extract: 2024-08-28-futardio-proposal-test-proposal-based-on-metadao-content
Pentagon-Agent: Ganymede <F99EBFA6-547B-4096-BEEA-1D59C3E4028A>
This commit is contained in:
parent
1de55f27dc
commit
08fb75eb04
3 changed files with 28 additions and 1 deletions
|
|
@ -27,6 +27,12 @@ From the MetaDAO proposal:
|
|||
|
||||
This claim extends futarchy-governed-permissionless-launches-require-brand-separation-to-manage-reputational-liability-because-failed-projects-on-a-curated-platform-damage-the-platforms-credibility by showing the reputational concern operates at the mechanism level, not just the platform level. The market's rejection of Futardio suggests futarchy stakeholders prioritize mechanism credibility over short-term adoption metrics.
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
### Additional Evidence (confirm)
|
||||
*Source: [[2024-08-28-futardio-proposal-test-proposal-based-on-metadao-content]] | Added: 2026-03-16*
|
||||
|
||||
Proposal lists 'Makes futarchy look less serious' and 'May make it harder to sell DeFi DAOs / non-crypto organizations' as explicit potential pitfalls, showing MetaDAO leadership recognized the reputational risk before launching futardio.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
Relevant Notes:
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -34,6 +34,12 @@ This claim complements [[coin price is the fairest objective function for asset
|
|||
|
||||
MetaDAO's Futardio proposal explicitly states: 'One of the ideal use-cases for futarchy is memecoin governance. This is because memecoin holders only want the price of the token to increase. There's no question of "maybe the market knows what's the best short-term action, but not the best long-term action."' This provides direct confirmation from MetaDAO itself that memecoins eliminate the temporal tradeoff problem that complicates futarchy in other contexts.
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
### Additional Evidence (confirm)
|
||||
*Source: [[2024-08-28-futardio-proposal-test-proposal-based-on-metadao-content]] | Added: 2026-03-16*
|
||||
|
||||
MetaDAO proposal explicitly states 'memecoin holders only want the price of the token to increase. There's no question of "maybe the market knows what's the best short-term action, but not the best long-term action."' This confirms the theoretical argument with direct practitioner reasoning.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
Relevant Notes:
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -6,9 +6,13 @@ url: "https://www.futard.io/proposal/EmPUGgv2Utzuu2vgSu6GcTRAtJMox5vJeZKi95cBgfJ
|
|||
date: 2024-08-28
|
||||
domain: internet-finance
|
||||
format: data
|
||||
status: unprocessed
|
||||
status: enrichment
|
||||
tags: [futardio, metadao, futarchy, solana, governance]
|
||||
event_type: proposal
|
||||
processed_by: rio
|
||||
processed_date: 2026-03-16
|
||||
enrichments_applied: ["memecoin-governance-is-ideal-futarchy-use-case-because-single-objective-function-eliminates-long-term-tradeoff-ambiguity.md", "futarchy-governed-memecoin-launchpads-face-reputational-risk-tradeoff-between-adoption-and-credibility.md"]
|
||||
extraction_model: "anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5"
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## Proposal Details
|
||||
|
|
@ -352,3 +356,14 @@ This would all be left to the discretion of the team building it, but they would
|
|||
- Autocrat version: 0.3
|
||||
- Completed: 2024-09-01
|
||||
- Ended: 2024-09-01
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
## Key Facts
|
||||
- futardio proposal created 2024-08-28, failed 2024-09-01
|
||||
- Proposed $100k grant paid over 6 months to development team
|
||||
- Target launch window was Q3 2024
|
||||
- Points-to-token conversion period capped at 180 days
|
||||
- Revenue distribution model: all platform revenue to vault claimable by FUTA holders
|
||||
- Token distribution: solely to points owners and MetaDAO
|
||||
- Planned immutable deployment on IPFS or Arweave
|
||||
- Nallok and Proph3t proposed as supporters/funders, not core team
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
Loading…
Reference in a new issue