ingestion: archive futardio proposal — 2026-03-13-futardio-proposal-dp-00002-mem-solo-acquisition-and-restricted-incentives-rese.md
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type: source
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title: "Futardio: DP-00002 (MEM): SOLO Acquisition and Restricted Incentives Reserve Framework"
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author: "futard.io"
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url: "https://www.metadao.fi/projects/solomon/proposal/wwRoJYcur3EjnQCLodUhLqCs6H9NQ97RvP6JNV4b9F6"
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date: 2026-03-13
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domain: internet-finance
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format: data
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status: unprocessed
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tags: [futarchy, solana, governance, solomon]
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event_type: proposal
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---
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## Proposal Details
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- Project: Solomon
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- Proposal: DP-00002 (MEM): SOLO Acquisition and Restricted Incentives Reserve Framework
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- Status: Passed
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- Created: 2026-03-13
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- URL: https://www.metadao.fi/projects/solomon/proposal/wwRoJYcur3EjnQCLodUhLqCs6H9NQ97RvP6JNV4b9F6
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- Description: This proposal authorizes the DAO to acquire SOLO using treasury funds
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## Content
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**Status:** Draft (proposal memorandum; to be voted)
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**Version:** 1.0.2
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**NON-BINDING SUMMARY.** This memorandum is informational only and is
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subordinate to the governing instruments and any adopted resolutions.
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In the event of conflict, the normative resolution text controls.
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---
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## Summary
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This proposal authorizes the DAO to acquire SOLO using treasury funds and to
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hold all acquired SOLO in a segregated **Restricted SOLO Incentives Reserve**.
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The purpose of this reserve is to provide a credible, prefunded path for
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future SOLO backed incentive programs intended to reward participation,
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deepen alignment, and support long term ecosystem growth. This includes,
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without limitation, the future pips program and any substantially similar
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successor or related participation based framework later approved by
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governance.
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This proposal earmarks that purpose now so that participants can have
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confidence that SOLO backing has been set aside in advance and cannot be
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redirected by signers, operators, contributors, or committees acting on
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discretion alone.
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This proposal does not establish the live Incentives Subcommittee or appoint
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its members. Those matters will be brought in a later proposal. Until that
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later governance action is adopted, no person or body may deploy,
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distribute, commit, or otherwise use reserve SOLO.
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---
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## Rationale
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A participation based incentive program only has credibility if there is a
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credible path from participation to the asset being promised or implied.
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If the DAO intends to use SOLO-backed incentives to reward durable
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participation, it is better to earmark that backing now than to leave
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it to future discretion.
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This proposal is intended to solve that credibility problem without
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prematurely locking the DAO into a single incentive design.
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This structure preserves three things at once:
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- confidence that incentive backing exists and has been ring fenced;
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- flexibility to design the actual program architecture; and
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- sufficient operational discretion to finalize and implement program
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details in a way that reduces front running, gaming, sybil behavior, and
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other exploitative positioning before launch.
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There is also a clear timing advantage. With SOLO trading below
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treasury implied value ("NAV"), the DAO has an opportunity to build a
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restricted incentives reserve on attractive terms and use treasury
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capital to strengthen long term alignment across the network.
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---
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## Key Parameters
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- **Amount:** `1,000,000 USDC`
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- **Order Type:** `Recurring`
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- **Program Duration:** `Up to 60 days`
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- **Order Quantity:** `Variable recurring purchases, sized operationally
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within the approved cap and execution window`
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- **Order Frequency:** `Recurring over a period of up to 60 days`
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- **Maximum Order Price:** `0.74 USDC per SOLO (interpreted as a maximum
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program TWAP)`
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- **Estimated SOLO Acquired:** `Approximately 1,351,351.35 SOLO, assuming
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full use of the acquisition facility at the maximum program TWAP`
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## Process
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This proposal includes instructions to execute a recurring SOLO acquisition
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program using DAO treasury funds in an aggregate amount of up to
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**1,000,000 USDC** over a period of up to **60 days**, subject to a
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**maximum program TWAP of 0.74 USDC per SOLO**. Any SOLO acquired pursuant
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to this proposal shall be retained in the DAO treasury and accounted for
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as Restricted SOLO Incentives Reserve property.
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---
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## Section 1. Authorization of SOLO Acquisition
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**Resolved**, that the DAO hereby authorizes a capped SOLO acquisition
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program funded from DAO treasury using the parameters specified in this
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Proposal.
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**Resolved further**, that all SOLO acquired pursuant to this Proposal
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shall be retained in the DAO treasury and designated on the DAO's books
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and records as Restricted SOLO Incentives Reserve property.
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---
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## Section 2. Designation of Restricted SOLO Incentives Reserve
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**Resolved**, that all SOLO acquired pursuant to this Proposal shall be held
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in the DAO treasury and designated as Restricted SOLO Incentives Reserve
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property of the DAO.
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The Designated Purpose of the Restricted SOLO Incentives Reserve is to
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support SOLO backed incentive programs intended to reward participation,
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deepen alignment, and support long term ecosystem growth, including the
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future pips program and any substantially similar successor or related
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participation based framework later approved by governance.
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**Resolved further**, that pips, and any substantially similar successor
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participation framework approved by governance, shall have first call
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priority on the Restricted SOLO Incentives Reserve.
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**Resolved further**, that until amended by express later governance action,
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the Restricted SOLO Incentives Reserve shall remain earmarked for its
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Designated Purpose and shall not be repurposed, redirected, impaired, or
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clawed back by any signer, contributor, service provider, committee,
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operator, or other person acting without such governance approval.
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---
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## Section 3. No Current Deployment Authority
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**Resolved**, that this Proposal does not establish the live Incentives
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Subcommittee or appoint its members.
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**Resolved further**, that this Proposal does not authorize any person or
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body to distribute, commit, allocate, sell, transfer, make claimable, or
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otherwise deploy Restricted SOLO Incentives Reserve assets at this time.
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Until later governance action establishes and approves the live Incentives
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Subcommittee and any applicable activation framework, reserve SOLO shall
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remain held in the DAO treasury and accounted for solely for its
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Designated Purpose.
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---
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## Section 5. Core Guardrails
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Unless expressly approved by later governance action:
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- reserve SOLO shall remain held in the DAO treasury and separately
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accounted for as Restricted SOLO Incentives Reserve property;
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- reserve SOLO may not be self dealt, privately allocated, or directed to
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insiders or affiliates on preferential terms;
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- reserve SOLO may not be manually transferred wallet to wallet to selected
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recipients as a discretionary allocation method;
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- reserve SOLO may not be sold or otherwise disposed of below prevailing
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market price;
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- reserve SOLO may not be lent, pledged, staked, paired for liquidity,
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used as collateral, used as market making inventory, or used for
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compensation; and
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- any unused, expired, forfeited, cancelled, or unclaimed reserve SOLO
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shall be burned unless governance expressly directs otherwise.
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---
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## Plain English
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If adopted, this proposal means:
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- the DAO can acquire SOLO now;
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- that SOLO is ring-fenced now for future incentive use;
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- Pips has priority on that reserve;
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- nobody can use or redirect that reserve on discretion alone; and
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- a future Incentives Subcommittee can be voted in later to steward it.
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---
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## Links
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- Full normative resolution text (controls if there is any conflict
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with this summary):
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[DP-00002_MEM-full.md](https://github.com/SolomonDAOrg/dao-proposals/blob/main/proposals/DP-00002-acquisition-restricted-incentives-framework/DP-00002_MEM-full.md)
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- Compiled Company Agreement PDF:
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[Company_Agreement_SOLOMON_DAO_LLC.pdf](https://github.com/SolomonDAOrg/compiled-documents/blob/main/company-agreement/Company_Agreement_SOLOMON_DAO_LLC.pdf)
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- Proposal repository (canonical history + execution artefacts):
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[https://github.com/SolomonDAOrg/dao-proposals](https://github.com/SolomonDAOrg/dao-proposals)
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- SOP Registry (canonical):
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[https://github.com/SolomonDAOrg/sop-registry](https://github.com/SolomonDAOrg/sop-registry)
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---
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**Disclaimer (Governance Proposal; No Professional Advice).**
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This document is a governance proposal and governance communication.
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If adopted by the DAO through its governance mechanisms, it may become
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binding on the DAO and persons exercising authority under the
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Company Agreement to the extent provided in the Company Agreement and
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applicable law.
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This document does not constitute legal, tax, financial, or other
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professional advice.
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The author(s) are not acting as legal counsel to the DAO or any
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member or user. No attorney-client relationship is created.
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You must obtain your own independent advice for your circumstances.
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## Raw Data
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- Proposal account: `wwRoJYcur3EjnQCLodUhLqCs6H9NQ97RvP6JNV4b9F6`
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- Proposal number: 2
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- DAO account: `DzYtzoNvPbyFCzwZA6cSm9eDEEmxEB9f8AGkJXUXgnSA`
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- Proposer: `tSTp6B6kE9o6ZaTmHm2ZwnJBBtgd3x112tapxFhmBEQ`
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- Autocrat version: 0.6
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