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reciprocal edges: 6 edges from 2 new claims

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Teleo Agents 2026-04-15 18:01:26 +00:00
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5
domains/internet-finance/domain-expertise-loses-to-trading-skill-in-futarchy-markets-because-prediction-accuracy-requires-calibration-not-just-knowledge.md
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@ -6,7 +6,10 @@ description: "Optimism Badge Holders had lowest win rates in futarchy experiment
confidence: experimental confidence: experimental
source: "Optimism Futarchy v1 Preliminary Findings (2025-06-12), Badge Holder performance data" source: "Optimism Futarchy v1 Preliminary Findings (2025-06-12), Badge Holder performance data"
created: 2025-06-12 created: 2025-06-12
challenges: ["Living Agents are domain-expert investment entities where collective intelligence provides the analysis futarchy provides the governance and tokens provide permissionless access to private deal flow.md"] challenges:
- Living Agents are domain-expert investment entities where collective intelligence provides the analysis futarchy provides the governance and tokens provide permissionless access to private deal flow.md
related:
- insider-trading-in-futarchy-improves-governance-by-accelerating-ground-truth-incorporation-into-conditional-markets
--- ---
# Domain expertise loses to trading skill in futarchy markets because prediction accuracy requires calibration not just knowledge # Domain expertise loses to trading skill in futarchy markets because prediction accuracy requires calibration not just knowledge

2
domains/internet-finance/futarchy is manipulation-resistant because attack attempts create profitable opportunities for arbitrageurs.md
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@ -5,6 +5,8 @@ domain: internet-finance
created: 2026-02-16 created: 2026-02-16
confidence: likely confidence: likely
source: "Governance - Meritocratic Voting + Futarchy" source: "Governance - Meritocratic Voting + Futarchy"
related:
- insider-trading-in-futarchy-improves-governance-by-accelerating-ground-truth-incorporation-into-conditional-markets
--- ---
# futarchy is manipulation-resistant because attack attempts create profitable opportunities for arbitrageurs # futarchy is manipulation-resistant because attack attempts create profitable opportunities for arbitrageurs

6
domains/internet-finance/futarchy-governance-markets-create-insider-trading-paradox-because-informed-governance-participants-are-simultaneously-the-most-valuable-traders-and-the-most-restricted-under-insider-trading-frameworks.md
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@ -10,6 +10,12 @@ agent: rio
scope: structural scope: structural
sourcer: Agent analysis of Torres Act implications sourcer: Agent analysis of Torres Act implications
related_claims: ["[[futarchy-governed entities are structurally not securities because prediction market participation replaces the concentrated promoter effort that the Howey test requires]]", "[[optimal governance requires mixing mechanisms because different decisions have different manipulation risk profiles]]"] related_claims: ["[[futarchy-governed entities are structurally not securities because prediction market participation replaces the concentrated promoter effort that the Howey test requires]]", "[[optimal governance requires mixing mechanisms because different decisions have different manipulation risk profiles]]"]
challenged_by:
- insider-trading-in-futarchy-improves-governance-by-accelerating-ground-truth-incorporation-into-conditional-markets
- stock-markets-function-despite-20-40-percent-insider-trading-proving-information-asymmetry-does-not-break-price-discovery
related:
- insider-trading-in-futarchy-improves-governance-by-accelerating-ground-truth-incorporation-into-conditional-markets
- stock-markets-function-despite-20-40-percent-insider-trading-proving-information-asymmetry-does-not-break-price-discovery
--- ---
# Futarchy governance markets create insider trading paradox because informed governance participants are simultaneously the most valuable traders and the most restricted under insider trading frameworks # Futarchy governance markets create insider trading paradox because informed governance participants are simultaneously the most valuable traders and the most restricted under insider trading frameworks