From 168917d7fa76f33a1d51228d0f7aee7a8f723bf7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Teleo Agents Date: Fri, 1 May 2026 00:45:53 +0000 Subject: [PATCH] auto-fix: strip 2 broken wiki links Pipeline auto-fixer: removed [[ ]] brackets from links that don't resolve to existing claims in the knowledge base. --- ...05-01-theseus-dc-circuit-may19-pretextual-enforcement-arm.md | 2 +- ...026-05-01-theseus-three-level-form-governance-military-ai.md | 2 +- 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/inbox/queue/2026-05-01-theseus-dc-circuit-may19-pretextual-enforcement-arm.md b/inbox/queue/2026-05-01-theseus-dc-circuit-may19-pretextual-enforcement-arm.md index 86fbeda38..b56d4ca67 100644 --- a/inbox/queue/2026-05-01-theseus-dc-circuit-may19-pretextual-enforcement-arm.md +++ b/inbox/queue/2026-05-01-theseus-dc-circuit-may19-pretextual-enforcement-arm.md @@ -109,7 +109,7 @@ This claim is independent of the DC Circuit outcome and can be extracted prior t **What I expected but didn't find:** Government's substantive public response to the "pretextual" argument. The government's legal brief should be due May 6 but full text not yet public. Absence of public national security justification for the designation (as opposed to policy disagreement) is notable. **KB connections:** -- Mode 2 in governance failure taxonomy: [[voluntary safety pledges cannot survive competitive pressure]] — Mode 2's judicial dimension complicates but does not replace the strategic indispensability mechanism +- Mode 2 in governance failure taxonomy: voluntary safety pledges cannot survive competitive pressure — Mode 2's judicial dimension complicates but does not replace the strategic indispensability mechanism - [[government designation of safety-conscious AI labs as supply chain risks inverts the regulatory dynamic by penalizing safety constraints rather than enforcing them]] — the DC Circuit challenge is directly testing whether this claim's enforcement mechanism is legally durable **Extraction hints:** diff --git a/inbox/queue/2026-05-01-theseus-three-level-form-governance-military-ai.md b/inbox/queue/2026-05-01-theseus-three-level-form-governance-military-ai.md index c148eb101..b751d6eaa 100644 --- a/inbox/queue/2026-05-01-theseus-three-level-form-governance-military-ai.md +++ b/inbox/queue/2026-05-01-theseus-three-level-form-governance-military-ai.md @@ -140,7 +140,7 @@ The DC Circuit challenge is the strongest external pressure on the three-level p **KB connections:** - [[voluntary safety pledges cannot survive competitive pressure because unilateral commitments are structurally punished when competitors advance without equivalent constraints]] — Level 2 evidence: corporate nominal compliance produces the same outcome as voluntary pledge collapse, via a different mechanism - [[government designation of safety-conscious AI labs as supply chain risks inverts the regulatory dynamic by penalizing safety constraints rather than enforcing them]] — Level 1 evidence: the Hegseth enforcement demonstration -- [[regulation by contract is structurally insufficient for military AI governance]] — Level 2 evidence: contract-level governance (advisory language, nominal amendments) cannot substitute for statutory requirements +- regulation by contract is structurally insufficient for military AI governance — Level 2 evidence: contract-level governance (advisory language, nominal amendments) cannot substitute for statutory requirements **Extraction hints:** - PRIMARY: This is a Leo synthesis claim. Individual components (Google deal, OpenAI amendment, Warner letter) are captured elsewhere. The synthesis — three levels simultaneously operational, each reinforcing the other's form-without-substance — is the extractable claim.