diff --git a/domains/internet-finance/MetaDAOs futarchy implementation shows limited trading volume in uncontested decisions.md b/domains/internet-finance/MetaDAOs futarchy implementation shows limited trading volume in uncontested decisions.md
index 7e557c94f..62c48d217 100644
--- a/domains/internet-finance/MetaDAOs futarchy implementation shows limited trading volume in uncontested decisions.md	
+++ b/domains/internet-finance/MetaDAOs futarchy implementation shows limited trading volume in uncontested decisions.md	
@@ -23,6 +23,12 @@ This evidence has direct implications for governance design. It suggests that [[
 
 Optimism's futarchy experiment achieved 5,898 total trades from 430 active forecasters (average 13.6 transactions per person) over 21 days, with 88.6% being first-time Optimism governance participants. This suggests futarchy CAN attract substantial engagement when implemented at scale with proper incentives, contradicting the limited-volume pattern observed in MetaDAO. Key differences: Optimism used play money (lower barrier to entry), had institutional backing (Uniswap Foundation co-sponsor), and involved grant selection (clearer stakes) rather than protocol governance decisions. The participation breadth (10 countries, 4 continents, 36 new users/day) suggests the limited-volume finding may be specific to MetaDAO's implementation or use case rather than a structural futarchy limitation.
 
+
+### Additional Evidence (extend)
+*Source: [[2025-00-00-frontiers-futarchy-desci-empirical-simulation]] | Added: 2026-03-12 | Extractor: anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5*
+
+Empirical analysis of 13 DeSci DAOs found that most operate below 1 proposal/month, which the researchers argue is too infrequent for continuous futarchy. Low governance cadence creates structural problems: liquidity fragmentation (each proposal creates new markets, but <1/month means capital spread too thin), participant disengagement (traders need regular opportunities), and information staleness (futarchy's advantage is continuous price discovery, but low frequency means infrequent updates). This provides a structural explanation for limited trading volume beyond just 'uncontested decisions' — governance cadence itself determines whether futarchy markets can maintain depth. The paper notes that 'only some DAOs exhibit governance tempo compatible with continuous outcome-based decision processes,' suggesting a minimum decision throughput threshold for futarchy viability.
+
 ---
 
 Relevant Notes:
diff --git a/domains/internet-finance/coin price is the fairest objective function for asset futarchy.md b/domains/internet-finance/coin price is the fairest objective function for asset futarchy.md
index 459920435..c89f7f05b 100644
--- a/domains/internet-finance/coin price is the fairest objective function for asset futarchy.md	
+++ b/domains/internet-finance/coin price is the fairest objective function for asset futarchy.md	
@@ -16,6 +16,12 @@ This clarity becomes crucial when combined with [[decision markets make majority
 
 The contrast with other governance domains matters. For government policy futarchy, choosing objective functions remains genuinely difficult—citizens want fairness, prosperity, security, and other goods that trade off. But for asset futarchy, the shared financial interest provides natural alignment. This connects to [[ownership alignment turns network effects from extractive to generative]]—the simple, shared objective function is what enables the alignment.
 
+
+### Additional Evidence (challenge)
+*Source: [[2025-00-00-frontiers-futarchy-desci-empirical-simulation]] | Added: 2026-03-12 | Extractor: anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5*
+
+A peer-reviewed academic paper argues that KPI-conditional futarchy (forecasting proposal-specific key performance indicators) is more appropriate than asset-price futarchy for organizations where token price is a noisy proxy for success. The paper examines DeSci DAOs where token markets are thinly traded and tightly coupled to crypto market sentiment, making price a poor signal of organizational welfare. The authors argue that when 'token price is a noisy proxy for organizational success,' KPI-conditional markets that directly measure outcomes (papers published, milestones achieved) provide better governance signal than speculating on token price movements. This challenges the universality of coin-price objectives, suggesting they work best in liquid markets where price efficiently aggregates organizational value, but fail in contexts with thin liquidity or external noise dominance.
+
 ---
 
 Relevant Notes:
diff --git a/domains/internet-finance/futarchy-information-advantage-scales-with-information-asymmetry-converging-to-voting-in-aligned-expert-communities.md b/domains/internet-finance/futarchy-information-advantage-scales-with-information-asymmetry-converging-to-voting-in-aligned-expert-communities.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..5543a66e4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/domains/internet-finance/futarchy-information-advantage-scales-with-information-asymmetry-converging-to-voting-in-aligned-expert-communities.md
@@ -0,0 +1,75 @@
+---
+type: claim
+domain: internet-finance
+description: "Empirical evidence from DeSci DAOs shows futarchy and voting reach identical outcomes when participants have similar information access"
+confidence: experimental
+source: "Frontiers in Blockchain academic paper, VitaDAO retrospective simulation (2025)"
+created: 2026-03-11
+secondary_domains: [collective-intelligence]
+depends_on:
+  - "speculative markets aggregate information through incentive and selection effects not wisdom of crowds"
+  - "MetaDAOs futarchy implementation shows limited trading volume in uncontested decisions"
+---
+
+# Futarchy's information-aggregation advantage scales with information asymmetry between participants — in aligned expert communities it converges to the same outcomes as voting
+
+A peer-reviewed empirical study of 13 DeSci DAOs found that futarchy-preferred outcomes matched actual voting outcomes in VitaDAO's governance history through April 2025. This null result is theoretically significant: it defines the boundary condition where prediction markets provide no decision advantage over conventional voting.
+
+The mechanism is information asymmetry. [[speculative markets aggregate information through incentive and selection effects not wisdom of crowds]] — markets excel when participants have different information that needs aggregation. But in DeSci DAOs, participants are domain experts with similar information access and aligned incentives (advancing the scientific mission). When everyone has roughly the same information, there's nothing for markets to aggregate that voting doesn't already capture.
+
+This explains why [[MetaDAOs futarchy implementation shows limited trading volume in uncontested decisions]] — low information asymmetry means no profitable trading opportunities, which means thin markets, which means futarchy adds overhead without decision improvement.
+
+## Evidence
+
+**VitaDAO Retrospective Simulation:**
+- Researchers simulated KPI-conditional futarchy markets for VitaDAO's historical proposals
+- Futarchy-preferred outcomes matched actual token-weighted voting outcomes in 100% of cases examined (through April 2025)
+- This is a null result for futarchy's value-add in this context
+
+**Governance Cadence Analysis:**
+- Most DeSci DAOs operate below 1 proposal/month
+- Low proposal frequency reduces futarchy's continuous decision-making advantage
+- Only some DAOs exhibit governance tempo compatible with continuous outcome-based markets
+
+**Theoretical Framing from Paper:**
+- "Futarchy's foundational premises regarding informational efficiency of speculative markets, incentive alignment under risk, and objectivity of welfare metrics remain open to contestation"
+- Markets require "institutional preconditions" to serve as "primary decision-making substrates" rather than just "informational supplements"
+
+## Scope and Implications
+
+This finding does NOT invalidate futarchy generally — it defines where it adds value:
+
+**Low information asymmetry contexts (futarchy ≈ voting):**
+- Expert communities with shared knowledge
+- Aligned incentives toward common goals
+- Transparent information environments
+- Examples: DeSci DAOs, professional associations, academic governance
+
+**High information asymmetry contexts (futarchy > voting):**
+- Capital allocation among strangers
+- Diverse participant knowledge bases
+- Misaligned incentives requiring price discovery
+- Examples: public token launches, cross-domain investment decisions, adversarial environments
+
+The paper's authors note this explicitly: KPI-conditional futarchy may be more appropriate than asset-price futarchy when "token price is a noisy proxy for organizational success" — which is true for early-stage, thinly-traded science DAOs coupled to crypto market sentiment.
+
+## Challenges
+
+This is a single-DAO retrospective simulation, not a controlled experiment. Possible confounds:
+- VitaDAO voters may have been unusually well-informed
+- The proposals examined may have been unusually uncontroversial
+- Simulation methodology may not capture real market dynamics
+
+The 13-DAO governance cadence analysis supports the finding (most DeSci DAOs have low proposal frequency), but only VitaDAO had detailed enough records for outcome simulation.
+
+---
+
+Relevant Notes:
+- [[speculative markets aggregate information through incentive and selection effects not wisdom of crowds]]
+- [[MetaDAOs futarchy implementation shows limited trading volume in uncontested decisions]]
+- [[optimal governance requires mixing mechanisms because different decisions have different manipulation risk profiles]]
+- [[domain-expertise-loses-to-trading-skill-in-futarchy-markets-because-prediction-accuracy-requires-calibration-not-just-knowledge]]
+
+Topics:
+- [[domains/internet-finance/_map]]
+- [[foundations/collective-intelligence/_map]]
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/domains/internet-finance/governance-cadence-below-one-proposal-per-month-is-incompatible-with-continuous-futarchy-because-markets-require-regular-decision-flow.md b/domains/internet-finance/governance-cadence-below-one-proposal-per-month-is-incompatible-with-continuous-futarchy-because-markets-require-regular-decision-flow.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..70c47578d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/domains/internet-finance/governance-cadence-below-one-proposal-per-month-is-incompatible-with-continuous-futarchy-because-markets-require-regular-decision-flow.md
@@ -0,0 +1,70 @@
+---
+type: claim
+domain: internet-finance
+description: "Empirical analysis of 13 DeSci DAOs shows most operate below 1 proposal/month, too infrequent for futarchy's continuous market advantage"
+confidence: likely
+source: "Frontiers in Blockchain, DeSci DAO governance cadence analysis (2025)"
+created: 2026-03-11
+secondary_domains: [collective-intelligence]
+---
+
+# Governance cadence below one proposal per month is incompatible with continuous futarchy because prediction markets require regular decision flow to maintain liquidity and participant engagement
+
+An empirical study of 13 DeSci DAOs (AthenaDAO, BiohackerDAO, CerebrumDAO, CryoDAO, GenomesDAO, HairDAO, HippocratDAO, MoonDAO, PsyDAO, VitaDAO, and others) found that most operate below 1 proposal per month. This low governance cadence creates structural problems for futarchy adoption:
+
+1. **Liquidity fragmentation:** Each proposal creates new conditional token markets. With <1 proposal/month, capital is spread across too few markets to maintain depth.
+
+2. **Participant disengagement:** Traders need regular opportunities to deploy capital and demonstrate skill. Months between decisions means participants drift away.
+
+3. **Information staleness:** Futarchy's advantage is continuous price discovery. Low proposal frequency means prices update infrequently, reducing the information advantage over periodic voting.
+
+This explains why [[MetaDAOs futarchy implementation shows limited trading volume in uncontested decisions]] — the mechanism requires a minimum decision throughput to function effectively.
+
+## Evidence
+
+**DeSci DAO Governance Cadence (2025 data):**
+- Most DeSci DAOs: <1 proposal/month
+- Only some DAOs exhibit governance tempo "compatible with continuous outcome-based decision processes"
+- Paper does not specify which DAOs meet the threshold, but the aggregate finding is clear
+
+**Theoretical Mechanism:**
+- Futarchy's value proposition includes continuous market-based governance
+- "Continuous" requires regular decision flow to maintain market infrastructure
+- Below a threshold frequency, the overhead of market creation exceeds the benefit
+
+**Comparison to MetaDAO:**
+- MetaDAO has higher proposal frequency but still faces [[MetaDAOs futarchy implementation shows limited trading volume in uncontested decisions]]
+- This suggests the threshold is higher than DeSci DAOs' current cadence
+
+## Implications
+
+This is a **scope condition** for futarchy adoption, not a fundamental limitation:
+
+**Organizations well-suited for futarchy:**
+- High proposal frequency (multiple decisions per week)
+- Continuous capital allocation (investment DAOs, protocol treasuries)
+- Operational decisions requiring rapid iteration
+
+**Organizations poorly suited for futarchy:**
+- Infrequent strategic decisions (quarterly board votes)
+- Mission-driven organizations with slow decision cycles
+- Early-stage projects without established governance rhythm
+
+DeSci DAOs fall into the second category because scientific research has long timelines and infrequent funding decisions. This doesn't mean futarchy is wrong for DeSci — it means DeSci DAOs need to either increase governance cadence or accept that futarchy will function as an occasional tool rather than continuous infrastructure.
+
+## Relationship to Existing Claims
+
+This finding supports [[MetaDAOs futarchy implementation shows limited trading volume in uncontested decisions]] by identifying governance cadence as a structural driver of trading volume. Low frequency → thin markets → limited information aggregation → futarchy adds less value.
+
+It also relates to [[futarchy adoption faces friction from token price psychology proposal complexity and liquidity requirements]] — liquidity requirements are harder to meet when proposals are infrequent.
+
+---
+
+Relevant Notes:
+- [[MetaDAOs futarchy implementation shows limited trading volume in uncontested decisions]]
+- [[futarchy adoption faces friction from token price psychology proposal complexity and liquidity requirements]]
+- [[optimal governance requires mixing mechanisms because different decisions have different manipulation risk profiles]]
+
+Topics:
+- [[domains/internet-finance/_map]]
+- [[core/mechanisms/_map]]
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/domains/internet-finance/kpi-conditional-futarchy-is-more-appropriate-than-asset-price-futarchy-for-organizations-where-token-price-is-a-noisy-proxy-for-success.md b/domains/internet-finance/kpi-conditional-futarchy-is-more-appropriate-than-asset-price-futarchy-for-organizations-where-token-price-is-a-noisy-proxy-for-success.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..1c9e1dd29
--- /dev/null
+++ b/domains/internet-finance/kpi-conditional-futarchy-is-more-appropriate-than-asset-price-futarchy-for-organizations-where-token-price-is-a-noisy-proxy-for-success.md
@@ -0,0 +1,76 @@
+---
+type: claim
+domain: internet-finance
+description: "Academic paper argues KPI-conditional markets outperform coin-price futarchy when token markets are thin or coupled to external sentiment"
+confidence: experimental
+source: "Frontiers in Blockchain, DeSci futarchy paper (2025)"
+created: 2026-03-11
+secondary_domains: [collective-intelligence]
+challenged_by:
+  - "coin price is the fairest objective function for asset futarchy"
+---
+
+# KPI-conditional futarchy is more appropriate than asset-price futarchy for organizations where token price is a noisy proxy for organizational success
+
+The standard futarchy formulation uses token price as the objective function: "vote on values, bet on beliefs" where beliefs are about future token price. But a peer-reviewed academic study of DeSci DAOs argues that **KPI-conditional markets** — forecasting proposal-specific key performance indicators rather than token price — are more appropriate when:
+
+1. Token markets are thinly traded (low liquidity makes price manipulation easy)
+2. Token price is tightly coupled to external market sentiment (crypto market beta dominates organizational alpha)
+3. Organizational success has measurable non-price indicators (research outputs, user growth, scientific milestones)
+
+This directly challenges [[coin price is the fairest objective function for asset futarchy]], which assumes token price efficiently aggregates all information about organizational value.
+
+## Evidence
+
+**DeSci DAO Context:**
+- Early-stage science DAOs have thin token markets with low trading volume
+- Token prices are "tightly coupled to crypto market sentiment" — external volatility drowns out governance signal
+- Scientific success has clear KPIs: papers published, patents filed, clinical trial progression, researcher engagement
+
+**Paper's Argument:**
+- "KPI-conditional futarchy" forecasts proposal-specific outcomes (e.g., "will this grant produce a peer-reviewed publication within 18 months?")
+- This separates governance signal from market noise
+- Participants bet on measurable outcomes rather than speculating on token price movements
+
+**Theoretical Framing:**
+- Asset-price futarchy assumes token price is a sufficient statistic for organizational welfare
+- This assumption breaks when price is dominated by external factors (market sentiment, liquidity constraints, speculation)
+- KPI-conditional markets directly measure what the organization cares about
+
+## Relationship to Existing KB Claims
+
+This challenges the universality of [[coin price is the fairest objective function for asset futarchy]]. That claim may hold for:
+- Liquid token markets where price discovery is efficient
+- Organizations where token value directly reflects organizational success
+- Contexts where participants are primarily token holders (aligned incentives)
+
+But KPI-conditional futarchy may be superior for:
+- Illiquid or nascent token markets
+- Organizations with non-financial mission objectives
+- Contexts where token price is dominated by external noise
+
+## Implementation Considerations
+
+KPI-conditional markets face their own challenges:
+- **Metric gaming:** Participants optimize for the measured KPI rather than true organizational welfare (Goodhart's Law)
+- **Verification complexity:** KPIs require trusted oracles or governance to determine outcomes
+- **Delayed resolution:** Scientific outcomes take months/years to verify, creating long market resolution times
+
+Asset-price futarchy has the advantage of continuous, permissionless price discovery. KPI-conditional markets trade this for reduced noise and better mission alignment.
+
+## Scope
+
+This is a theoretical argument supported by context analysis, not experimental evidence comparing KPI-conditional vs asset-price futarchy head-to-head. The paper's empirical work (VitaDAO simulation) used KPI-conditional markets but didn't test them against asset-price alternatives.
+
+The claim is domain-specific: it applies most strongly to mission-driven organizations with measurable non-price objectives and thin token markets. It may not generalize to liquid DeFi protocols or meme coins where price IS the primary success metric.
+
+---
+
+Relevant Notes:
+- [[coin price is the fairest objective function for asset futarchy]] — challenged by this claim
+- [[futarchy adoption faces friction from token price psychology proposal complexity and liquidity requirements]]
+- [[optimal governance requires mixing mechanisms because different decisions have different manipulation risk profiles]]
+
+Topics:
+- [[domains/internet-finance/_map]]
+- [[core/mechanisms/_map]]
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/domains/internet-finance/speculative markets aggregate information through incentive and selection effects not wisdom of crowds.md b/domains/internet-finance/speculative markets aggregate information through incentive and selection effects not wisdom of crowds.md
index 5164cd995..6d440c24d 100644
--- a/domains/internet-finance/speculative markets aggregate information through incentive and selection effects not wisdom of crowds.md	
+++ b/domains/internet-finance/speculative markets aggregate information through incentive and selection effects not wisdom of crowds.md	
@@ -26,6 +26,12 @@ The selection effect also relates to [[trial and error is the only coordination
 
 Optimism futarchy experiment reveals the selection effect works for ordinal ranking but fails for cardinal estimation. Markets correctly identified which projects would outperform alternatives (futarchy selections beat Grants Council by $32.5M), but catastrophically failed at magnitude prediction (8x overshoot: $239M predicted vs $31M actual). This suggests the incentive/selection mechanism produces comparative advantage assessment ("this will outperform that") rather than absolute forecasting accuracy. Additionally, Badge Holders (domain experts) had the LOWEST win rates, indicating the selection effect filters for trading skill and calibration ability, not domain knowledge—a different kind of 'information' than typically assumed. The mechanism aggregates trader wisdom (risk management, position sizing, timing) rather than domain wisdom (technical assessment, ecosystem understanding).
 
+
+### Additional Evidence (extend)
+*Source: [[2025-00-00-frontiers-futarchy-desci-empirical-simulation]] | Added: 2026-03-12 | Extractor: anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5*
+
+A retrospective simulation of VitaDAO governance found that futarchy-preferred outcomes matched actual token-weighted voting outcomes in 100% of cases examined through April 2025. This null result defines a boundary condition: when participants have similar information access and aligned incentives (as in expert DeSci communities), there is nothing for markets to aggregate that voting doesn't already capture. The paper's authors note that futarchy's 'foundational premises regarding informational efficiency of speculative markets, incentive alignment under risk, and objectivity of welfare metrics remain open to contestation' and that markets require 'institutional preconditions' to function as 'primary decision-making substrates.' This suggests information asymmetry is the key variable — markets excel when participants have different information, but converge to voting outcomes when information is symmetrically distributed.
+
 ---
 
 Relevant Notes:
diff --git a/inbox/archive/2025-00-00-frontiers-futarchy-desci-empirical-simulation.md b/inbox/archive/2025-00-00-frontiers-futarchy-desci-empirical-simulation.md
index 1c3fda435..8496aca54 100644
--- a/inbox/archive/2025-00-00-frontiers-futarchy-desci-empirical-simulation.md
+++ b/inbox/archive/2025-00-00-frontiers-futarchy-desci-empirical-simulation.md
@@ -7,10 +7,16 @@ date: 2025-00-00
 domain: internet-finance
 secondary_domains: [collective-intelligence, ai-alignment]
 format: paper
-status: unprocessed
+status: processed
 priority: high
 tags: [futarchy, DeSci, DAOs, empirical-evidence, VitaDAO, simulation, governance-cadence]
 flagged_for_theseus: ["DeSci governance patterns relevant to AI alignment coordination mechanisms"]
+processed_by: rio
+processed_date: 2026-03-11
+claims_extracted: ["futarchy-information-advantage-scales-with-information-asymmetry-converging-to-voting-in-aligned-expert-communities.md", "kpi-conditional-futarchy-is-more-appropriate-than-asset-price-futarchy-for-organizations-where-token-price-is-a-noisy-proxy-for-success.md", "governance-cadence-below-one-proposal-per-month-is-incompatible-with-continuous-futarchy-because-markets-require-regular-decision-flow.md"]
+enrichments_applied: ["coin price is the fairest objective function for asset futarchy.md", "MetaDAOs futarchy implementation shows limited trading volume in uncontested decisions.md", "speculative markets aggregate information through incentive and selection effects not wisdom of crowds.md"]
+extraction_model: "anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5"
+extraction_notes: "This is the first peer-reviewed empirical study of futarchy in DeSci DAOs. The VitaDAO null result (futarchy = voting outcomes) is theoretically significant because it defines the boundary condition where markets don't beat votes: low information asymmetry in aligned expert communities. The KPI-conditional vs asset-price futarchy distinction challenges our KB's assumption that coin price is the universal objective function. The governance cadence finding provides structural explanation for thin futarchy markets beyond just 'uncontested decisions.' All three claims are scoped to contexts where the findings apply, preserving the markets-beat-votes thesis while defining its limits."
 ---
 
 ## Content
@@ -43,3 +49,11 @@ Academic paper examining futarchy adoption in DeSci (Decentralized Science) DAOs
 PRIMARY CONNECTION: [[speculative markets aggregate information through incentive and selection effects not wisdom of crowds]]
 WHY ARCHIVED: Peer-reviewed evidence that futarchy converges with voting in low-information-asymmetry environments — defines the boundary condition where markets DON'T beat votes
 EXTRACTION HINT: Focus on the boundary condition claim — when does futarchy add value vs when does it converge with voting? The information asymmetry dimension is the key variable
+
+
+## Key Facts
+- 13 DeSci DAOs analyzed: AthenaDAO, BiohackerDAO, CerebrumDAO, CryoDAO, GenomesDAO, HairDAO, HippocratDAO, MoonDAO, PsyDAO, VitaDAO, and others
+- VitaDAO retrospective simulation covered all proposals through April 2025
+- Most DeSci DAOs operate below 1 proposal/month governance cadence
+- Paper published in Frontiers in Blockchain (peer-reviewed academic journal)
+- Study used KPI-conditional futarchy methodology, not asset-price futarchy