auto-fix: strip 22 broken wiki links
Some checks are pending
Sync Graph Data to teleo-app / sync (push) Waiting to run

Pipeline auto-fixer: removed [[ ]] brackets from links
that don't resolve to existing claims in the knowledge base.
This commit is contained in:
Teleo Agents 2026-03-24 18:30:58 +00:00
parent 65b77baa38
commit 08b1f5e991
2 changed files with 22 additions and 22 deletions

View file

@ -84,106 +84,106 @@ Futardio cult launch (2026-03-03 to 2026-03-04) demonstrates MetaDAO's platform
### Additional Evidence (extend) ### Additional Evidence (extend)
*Source: [[2024-06-05-futardio-proposal-fund-futuredaos-token-migrator]] | Added: 2026-03-12 | Extractor: anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5* *Source: 2024-06-05-futardio-proposal-fund-futuredaos-token-migrator | Added: 2026-03-12 | Extractor: anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5*
FutureDAO's token migrator extends the unruggable ICO concept to community takeovers of existing projects. The tool uses a 60% presale threshold as the success condition: if presale reaches 60% of target, migration proceeds with new LP creation; if not, all SOL is refunded and new tokens are burned. This applies the conditional market logic to post-launch rescues rather than just initial launches. The proposal describes the tool as addressing 'Rugged Projects: Preserve community and restore value in projects affected by rug pulls' and 'Hostile Takeovers: Enabling projects to acquire other projects and empowering communities to assert control over failed project teams.' The mechanism creates on-chain enforcement of community coordination thresholds for takeover scenarios, extending MetaDAO's unruggable ICO pattern to the secondary market for abandoned projects. FutureDAO's token migrator extends the unruggable ICO concept to community takeovers of existing projects. The tool uses a 60% presale threshold as the success condition: if presale reaches 60% of target, migration proceeds with new LP creation; if not, all SOL is refunded and new tokens are burned. This applies the conditional market logic to post-launch rescues rather than just initial launches. The proposal describes the tool as addressing 'Rugged Projects: Preserve community and restore value in projects affected by rug pulls' and 'Hostile Takeovers: Enabling projects to acquire other projects and empowering communities to assert control over failed project teams.' The mechanism creates on-chain enforcement of community coordination thresholds for takeover scenarios, extending MetaDAO's unruggable ICO pattern to the secondary market for abandoned projects.
*Source: [[2026-01-00-alearesearch-metadao-fair-launches-misaligned-market]] | Added: 2026-03-12 | Extractor: anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5* *Source: 2026-01-00-alearesearch-metadao-fair-launches-misaligned-market | Added: 2026-03-12 | Extractor: anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5*
MetaDAO ICO platform processed 8 projects from April 2025 to January 2026, raising $25.6M against $390M in committed demand (15x oversubscription). Platform generated $57.3M in Assets Under Futarchy and $1.5M in fees from $300M trading volume. Individual project performance: Avici 21x peak/7x current, Omnipair 16x peak/5x current, Umbra 8x peak/3x current with $154M committed for $3M raise (51x oversubscription). Recent launches (Ranger, Solomon, Paystream, ZKLSOL, Loyal) show convergence toward lower volatility with maximum 30% drawdown from launch. MetaDAO ICO platform processed 8 projects from April 2025 to January 2026, raising $25.6M against $390M in committed demand (15x oversubscription). Platform generated $57.3M in Assets Under Futarchy and $1.5M in fees from $300M trading volume. Individual project performance: Avici 21x peak/7x current, Omnipair 16x peak/5x current, Umbra 8x peak/3x current with $154M committed for $3M raise (51x oversubscription). Recent launches (Ranger, Solomon, Paystream, ZKLSOL, Loyal) show convergence toward lower volatility with maximum 30% drawdown from launch.
### Additional Evidence (extend) ### Additional Evidence (extend)
*Source: [[2024-08-03-futardio-proposal-approve-q3-roadmap]] | Added: 2026-03-15* *Source: 2024-08-03-futardio-proposal-approve-q3-roadmap | Added: 2026-03-15*
MetaDAO Q3 2024 roadmap prioritized launching a market-based grants product as the primary objective, with specific targets to launch 5 organizations and process 8 proposals through the product. This represents an expansion from pure ICO functionality to grants decision-making, demonstrating futarchy's application to capital allocation beyond fundraising. MetaDAO Q3 2024 roadmap prioritized launching a market-based grants product as the primary objective, with specific targets to launch 5 organizations and process 8 proposals through the product. This represents an expansion from pure ICO functionality to grants decision-making, demonstrating futarchy's application to capital allocation beyond fundraising.
### Additional Evidence (extend) ### Additional Evidence (extend)
*Source: [[2025-04-09-blockworks-ranger-ico-metadao-reset]] | Added: 2026-03-15* *Source: 2025-04-09-blockworks-ranger-ico-metadao-reset | Added: 2026-03-15*
Ranger Finance ICO completed in April 2025, adding ~$9.1M to total Assets Under Futarchy, bringing the total to $57.3M across 10 launched projects. This represents continued momentum in futarchy-governed capital formation, with Ranger being a leveraged trading platform on Solana. The article also notes MetaDAO was 'considering strategic changes to its platform model' around this time, though details were not specified. Ranger Finance ICO completed in April 2025, adding ~$9.1M to total Assets Under Futarchy, bringing the total to $57.3M across 10 launched projects. This represents continued momentum in futarchy-governed capital formation, with Ranger being a leveraged trading platform on Solana. The article also notes MetaDAO was 'considering strategic changes to its platform model' around this time, though details were not specified.
### Additional Evidence (confirm) ### Additional Evidence (confirm)
*Source: [[2025-10-06-futardio-launch-umbra]] | Added: 2026-03-15* *Source: 2025-10-06-futardio-launch-umbra | Added: 2026-03-15*
Umbra raised $3M through MetaDAO's futard.io platform (Oct 6-10, 2025) with $154.9M total committed against $750K target, demonstrating 206x oversubscription. This is concrete evidence of MetaDAO's operational capacity to facilitate large-scale futarchy-governed capital raises. Umbra raised $3M through MetaDAO's futard.io platform (Oct 6-10, 2025) with $154.9M total committed against $750K target, demonstrating 206x oversubscription. This is concrete evidence of MetaDAO's operational capacity to facilitate large-scale futarchy-governed capital raises.
### Additional Evidence (extend) ### Additional Evidence (extend)
*Source: [[2025-12-00-pine-analytics-metadao-q4-2025-report]] | Added: 2026-03-16* *Source: 2025-12-00-pine-analytics-metadao-q4-2025-report | Added: 2026-03-16*
Q4 2025 achieved 6 ICO launches raising $18.7M with several exceeds exceeding minimums by tens of millions in deposits. Total futarchy marketcap reached $219M with $69M in non-META tokens showing ecosystem diversification beyond the platform token. First profitable quarter validates the business model at scale. Q4 2025 achieved 6 ICO launches raising $18.7M with several exceeds exceeding minimums by tens of millions in deposits. Total futarchy marketcap reached $219M with $69M in non-META tokens showing ecosystem diversification beyond the platform token. First profitable quarter validates the business model at scale.
### Additional Evidence (extend) ### Additional Evidence (extend)
*Source: [[2026-03-09-futarddotio-x-archive]] | Added: 2026-03-16* *Source: 2026-03-09-futarddotio-x-archive | Added: 2026-03-16*
Futardio extends MetaDAO's infrastructure to permissionless launches, demonstrating that the Autocrat program can scale beyond curated ICOs. The architecture separates the protocol layer (MetaDAO/Autocrat) from the application layer (Futardio), with Futardio handling anyone-can-launch while MetaDAO maintains curated quality. Futardio extends MetaDAO's infrastructure to permissionless launches, demonstrating that the Autocrat program can scale beyond curated ICOs. The architecture separates the protocol layer (MetaDAO/Autocrat) from the application layer (Futardio), with Futardio handling anyone-can-launch while MetaDAO maintains curated quality.
### Additional Evidence (extend) ### Additional Evidence (extend)
*Source: [[2026-03-17-metadao-q1-2026-update]] | Added: 2026-03-18* *Source: 2026-03-17-metadao-q1-2026-update | Added: 2026-03-18*
First MetaDAO ICO failure occurred February 7, 2026 when Hurupay (onchain neobank) failed to reach $3M minimum target despite strong metrics ($7.2M monthly volume, $500K+ revenue). All previous 8 ICOs since April 2025 had succeeded before this. Two competing interpretations: (1) the platform's quality filter works — not all projects pass, which strengthens rather than weakens the ownership coin thesis; (2) the investor base was thinning during the post-December 2025 revenue decline, and the failure reflects demand contraction rather than project-specific filtering. The evidence supports both readings — Hurupay's fundamentals were stronger than several projects that did raise successfully, which favors the demand-thinning interpretation, but the timing also coincided with broader emerging-market sentiment weakness. First MetaDAO ICO failure occurred February 7, 2026 when Hurupay (onchain neobank) failed to reach $3M minimum target despite strong metrics ($7.2M monthly volume, $500K+ revenue). All previous 8 ICOs since April 2025 had succeeded before this. Two competing interpretations: (1) the platform's quality filter works — not all projects pass, which strengthens rather than weakens the ownership coin thesis; (2) the investor base was thinning during the post-December 2025 revenue decline, and the failure reflects demand contraction rather than project-specific filtering. The evidence supports both readings — Hurupay's fundamentals were stronger than several projects that did raise successfully, which favors the demand-thinning interpretation, but the timing also coincided with broader emerging-market sentiment weakness.
### Additional Evidence (extend) ### Additional Evidence (extend)
*Source: [[2026-03-17-metadao-q1-2026-update]] | Added: 2026-03-18* *Source: 2026-03-17-metadao-q1-2026-update | Added: 2026-03-18*
Revenue declined sharply since mid-December 2025, with the ICO cadence problem persisting due to the curated model limiting throughput. This is the key new signal — the platform's revenue trajectory has inverted despite strong cumulative metrics, suggesting the curated model's throughput ceiling may be binding. Revenue declined sharply since mid-December 2025, with the ICO cadence problem persisting due to the curated model limiting throughput. This is the key new signal — the platform's revenue trajectory has inverted despite strong cumulative metrics, suggesting the curated model's throughput ceiling may be binding.
### Additional Evidence (extend) ### Additional Evidence (extend)
*Source: [[2026-03-19-metadao-ownership-radio-march-2026]] | Added: 2026-03-19* *Source: 2026-03-19-metadao-ownership-radio-march-2026 | Added: 2026-03-19*
MetaDAO hosted two Ownership Radio community calls in March 2026 (March 8 and March 15) focused on ecosystem updates, Futardio launches, and upcoming ICOs like P2P.me (March 26), but neither session addressed protocol-level changes or the FairScale implicit put option problem from January 2026. This suggests MetaDAO's community communication prioritizes new launches over governance mechanism reflection. MetaDAO hosted two Ownership Radio community calls in March 2026 (March 8 and March 15) focused on ecosystem updates, Futardio launches, and upcoming ICOs like P2P.me (March 26), but neither session addressed protocol-level changes or the FairScale implicit put option problem from January 2026. This suggests MetaDAO's community communication prioritizes new launches over governance mechanism reflection.
### Additional Evidence (challenge) ### Additional Evidence (challenge)
*Source: [[2026-03-20-pineanalytics-bank-ico-dilution]] | Added: 2026-03-20* *Source: 2026-03-20-pineanalytics-bank-ico-dilution | Added: 2026-03-20*
$BANK (March 2026) launched with 5% public allocation and 95% insider retention, representing the exact treasury control extraction pattern that futarchy-governed ICOs were designed to prevent. Pine Analytics flagged this as 'fund-level risk with venture-level dilution' where public buyers bear poker staking variance while holding only 5% of tokens. This tests whether MetaDAO's governance filter actually catches structural alignment failures or whether growth narratives override ownership economics. $BANK (March 2026) launched with 5% public allocation and 95% insider retention, representing the exact treasury control extraction pattern that futarchy-governed ICOs were designed to prevent. Pine Analytics flagged this as 'fund-level risk with venture-level dilution' where public buyers bear poker staking variance while holding only 5% of tokens. This tests whether MetaDAO's governance filter actually catches structural alignment failures or whether growth narratives override ownership economics.
--- ---
### Additional Evidence (confirm) ### Additional Evidence (confirm)
*Source: [[2026-03-21-phemex-hurupay-ico-failure]] | Added: 2026-03-21* *Source: 2026-03-21-phemex-hurupay-ico-failure | Added: 2026-03-21*
Hurupay ICO raised $2,003,593 against $3M minimum (67% of target) and all capital was fully refunded with no tokens issued, demonstrating the minimum-miss refund mechanism working exactly as designed. This is the first documented failed ICO on MetaDAO platform where the unruggable mechanism successfully returned capital. Hurupay ICO raised $2,003,593 against $3M minimum (67% of target) and all capital was fully refunded with no tokens issued, demonstrating the minimum-miss refund mechanism working exactly as designed. This is the first documented failed ICO on MetaDAO platform where the unruggable mechanism successfully returned capital.
### Additional Evidence (extend) ### Additional Evidence (extend)
*Source: [[2026-03-23-telegram-m3taversal-futairdbot-research-the-upcoming-p2p-fundraise-la]] | Added: 2026-03-23* *Source: 2026-03-23-telegram-m3taversal-futairdbot-research-the-upcoming-p2p-fundraise-la | Added: 2026-03-23*
P2P.me is planning a MetaDAO permissionless launch with ~23k users and $3.95M monthly volume peak. The project has tight unit economics ($500K annualized revenue, $82K gross profit, $175K/month burn with 25-person team) going into the raise, demonstrating that MetaDAO is attracting operational businesses with real traction, not just speculative projects. P2P.me is planning a MetaDAO permissionless launch with ~23k users and $3.95M monthly volume peak. The project has tight unit economics ($500K annualized revenue, $82K gross profit, $175K/month burn with 25-person team) going into the raise, demonstrating that MetaDAO is attracting operational businesses with real traction, not just speculative projects.
### Additional Evidence (extend) ### Additional Evidence (extend)
*Source: [[2026-03-23-telegram-m3taversal-futairdbot-research-the-upcoming-p2p-fundraise-la]] | Added: 2026-03-23* *Source: 2026-03-23-telegram-m3taversal-futairdbot-research-the-upcoming-p2p-fundraise-la | Added: 2026-03-23*
Theia Research (Felipe Montealegre) identified as the most active institutional player in the MetaDAO ecosystem with 1,070+ META tokens, suggesting institutional capital is beginning to specialize in futarchy-governed launches as an asset class. Theia Research (Felipe Montealegre) identified as the most active institutional player in the MetaDAO ecosystem with 1,070+ META tokens, suggesting institutional capital is beginning to specialize in futarchy-governed launches as an asset class.
### Additional Evidence (challenge) ### Additional Evidence (challenge)
*Source: [[2026-03-23-telegram-m3taversal-futairdbot-what-are-people-saying-about-the-p2p]] | Added: 2026-03-23* *Source: 2026-03-23-telegram-m3taversal-futairdbot-what-are-people-saying-about-the-p2p | Added: 2026-03-23*
P2P.me launch demonstrates tension in MetaDAO's value proposition. Critics question 'why does a working P2P fiat ramp need a token?' for a product with 23k+ users and $4M monthly volume. The team frames it as 'community ownership infrastructure' but unit economics reveal tight margins: ~$500K annualized revenue, only ~$82K gross profit after costs, burning $175K/month. This suggests the token launch functions partly as a runway play dressed up as decentralization, undermining the narrative that futarchy-governed ICOs are primarily about governance quality rather than capital extraction. P2P.me launch demonstrates tension in MetaDAO's value proposition. Critics question 'why does a working P2P fiat ramp need a token?' for a product with 23k+ users and $4M monthly volume. The team frames it as 'community ownership infrastructure' but unit economics reveal tight margins: ~$500K annualized revenue, only ~$82K gross profit after costs, burning $175K/month. This suggests the token launch functions partly as a runway play dressed up as decentralization, undermining the narrative that futarchy-governed ICOs are primarily about governance quality rather than capital extraction.
### Additional Evidence (extend) ### Additional Evidence (extend)
*Source: [[2026-03-23-x-research-metadao-robin-hanson-george-mason-futarchy-research-proposal]] | Added: 2026-03-23* *Source: 2026-03-23-x-research-metadao-robin-hanson-george-mason-futarchy-research-proposal | Added: 2026-03-23*
MetaDAO proposed funding six months of futarchy research at George Mason University led by economist Robin Hanson, demonstrating institutional academic engagement with futarchy mechanisms beyond just implementation. MetaDAO proposed funding six months of futarchy research at George Mason University led by economist Robin Hanson, demonstrating institutional academic engagement with futarchy mechanisms beyond just implementation.
### Additional Evidence (extend) ### Additional Evidence (extend)
*Source: [[2026-03-23-telegram-m3taversal-futairdbot-you-should-learn-about-this-i-know-dr]] | Added: 2026-03-23* *Source: 2026-03-23-telegram-m3taversal-futairdbot-you-should-learn-about-this-i-know-dr | Added: 2026-03-23*
Drift Protocol, the most legitimate DeFi protocol on Solana by revenue ($19.8M annual fees, ~$95M FDV, 3.5x price-to-book), is reportedly considering migration to a MetaDAO ownership coin structure. This would represent the first case of an established, revenue-generating protocol adopting futarchy governance post-launch, rather than using it for initial capital formation. Drift Protocol, the most legitimate DeFi protocol on Solana by revenue ($19.8M annual fees, ~$95M FDV, 3.5x price-to-book), is reportedly considering migration to a MetaDAO ownership coin structure. This would represent the first case of an established, revenue-generating protocol adopting futarchy governance post-launch, rather than using it for initial capital formation.
### Additional Evidence (confirm) ### Additional Evidence (confirm)
*Source: [[2026-03-23-x-research-metadao-robin-hanson]] | Added: 2026-03-23* *Source: 2026-03-23-x-research-metadao-robin-hanson | Added: 2026-03-23*
Multiple X posts reference Robin Hanson's direct involvement with MetaDAO, with @Alderwerelt noting 'MetaDAO proposed funding futarchy research at George Mason Uni with Robin Hanson' and @position_xbt reporting 'MetaDAO just dropped a new tradable proposal to fund six months of futarchy research at George Mason University. Led by economist Robin Hanson.' This confirms Hanson's ongoing engagement with MetaDAO's implementation beyond just theoretical origins. Multiple X posts reference Robin Hanson's direct involvement with MetaDAO, with @Alderwerelt noting 'MetaDAO proposed funding futarchy research at George Mason Uni with Robin Hanson' and @position_xbt reporting 'MetaDAO just dropped a new tradable proposal to fund six months of futarchy research at George Mason University. Led by economist Robin Hanson.' This confirms Hanson's ongoing engagement with MetaDAO's implementation beyond just theoretical origins.
### Additional Evidence (extend) ### Additional Evidence (extend)
*Source: [[2026-03-24-telegram-m3taversal-futairdbot-what-have-people-been-saying-about-p2]] | Added: 2026-03-24* *Source: 2026-03-24-telegram-m3taversal-futairdbot-what-have-people-been-saying-about-p2 | Added: 2026-03-24*
P2P.me is conducting an ICO through MetaDAO's platform, demonstrating the platform's use for non-custodial fiat-to-crypto ramps. The project has ~23K registered users, peaked at $3.95M monthly volume, and operates primarily in India (78%) and Brazil (15%). Community engagement around allocation multipliers (3x preferential allocations) shows the ICO mechanics in practice. P2P.me is conducting an ICO through MetaDAO's platform, demonstrating the platform's use for non-custodial fiat-to-crypto ramps. The project has ~23K registered users, peaked at $3.95M monthly volume, and operates primarily in India (78%) and Brazil (15%). Community engagement around allocation multipliers (3x preferential allocations) shows the ICO mechanics in practice.

View file

@ -80,19 +80,19 @@ Colosseum's $250,000 OTC acquisition of META at market-determined pricing (TWAP
### Additional Evidence (confirm) ### Additional Evidence (confirm)
*Source: [[2026-03-09-pineanalytics-x-archive]] | Added: 2026-03-16* *Source: 2026-03-09-pineanalytics-x-archive | Added: 2026-03-16*
Q4 2025 data: 8 ICOs raised $25.6M with $390M committed (15.2x oversubscription), 95% refund rate from oversubscription. $300M AMM volume generated $1.5M in fees. These metrics validate both the capital formation efficiency and the market depth supporting futarchy governance. Q4 2025 data: 8 ICOs raised $25.6M with $390M committed (15.2x oversubscription), 95% refund rate from oversubscription. $300M AMM volume generated $1.5M in fees. These metrics validate both the capital formation efficiency and the market depth supporting futarchy governance.
--- ---
### Additional Evidence (extend) ### Additional Evidence (extend)
*Source: [[2026-03-23-telegram-m3taversal-futairdbot-what-are-people-saying-about-the-p2p]] | Added: 2026-03-23* *Source: 2026-03-23-telegram-m3taversal-futairdbot-what-are-people-saying-about-the-p2p | Added: 2026-03-23*
P2P.me case shows oversubscription patterns may compress on pro-rata allocation: 'MetaDAO launches tend to get big commitment numbers that compress hard on pro-rata allocation.' This suggests the 15x oversubscription metric may overstate actual capital deployment if commitment-to-allocation conversion is systematically low. P2P.me case shows oversubscription patterns may compress on pro-rata allocation: 'MetaDAO launches tend to get big commitment numbers that compress hard on pro-rata allocation.' This suggests the 15x oversubscription metric may overstate actual capital deployment if commitment-to-allocation conversion is systematically low.
### Additional Evidence (extend) ### Additional Evidence (extend)
*Source: [[2026-03-23-umbra-ico-155m-commitments-metadao-platform-recovery]] | Added: 2026-03-23* *Source: 2026-03-23-umbra-ico-155m-commitments-metadao-platform-recovery | Added: 2026-03-23*
Umbra Privacy ICO achieved 206x oversubscription ($155M commitments vs $750K target) with 10,518 participants, representing the largest MetaDAO ICO by demand margin. Post-ICO token performance reached 5x (from $0.30 to ~$1.50) within one month, demonstrating that futarchy-governed anti-rug mechanisms can attract institutional-scale capital even in bear market conditions. The $34K monthly budget cap enforced by futarchy governance remained binding post-raise, proving the anti-rug structure holds after capital deployment. Umbra Privacy ICO achieved 206x oversubscription ($155M commitments vs $750K target) with 10,518 participants, representing the largest MetaDAO ICO by demand margin. Post-ICO token performance reached 5x (from $0.30 to ~$1.50) within one month, demonstrating that futarchy-governed anti-rug mechanisms can attract institutional-scale capital even in bear market conditions. The $34K monthly budget cap enforced by futarchy governance remained binding post-raise, proving the anti-rug structure holds after capital deployment.