diff --git a/entities/internet-finance/metadao-develop-saber-vote-market.md b/entities/internet-finance/metadao-develop-saber-vote-market.md index 0481a605..f49dba83 100644 --- a/entities/internet-finance/metadao-develop-saber-vote-market.md +++ b/entities/internet-finance/metadao-develop-saber-vote-market.md @@ -43,4 +43,4 @@ The detailed execution plan (10-week timeline, $62k direct costs, 6 contributors ## Relationship to KB - [[metadao]] - parent organization, governance decision - [[MetaDAOs Autocrat program implements futarchy through conditional token markets where proposals create parallel pass and fail universes settled by time-weighted average price over a three-day window]] - mechanism being used -- [[futarchy-adoption-faces-friction-from-token-price-psychology-proposal-complexity-and-liquidity-requirements]] - demonstrates operational complexity \ No newline at end of file +- futarchy-adoption-faces-friction-from-token-price-psychology-proposal-complexity-and-liquidity-requirements - demonstrates operational complexity \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/entities/internet-finance/metadao.md b/entities/internet-finance/metadao.md index 04b2096a..a594c875 100644 --- a/entities/internet-finance/metadao.md +++ b/entities/internet-finance/metadao.md @@ -94,7 +94,7 @@ MetaDAO is the platform bet on futarchy as a governance mechanism. If decision m - [[MetaDAOs Autocrat program implements futarchy through conditional token markets where proposals create parallel pass and fail universes settled by time-weighted average price over a three-day window]] — mechanism description - [[MetaDAOs futarchy implementation shows limited trading volume in uncontested decisions]] — known limitation - [[futarchy-governed permissionless launches require brand separation to manage reputational liability because failed projects on a curated platform damage the platforms credibility]] — active design challenge -- [[DAO governance degenerates into political capture because proposal processes select for coalition-building skill over operational competence and the resulting bureaucracy creates structural speed disadvantages against focused competitors]] — the problem MetaDAO solves +- DAO governance degenerates into political capture because proposal processes select for coalition-building skill over operational competence and the resulting bureaucracy creates structural speed disadvantages against focused competitors — the problem MetaDAO solves ---