From 11e3a4d63be25af4e764896cfcf9bedbfcd80866 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Teleo Agents Date: Sun, 15 Mar 2026 18:58:47 +0000 Subject: [PATCH] extract: 2025-01-14-futardio-proposal-should-deans-list-dao-update-the-liquidity-fee-structure Pentagon-Agent: Ganymede --- ...quidity-creating-self-reinforcing-depth.md | 6 +++ ...pation-friction-not-market-disagreement.md | 6 +++ ...ao-update-the-liquidity-fee-structure.json | 43 +++++++++++++++++++ ...-dao-update-the-liquidity-fee-structure.md | 15 ++++++- 4 files changed, 69 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) create mode 100644 inbox/archive/.extraction-debug/2025-01-14-futardio-proposal-should-deans-list-dao-update-the-liquidity-fee-structure.json diff --git a/domains/internet-finance/amm-futarchy-bootstraps-liquidity-through-high-fee-incentives-and-required-proposer-initial-liquidity-creating-self-reinforcing-depth.md b/domains/internet-finance/amm-futarchy-bootstraps-liquidity-through-high-fee-incentives-and-required-proposer-initial-liquidity-creating-self-reinforcing-depth.md index 306d266d..97710c22 100644 --- a/domains/internet-finance/amm-futarchy-bootstraps-liquidity-through-high-fee-incentives-and-required-proposer-initial-liquidity-creating-self-reinforcing-depth.md +++ b/domains/internet-finance/amm-futarchy-bootstraps-liquidity-through-high-fee-incentives-and-required-proposer-initial-liquidity-creating-self-reinforcing-depth.md @@ -28,6 +28,12 @@ The mechanism addresses the "lack of liquidity" problem identified with CLOBs, w Rated experimental because this is a proposed design not yet deployed. The liquidity bootstrapping logic is sound but requires real-world validation. + +### Additional Evidence (confirm) +*Source: [[2025-01-14-futardio-proposal-should-deans-list-dao-update-the-liquidity-fee-structure]] | Added: 2026-03-15* + +Dean's List DAO proposal explicitly uses 5% base fee (vs 0.25% baseline) to incentivize LP provision, with projected annual treasury growth of $19,416-$24,960 demonstrating how high fees create sustainable LP incentives + --- Relevant Notes: diff --git a/domains/internet-finance/futarchy-proposals-with-favorable-economics-can-fail-due-to-participation-friction-not-market-disagreement.md b/domains/internet-finance/futarchy-proposals-with-favorable-economics-can-fail-due-to-participation-friction-not-market-disagreement.md index f8916167..3d3d1ac7 100644 --- a/domains/internet-finance/futarchy-proposals-with-favorable-economics-can-fail-due-to-participation-friction-not-market-disagreement.md +++ b/domains/internet-finance/futarchy-proposals-with-favorable-economics-can-fail-due-to-participation-friction-not-market-disagreement.md @@ -43,6 +43,12 @@ Single-case evidence limits generalizability. The failure could be specific to: However, this case provides concrete evidence that [[futarchy adoption faces friction from token price psychology proposal complexity and liquidity requirements]] operates even when the economics appear favorable. + +### Additional Evidence (extend) +*Source: [[2025-01-14-futardio-proposal-should-deans-list-dao-update-the-liquidity-fee-structure]] | Added: 2026-03-15* + +Proposal passed with clear economic benefits (42-54x revenue increase) but required explicit TWAP threshold design and volatility buffers, showing that even obviously beneficial proposals need careful mechanism design to overcome participation friction + --- Relevant Notes: diff --git a/inbox/archive/.extraction-debug/2025-01-14-futardio-proposal-should-deans-list-dao-update-the-liquidity-fee-structure.json b/inbox/archive/.extraction-debug/2025-01-14-futardio-proposal-should-deans-list-dao-update-the-liquidity-fee-structure.json new file mode 100644 index 00000000..64a3a5f6 --- /dev/null +++ b/inbox/archive/.extraction-debug/2025-01-14-futardio-proposal-should-deans-list-dao-update-the-liquidity-fee-structure.json @@ -0,0 +1,43 @@ +{ + "rejected_claims": [ + { + "filename": "high-fee-liquidity-pools-create-tiered-market-structure-where-daos-capture-large-trade-revenue-while-individual-lps-serve-small-trades.md", + "issues": [ + "no_frontmatter" + ] + }, + { + "filename": "dao-liquidity-fee-increases-face-20-30-percent-volume-reduction-risk-but-remain-net-positive-for-treasury-through-fee-multiplication.md", + "issues": [ + "no_frontmatter" + ] + }, + { + "filename": "futarchy-proposals-use-twap-thresholds-with-volatility-buffers-to-set-pass-fail-conditions.md", + "issues": [ + "no_frontmatter" + ] + } + ], + "validation_stats": { + "total": 3, + "kept": 0, + "fixed": 6, + "rejected": 3, + "fixes_applied": [ + "high-fee-liquidity-pools-create-tiered-market-structure-where-daos-capture-large-trade-revenue-while-individual-lps-serve-small-trades.md:set_created:2026-03-15", + "high-fee-liquidity-pools-create-tiered-market-structure-where-daos-capture-large-trade-revenue-while-individual-lps-serve-small-trades.md:stripped_wiki_link:high-fee-amms-create-lp-incentive-and-manipulation-deterrent", + "dao-liquidity-fee-increases-face-20-30-percent-volume-reduction-risk-but-remain-net-positive-for-treasury-through-fee-multiplication.md:set_created:2026-03-15", + "dao-liquidity-fee-increases-face-20-30-percent-volume-reduction-risk-but-remain-net-positive-for-treasury-through-fee-multiplication.md:stripped_wiki_link:high-fee-amms-create-lp-incentive-and-manipulation-deterrent", + "futarchy-proposals-use-twap-thresholds-with-volatility-buffers-to-set-pass-fail-conditions.md:set_created:2026-03-15", + "futarchy-proposals-use-twap-thresholds-with-volatility-buffers-to-set-pass-fail-conditions.md:stripped_wiki_link:MetaDAOs-Autocrat-program-implements-futarchy-through-condit" + ], + "rejections": [ + "high-fee-liquidity-pools-create-tiered-market-structure-where-daos-capture-large-trade-revenue-while-individual-lps-serve-small-trades.md:no_frontmatter", + "dao-liquidity-fee-increases-face-20-30-percent-volume-reduction-risk-but-remain-net-positive-for-treasury-through-fee-multiplication.md:no_frontmatter", + "futarchy-proposals-use-twap-thresholds-with-volatility-buffers-to-set-pass-fail-conditions.md:no_frontmatter" + ] + }, + "model": "anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5", + "date": "2026-03-15" +} \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/inbox/archive/2025-01-14-futardio-proposal-should-deans-list-dao-update-the-liquidity-fee-structure.md b/inbox/archive/2025-01-14-futardio-proposal-should-deans-list-dao-update-the-liquidity-fee-structure.md index fa2c5ae9..6e265ec7 100644 --- a/inbox/archive/2025-01-14-futardio-proposal-should-deans-list-dao-update-the-liquidity-fee-structure.md +++ b/inbox/archive/2025-01-14-futardio-proposal-should-deans-list-dao-update-the-liquidity-fee-structure.md @@ -6,9 +6,13 @@ url: "https://www.futard.io/proposal/B8WLuXqoBb3hRD9XBCNuSqxDqCXCixqRdKR4pVFGzNP date: 2025-01-14 domain: internet-finance format: data -status: unprocessed +status: enrichment tags: [futardio, metadao, futarchy, solana, governance] event_type: proposal +processed_by: rio +processed_date: 2026-03-15 +enrichments_applied: ["amm-futarchy-bootstraps-liquidity-through-high-fee-incentives-and-required-proposer-initial-liquidity-creating-self-reinforcing-depth.md", "futarchy-proposals-with-favorable-economics-can-fail-due-to-participation-friction-not-market-disagreement.md"] +extraction_model: "anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5" --- ## Proposal Details @@ -165,3 +169,12 @@ Current MCAP will be -5% of the MCAP at the time of the proposal to account for - Autocrat version: 0.3 - Completed: 2025-01-17 - Ended: 2025-01-17 + + +## Key Facts +- Dean's List DAO treasury was approximately $80,000 including native tokens as of January 2025 +- Dean's List DAO market cap was $298,889 (volatility-adjusted) at proposal creation on January 11, 2025 +- Dean's List DAO monthly trading volume was 46,228 USDC for the period December 6, 2024 to January 6, 2025 +- Dean's List DAO proposal B8WLuXqoBb3hRD9XBCNuSqxDqCXCixqRdKR4pVFGzNP was proposal number 8 +- Dean's List DAO treasurer wallet address is 3YW5dxM6u8TG8bZR6ShSiDS8aTfZPG72vUFuGuBVQA2z +- Dean's List DAO uses Autocrat version 0.3 for futarchy governance