechanism design claims about multi-option proposals (bandwidth increase and pork barrel solution), enriched 2 existing claims about Autocrat architecture and futarchy adoption friction, created decision_market entity for the proposal, updated metadao timeline, and created new person entity for agrippa. Proposal failed despite detailed technical specification and value quantification—significant for understanding MetaDAO's early mechanism design priorities and risk tolerance."
 ---
 
 ## Proposal Details
@@ -107,3 +113,10 @@ I would be very excited to join this futarchic society as a major techinical con
 - Autocrat version: 0.1
 - Completed: 2024-02-25
 - Ended: 2024-02-25
+
+
+## Key Facts
+- MetaDAO circulating supply was 14,416 META as of 2024-02-20
+- Proposal J7dWFgSSuMg3BNZBAKYp3AD5D2yuaaLUmyKqvxBZgHht failed 2024-02-25
+- agrippa's precogparty project was FTX-funded
+- Multisig composition: Proph3t, DeanMachine, 0xNallok, LegalizeOnionFutures, sapphire