rio: extract from 2025-11-07-futardio-proposal-meta-pow-the-ore-treasury-protocol.md
- Source: inbox/archive/2025-11-07-futardio-proposal-meta-pow-the-ore-treasury-protocol.md - Domain: internet-finance - Extracted by: headless extraction cron (worker 4) Pentagon-Agent: Rio <HEADLESS>
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@ -82,6 +82,12 @@ Futardio cult launch (2026-03-03 to 2026-03-04) demonstrates MetaDAO's platform
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(challenge) Areal's failed Futardio launch ($11,654 raised of $50K target, REFUNDING status) demonstrates that futarchy-governed fundraising does not guarantee capital formation success. The mechanism provides credible exit guarantees through market-governed liquidation and governance quality through conditional markets, but market participants still evaluate project fundamentals and team credibility. Futarchy reduces rug risk but does not eliminate market skepticism of unproven business models or early-stage teams.
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### Additional Evidence (extend)
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*Source: [[2025-11-07-futardio-proposal-meta-pow-the-ore-treasury-protocol]] | Added: 2026-03-12 | Extractor: anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5*
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The Meta-PoW proposal demonstrates a specific implementation pattern for ownership coins on MetaDAO: using token economics to create automatic treasury accumulation loops. COAL's design burns tokens at multiple points (smelting at 100 COAL per INGOT, pickaxe licenses at c(y) COAL) while channeling external hard assets (ORE) into the treasury through a single choke point (INGOT smelting at 12.10 ORE per INGOT). The proposal explicitly frames this as a 'simple, mechanical ownership coin loop' that reliably accumulates ORE in the COAL treasury and ties player behavior to COAL/ORE price dynamics. This provides a concrete example of how ownership coins can be structured beyond simple fundraising—creating ongoing economic engines that continuously accumulate treasury value through user participation rather than one-time capital raises. The Meta-PoW design shows how ownership coins can implement self-regulating feedback loops (dynamic license fees responding to price ratios) that maintain system stability without continuous governance intervention.
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---
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Relevant Notes:
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@ -32,6 +32,12 @@ The connection to futarchy governance is important. Since [[MetaDAOs Autocrat pr
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- If performance metrics are poorly chosen, dynamic minting could be more inflationary than fixed schedules, diluting holders during periods of metric gaming
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- Without robust oracle or futarchy verification of performance claims, this reduces to governance theater with extra steps
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### Additional Evidence (extend)
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*Source: [[2025-11-07-futardio-proposal-meta-pow-the-ore-treasury-protocol]] | Added: 2026-03-12 | Extractor: anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5*
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COAL's Meta-PoW implements a hybrid approach that combines fixed emission schedules with dynamic access controls. The protocol maintains fixed halving-band emissions (R_t = R_0 * 2^(-k_t) where k_t advances every 5% of max supply, with R_0 = 11,250 COAL/day initially), but gates access to those emissions through dynamic pickaxe license fees c(y) = c0 * (y / y_ref)^p that respond to COAL/ORE price ratios (with baseline c0 = 200, y_ref = 50, p = 3, bounds 1-300 COAL). This creates 'algorithmic meritocracy' not through variable emission rates but through variable participation costs—when COAL strengthens (y decreases), license fees drop and more players can economically access the fixed emissions; when COAL weakens (y increases), license fees rise sharply and only committed players continue mining. The mechanism preserves emission predictability while making participation economically self-regulating. The proposal states: 'Meta-PoW does not change R_t. It defines how R_t is accessed via tools,' showing how fixed emissions can be combined with dynamic access mechanisms to create outcome-responsive systems without changing the underlying emission schedule.
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---
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Relevant Notes:
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---
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type: claim
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domain: internet-finance
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description: "COAL's c(y) function uses cubic price ratio to automatically increase crafting costs when COAL weakens relative to ORE, creating self-regulating supply without governance votes"
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confidence: experimental
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source: "futard.io, Meta-PoW: The ORE Treasury Protocol proposal, 2025-11-07"
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created: 2026-03-11
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---
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# Dynamic license fees using price ratio exponents create automatic supply throttles that self-stabilize without governance intervention
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COAL's Meta-PoW implements a dynamic pickaxe license fee c(y) = c0 * (y / y_ref)^p where y = P_ORE / P_COAL, creating an automatic economic throttle that responds to relative token prices without requiring governance votes. With baseline parameters c0 = 200 COAL, y_ref = 50, p = 3, and bounds of 1 ≤ c(y) ≤ 300, the cubic exponent makes the license fee highly sensitive to price ratio changes.
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When COAL strengthens relative to ORE (y decreases), the license fee drops, making pickaxe crafting economically attractive. This increases mining activity, which drives more INGOT smelting and more ORE flowing into the treasury. When COAL weakens relative to ORE (y increases), the license fee rises sharply due to the cubic exponent, making new pickaxe crafting prohibitively expensive and naturally throttling supply expansion without breaking existing tool holders.
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The mechanism uses an EMA-smoothed TWAP for the price ratio to prevent manipulation through short-term price spikes. The license COAL is burned (not sent to treasury), making it purely a control parameter rather than a revenue stream. The proposal states: "When COAL strengthens, crafting scales up, more picks come online, more INGOT gets smelted, and more ORE flows into the treasury. If COAL weakens, crafting slows without breaking the system."
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The cubic exponent (p = 3) is the critical design choice—linear or quadratic functions would respond too slowly to price changes, while higher exponents would create excessive volatility. The 1-300 COAL bounds prevent the function from collapsing to zero or exploding to infinity at price extremes. This creates a self-regulating feedback loop where the system automatically adjusts mining capacity in response to market conditions.
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---
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Relevant Notes:
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- [[dynamic performance-based token minting replaces fixed emission schedules by tying new token creation to measurable outcomes creating algorithmic meritocracy in token distribution]]
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- [[optimal governance requires mixing mechanisms because different decisions have different manipulation risk profiles]]
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Topics:
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- [[domains/internet-finance/_map]]
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- [[core/mechanisms/_map]]
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---
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type: claim
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domain: internet-finance
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description: "COAL's Meta-PoW uses 4% daily decay and repair costs below replacement to incentivize tool maintenance over churn, creating predictable ORE treasury inflow"
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confidence: experimental
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source: "futard.io, Meta-PoW: The ORE Treasury Protocol proposal, 2025-11-07"
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created: 2026-03-11
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---
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# Meta-PoW implements evergreen tool economy where repair cost undercuts replacement creating stable demand for INGOT and ORE treasury inflow
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COAL's Meta-PoW protocol creates economic incentives for tool maintenance rather than replacement by making daily repair cheaper than recrafting. Pickaxes decay at 4% per day if not repaired, but repair costs only 0.082643 INGOT plus 0.3 WOOD versus the full crafting cost of 1 INGOT, 8 WOOD, and a dynamic COAL license fee c(y). This cost structure makes rational players maintain existing tools rather than constantly recraft, creating predictable steady-state demand for INGOT smelting.
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The evergreen design solves the churn problem that would otherwise create volatile ORE inflows. Since each fully maintained pickaxe is calibrated to drive approximately 1 ORE per day into the treasury through INGOT repair demand (at 12.10 ORE per INGOT), the number of active maintained picks becomes the key state variable for treasury accumulation. Players who skip repairs accumulate debt (missed repair costs) but can restore full power by paying the accumulated cost, preventing permanent tool loss while maintaining economic pressure to repair.
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This mechanism creates a continuous ORE sink into the COAL treasury that scales with active player count rather than with speculative crafting cycles. The repair-versus-replace economics are the load-bearing structure that makes the "ownership coin" loop function as designed. The proposal explicitly states: "Tools are evergreen and cheaper to repair than to recraft, so players maintain their gear instead of churning it."
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---
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Relevant Notes:
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- [[MetaDAO is the futarchy launchpad on Solana where projects raise capital through unruggable ICOs governed by conditional markets creating the first platform for ownership coins at scale]]
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- [[ownership coin treasuries should be actively managed through buybacks and token sales as continuous capital calibration not treated as static war chests]]
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Topics:
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- [[domains/internet-finance/_map]]
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---
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type: claim
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domain: internet-finance
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description: "Meta-PoW channels all ORE inflows through INGOT smelting only, creating a single auditable point for treasury accumulation rather than distributing fees across multiple operations"
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confidence: experimental
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source: "futard.io, Meta-PoW: The ORE Treasury Protocol proposal, 2025-11-07"
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created: 2026-03-11
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---
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# Separating ORE payment to smelting only creates single choke point for treasury accumulation making economic flows auditable and predictable
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COAL's Meta-PoW protocol requires ORE payment only at INGOT smelting (μ ORE per INGOT, currently 12.10 ORE), while pickaxe crafting and repair consume INGOT but pay no additional ORE. This architectural choice creates a single point where ORE enters the treasury, making the economic model transparent and auditable. All ORE paid at smelting goes directly to the COAL treasury with no intermediate distribution.
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The single-choke-point design means INGOT becomes "on-chain proof of COAL burn plus ORE fee," functioning as a treasury receipt. Since pickaxe repair requires 0.082643 INGOT per day to maintain full power, and each INGOT represents 12.10 ORE paid at smelting, the system creates a direct mathematical relationship: one fully maintained pickaxe drives approximately 1 ORE per day into the treasury (0.082643 × 12.10 ≈ 1.0).
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This contrasts with designs that charge fees at multiple points (craft, repair, mining). By concentrating ORE payment at smelting, the protocol makes treasury accumulation predictable from observable on-chain state (number of active maintained picks) without requiring complex fee accounting across multiple transaction types. The proposal explicitly states: "ORE enters only at smelt. No ORE is charged at craft or repair. INGOT is the on-chain proof of COAL burn plus ORE fee."
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The design also prevents fee evasion—since INGOT is required for all tool operations and can only be created by paying ORE at smelting, there is no way to participate in the mining economy without contributing to treasury accumulation. The calibration parameter μ can be adjusted by governance to change the ORE/day target per pick, but the single-payment architecture remains constant.
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---
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Relevant Notes:
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- [[MetaDAO is the futarchy launchpad on Solana where projects raise capital through unruggable ICOs governed by conditional markets creating the first platform for ownership coins at scale]]
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- [[ownership coin treasuries should be actively managed through buybacks and token sales as continuous capital calibration not treated as static war chests]]
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Topics:
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- [[domains/internet-finance/_map]]
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- [[core/mechanisms/_map]]
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---
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type: entity
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entity_type: decision_market
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name: "COAL: Meta-PoW: The ORE Treasury Protocol"
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domain: internet-finance
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status: passed
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parent_entity: "[[coal]]"
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platform: "futardio"
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proposer: "futard.io"
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proposal_url: "https://www.futard.io/proposal/G33HJH2J2zRqqcHZKMggkQurvqe1cmaDtfBz3hgmuuAg"
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proposal_account: "G33HJH2J2zRqqcHZKMggkQurvqe1cmaDtfBz3hgmuuAg"
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proposal_number: 4
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proposal_date: 2025-11-07
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resolution_date: 2025-11-10
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category: "mechanism"
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summary: "Introduces Meta-PoW economic model that moves mining power into pickaxes and creates deterministic ORE treasury accumulation through INGOT smelting"
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tracked_by: rio
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created: 2026-03-11
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---
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# COAL: Meta-PoW: The ORE Treasury Protocol
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## Summary
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The Meta-PoW proposal establishes COAL's core economic model by creating a loop where players craft pickaxes using COAL, INGOT, and WOOD; mine COAL with those pickaxes; and smelt INGOT by burning COAL and paying ORE to the treasury. The design makes tools evergreen (cheaper to repair than replace), concentrates all ORE payments at the smelting choke point, and uses dynamic license fees c(y) based on COAL/ORE price ratios to automatically throttle supply without governance intervention.
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## Market Data
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- **Outcome:** Passed
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- **Proposer:** futard.io
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- **Proposal Account:** G33HJH2J2zRqqcHZKMggkQurvqe1cmaDtfBz3hgmuuAg
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- **DAO Account:** 3LGGRzLrgwhEbEsNYBSTZc5MLve1bw3nDaHzzfJMQ1PG
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- **Autocrat Version:** 0.3
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- **Created:** 2025-11-07
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- **Completed:** 2025-11-10
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## Mechanism Design
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The proposal implements three key economic mechanisms:
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1. **Evergreen Tools:** Pickaxes decay 4% daily if not repaired but cost only 0.082643 INGOT + 0.3 WOOD to repair versus 1 INGOT + 8 WOOD + c(y) COAL to recraft, incentivizing maintenance over churn
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2. **Single ORE Choke Point:** All ORE flows into treasury through INGOT smelting (12.10 ORE per INGOT), with no ORE charged at craft or repair, making treasury accumulation auditable and predictable
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3. **Dynamic License Throttle:** Pickaxe crafting requires burning c(y) = c0 * (y / y_ref)^p COAL where y = P_ORE / P_COAL, creating automatic supply adjustment (baseline: c0=200, y_ref=50, p=3, bounds 1-300)
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Calibration targets ~1 ORE/day treasury inflow per fully maintained pickaxe.
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## Significance
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This proposal demonstrates a specific implementation pattern for ownership coins: using token burn mechanics and external asset accumulation to create self-regulating economic loops. The cubic price-ratio exponent in the license fee and the repair-versus-replace economics are novel mechanism design choices that could inform future futarchy-governed token economies.
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The proposal also shows MetaDAO's governance evolution—allowing "parameters to be slightly adjusted by the core team before launch, upon feedback from the community" rather than requiring new proposals for minor calibration changes.
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## Relationship to KB
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- [[coal]] - core economic model implementation
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- [[ore]] - treasury accumulation asset
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- [[futardio]] - governance platform
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- [[MetaDAO is the futarchy launchpad on Solana where projects raise capital through unruggable ICOs governed by conditional markets creating the first platform for ownership coins at scale]] - ownership coin implementation example
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@ -6,9 +6,15 @@ url: "https://www.futard.io/proposal/G33HJH2J2zRqqcHZKMggkQurvqe1cmaDtfBz3hgmuuA
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date: 2025-11-07
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domain: internet-finance
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format: data
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status: unprocessed
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status: processed
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tags: [futardio, metadao, futarchy, solana, governance]
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event_type: proposal
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processed_by: rio
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processed_date: 2026-03-11
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claims_extracted: ["meta-pow-implements-evergreen-tool-economy-where-repair-cost-undercuts-replacement-creating-stable-demand-for-ingot-and-ore-treasury-inflow.md", "dynamic-license-fees-using-price-ratio-exponents-create-automatic-supply-throttles-that-self-stabilize-without-governance-intervention.md", "separating-ore-payment-to-smelting-only-creates-single-choke-point-for-treasury-accumulation-making-economic-flows-auditable-and-predictable.md"]
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enrichments_applied: ["MetaDAO is the futarchy launchpad on Solana where projects raise capital through unruggable ICOs governed by conditional markets creating the first platform for ownership coins at scale.md", "dynamic performance-based token minting replaces fixed emission schedules by tying new token creation to measurable outcomes creating algorithmic meritocracy in token distribution.md"]
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extraction_model: "anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5"
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extraction_notes: "Extracted three mechanism design claims about evergreen tool economics, dynamic license throttles, and single-choke-point treasury accumulation. Created decision_market entity for the Meta-PoW proposal. Enriched two existing claims about ownership coins and dynamic token distribution. The proposal contains detailed economic parameters but these are factual specifications rather than arguable claims—preserved as key_facts for reference."
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---
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## Proposal Details
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@ -265,3 +271,19 @@ Vote NO – keep the current model unchanged.
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- Autocrat version: 0.3
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- Completed: 2025-11-10
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- Ended: 2025-11-10
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## Key Facts
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- COAL max supply: 25,000,000 tokens
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- COAL halving bands: every 5% of max supply (1,250,000 COAL)
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- Initial daily emissions: R_0 = 11,250 COAL/day
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- INGOT smelting cost: 100 COAL + 12.10 ORE per INGOT
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- Pickaxe crafting cost: 1 INGOT + 8 WOOD + c(y) COAL license
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- Daily pickaxe repair cost: 0.082643 INGOT + 0.3 WOOD
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- Pickaxe decay rate: 4% per day if not repaired
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- Axe crafting cost: 1 INGOT + 6 WOOD
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- Daily axe repair cost: 0.082643 INGOT + 0.25 WOOD
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- License fee baseline: c0=200 COAL, y_ref=50, p=3, bounds 1-300 COAL
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- Proposal account: G33HJH2J2zRqqcHZKMggkQurvqe1cmaDtfBz3hgmuuAg
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- DAO account: 3LGGRzLrgwhEbEsNYBSTZc5MLve1bw3nDaHzzfJMQ1PG
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- Autocrat version: 0.3
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