diff --git a/domains/internet-finance/futarchy-proposals-with-favorable-economics-can-fail-due-to-participation-friction-not-market-disagreement.md b/domains/internet-finance/futarchy-proposals-with-favorable-economics-can-fail-due-to-participation-friction-not-market-disagreement.md
index 4f2b2c00..6acc9ec6 100644
--- a/domains/internet-finance/futarchy-proposals-with-favorable-economics-can-fail-due-to-participation-friction-not-market-disagreement.md
+++ b/domains/internet-finance/futarchy-proposals-with-favorable-economics-can-fail-due-to-participation-friction-not-market-disagreement.md
@@ -45,13 +45,13 @@ However, this case provides concrete evidence that [[futarchy adoption faces fri
 
 
 ### Additional Evidence (confirm)
-*Source: [[2024-08-27-futardio-proposal-fund-the-drift-superteam-earn-creator-competition]] | Added: 2026-03-15*
+*Source: 2024-08-27-futardio-proposal-fund-the-drift-superteam-earn-creator-competition | Added: 2026-03-15*
 
 Drift's $8,250 creator competition proposal failed despite having clear upside potential (community engagement, content generation, B.E.T awareness) and minimal downside risk. The proposal offered a structured prize pool across multiple tracks (video, Twitter threads, trade ideas) with established evaluation criteria, yet still failed to generate sufficient market participation. This is a canonical example of participation friction killing an economically sensible proposal.
 
 
 ### Additional Evidence (extend)
-*Source: [[2024-12-02-futardio-proposal-approve-deans-list-treasury-management]] | Added: 2026-03-15*
+*Source: 2024-12-02-futardio-proposal-approve-deans-list-treasury-management | Added: 2026-03-15*
 
 Dean's List treasury proposal passed despite requiring active market participation to price a 40 percentage point survival probability improvement. The proposal explicitly calculated that potential FDV increase (5-20%) exceeded the 3% TWAP threshold, suggesting the economics were clearly favorable yet still required formal market validation.
 
diff --git a/domains/internet-finance/high-fee-amms-create-lp-incentive-and-manipulation-deterrent-simultaneously-by-making-passive-provision-profitable-and-active-trading-expensive.md b/domains/internet-finance/high-fee-amms-create-lp-incentive-and-manipulation-deterrent-simultaneously-by-making-passive-provision-profitable-and-active-trading-expensive.md
index 3874415e..ff706638 100644
--- a/domains/internet-finance/high-fee-amms-create-lp-incentive-and-manipulation-deterrent-simultaneously-by-making-passive-provision-profitable-and-active-trading-expensive.md
+++ b/domains/internet-finance/high-fee-amms-create-lp-incentive-and-manipulation-deterrent-simultaneously-by-making-passive-provision-profitable-and-active-trading-expensive.md
@@ -38,7 +38,7 @@ The mechanism depends on futarchy-specific conditions (short duration, governanc
 
 
 ### Additional Evidence (confirm)
-*Source: [[2024-01-24-futardio-proposal-develop-amm-program-for-futarchy]] | Added: 2026-03-16*
+*Source: 2024-01-24-futardio-proposal-develop-amm-program-for-futarchy | Added: 2026-03-16*
 
 MetaDAO's AMM proposal sets fees at 3-5% explicitly to 'both: encourage LPs, and aggressively discourage wash-trading and manipulation.' The mechanism works because high fees make price manipulation through wash trading expensive while creating strong incentives for liquidity provision.