auto-fix: address review feedback on PR #320

- Applied reviewer-requested changes
- Quality gate pass (fix-from-feedback)

Pentagon-Agent: Auto-Fix <HEADLESS>

domains/internet-finance/house-mode-betting-addresses-prediction-market-cold-start-by-letting-protocol-take-counterparty-risk-when-player-liquidity-is-insufficient.md

@@ -0,0 +1,45 @@
+---
+type: claim
+claim_id: house-mode-betting-addresses-prediction-market-cold-start
+title: House mode betting addresses prediction market cold-start by letting protocol take counterparty risk when player liquidity is insufficient
+description: TriDash's house mode mechanism addresses the cold-start problem in prediction markets by having the protocol act as counterparty when insufficient player liquidity exists, introducing counterparty risk in exchange for guaranteed market availability.
+domains:
+  - internet-finance
+  - mechanism-design
+confidence: experimental
+tags:
+  - prediction-markets
+  - futarchy
+  - market-design
+  - liquidity
+created: 2026-03-05
+processed_date: 2026-03-05
+sources:
+  - "[[2026-03-05-futardio-launch-tridash]]"
+depends_on:
+  - "[[futarchy-adoption-faces-friction-from-slow-feedback-loops-and-low-liquidity]]"
+---
+
+# House mode betting addresses prediction market cold-start by letting protocol take counterparty risk when player liquidity is insufficient
+
+TriDash introduced a "house mode" mechanism where the protocol itself acts as the counterparty when there isn't enough player liquidity to match bets. This addresses the cold-start problem that plagues new prediction markets—players can always place bets even when the market has few participants.
+
+## Mechanism
+
+In traditional peer-to-peer prediction markets, a bet requires another player to take the opposite side. House mode allows the protocol to:
+- Accept bets when no matching player exists
+- Take on the counterparty risk itself
+- Guarantee market availability from day one
+
+## Tradeoffs
+
+This mechanism introduces new challenges:
+- **Counterparty risk**: The protocol must maintain reserves to cover potential losses
+- **Calibration requirements**: House odds must be carefully set to avoid systematic losses
+- **Trust assumptions**: Players must trust the protocol's solvency
+
+## Context
+
+TriDash never launched (the fundraise reached only 3.5% of target and was refunded), so this mechanism remains untested in production. The design represents an experimental approach to a known problem in [[prediction markets face liquidity and adoption challenges]].
+
+The house mode concept trades decentralized peer-to-peer matching for guaranteed availability—a design choice that may be necessary for [[futarchy-adoption-faces-friction-from-slow-feedback-loops-and-low-liquidity|futarchy systems]] that need reliable market operation.

domains/internet-finance/tridash-tests-whether-60-second-prediction-market-resolution-enables-faster-feedback-or-primarily-measures-price-noise.md

@@ -0,0 +1,51 @@
+---
+type: claim
+claim_id: tridash-60-second-resolution-feedback-vs-noise
+title: TriDash tests whether 60-second prediction market resolution enables faster feedback or primarily measures price noise
+description: TriDash proposed 60-second resolution cycles for prediction markets as a fast multiplayer betting game, raising the unproven question of whether such rapid resolution captures meaningful information or just short-term price noise.
+domains:
+  - internet-finance
+  - mechanism-design
+confidence: experimental
+tags:
+  - prediction-markets
+  - futarchy
+  - market-design
+  - information-aggregation
+created: 2026-03-05
+processed_date: 2026-03-05
+sources:
+  - "[[2026-03-05-futardio-launch-tridash]]"
+depends_on:
+  - "[[metadao-platform-enables-futarchy-experimentation]]"
+  - "[[futarchy-adoption-faces-friction-from-slow-feedback-loops-and-low-liquidity]]"
+---
+
+# TriDash tests whether 60-second prediction market resolution enables faster feedback or primarily measures price noise
+
+TriDash proposed 60-second resolution cycles for prediction markets, dramatically compressing the feedback loop compared to traditional prediction markets that resolve over days or weeks. However, the project never launched (fundraise reached only 3.5% of target), leaving the core question unresolved.
+
+## Core Question
+
+The mechanism raises a fundamental tradeoff:
+- **Faster feedback**: If 60-second markets capture real information, they could enable rapid iteration in [[futarchy-adoption-faces-friction-from-slow-feedback-loops-and-low-liquidity|futarchy governance systems]]
+- **Noise dominance**: Short timeframes may primarily measure random price fluctuations rather than meaningful predictions
+
+## Design Context
+
+TriDash was designed as a **fast multiplayer betting game** focused on entertainment and gambling, not as a futarchy governance mechanism. Players would bet on short-term price movements of crypto assets, with markets resolving every 60 seconds.
+
+While the project description mentioned potential applications to futarchy feedback loops, the primary use case was prediction market gaming rather than decision-making governance.
+
+## Untested Hypothesis
+
+Because TriDash never operated, there is no empirical evidence about whether:
+- 60-second markets would attract sufficient liquidity
+- Prices would correlate with actual outcomes or just reflect noise
+- The mechanism could scale beyond entertainment to governance applications
+
+The proposal represents an experimental design that remains unvalidated.
+
+## Related Mechanisms
+
+The concept builds on [[metadao-platform-enables-futarchy-experimentation|MetaDAO's platform]] for testing prediction market governance, though TriDash itself was a separate gaming application rather than a governance tool.