rio: extract claims from 2025-01-14-futardio-proposal-should-deans-list-dao-update-the-liquidity-fee-structure.md
- Source: inbox/archive/2025-01-14-futardio-proposal-should-deans-list-dao-update-the-liquidity-fee-structure.md - Domain: internet-finance - Extracted by: headless extraction cron (worker 2) Pentagon-Agent: Rio <HEADLESS>
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@ -23,6 +23,12 @@ This evidence has direct implications for governance design. It suggests that [[
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Optimism's futarchy experiment achieved 5,898 total trades from 430 active forecasters (average 13.6 transactions per person) over 21 days, with 88.6% being first-time Optimism governance participants. This suggests futarchy CAN attract substantial engagement when implemented at scale with proper incentives, contradicting the limited-volume pattern observed in MetaDAO. Key differences: Optimism used play money (lower barrier to entry), had institutional backing (Uniswap Foundation co-sponsor), and involved grant selection (clearer stakes) rather than protocol governance decisions. The participation breadth (10 countries, 4 continents, 36 new users/day) suggests the limited-volume finding may be specific to MetaDAO's implementation or use case rather than a structural futarchy limitation.
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Optimism's futarchy experiment achieved 5,898 total trades from 430 active forecasters (average 13.6 transactions per person) over 21 days, with 88.6% being first-time Optimism governance participants. This suggests futarchy CAN attract substantial engagement when implemented at scale with proper incentives, contradicting the limited-volume pattern observed in MetaDAO. Key differences: Optimism used play money (lower barrier to entry), had institutional backing (Uniswap Foundation co-sponsor), and involved grant selection (clearer stakes) rather than protocol governance decisions. The participation breadth (10 countries, 4 continents, 36 new users/day) suggests the limited-volume finding may be specific to MetaDAO's implementation or use case rather than a structural futarchy limitation.
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### Additional Evidence (extend)
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*Source: [[2025-01-14-futardio-proposal-should-deans-list-dao-update-the-liquidity-fee-structure]] | Added: 2026-03-11 | Extractor: anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5*
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(extend) Dean's List DAO's fee structure proposal (B8WLuXqoBb3hRD9XBCNuSqxDqCXCixqRdKR4pVFGzNP) passed on 2025-01-17 with a clear economic trade-off: 20x fee increase (0.25% → 5%) with projected 20-30% volume decline. The proposal included detailed financial modeling with three scenarios (conservative: $19,416 annual growth, moderate: $22,188, optimistic: $24,960) and set pass threshold at MCAP + 3%. This represents a contested decision with quantifiable stakes and measurable financial impact, suggesting futarchy markets may attract higher participation when proposals involve complex economic trade-offs rather than governance or parameter tweaks. However, the source provides no trading volume data for the conditional markets themselves, so we cannot confirm whether this proposal attracted more liquidity than typical MetaDAO proposals or whether the complexity increased participation.
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@ -16,6 +16,12 @@ This clarity becomes crucial when combined with [[decision markets make majority
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The contrast with other governance domains matters. For government policy futarchy, choosing objective functions remains genuinely difficult—citizens want fairness, prosperity, security, and other goods that trade off. But for asset futarchy, the shared financial interest provides natural alignment. This connects to [[ownership alignment turns network effects from extractive to generative]]—the simple, shared objective function is what enables the alignment.
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The contrast with other governance domains matters. For government policy futarchy, choosing objective functions remains genuinely difficult—citizens want fairness, prosperity, security, and other goods that trade off. But for asset futarchy, the shared financial interest provides natural alignment. This connects to [[ownership alignment turns network effects from extractive to generative]]—the simple, shared objective function is what enables the alignment.
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### Additional Evidence (confirm)
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*Source: [[2025-01-14-futardio-proposal-should-deans-list-dao-update-the-liquidity-fee-structure]] | Added: 2026-03-11 | Extractor: anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5*
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(confirm) Dean's List DAO used MCAP (coin price × supply) as the objective function for its fee structure proposal, setting pass threshold at current MCAP + 3% ($307,855). The proposal explicitly projected MCAP impact under three scenarios (+10%, +11.9%, +13.8%) and required the market to price whether fee revenue increase would outweigh volume decline. This demonstrates coin price as objective function in practice: the proposal's financial modeling (treasury growth → MCAP growth via 2.5x ratio) directly tied the decision to token price, and the three-day TWAP settlement forced traders to evaluate the net impact on DAO value. The proposal passed, indicating the market agreed the fee increase would be net positive for MCAP. This is consistent with the claim that coin price provides a measurable, non-subjective objective function for futarchy decisions.
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---
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type: claim
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domain: internet-finance
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description: "Dean's List DAO passed a futarchy proposal to increase liquidity fees 20x (0.25% to 5%) projecting $19k-$25k annual treasury growth despite assuming 20-30% volume decline"
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confidence: experimental
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source: "Dean's List DAO proposal B8WLuXqoBb3hRD9XBCNuSqxDqCXCixqRdKR4pVFGzNP, passed 2025-01-17"
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created: 2025-01-14
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processed_date: 2025-01-14
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depends_on:
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- "MetaDAOs Autocrat program implements futarchy through conditional token markets where proposals create parallel pass and fail universes settled by time-weighted average price over a three-day window"
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- "coin price is the fairest objective function for asset futarchy"
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---
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# Dean's List DAO passed futarchy proposal to increase swap fees 20x, projecting $19k-$25k annual treasury growth despite 20-30% volume decline assumption
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Dean's List DAO passed a futarchy-governed proposal (B8WLuXqoBb3hRD9XBCNuSqxDqCXCixqRdKR4pVFGzNP) on 2025-01-17 to increase its swap liquidity fee from 0.25% dynamic pool fee to a 5% DLMM base fee (with potential escalation to 10%), projecting annual treasury growth of $19,416 to $24,960 despite assuming 20-30% trading volume decline.
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## Evidence
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**Current metrics (06 Dec 2024 - 06 Jan 2025):**
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- Monthly trading volume: 46,228 USDC
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- Average daily volume: ~1,541 USDC
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- Current monthly fee revenue (0.25%): ~3.85 USDC
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- Treasury: ~$80,000 (including native tokens)
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- MCAP: $298,889 (adjusted -5% for volatility from proposal creation)
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**Rationale:** The proposal stated current 0.25% fees generated only ~3.85 USDC daily, insufficient for operational costs and development reserves. At 5% fees, even with 30% volume decrease (conservative scenario), monthly fee revenue would increase to 1,618 USDC.
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**Projected scenarios (all assume 5% fee rate):**
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1. Conservative (30% volume decrease):
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- New monthly volume: 32,360 USDC
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- New monthly fee revenue: 1,618 USDC
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- Annual treasury growth: ~$19,416
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- Projected MCAP: $328,778 (+10%)
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2. Moderate (20% volume decrease):
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- New monthly volume: 36,982 USDC
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- New monthly fee revenue: 1,849 USDC
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- Annual treasury growth: ~$22,188
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- Projected MCAP: $334,445 (+11.9%)
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3. Optimistic (10% volume decrease):
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- New monthly volume: 41,605 USDC
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- New monthly fee revenue: 2,080 USDC
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- Annual treasury growth: ~$24,960
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- Projected MCAP: $340,112 (+13.8%)
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The proposal assumes a 2.5x treasury-to-MCAP ratio for valuation projections.
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## Market Structure Hypothesis
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The proposal theorizes a tiered market structure would emerge:
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- Large trades prefer DAO pool (high liquidity, accept 5% fees, less slippage)
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- Small trades use individual LP pools (lower fees ~0.25%, acceptable liquidity)
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- DAO captures revenue from size-requiring trades
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- Contributors incentivized to provide smaller pools
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This represents the proposer's untested theory of market segmentation.
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## Implementation
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- DLMM pool with 5% base fee, bin step of 80
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- Quote token changed from mSOL back to SOL
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- Fee reclaiming monthly (first week) to main treasury
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- Implemented through DAO treasurer hot wallet
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- Immediate effect (1-2 days post-passage)
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## Limitations
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The proposal's projections depend on:
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- Trading volume remaining stable or declining predictably (20-30% range)
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- Market participants accepting higher fees for larger trades
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- No competing pools emerging at lower fee rates
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- The 2.5x treasury-to-MCAP ratio holding as a valuation model
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No post-implementation data on actual volume impact or fee revenue is available in the source.
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---
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Relevant Notes:
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- [[MetaDAOs Autocrat program implements futarchy through conditional token markets where proposals create parallel pass and fail universes settled by time-weighted average price over a three-day window]]
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- [[coin price is the fairest objective function for asset futarchy]]
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- [[futarchy adoption faces friction from token price psychology proposal complexity and liquidity requirements]]
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- [[MetaDAOs futarchy implementation shows limited trading volume in uncontested decisions]]
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Topics:
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- [[domains/internet-finance/_map]]
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- [[core/mechanisms/_map]]
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@ -34,6 +34,12 @@ MycoRealms implementation reveals operational friction points: monthly $10,000 a
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Optimism futarchy achieved 430 active forecasters and 88.6% first-time governance participants by using play money, demonstrating that removing capital requirements can dramatically lower participation barriers. However, this came at the cost of prediction accuracy (8x overshoot on magnitude estimates), revealing a new friction: the play-money vs real-money tradeoff. Play money enables permissionless participation but sacrifices calibration; real money provides calibration but creates regulatory and capital barriers. This suggests futarchy adoption faces a structural dilemma between accessibility and accuracy that liquidity requirements alone don't capture. The tradeoff is not merely about quantity of liquidity but the fundamental difference between incentive structures that attract participants vs incentive structures that produce accurate predictions.
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Optimism futarchy achieved 430 active forecasters and 88.6% first-time governance participants by using play money, demonstrating that removing capital requirements can dramatically lower participation barriers. However, this came at the cost of prediction accuracy (8x overshoot on magnitude estimates), revealing a new friction: the play-money vs real-money tradeoff. Play money enables permissionless participation but sacrifices calibration; real money provides calibration but creates regulatory and capital barriers. This suggests futarchy adoption faces a structural dilemma between accessibility and accuracy that liquidity requirements alone don't capture. The tradeoff is not merely about quantity of liquidity but the fundamental difference between incentive structures that attract participants vs incentive structures that produce accurate predictions.
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### Additional Evidence (extend)
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*Source: [[2025-01-14-futardio-proposal-should-deans-list-dao-update-the-liquidity-fee-structure]] | Added: 2026-03-11 | Extractor: anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5*
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(extend) Dean's List DAO's fee proposal demonstrates proposal complexity friction through its extensive financial modeling: three volume scenarios (conservative/moderate/optimistic), treasury growth projections ($19k-$25k annually), MCAP impact calculations (2.5x treasury-to-MCAP ratio), volatility adjustments (-5% baseline), and tiered market structure hypothesis (large trades vs small trades). The proposal document includes multiple charts, detailed assumptions about volume decline (20-30%), and explicit TWAP threshold calculations ($307,855 pass threshold). This level of complexity may be necessary for informed futarchy trading but creates significant cognitive load for participants. The proposal also reveals token price psychology friction: it had to explicitly justify why a 20x fee increase would increase MCAP despite volume decline, suggesting participants required convincing that higher fees could be net positive rather than intuitively accepting it.
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@ -0,0 +1,65 @@
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---
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type: claim
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domain: internet-finance
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description: "Futarchy-governed fee proposals use MCAP-plus-threshold pass conditions to align proposal success with token price appreciation"
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confidence: experimental
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source: "Dean's List DAO proposal B8WLuXqoBb3hRD9XBCNuSqxDqCXCixqRdKR4pVFGzNP, passed 2025-01-17"
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created: 2025-01-14
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processed_date: 2025-01-14
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depends_on:
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- "MetaDAOs Autocrat program implements futarchy through conditional token markets where proposals create parallel pass and fail universes settled by time-weighted average price over a three-day window"
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- "coin price is the fairest objective function for asset futarchy"
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---
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# Futarchy-governed fee proposals use MCAP-plus-threshold pass conditions to align proposal success with token price appreciation
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Dean's List DAO's liquidity fee proposal set its pass threshold at current MCAP ($298,889) + 3% = $307,855, requiring token price appreciation for the proposal to pass. This creates direct alignment between the proposal's claimed value creation and the market's assessment through TWAP settlement.
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## Evidence
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**TWAP threshold structure:**
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- Baseline MCAP at proposal creation: $314,620 (2025-01-11 8:53 UTC)
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- Volatility adjustment applied: -5% = -$15,731
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- Adjusted baseline MCAP: $298,889
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- Pass threshold: $298,889 + 3% = $307,855
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- Fail threshold: < $298,889
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The proposal explicitly calculated the -5% volatility adjustment to account for market movement between proposal writing and on-chain creation. For the proposal to pass, the three-day TWAP had to exceed $307,855. For it to fail, MCAP had to remain below $298,889. The proposal passed on 2025-01-17, indicating the three-day TWAP exceeded the pass threshold.
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**Mechanism design implication:** This structure forces traders to price whether the fee increase (projected to generate $19k-$25k annual treasury growth) would outweigh the expected 20-30% volume decline. The 3% threshold is modest enough to be achievable but high enough to require genuine value creation belief.
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**Projected valuation impact (from proposal):**
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Assuming 2.5x treasury-to-MCAP ratio, all three scenarios exceeded the 3% threshold:
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- Conservative scenario: +10% MCAP
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- Moderate scenario: +11.9% MCAP
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- Optimistic scenario: +13.8% MCAP
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This suggests the market priced in at least the conservative case for passage.
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## Mechanism Design Comparison
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This approach differs from simple majority voting by:
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1. **Quantification requirement:** Proposers must specify expected value creation in measurable terms
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2. **Market pricing:** Forces traders to evaluate the fee-volume trade-off explicitly
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3. **Skin-in-the-game:** Conditional token positions create financial incentive for accurate assessment
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4. **Measurable criterion:** MCAP change is directly observable and non-subjective
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## Limitations
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This is a single case study. The approach assumes:
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- MCAP is a valid proxy for DAO value (not always true if treasury composition changes)
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- The 2.5x treasury-to-MCAP ratio is stable (may vary by market conditions)
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- Traders can accurately price complex economic trade-offs (uncertain)
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- The 3% threshold was appropriately calibrated (no comparative data)
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---
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Relevant Notes:
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- [[MetaDAOs Autocrat program implements futarchy through conditional token markets where proposals create parallel pass and fail universes settled by time-weighted average price over a three-day window]]
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- [[coin price is the fairest objective function for asset futarchy]]
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- [[futarchy-excels-at-relative-selection-but-fails-at-absolute-prediction-because-ordinal-ranking-works-while-cardinal-estimation-requires-calibration]]
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- [[decision markets make majority theft unprofitable through conditional token arbitrage]]
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Topics:
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- [[domains/internet-finance/_map]]
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- [[core/mechanisms/_map]]
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@ -6,9 +6,15 @@ url: "https://www.futard.io/proposal/B8WLuXqoBb3hRD9XBCNuSqxDqCXCixqRdKR4pVFGzNP
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date: 2025-01-14
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date: 2025-01-14
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domain: internet-finance
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domain: internet-finance
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format: data
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format: data
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status: unprocessed
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status: processed
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tags: [futardio, metadao, futarchy, solana, governance]
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tags: [futardio, metadao, futarchy, solana, governance]
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event_type: proposal
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event_type: proposal
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processed_by: rio
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processed_date: 2025-01-14
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claims_extracted: ["deans-list-dao-increased-swap-fees-from-0-25-to-5-percent-projecting-19k-to-25k-annual-treasury-growth.md", "futarchy-governed-fee-changes-use-mcap-plus-threshold-as-pass-condition-creating-alignment-between-proposal-success-and-token-price.md"]
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enrichments_applied: ["MetaDAOs futarchy implementation shows limited trading volume in uncontested decisions.md", "futarchy adoption faces friction from token price psychology proposal complexity and liquidity requirements.md", "coin price is the fairest objective function for asset futarchy.md"]
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extraction_model: "anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5"
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extraction_notes: "Extracted two claims: (1) the specific fee increase case with financial projections, and (2) the MCAP+threshold mechanism as a general futarchy pattern. Enriched three existing claims with new evidence about proposal complexity, trading volume context, and coin price as objective function. The tiered market structure hypothesis (large trades prefer DAO pool, small trades use LP pools) is interesting but untested speculation, included in first claim as proposer's theory. No actual post-implementation data available yet since proposal just passed."
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## Proposal Details
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## Proposal Details
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@ -165,3 +171,17 @@ Current MCAP will be -5% of the MCAP at the time of the proposal to account for
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- Autocrat version: 0.3
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- Autocrat version: 0.3
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- Completed: 2025-01-17
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- Completed: 2025-01-17
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- Ended: 2025-01-17
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- Ended: 2025-01-17
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## Key Facts
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- Dean's List DAO proposal B8WLuXqoBb3hRD9XBCNuSqxDqCXCixqRdKR4pVFGzNP passed 2025-01-17
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- Monthly trading volume (06 Dec 2024 - 06 Jan 2025): 46,228 USDC
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- Average daily volume: ~1,541 USDC
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- Treasury: ~$80,000 (including native tokens)
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- MCAP at proposal: $298,889 (adjusted -5% for volatility)
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- Pass threshold: $307,855 (MCAP + 3%)
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- Fee change: 0.25% → 5% DLMM base fee
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- Quote token changed: mSOL → SOL
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- DAO account: 9TKh2yav4WpSNkFV2cLybrWZETBWZBkQ6WB6qV9Nt9dJ
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- Treasurer wallet: 3YW5dxM6u8TG8bZR6ShSiDS8aTfZPG72vUFuGuBVQA2z
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- Autocrat version: 0.3
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