rio: decision records batch 1 — 5 missing MetaDAO governance proposals (full text)
- What: 5 new decision records with full verbatim proposal text, summary
+ connections at top, correct URLs, on-chain metadata
- Records: LST Vote Market (Proposal 0, passed), Ben Hawkins $100K OTC
(Proposal 8, failed), Memecoin Launchpad (Proposal 5, failed), Theia
$700K OTC (Proposal 9, failed), Theia $630K OTC (Proposal 14, passed)
- URLs: v1.metadao.fi/metadao/trade/{id} for all pre-migration proposals
- Format: Summary & Connections → Full Proposal Text → Raw Data → KB links
This is the template for all future decision records.
- Source: Ben's API proposal archives in inbox/archive/internet-finance/
Pentagon-Agent: Rio <5551F5AF-0C5C-429F-8915-1FE74A00E019>
This commit is contained in:
parent
7c7b81306a
commit
198cb3b11e
5 changed files with 617 additions and 0 deletions
142
decisions/internet-finance/metadao-develop-lst-vote-market.md
Normal file
142
decisions/internet-finance/metadao-develop-lst-vote-market.md
Normal file
|
|
@ -0,0 +1,142 @@
|
||||||
|
---
|
||||||
|
type: decision
|
||||||
|
entity_type: decision_market
|
||||||
|
name: "MetaDAO: Develop a LST Vote Market?"
|
||||||
|
domain: internet-finance
|
||||||
|
status: passed
|
||||||
|
parent_entity: "[[metadao]]"
|
||||||
|
platform: metadao
|
||||||
|
proposer: "Proph3t"
|
||||||
|
proposal_url: "https://v1.metadao.fi/metadao/trade/9RisXkQCFLt7NA29vt5aWatcnU8SkyBgS95HxXhwXhW"
|
||||||
|
proposal_date: 2023-11-18
|
||||||
|
resolution_date: 2023-11-29
|
||||||
|
category: strategy
|
||||||
|
summary: "Proposal 0 — the first-ever futarchy governance decision. Build Votium-style LST bribe platform for Marinade. Requesting 3,000 META."
|
||||||
|
key_metrics:
|
||||||
|
proposal_number: 0
|
||||||
|
proposal_account: "9RisXkQCFLt7NA29vt5aWatcnU8SkyBgS95HxXhwXhW"
|
||||||
|
autocrat_version: "0"
|
||||||
|
budget: "3,000 META"
|
||||||
|
tags: [metadao, lst, marinade, bribe-market, first-proposal]
|
||||||
|
tracked_by: rio
|
||||||
|
created: 2026-03-24
|
||||||
|
---
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
# MetaDAO: Develop a LST Vote Market?
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
## Summary & Connections
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
**Proposal 0 — the genesis event for futarchy governance on Solana.** The community evaluated a business proposal (build a Votium-style LST bribe platform for Marinade) through conditional token markets and approved it. Budget: 3,000 META. Estimated $10.5M enterprise value addition if executed.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
**Outcome:** Passed (2023-11-29). The LST vote market was later superseded by Marinade's internal solution; MetaDAO pivoted to the Saber vote market ([[metadao-develop-saber-vote-market]]).
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
**Connections:**
|
||||||
|
- This established the template for all subsequent MetaDAO proposals — probability-weighted enterprise value projections, team allocation, milestone-based compensation
|
||||||
|
- The financial projection framework ("if you believe X% chance of success at Y enterprise value...") became the standard for how proposals are evaluated through futarchy
|
||||||
|
- Proph3t's framing — "the Meta-DAO lacks legitimacy, we need to prove the model works by building profit-turning products" — remains the core strategic thesis through 2026
|
||||||
|
- Related: [[metadao-develop-saber-vote-market]] (Proposal 3, pivoted from Marinade to Saber after learning Marinade was building internally)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
---
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
## Full Proposal Text
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
### Overview
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
The Meta-DAO is awakening.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Given that the Meta-DAO is a fundamentally new kind of organization, it lacks legitimacy. To gain legitimacy, we need to first *prove that the model works*. I believe that the best way to do that is by building profit-turning products under the Meta-DAO umbrella.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Here, we propose the first one: an LST bribe platform. This platform would allow MNDE and mSOL holders to earn extra yield by directing their stake to validators who pay them. A bribe market already exists, but it's fragmented and favors whales. This platform would centralize the market, facilitating open exchange between validators and MNDE / mSOL holders and allowing small holders to earn the same yield as whales.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
### Executive summary
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
- The product would exist as a 2-sided marketplace between validators who want more stake and MNDE and mSOL holders who want more yield.
|
||||||
|
- The platform would likely be structured similar to Votium.
|
||||||
|
- The platform would monetize by taking 10% of bribes.
|
||||||
|
- We estimate that this product would generate $1.5M per year for the Meta-DAO, increasing the Meta-DAO's enterprise value by $10.5M, if executed successfully.
|
||||||
|
- We are requesting 3,000 META and the promise of retroactively-decided performance-based incentives. If executed, this proposal would transfer the first 1,000 META.
|
||||||
|
- Three contributors have expressed interest in working on this: Proph3t, for the smart contracts; marie, for the UI; and nicovrg, for the BD with Marinade. Proph3t would be the point person and would be responsible for delivering this project to the Meta-DAO.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
### Problem statement
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Validators want more stake. MNDE and mSOL holders want more yield. Since Marinade allows its MNDE and mSOL holders to direct 40% of its stake, this creates an opportunity for mSOL and MNDE to earn higher yield by selling their votes to validators.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Today, this market is fragmented. Trading occurs through one-off locations like Solana Compass' Turbo Stake and in back-room Telegram chats. This makes it hard for people who don't actively follow the Solana ecosystem and small holders to earn the highest yields.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
We propose a platform that would centralize this trading. Essentially, this would provide an easy place where validators who want more stake can pay for the votes of MNDE and mSOL holders. In the future, we could expand to other LSTs like bSOL.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
### Design
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
There are a number ways you could design a bribe platform. After considering a few options, a Votium-style system appears to be the best one.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
**Votium**
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Votium is a bribe platform on Ethereum. Essentially, projects that want liquidity in their token pay veCRV holders to allocate CRV emissions to their token's liquidity pool. If you're a project that wants to pay for votes, you: create a Votium pool, specify which Curve pool you want CRV emissions directed to, and allocate funds. If you're a veCRV-holder, you vote for the specified Curve pool and then claim a pro rata share of the tokens. Alternatively, you can delegate to Votium, who will spread your votes among the various pools.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
**Our system**
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
In our case, a Votium-style platform would look like the following:
|
||||||
|
- Once a month, each participating validator creates a pool, specifying a *price per vote* and depositing SOL to their pool. The amount of SOL deposited in a pool defines the maximum votes bought. For example, if Laine deposits 1,000 SOL to a pool and specifies a price per vote of 0.1 SOL, then this pool can buy up to 10,000 votes
|
||||||
|
- veMNDE and mSOL holders are given 1 week to join pools, which they do by directing their stake to the respective validator
|
||||||
|
- After 1 month passes, veMNDE and mSOL holders can claim their SOL bribes from the pools
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
The main advantage of the Votium approach is that it's non-custodial. There would be no risk of user fund loss. In the event of a hack, the only thing that could be stolen are the bribes deposited to the pools.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
### Business model
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
The Meta-DAO would take a small fee from the rewards that are paid to bribees. Currently, we envision this number being 10%, but that is subject to change.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
### Financial projections
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Marinade Finance currently has $532M of SOL locked in it. Of that, 40% or $213M is directed by votes. Validators are likely willing to pay up to the marginal revenue that they can gain by bribing. So, at 8% staking rates and 10% commissions, the estimated market for this is $213M * 0.08 * 0.1, or $1.7M.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
At a 10% fee, the revenue available to the Meta-DAO would be $170k. The revenue share with Marinade is yet to be negotiated. At a 10% revshare, the Meta-DAO would earn $150k per year. At a 30% revshare, the Meta-DAO would earn $120k per year.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
We take the average of $135k per year and multiply by the typical SaaS valuation multiple of 7.8x to achieve the estimate that this product would add $1.05M to the Meta-DAO's enterprise value if executed successfully.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Of course, there is a chance that is not executed successfully. To estimate how much value this would create for the Meta-DAO, you can calculate:
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
[(% chance of successful execution / 100) * (estimated addition to the Meta-DAO's enterprise value if successfully executed)] - up-front costs
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
For example, if you believe that the chance of us successfully executing is 70% and that this would add $10.5M to the Meta-DAO's enterprise value, you can do (0.7 * 10.5M) - dilution cost of 3,000 META. Since each META has a book value of $1 and is probably worth somewhere between $1 and $100, this leaves you with $730k - $700k of value created by the proposal.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
As with any financial projections, these results are highly speculative and sensitive to assumptions. Market participants are encouraged to make their own assumptions and to price the proposal accordingly.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
### Proposal request
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
We are requesting 3,000 META and retroactively-decided performance-based incentives to fund this project.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
This 3,000 META would be split among:
|
||||||
|
- Proph3t, who would perform the smart contract work
|
||||||
|
- marie, who would perform the UI/UX work
|
||||||
|
- nicovrg, who would be the point person to Marinade Finance and submit the grant proposal to the Marinade forums
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
1,000 META would be paid up-front by the execution of this proposal. 2,000 META would be paid after the proposal is done.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
The Meta-DAO is still figuring out how to properly incentivize performance, so we don't want to be too specific with how that would done. Still, it is game-theoretically optimal for the Meta-DAO to compensate us fairly because under-paying us would dissuade future builders from contributing to the Meta-DAO. So we'll put our trust in the game theory.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
### References
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
- Solana LST Dune Dashboard
|
||||||
|
- Marinade Docs — MNDE Directed Stake and mSOL Directed Stake
|
||||||
|
- Marinade's Validator Dashboard
|
||||||
|
- MNDE Gauge Profit Calculator
|
||||||
|
- Marinade SDK
|
||||||
|
- Solana Compass Turbo Staking
|
||||||
|
- Marinade Directed Stake program
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
---
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
## Raw Data
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
- Proposal account: `9RisXkQCFLt7NA29vt5aWatcnU8SkyBgS95HxXhwXhW`
|
||||||
|
- Proposal number: 0
|
||||||
|
- DAO account: `3wDJ5g73ABaDsL1qofF5jJqEJU4RnRQrvzRLkSnFc5di`
|
||||||
|
- Proposer: `HfFi634cyurmVVDr9frwu4MjGLJzz9XbAJz981HdVaNz`
|
||||||
|
- Autocrat version: 0
|
||||||
|
- Completed: 2023-11-29
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
## Relationship to KB
|
||||||
|
- [[metadao]] — parent entity, first-ever proposal
|
||||||
|
- [[metadao-develop-saber-vote-market]] — pivot after Marinade built internally
|
||||||
|
- [[MetaDAOs Autocrat program implements futarchy through conditional token markets where proposals create parallel pass and fail universes settled by time-weighted average price over a three-day window]] — first deployment of the mechanism
|
||||||
103
decisions/internet-finance/metadao-develop-memecoin-launchpad.md
Normal file
103
decisions/internet-finance/metadao-develop-memecoin-launchpad.md
Normal file
|
|
@ -0,0 +1,103 @@
|
||||||
|
---
|
||||||
|
type: decision
|
||||||
|
entity_type: decision_market
|
||||||
|
name: "MetaDAO: Develop Memecoin Launchpad?"
|
||||||
|
domain: internet-finance
|
||||||
|
status: failed
|
||||||
|
parent_entity: "[[metadao]]"
|
||||||
|
platform: metadao
|
||||||
|
proposer: "Proph3t"
|
||||||
|
proposal_url: "https://v1.metadao.fi/metadao/trade/J57DcV2yQGiDpSetQHui6Piwjwsbet2ozXVPG77kTvTd"
|
||||||
|
proposal_date: 2024-08-14
|
||||||
|
resolution_date: 2024-08-18
|
||||||
|
category: strategy
|
||||||
|
summary: "Proposal 5 — Build 'futardio' as memecoin launchpad with futarchy governance. $100K grant over 6 months. Failed in Aug 2024, but Futardio launched anyway in Feb 2026 under a different proposal."
|
||||||
|
key_metrics:
|
||||||
|
proposal_number: 5
|
||||||
|
proposal_account: "J57DcV2yQGiDpSetQHui6Piwjwsbet2ozXVPG77kTvTd"
|
||||||
|
autocrat_version: "0.3"
|
||||||
|
budget: "$100,000 grant over 6 months"
|
||||||
|
tags: [metadao, futardio, memecoin, launchpad, failed]
|
||||||
|
tracked_by: rio
|
||||||
|
created: 2026-03-24
|
||||||
|
---
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
# MetaDAO: Develop Memecoin Launchpad?
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
## Summary & Connections
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
**Proposal 5 — the original futardio pitch, failed.** Build a memecoin launchpad where a portion of every launched token goes to a futarchy DAO. Points → $FUTA token. All revenue to FUTA holders. $100K grant over 6 months. The market said no.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
**Outcome:** Failed (2024-08-18). But the idea came back — Futardio launched in February 2026 under [[metadao-release-launchpad]], dropping the $FUTA token concept and focusing purely on permissionless futarchy-governed launches.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
**Connections:**
|
||||||
|
- The market rejected the speculative version ("pump.fun with a token") and later approved the infrastructure version — evidence that [[futarchy can override its own prior decisions when new evidence emerges because conditional markets re-evaluate proposals against current information not historical commitments]]
|
||||||
|
- Proph3t's insight — "memecoin holders only want the price to increase, there's no question of best long-term action" — became the basis for [[memecoin-governance-is-ideal-futarchy-use-case-because-single-objective-function-eliminates-long-term-tradeoff-ambiguity]]
|
||||||
|
- The "potential pitfalls" section (makes futarchy look less serious, harder to sell DeFi DAOs) predicted exactly the brand separation problem addressed by [[futarchy-governed permissionless launches require brand separation to manage reputational liability because failed projects on a curated platform damage the platforms credibility]]
|
||||||
|
- [[metadao-create-futardio]] — a second attempt to create Futardio also failed (Nov 2024), before the launchpad proposal finally passed
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
---
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
## Full Proposal Text
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
MetaDAO now has a platform for creating and participating in futarchies. The central problem is distributing it: getting people and organizations to use futarchy.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
One of the ideal use-cases for futarchy is memecoin governance. This is because memecoin holders only want the price of the token to increase. There's no question of "maybe the market knows what's the best short-term action, but not the best long-term action."
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Coincidentally, there appears to be an opening in the market to launch "pump.fun with a token." Such a platform may be able to bootstrap adoption by issuing points that convert into a token that receives the revenue generated by the platform.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
For these reasons, I had the idea to create "futardio," a memecoin launchpad with said bootstrapping mechanism where a portion of every launched memecoin gets allocated to a futarchy DAO.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
We are not sure whether it makes sense for MetaDAO to release such a platform. There are potential advantages and potential pitfalls. So we are putting this decision up to the market. **If this proposal passes, MetaDAO will develop and release futardio. If it fails, it will not.**
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
### Details
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
The key ideas are expressed in https://futard.io.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
The details of Futardio would be:
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
- A memecoin launchpad where some percentage of every new token's supply gets allocated to its futarchy DAO
|
||||||
|
- When users increase key metrics (e.g., volume), they earn points
|
||||||
|
- After a period of time not exceeding 180 days, these points would convert into a new token ('$FUTA')
|
||||||
|
- FUTA would be distributed to solely two parties: points owners and MetaDAO
|
||||||
|
- All revenue from Futardio would be distributed to a vault that can be claimed by FUTA holders
|
||||||
|
- By the time the token is live, Futardio would be immutable and decentralized. The program would be immutable, open-source, and verifiable, with any parameters being governed by MetaDAO. The website would be deployed immutably on IPFS or Arweave. Futardio would be a gambling hyperstructure.
|
||||||
|
- The goal would be to launch it in Q3.
|
||||||
|
- Nallok and Proph3t wouldn't be the core team, but they would support a team and fund them with a $100k grant paid over 6 months. If a team hasn't started work by the end of Q3, the money would be returned and the project idea cancelled.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
This would all be left to the discretion of the team building it, but they would be expected to follow the broad outline.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
### Potential advantages
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
- Drive attention and usage to futarchy
|
||||||
|
- More exposure
|
||||||
|
- More usage helps MetaDAO improve the product
|
||||||
|
- Provides more proof points of futarchy
|
||||||
|
- If MetaDAO sells some of its tokens or stakes them to the vault, it could receive cash to fund future activities
|
||||||
|
- Create a forcing function to improve the security of the core futarchy platform
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
### Potential pitfalls
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
- Makes futarchy look less serious
|
||||||
|
- May make it harder to sell DeFi DAOs / non-crypto organizations
|
||||||
|
- May make it harder to recruit contributors
|
||||||
|
- Time & energy investment
|
||||||
|
- Would prevent MetaDAO from solely focusing on the core platform
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
---
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
## Raw Data
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
- Proposal account: `J57DcV2yQGiDpSetQHui6Piwjwsbet2ozXVPG77kTvTd`
|
||||||
|
- Proposal number: 5
|
||||||
|
- DAO account: `CNMZgxYsQpygk8CLN9Su1igwXX2kHtcawaNAGuBPv3G9`
|
||||||
|
- Proposer: `65U66fcYuNfqN12vzateJhZ4bgDuxFWN9gMwraeQKByg`
|
||||||
|
- Autocrat version: 0.3
|
||||||
|
- Completed: 2024-08-18
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
## Relationship to KB
|
||||||
|
- [[metadao]] — parent entity
|
||||||
|
- [[metadao-create-futardio]] — second attempt (Nov 2024, also failed)
|
||||||
|
- [[metadao-release-launchpad]] — the proposal that actually launched Futardio (Feb 2025, passed)
|
||||||
|
- [[futarchy-governed permissionless launches require brand separation to manage reputational liability because failed projects on a curated platform damage the platforms credibility]] — predicted in the "potential pitfalls"
|
||||||
|
- [[memecoin-governance-is-ideal-futarchy-use-case-because-single-objective-function-eliminates-long-term-tradeoff-ambiguity]] — the theoretical basis articulated here
|
||||||
149
decisions/internet-finance/metadao-otc-trade-ben-hawkins-2.md
Normal file
149
decisions/internet-finance/metadao-otc-trade-ben-hawkins-2.md
Normal file
|
|
@ -0,0 +1,149 @@
|
||||||
|
---
|
||||||
|
type: decision
|
||||||
|
entity_type: decision_market
|
||||||
|
name: "MetaDAO: Engage in $100,000 OTC Trade with Ben Hawkins? [2]"
|
||||||
|
domain: internet-finance
|
||||||
|
status: failed
|
||||||
|
parent_entity: "[[metadao]]"
|
||||||
|
platform: metadao
|
||||||
|
proposer: "Ben Hawkins, 0xNallok"
|
||||||
|
proposal_url: "https://v1.metadao.fi/metadao/trade/E1FJAp8saDU6Da2ccayjLBfA53qbjKRNYvu7QiMAnjQx"
|
||||||
|
proposal_date: 2024-02-18
|
||||||
|
resolution_date: 2024-02-24
|
||||||
|
category: treasury
|
||||||
|
summary: "Proposal 8 — Second Ben Hawkins OTC attempt. $100K for up to 500 META at max(TWAP, $200) with 20/80 vesting. Failed. Market rejected a solution to its own liquidity problem."
|
||||||
|
key_metrics:
|
||||||
|
proposal_number: 8
|
||||||
|
proposal_account: "E1FJAp8saDU6Da2ccayjLBfA53qbjKRNYvu7QiMAnjQx"
|
||||||
|
autocrat_version: "0.1"
|
||||||
|
offer_amount: "$100,000 USDC"
|
||||||
|
max_meta: "500 META"
|
||||||
|
meta_spot_price: "$695.92 (2024-02-18)"
|
||||||
|
circulating_supply: "14,530 META"
|
||||||
|
tags: [metadao, otc, ben-hawkins, liquidity, failed]
|
||||||
|
tracked_by: rio
|
||||||
|
created: 2026-03-24
|
||||||
|
---
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
# MetaDAO: Engage in $100,000 OTC Trade with Ben Hawkins? [2]
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
## Summary & Connections
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
**Proposal 8 — second Ben Hawkins OTC attempt, failed.** $100K USDC for up to 500 META at max(TWAP, $200). 20% immediate, 80% linear vest 12 months. USDC to create 50/50 AMM LP. META spot was $695.92 at proposal time.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
**Outcome:** Failed (2024-02-24). The market rejected a deal designed to solve a real problem (low liquidity) — demonstrating futarchy can distinguish between "we have a problem" and "this specific solution is net positive."
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
**Connections:**
|
||||||
|
- [[metadao-otc-trade-ben-hawkins]] — first Hawkins attempt ($50K, Proposal 6, also failed). Both failures are empirical evidence for [[decision markets make majority theft unprofitable through conditional token arbitrage]]
|
||||||
|
- The 6-member multisig execution structure (4/6 threshold, named members) shows early convergence on traditional corporate scaffolding within futarchy governance
|
||||||
|
- The proposal's failure despite acknowledged liquidity needs is evidence that [[futarchy-governed liquidation is the enforcement mechanism that makes unruggable ICOs credible because investors can force full treasury return when teams materially misrepresent]] — the same market mechanism that rejects extractive deals also rejects deals that look net-negative even when addressing real problems
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
---
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
## Full Proposal Text
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Drafted with support from: Ben Hawkins and 0xNallok
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
### Responsible Parties
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
- Ben Hawkins (`7GmjpH2hpj3A5d6f1LTjXUAy8MR8FDTvZcPY79RDRDhq`)
|
||||||
|
- Squads Multi-sig (4/6) `Meta-DAO Executor` (`FpMnruqVCxh3o2oBFZ9uSQmshiyfMqzeJ3YfNQfP9tHy`)
|
||||||
|
- The Meta-DAO (`metaX99LHn3A7Gr7VAcCfXhpfocvpMpqQ3eyp3PGUUq`)
|
||||||
|
- The Markets
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
### Overview
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
- Ben Hawkins (`7GmjpH2hpj3A5d6f1LTjXUAy8MR8FDTvZcPY79RDRDhq`) wishes to acquire up to 500 META (`METADDFL6wWMWEoKTFJwcThTbUmtarRJZjRpzUvkxhr`) from The Meta-DAO Treasury (`ADCCEAbH8eixGj5t73vb4sKecSKo7ndgDSuWGvER4Loy`).
|
||||||
|
- The price per META shall be determined upon passing of the proposal and the greater of the TWAP price of the pass market and $200. ppM = max(twapPass, 200)
|
||||||
|
- A total of $100,000 USDC (`EPjFWdd5AufqSSqeM2qN1xzybapC8G4wEGGkZwyTDt1v`) will be committed by Ben Hawkins
|
||||||
|
- The amount of META shall be determined as the $100,000 USDC funds sent divided by the price determined above. amountMETA = 100,000/ppM
|
||||||
|
- The Meta-DAO will transfer 20% of the final allocation of META to Ben Hawkins's wallet immediately and place 80% of the final allocation of META into a 12 month, linear vest Streamflow program.
|
||||||
|
- The amount of $100,000 USDC shall be used to create a 50/50 AMM pool with 1% fee matched in META by The Meta-DAO.
|
||||||
|
- Ben will also send $2,000 USDC in addition to compensate members of The Meta-DAO Executor.
|
||||||
|
- Any META not sent or utilized for liquidity provisioning shall be returned to The Meta-DAO.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
### Background
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
The current liquidity within the META markets is proving insufficient to support the demand. This proposal addresses this issue by providing immediate liquidity in a sizable amount which should at least provide a temporary backstop to allow proposals to be constructed addressing the entire demand.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
### Implementation
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
The proposal contains the instruction for a transfer 1,000 META into a multisignature wallet `FpMnruqVCxh3o2oBFZ9uSQmshiyfMqzeJ3YfNQfP9tHy` with a 4/6 threshold of which the following parties are members:
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
- Proph3t (`65U66fcYuNfqN12vzateJhZ4bgDuxFWN9gMwraeQKByg`)
|
||||||
|
- Dean (`3PKhzE9wuEkGPHHu2sNCvG86xNtDJduAcyBPXpE6cSNt`)
|
||||||
|
- 0xNallok (`4LpE9Lxqb4jYYh8jA8oDhsGDKPNBNkcoXobbAJTa3pWw`)
|
||||||
|
- Durden (`91NjPFfJxQw2FRJvyuQUQsdh9mBGPeGPuNavt7nMLTQj`)
|
||||||
|
- Blockchainfixesthis (`HKcXZAkT4ec2VBzGNxazWhpV7BTk3frQpSufpaNoho3D`)
|
||||||
|
- Rar3 (`BYeFEm6n4rUDpyHzDjt5JF8okGpoZUdS2Y4jJM2dJCm4`)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
The multisig members instructions are as follows:
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
- Accept the full USDC amount of $100,000 from Ben Hawkins into the Multi-sig upon launch of proposal
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
If the proposal passes:
|
||||||
|
- Accept receipt of META into the Multi-sig as defined by on chain instruction
|
||||||
|
- Determine and publish the price per META according to the definition above
|
||||||
|
- Confirmation from two parties within The Meta-DAO that the balances exist and are in full
|
||||||
|
- Take $100,000 / ppM and determine final allocation quantity of META
|
||||||
|
- Transfer 20% of the final allocation of META to Ben's address `7GmjpH2hpj3A5d6f1LTjXUAy8MR8FDTvZcPY79RDRDhq`
|
||||||
|
- Configure a 12 month Streamflow vesting program with a linear vest
|
||||||
|
- Transfer 80% of the final allocation of META into the Streamflow program
|
||||||
|
- Create a 50/50 Meteora LP 1% Volatile Pool META-USDC allocating at ratios determined and able to be executed via Multi-sig
|
||||||
|
- Return any remaining META to the DAO treasury
|
||||||
|
- Make USDC payment to each Multi-sig members
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
If the proposal fails:
|
||||||
|
- Make USDC payment to each Multi-sig member.
|
||||||
|
- Return 100,000 USDC to `7GmjpH2hpj3A5d6f1LTjXUAy8MR8FDTvZcPY79RDRDhq`
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
### Risks
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
The price is extremely volatile and given the variance there is an unknown amount at the time of proposal launching which would be introduced into circulation. This will be impactful to the price.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Given there are other proposals with active markets, the capacity for accurate pricing and participation of this proposal is unknown.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
This is an experiment and largely contains unknown unknowns, IT CONTAINS EXTREME RISK.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
### Result
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
The proposal evaluates a net increase in value to META by bringing additional liquidity into the ecosystem. This should also improve the capacity for proposal functionality. The expected increase in value to META is ~15% given the fact that the amounts are yet to be determined, but an increase in circulating supply by ~2-7%.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
| Details | |
|
||||||
|
|---|---|
|
||||||
|
| META Spot Price 2024-02-18 20:20 UTC | $695.92 |
|
||||||
|
| META Circulating Supply 2024-02-18 20:20 UTC | 14,530 |
|
||||||
|
| Offer Price | ≥ $200 |
|
||||||
|
| Offer META | ≤ 500 |
|
||||||
|
| Offer USDC | $100,000 |
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Post-money valuations at different prices:
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
| Price/META | Mcap | Liquidity % of Circulation | Acquisition/LP Circulation | Total |
|
||||||
|
|--|--|--|--|--|
|
||||||
|
| $200 | $3.6M | 6.3% | 500 META/500 META ~3.4% | 1000 META ~6.8% |
|
||||||
|
| $350 | $5.1M | 4.8% | 285 META/285 META ~1.9% | 570 META ~3.8% |
|
||||||
|
| $700 | $10.2M | 3.8% | 142 META/142 META ~0.9% | 284 META ~1.8% |
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
### References
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
- Proposal 7
|
||||||
|
- Proposal 6
|
||||||
|
- Discord
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
---
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
## Raw Data
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
- Proposal account: `E1FJAp8saDU6Da2ccayjLBfA53qbjKRNYvu7QiMAnjQx`
|
||||||
|
- Proposal number: 8
|
||||||
|
- DAO account: `7J5yieabpMoiN3LrdfJnRjQiXHgi7f47UuMnyMyR78yy`
|
||||||
|
- Proposer: `3Rx29Y8npZexsab4tzSrLfX3UmgQTC7TWtx6XjUbRBVy`
|
||||||
|
- Autocrat version: 0.1
|
||||||
|
- Completed: 2024-02-24
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
## Relationship to KB
|
||||||
|
- [[metadao]] — parent entity
|
||||||
|
- [[metadao-otc-trade-ben-hawkins]] — first Hawkins OTC attempt ($50K, also failed)
|
||||||
|
- [[decision markets make majority theft unprofitable through conditional token arbitrage]] — both Hawkins failures are empirical evidence
|
||||||
|
- [[ben-hawkins]] — proposer entity
|
||||||
105
decisions/internet-finance/metadao-otc-trade-theia-1.md
Normal file
105
decisions/internet-finance/metadao-otc-trade-theia-1.md
Normal file
|
|
@ -0,0 +1,105 @@
|
||||||
|
---
|
||||||
|
type: decision
|
||||||
|
entity_type: decision_market
|
||||||
|
name: "MetaDAO: Engage in $700,000 OTC Trade with Theia?"
|
||||||
|
domain: internet-finance
|
||||||
|
status: failed
|
||||||
|
parent_entity: "[[metadao]]"
|
||||||
|
platform: metadao
|
||||||
|
proposer: "Proph3t (on behalf of Theia)"
|
||||||
|
proposal_url: "https://v1.metadao.fi/metadao/trade/BnfFejPpykmTtM5TyNEySgRCctRizmrZe9Bbe8V1UTon"
|
||||||
|
proposal_date: 2025-01-03
|
||||||
|
resolution_date: 2025-01-06
|
||||||
|
category: treasury
|
||||||
|
summary: "Proposal 9 — Theia's first OTC attempt. 609 META at $1,149/token ($700K) at $24M FDV with 6-month lock. 12.7% discount to spot. Failed despite detailed strategic partnership pitch."
|
||||||
|
key_metrics:
|
||||||
|
proposal_number: 9
|
||||||
|
proposal_account: "BnfFejPpykmTtM5TyNEySgRCctRizmrZe9Bbe8V1UTon"
|
||||||
|
autocrat_version: "0.3"
|
||||||
|
offer_amount: "$700,000 USDC"
|
||||||
|
meta_amount: "609 META"
|
||||||
|
price_per_meta: "$1,149.425"
|
||||||
|
implied_fdv: "$24M"
|
||||||
|
discount_to_spot: "12.7%"
|
||||||
|
lock_period: "6 months"
|
||||||
|
tags: [metadao, otc, theia, institutional, failed]
|
||||||
|
tracked_by: rio
|
||||||
|
created: 2026-03-24
|
||||||
|
---
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
# MetaDAO: Engage in $700,000 OTC Trade with Theia?
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
## Summary & Connections
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
**Proposal 9 — Theia's first OTC attempt, failed.** 609 META at $1,149.425/token ($700K total) at $24M FDV. 12.7% discount to spot. 6-month Streamflow lock. Most detailed institutional pitch in MetaDAO history — 5 dimensions of value-add with named portfolio company references.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
**Outcome:** Failed (2025-01-06). Theia came back 3 weeks later with [[metadao-otc-trade-theia-2]] at $500K/370 META/$1,350/token — smaller commitment but at a premium to spot. That one passed.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
**Connections:**
|
||||||
|
- The Theia OTC sequence: rejected at discount (this, $700K, -12.7%) → accepted at premium ([[metadao-otc-trade-theia-2]], $500K, +14%) → accepted at premium ([[metadao-otc-trade-theia-3]], $630K, +38%). The market distinguishes between extractive and aligned capital.
|
||||||
|
- Theia's description of themselves — "onchain liquid token fund that replicates traditional private investment strategies" with 2-4 year hold periods — is core evidence for [[publishing investment analysis openly before raising capital inverts hedge fund secrecy because transparency attracts domain-expert LPs who can independently verify the thesis]]
|
||||||
|
- The proposal's failure despite Theia offering genuine strategic value (portfolio synergies, token structuring, roadshows, market framing, policy) demonstrates futarchy's independence from persuasion — the mechanism priced the deal as net-negative regardless of the pitch quality
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
---
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
## Full Proposal Text
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
### Overview
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
- Theia wishes to acquire 609 META tokens (METADDFL6wWMWEoKTFJwcThTbUmtarRJZjRpzUvkxhr) at a USD price of $1,149.425 per token from the MetaDAO Treasury (6awyHMshBGVjJ3ozdSJdyyDE1CTAXUwrpNMaRGMsb4sf) in exchange for $700,000 USDC (EPjFWdd5AufqSSqeM2qN1xzybapC8G4wEGGkZwyTDt1v).
|
||||||
|
- Theia will allocate resources to helping MetaDAO succeed and believes it can be helpful across multiple core areas, including governance, research, token structuring/liquidity, US policy, and business development. We have provided numerous portfolio company references to the MetaDAO team that can attest to our involvement and value add.
|
||||||
|
- Theia's $700K investment could be spent to hire an additional senior engineer, seed liquidity on new markets, and expand business development operations to onboard more DAOs to MetaDAO.
|
||||||
|
- MetaDAO will transfer the entire portion of META tokens through a 6-month lock Streamflow program.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
### Introduction to Theia
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Theia is an onchain liquid token fund manager that invests in companies building the Internet Financial System. Theia replicates traditional private investment strategies by taking large positions in small-cap tokens within under-explored market parts and working closely with management teams to add value. Theia typically buys liquid tokens through structured and proprietary deals and holds investments through a two to four-year investment thesis.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Our team operates on the premise that the Internet Financial System will take share from the existing global financial system by providing innovative and increasingly efficient financial primitives that expand the design space for financial products and accelerate financialization through the Internet. The global financial system represents the largest addressable market in the world and we believe permissionless blockchain technology will expand the TAM.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Theia is a differentiated partner due to the time and expertise we commit to our portfolio companies as well as our intense focus on core infrastructure and financial applications in EVM and SVM. Our fund strategy is designed to drive value for our portfolio companies; we cap our fund size, maintain a concentrated book of few investments, and seek to hold investments for many years. We work to ensure that each portfolio company has time and ample resources to realize our underwriting model forecast. This allows us to hold for the long term and ignore price fluctuations that are unrelated to business-specific catalysts.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
### Proposal
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
We appreciate the time and effort both Proph3t and Kollan have spent with our team as we have conducted our diligence on MetaDAO. Better governance is a pressing need across the Internet Financial System and we are impressed by MetaDAO's commitment to the vision of Futarchy. It isn't often you find a team that combines missionary zeal with real talent as builders.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
We are pleased to submit an offer to acquire META tokens on behalf of Theia and serve as a strategic partner to MetaDAO. While this letter outlines specific terms for a token agreement, we believe that a long-term partnership between Theia and MetaDAO is the most important component of our proposal.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
On behalf of Theia Blockchain Partners Master Fund LP ("Theia"), we submit a bid to acquire 609 META tokens at a USD price of $1,149.425 per token, an implied valuation of $24M FDV. This equates to $700,000 of locked tokens at a 12.7% discount to spot price as of 1/3/25 at a 6-month lock.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
We believe this valuation is appropriate for a long-term partnership deal because —
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
- The valuation is on the upper end of seed-range ($10M to $25M) - we believe MetaDAO deserves to be at the top of this range as it has a working product and users.
|
||||||
|
- The valuation represents a large (>60%) markup to the latest large venture round to reflect significant progress.
|
||||||
|
- We expect MetaDAO to continue to issue tokens as it scales operations and are factoring in 10-20% dilution per year. Given this assumption, a $24M FDV today represents a $35M valuation on a 3-year go-forward basis.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Importantly, our $700,000 investment would provide valuable capital to MetaDAO. Theia's $700K investment could be spent to hire an additional senior engineer, seed liquidity on new markets, and expand business development operations to onboard more DAOs to MetaDAO.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
### Theia Value Add
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
MetaDAO is one of the most exciting ideas in the Internet Financial System and global governance as a whole, and we are eager to support the company through its next phase of growth. Our proposed terms would result in a ~$102K discount relative to a deal at liquid market price, or ~40bps of dilution relative to market price. We will work hard to increase the probability of success for MetaDAO by much more than that across the following five dimensions:
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
- **Portfolio Synergies & Strategy:** Given our position in the market, we work closely with teams to implement best practices we observe from across the market. We constantly meet with companies, funds, exchanges, and infrastructure providers. For example, we worked closely with the BananaGun, Unibot, and Turtle Club teams to launch on Solana, introducing them to leading ecosystem players. We worked with Derive to design structured product vaults to attract retail users to a complex product. We worked with Kamino to introduce modular lending to their core monolithic lending business.
|
||||||
|
- **Token Structuring:** We actively work on token structuring across our entire portfolio. This work ranges from strategic consultation on incremental improvements to large-scale token redesigns. In the case of Derive (fka Lyra), we helped the team redesign their token to match their new business model. We worked with Houdini Swap (LOCK) on a full-scale token rebrand and tokenomics redesign. We are beginning to work with Vertex on a similar token redesign and are actively working with the Turtle Club team.
|
||||||
|
- **Roadshows:** We meet regularly with most major US and European liquid funds. We openly share our best ideas but pay close attention to the stylistic preferences of different funds. When mutually beneficial, we facilitate introductions and help prepare. We provide detailed feedback on presentations, data rooms, and investor pitches.
|
||||||
|
- **Market Framing:** We are an active research firm and believe that the correct market framing can help a company raise capital, hire talent, win partnerships, and focus resources on the most impactful outcomes. We write consistently about our portfolio companies and the key themes that affect them.
|
||||||
|
- **Policy:** We expect US policy to remain an important input for companies, especially as they seek to expand beyond what exists onchain today. We have built strong relationships with political consultants, congressional staffers, regulatory agencies, and law firms.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
---
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
## Raw Data
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
- Proposal account: `BnfFejPpykmTtM5TyNEySgRCctRizmrZe9Bbe8V1UTon`
|
||||||
|
- Proposal number: 9
|
||||||
|
- DAO account: `CNMZgxYsQpygk8CLN9Su1igwXX2kHtcawaNAGuBPv3G9`
|
||||||
|
- Proposer: `proPaC9tVZEsmgDtNhx15e7nSpoojtPD3H9h4GqSqB2`
|
||||||
|
- Autocrat version: 0.3
|
||||||
|
- Completed: 2025-01-06
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
## Relationship to KB
|
||||||
|
- [[metadao]] — parent entity
|
||||||
|
- [[metadao-otc-trade-theia-2]] — second attempt (passed, $500K at +14% premium)
|
||||||
|
- [[metadao-otc-trade-theia-3]] — third attempt (passed, $630K at +38% premium)
|
||||||
|
- [[theia-research]] — institutional participant
|
||||||
|
- [[publishing investment analysis openly before raising capital inverts hedge fund secrecy because transparency attracts domain-expert LPs who can independently verify the thesis]] — Theia's open research model
|
||||||
|
- [[futarchy adoption faces friction from token price psychology proposal complexity and liquidity requirements]] — complex OTC structures
|
||||||
118
decisions/internet-finance/metadao-otc-trade-theia-3.md
Normal file
118
decisions/internet-finance/metadao-otc-trade-theia-3.md
Normal file
|
|
@ -0,0 +1,118 @@
|
||||||
|
---
|
||||||
|
type: decision
|
||||||
|
entity_type: decision_market
|
||||||
|
name: "MetaDAO: Engage in $630,000 OTC Trade with Theia?"
|
||||||
|
domain: internet-finance
|
||||||
|
status: passed
|
||||||
|
parent_entity: "[[metadao]]"
|
||||||
|
platform: metadao
|
||||||
|
proposer: "Proph3t (on behalf of Theia)"
|
||||||
|
proposal_url: "https://v1.metadao.fi/metadao/trade/vEMYm3RaJjyuxXbD6EasE9wZpFdCNPGZi1VXt5i8cUb"
|
||||||
|
proposal_date: 2025-07-21
|
||||||
|
resolution_date: 2025-07-24
|
||||||
|
category: treasury
|
||||||
|
summary: "Proposal 14 — Theia's third OTC. 700 META at $900/token ($630K) at 38% PREMIUM to spot. Passed. Funds for legal advisory on futarchy regulatory positioning. Exhausted DAO META treasury, triggering token migration planning."
|
||||||
|
key_metrics:
|
||||||
|
proposal_number: 14
|
||||||
|
proposal_account: "vEMYm3RaJjyuxXbD6EasE9wZpFdCNPGZi1VXt5i8cUb"
|
||||||
|
autocrat_version: "0.3"
|
||||||
|
offer_amount: "$630,000 USDC"
|
||||||
|
meta_amount: "700 META"
|
||||||
|
price_per_meta: "$900"
|
||||||
|
premium_to_spot: "38%"
|
||||||
|
lock_period: "12 months linear vest"
|
||||||
|
tags: [metadao, otc, theia, institutional, legal, treasury-exhaustion, token-migration]
|
||||||
|
tracked_by: rio
|
||||||
|
created: 2026-03-24
|
||||||
|
---
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
# MetaDAO: Engage in $630,000 OTC Trade with Theia?
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
## Summary & Connections
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
**Proposal 14 — Theia's third OTC, passed at 38% premium.** 700 META at $900/token ($630K USDC). 12-month linear vest. Funds earmarked for legal advisory and runway extension. This sale exhausted the DAO's META treasury holdings.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
**Outcome:** Passed (2025-07-24).
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
**Connections:**
|
||||||
|
- The Theia sequence demonstrates futarchy pricing evolution: rejected at discount ([[metadao-otc-trade-theia-1]], -12.7%) → accepted at premium ([[metadao-otc-trade-theia-2]], +14%) → accepted at larger premium (this, +38%). The market learned to value aligned institutional capital at a premium. Compare with [[metadao-vc-discount-rejection]] where the market rejected a VC discount — consistent pattern of accepting premium deals, rejecting discount deals.
|
||||||
|
- **Treasury exhaustion forcing function:** Proph3t's note that "this sale will exhaust the DAO treasury of META holdings" triggered token migration planning — minting new token, conversion contract, new DAO initialization. A governance mechanism that depletes its own treasury through market-approved decisions is operating as designed, but reveals a design limitation in fixed-supply governance tokens.
|
||||||
|
- **Legal funding for futarchy:** First MetaDAO treasury allocation specifically to legal infrastructure. "Futarchy has garnered attention of organizations and its use and risk of use have brought up questions no one has answered yet." Directly relevant to [[the DAO Reports rejection of voting as active management is the central legal hurdle for futarchy because prediction market trading must prove fundamentally more meaningful than token voting]]
|
||||||
|
- Theia's framing of the "Lemon Problem in Token Markets" and their Token Transparency Framework with Blockworks connects to [[ownership coins primary value proposition is investor protection not governance quality because anti-rug enforcement through market-governed liquidation creates credible exit guarantees that no amount of decision optimization can match]]
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
---
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
## Full Proposal Text
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
### Definitions
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
- MetaDAO Treasury - Squads multisig 6awyHMshBGVjJ3ozdSJdyyDE1CTAXUwrpNMaRGMsb4sf
|
||||||
|
- USDC - EPjFWdd5AufqSSqeM2qN1xzybapC8G4wEGGkZwyTDt1v
|
||||||
|
- META - METADDFL6wWMWEoKTFJwcThTbUmtarRJZjRpzUvkxhr
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
### Overview
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
- Theia wishes to acquire 700 META tokens at a USD price of $900 per token from the MetaDAO Treasury in exchange for $630,000 USDC. Importantly, this is a ~38% premium to the liquid market price of META.
|
||||||
|
- Theia is already an active partner to MetaDAO helping across multiple core areas including strategy, research, token structuring/liquidity, US policy and business development as well as by serving as an early activist in MetaDAO's futarchic markets.
|
||||||
|
- Theia's $630K investment will be used to extend runway and engage legal advisory services.
|
||||||
|
- MetaDAO will transfer the entire portion of META tokens through a 12 month linear vest Streamflow program.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
### Introduction to Theia
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Theia is an onchain liquid token fund manager that invests in companies building the Internet Financial System. Theia replicates traditional private investment strategies by taking large positions in small-cap tokens within under-explored parts of the market and working closely with management teams to add value. Theia typically buys liquid tokens through structured and proprietary deals, and holds investments through a two to four-year investment thesis.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Our team operates on the premise that the Internet Financial System will take share from the existing global financial system by providing innovative and increasingly efficient financial primitives that expand the design space for financial products and accelerate financialization through the Internet. The global financial system represents the largest addressable market in the world and we believe permissionless blockchain technology will expand the TAM.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Theia is a differentiated partner due to the time and expertise we commit to our portfolio companies as well as our intense focus on core infrastructure and financial applications in EVM and SVM. Our fund strategy is specifically designed to drive value for our portfolio companies; we cap our fund size, maintain a concentrated book of few investments, and seek to hold investments for many years. We work to ensure that each portfolio company has time and ample resources to realize our underwriting model forecast. This allows us to hold for the long term and ignore price fluctuations that are unrelated to business-specific catalysts.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
### Theia is Focused on Token Governance
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Recently, Theia has taken an active role in attempting to address and improve the problem of Onchain Token Governance. We believe this is a fundamental problem for onchain capital formation and the Internet Capital Markets thesis more broadly. Liquid investors (both fund and individual) lose hundreds of millions of dollars each year to misguided and even fraudulent governance failures. Despite a very favorable institutional and regulatory environment for crypto, We have observed a steady decline in the amount of institutional capital in liquid token markets as well as a decline in the number of businesses seeking to raise capital onchain. We believe Futarchy offers the single best solution to the problem of onchain token governance and would like to be strategic partners to MetaDAO as they bring the concept of Futarchy to market; first on Solana and then the world.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Theia describes the Lemon Problem in Token Markets at Research Day: https://x.com/TheiaResearch/status/1927536607604715671
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Our essay describing the Lemon Problem in Token Markets: https://x.com/TheiaResearch/status/1935338529560662527
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Theia launches Token Transparency Framework with Blockworks: https://x.com/TheiaResearch/status/1935325282497376261
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
### Proposal
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
We have enjoyed our time as partners to MetaDAO over the past six months. We believe we have been value-added partners to MetaDAO over this period, particularly by serving as thought and business partners to Proph3t and Kollan as they build MetaDAO and as active participants in MetaDAO markets. We would encourage any traders to ask Proph3t and Kollan for references on the past few months of our partnership and their expectations for our future contributions.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
We are pleased to submit this offer to acquire META tokens on behalf of Theia. While this proposal outlines specific terms for a token agreement, we continue to believe that an enhanced long-term partnership between Theia and MetaDAO is the most important component of our proposal.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
On behalf of Theia Blockchain Partners Master Fund LP ("Theia"), we submit a bid to acquire 700 META tokens at a USD price of $900 per token. This equates to $630,000 USDC of locked tokens at a ~38% premium to spot price at a 6-month lock.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Importantly, our investment would provide valuable capital to MetaDAO.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
In general, we believe young companies should have at least 24 months of runway in case market conditions deteriorate or the business takes 1-2 years to get up and running. We believe MetaDAO is currently burning between $100K and $120K each month and has a USD treasury of $1.5M (~12.5 months of runway assuming no additional growth investments). You can confirm these numbers on MetaDAO's Transparency Report.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Importantly, we have not sold a single MetaDAO token and have accumulated a substantial open market position in META. We expect to continue increasing our position size in META through open market transactions and trading proposals. We are submitting this proposal in large part because we believe META would be worth more if the underlying business had a larger treasury of USDC.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
### Proph3t and Kollan Statement
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Theia's $630,000 USDC investment would be used to extend the runway and expand operating budget to engage legal for regulatory review, legal structuring and tax structuring. Futarchy has garnered attention of organizations and its use and risk of use have brought up questions no one has answered yet. It is important to understand the legal and tax landscape for continued adoption of the novel governance mechanism, futarchy.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Importantly, this sale will exhaust the DAO treasury of META holdings. It is therefore critical that we plan for the eventual token migration. This equates to minting a new token, creating a conversion contract, a UI for conversion, initializing a new DAO, creating a proposal for transfer of assets and managing the existing liquidity. If passed this proposal is a signal to the team to direct energy towards this as soon as time permits.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
We're excited about the continued engagement and alignment from Theia. Onwards and upwards.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
---
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
## Raw Data
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
- Proposal account: `vEMYm3RaJjyuxXbD6EasE9wZpFdCNPGZi1VXt5i8cUb`
|
||||||
|
- Proposal number: 14
|
||||||
|
- DAO account: `CNMZgxYsQpygk8CLN9Su1igwXX2kHtcawaNAGuBPv3G9`
|
||||||
|
- Proposer: `proPaC9tVZEsmgDtNhx15e7nSpoojtPD3H9h4GqSqB2`
|
||||||
|
- Autocrat version: 0.3
|
||||||
|
- Completed: 2025-07-24
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
## Relationship to KB
|
||||||
|
- [[metadao]] — parent entity, treasury exhaustion event
|
||||||
|
- [[metadao-otc-trade-theia-1]] — first attempt (failed, $700K at -12.7% discount)
|
||||||
|
- [[metadao-otc-trade-theia-2]] — second attempt (passed, $500K at +14% premium)
|
||||||
|
- [[theia-research]] — institutional participant
|
||||||
|
- [[the DAO Reports rejection of voting as active management is the central legal hurdle for futarchy because prediction market trading must prove fundamentally more meaningful than token voting]] — legal funding directly addresses this
|
||||||
|
- [[ownership coin treasuries should be actively managed through buybacks and token sales as continuous capital calibration not treated as static war chests]] — treasury management via OTC
|
||||||
|
- [[futarchy-daos-require-mintable-governance-tokens-because-fixed-supply-treasuries-exhaust-without-issuance-authority-forcing-disruptive-token-architecture-migrations]] — treasury exhaustion proves this claim
|
||||||
Loading…
Reference in a new issue