auto-fix: strip 21 broken wiki links

Pipeline auto-fixer: removed [[ ]] brackets from links
that don't resolve to existing claims in the knowledge base.

inbox/queue/2025-11-18-solomon-labs-metadao-ico-102m-commitments-8m-cap.md

@@ -47,19 +47,19 @@ This is a behavioral signal worth flagging: traditional fundraising maximizes ra
 **What I expected but didn't find:** Data on how Solomon's futarchy governance performed during the ICO — what the governance market price signals looked like during the fundraise period.
 
 **KB connections:**
-- [[Futarchy solves trustless joint ownership not just better decision-making]] — $102.9M in commitments from 6,603 strangers willing to pool capital through a futarchy mechanism is direct evidence of trustless capital formation
+- Futarchy solves trustless joint ownership not just better decision-making — $102.9M in commitments from 6,603 strangers willing to pool capital through a futarchy mechanism is direct evidence of trustless capital formation
-- [[MetaDAO empirical results show smaller participants gaining influence through futarchy]] — 6,603 contributors with ~$285 average allocation (from $8M cap) is highly democratized
+- MetaDAO empirical results show smaller participants gaining influence through futarchy — 6,603 contributors with ~$285 average allocation (from $8M cap) is highly democratized
-- [[Legacy ICOs failed because team treasury control created extraction incentives that scaled with success]] — Solomon's voluntary $8M cap despite $102.9M demand is the opposite of legacy ICO behavior: no extraction of maximum available capital
+- Legacy ICOs failed because team treasury control created extraction incentives that scaled with success — Solomon's voluntary $8M cap despite $102.9M demand is the opposite of legacy ICO behavior: no extraction of maximum available capital
 
 **Extraction hints:**
 1. "MetaDAO ICO teams consistently choose to raise far below available demand — Solomon at $8M vs. $102.9M committed, Umbra at $3M vs. $154.9M committed — suggesting futarchy governance discipline internalizes a raise-what-you-need-not-what-you-can-get norm absent from traditional fundraising" — potential claim candidate, confidence: experimental (pattern from two data points)
-2. Enrich [[MetaDAO empirical results show smaller participants gaining influence through futarchy]] with Solomon's 6,603-contributor data point (complements Umbra's 10,518)
+2. Enrich MetaDAO empirical results show smaller participants gaining influence through futarchy with Solomon's 6,603-contributor data point (complements Umbra's 10,518)
 
 **Context:** Blocmates is a credible MetaDAO ecosystem watcher. ICO dates: November 15-18, 2025. Note: this is a historical archive from November 2025 — the ICO concluded before the current research period but the data was not previously fully captured.
 
 ## Curator Notes
 
-PRIMARY CONNECTION: [[Futarchy solves trustless joint ownership not just better decision-making]]
+PRIMARY CONNECTION: Futarchy solves trustless joint ownership not just better decision-making
 
 WHY ARCHIVED: Solomon adds a second data point to the "MetaDAO mega-ICO pattern" alongside Umbra. The combined pattern ($260M in commitments from two raises, both capped far below demand) is the strongest empirical evidence for futarchy-governed trustless capital formation in the knowledge base.
 

inbox/queue/2026-02-25-occ-nprm-genius-act-stablecoin-framework.md

@@ -52,7 +52,7 @@ The yield prohibition is the operational crux of the bank competition question.
 **What I expected but didn't find:** Any discussion of non-custodial or decentralized stablecoin issuance (like algorithmic stablecoins or DeFi protocol-issued stablecoins). The NPRM focuses entirely on OCC-licensed entities. Algorithmic/decentralized stablecoins are outside the GENIUS Act framework — another example of regulatory scope delimitation that leaves decentralized protocols in a separate regulatory space.
 
 **KB connections:**
-- [[The blockchain coordination attractor state is programmable trust infrastructure where verifiable protocols ownership alignment and market-tested governance enable coordination that scales with complexity rather than requiring trusted intermediaries]] — GENIUS Act creates the regulated stablecoin infrastructure layer that could enable the attractor state's payment rail step
+- The blockchain coordination attractor state is programmable trust infrastructure where verifiable protocols ownership alignment and market-tested governance enable coordination that scales with complexity rather than requiring trusted intermediaries — GENIUS Act creates the regulated stablecoin infrastructure layer that could enable the attractor state's payment rail step
 - [[futarchy-based fundraising creates regulatory separation because there are no beneficial owners and investment decisions emerge from market forces not centralized control]] — MetaDAO's governance mechanism is outside the GENIUS Act framework; the regulatory separation argument holds
 
 **Extraction hints:**
@@ -63,7 +63,7 @@ The yield prohibition is the operational crux of the bank competition question.
 
 ## Curator Notes
 
-PRIMARY CONNECTION: [[Internet finance is an industry transition from traditional finance where the attractor state replaces intermediaries with programmable coordination and market-tested governance]]
+PRIMARY CONNECTION: Internet finance is an industry transition from traditional finance where the attractor state replaces intermediaries with programmable coordination and market-tested governance
 
 WHY ARCHIVED: The GENIUS Act framework is the primary regulatory architecture for payment stablecoins. Understanding its scope (OCC-licensed entities, yield prohibition, reserve requirements) is essential for tracking the stablecoin attractor state step. The framework's limitations (applies only to OCC-licensed PPSIs, not decentralized stablecoins) are as important as its reach.
 

inbox/queue/2026-03-30-fed-note-stablecoin-cross-border-payments-monetary-policy.md

@@ -46,7 +46,7 @@ The Fed paper explicitly notes that large international banks "could persist as
 **What I expected but didn't find:** Specific data on the cost differential (traditional vs. stablecoin for the same corridor). The paper is theoretical rather than empirical. The quantitative data comes from other sources (World Bank: 6.49% average; Juniper: $5T by 2035).
 
 **KB connections:**
-- [[Internet finance is an industry transition from traditional finance where the attractor state replaces intermediaries with programmable coordination and market-tested governance]] — the Fed paper's acknowledgment of structural cross-border payment inefficiencies confirms the slope measurement
+- Internet finance is an industry transition from traditional finance where the attractor state replaces intermediaries with programmable coordination and market-tested governance — the Fed paper's acknowledgment of structural cross-border payment inefficiencies confirms the slope measurement
 - The "banks persist as thinner intermediaries" framing is a useful complication for Rio's Belief #1 — full displacement is not the only evidence-consistent outcome; margin compression is
 
 **Extraction hints:**
@@ -57,7 +57,7 @@ The Fed paper explicitly notes that large international banks "could persist as
 
 ## Curator Notes
 
-PRIMARY CONNECTION: [[Internet finance is an industry transition from traditional finance where the attractor state replaces intermediaries with programmable coordination and market-tested governance]]
+PRIMARY CONNECTION: Internet finance is an industry transition from traditional finance where the attractor state replaces intermediaries with programmable coordination and market-tested governance
 
 WHY ARCHIVED: Federal Reserve economists explicitly validating the stablecoin cross-border payment cost-advantage thesis. The "banks as thinner intermediaries" framing is a useful complication for Rio's attractor state analysis — complete displacement is not required for the margin compression slope to operate.
 

inbox/queue/2026-04-27-juniper-research-cross-border-stablecoin-b2b-5-trillion-2035.md

@@ -40,8 +40,8 @@ The $850B ICBA claim and the 37,000% Juniper growth projection are operating on
 **What I expected but didn't find:** Consumer (not B2B) stablecoin payment volume projections. Juniper focuses on B2B; the Meta USDC creator payment data covers the consumer/creator side.
 
 **KB connections:**
-- [[The blockchain coordination attractor state is programmable trust infrastructure where verifiable protocols ownership alignment and market-tested governance enable coordination that scales with complexity rather than requiring trusted intermediaries]] — $5T in cross-border B2B stablecoin payments is a concrete projection of the attractor state's payment rail layer materializing
+- The blockchain coordination attractor state is programmable trust infrastructure where verifiable protocols ownership alignment and market-tested governance enable coordination that scales with complexity rather than requiring trusted intermediaries — $5T in cross-border B2B stablecoin payments is a concrete projection of the attractor state's payment rail layer materializing
-- [[Proxy inertia is the most reliable predictor of incumbent failure because current profitability rationally discourages pursuit of viable futures]] — correspondent banking's 6.49% margin is the "proxy inertia" being disrupted; banks are optimizing existing infrastructure rather than building stablecoin-native rails
+- Proxy inertia is the most reliable predictor of incumbent failure because current profitability rationally discourages pursuit of viable futures — correspondent banking's 6.49% margin is the "proxy inertia" being disrupted; banks are optimizing existing infrastructure rather than building stablecoin-native rails
 
 **Extraction hints:**
 1. The 6.49% → ~1-3% cost reduction across international remittances is a direct measurement of the intermediation rent being competed away. This is the empirical foundation for Belief #1's claim about the 2-3% GDP intermediation cost. Consider a claim: "Stablecoin cross-border payments reduce international remittance costs from 6.49% (World Bank 2026 average) to 1-3% on/off-ramp total, representing the clearest operational measurement of programmable coordination's intermediation rent reduction."
@@ -51,7 +51,7 @@ The $850B ICBA claim and the 37,000% Juniper growth projection are operating on
 
 ## Curator Notes
 
-PRIMARY CONNECTION: [[The blockchain coordination attractor state is programmable trust infrastructure where verifiable protocols ownership alignment and market-tested governance enable coordination that scales with complexity rather than requiring trusted intermediaries]]
+PRIMARY CONNECTION: The blockchain coordination attractor state is programmable trust infrastructure where verifiable protocols ownership alignment and market-tested governance enable coordination that scales with complexity rather than requiring trusted intermediaries
 
 WHY ARCHIVED: Provides quantitative cost comparison (6.49% traditional vs. 1-3% stablecoin) and market size projection ($5T by 2035) that grounds the attractor state analysis in measurable cost advantages. Pairs with Meta USDC deployment as empirical evidence of this trajectory beginning.
 

inbox/queue/2026-04-29-meta-usdc-creator-payments-solana-polygon-stripe.md

@@ -51,8 +51,8 @@ The choice of Solana (400ms settlement, near-zero fees) specifically over Ethere
 **What I expected but didn't find:** Specific data on cost savings Meta will realize vs. traditional payment rails. The announcement didn't include a cost comparison — presumably because Meta doesn't want to publicize that it's specifically avoiding correspondent banking fees.
 
 **KB connections:**
-- [[Internet finance is an industry transition from traditional finance where the attractor state replaces intermediaries with programmable coordination and market-tested governance]] — Meta's USDC deployment is the clearest single example of the attractor state's "stablecoin cross-border payment" step materializing at consumer scale
+- Internet finance is an industry transition from traditional finance where the attractor state replaces intermediaries with programmable coordination and market-tested governance — Meta's USDC deployment is the clearest single example of the attractor state's "stablecoin cross-border payment" step materializing at consumer scale
-- [[The blockchain coordination attractor state is programmable trust infrastructure where verifiable protocols ownership alignment and market-tested governance enable coordination that scales with complexity rather than requiring trusted intermediaries]] — Meta is using "verifiable protocol infrastructure" (Solana + USDC) instead of trusted intermediaries (banks)
+- The blockchain coordination attractor state is programmable trust infrastructure where verifiable protocols ownership alignment and market-tested governance enable coordination that scales with complexity rather than requiring trusted intermediaries — Meta is using "verifiable protocol infrastructure" (Solana + USDC) instead of trusted intermediaries (banks)
 
 **Extraction hints:**
 1. "Meta's USDC creator payouts on Solana demonstrate that large-scale programmable coordination infrastructure has achieved sufficient maturity for a 3-billion-MAU consumer company to deploy it for real cross-border payments rather than building proprietary rails" — claim candidate, confidence: likely
@@ -62,7 +62,7 @@ The choice of Solana (400ms settlement, near-zero fees) specifically over Ethere
 
 ## Curator Notes
 
-PRIMARY CONNECTION: [[Internet finance is an industry transition from traditional finance where the attractor state replaces intermediaries with programmable coordination and market-tested governance]]
+PRIMARY CONNECTION: Internet finance is an industry transition from traditional finance where the attractor state replaces intermediaries with programmable coordination and market-tested governance
 
 WHY ARCHIVED: This is the highest-profile real-world deployment of stablecoin payment rails at consumer scale documented in the research. Meta's choice (USDC on Solana, not proprietary coin) and the target markets (high-remittance corridors) are both important evidence for the programmable coordination attractor state.
 

inbox/queue/2026-05-01-americanbanker-stablecoin-yield-debate-genius-rule-comments.md

@@ -51,8 +51,8 @@ The CEA analysis used realistic assumptions (6x stablecoin growth, Federal Reser
 **What I expected but didn't find:** Any third-party economic analysis validating ICBA's $850B figure. No academic or neutral study has corroborated it. The only analysis cited by banks is their own lobby research.
 
 **KB connections:**
-- [[Proxy inertia is the most reliable predictor of incumbent failure because current profitability rationally discourages pursuit of viable futures]] — the margin is the slope: banks' 5% deposit spread is the rent under attack, and they're fighting to preserve it
+- Proxy inertia is the most reliable predictor of incumbent failure because current profitability rationally discourages pursuit of viable futures — the margin is the slope: banks' 5% deposit spread is the rent under attack, and they're fighting to preserve it
-- [[Internet finance is an industry transition from traditional finance where the attractor state replaces intermediaries with programmable coordination and market-tested governance]] — the stablecoin yield prohibition fight is a precise measurement of where the attractor state is threatening incumbent rents most directly
+- Internet finance is an industry transition from traditional finance where the attractor state replaces intermediaries with programmable coordination and market-tested governance — the stablecoin yield prohibition fight is a precise measurement of where the attractor state is threatening incumbent rents most directly
 
 **Extraction hints:**
 1. "Banks' $850B community lending risk claim from stablecoin yield competition is 404 times larger than the White House CEA's $2.1B estimate, revealing that the yield prohibition fight is about protecting deposit spread income rather than systemic stability" — high-value claim, confidence: likely (the discrepancy is documented; the interpretation requires judgment)
@@ -62,7 +62,7 @@ The CEA analysis used realistic assumptions (6x stablecoin growth, Federal Reser
 
 ## Curator Notes
 
-PRIMARY CONNECTION: [[Proxy inertia is the most reliable predictor of incumbent failure because current profitability rationally discourages pursuit of viable futures]] — the $850B vs $2.1B discrepancy is the cleanest single data point for the "margin IS the slope" principle in the research record
+PRIMARY CONNECTION: Proxy inertia is the most reliable predictor of incumbent failure because current profitability rationally discourages pursuit of viable futures — the $850B vs $2.1B discrepancy is the cleanest single data point for the "margin IS the slope" principle in the research record
 
 WHY ARCHIVED: The 404x discrepancy between bank lobby claims and White House economic analysis is the strongest single piece of evidence for Belief #1's core claim that intermediation costs are rent-protection, not genuine coordination value. Extractor should focus on this specific numerical gap.
 

inbox/queue/2026-05-01-defi-lending-rates-vs-bank-savings-comparison-2026.md

@@ -56,8 +56,8 @@ The bank regulatory capture story becomes sharper in this light: the GENIUS Act
 **What I expected but didn't find:** DeFi borrow rates (what borrowers pay). High borrow rates (10-20%+ for crypto-collateralized loans) remain above bank loan rates for equivalent credit quality — the DeFi cost advantage is on the lender/depositor side, not necessarily on the borrower side for all use cases.
 
 **KB connections:**
-- [[Proxy inertia is the most reliable predictor of incumbent failure because current profitability rationally discourages pursuit of viable futures]] — the 5% spread on deposits IS the proxy inertia being disrupted; banks are investing in faster execution on existing rails (ACH improvements, Zelle) rather than building the DeFi yield infrastructure that would compete away their spread
+- Proxy inertia is the most reliable predictor of incumbent failure because current profitability rationally discourages pursuit of viable futures — the 5% spread on deposits IS the proxy inertia being disrupted; banks are investing in faster execution on existing rails (ACH improvements, Zelle) rather than building the DeFi yield infrastructure that would compete away their spread
-- [[Community ownership accelerates growth through aligned evangelism not passive holding]] — institutional adoption of Morpho and Aave is the "community turns into investor" dynamic at scale
+- Community ownership accelerates growth through aligned evangelism not passive holding — institutional adoption of Morpho and Aave is the "community turns into investor" dynamic at scale
 
 **Extraction hints:**
 1. "DeFi lending protocols consistently offer 3-10% APY on stablecoins compared to traditional bank savings rates of 0.01%, representing a direct measurement of the deposit spread rent that DeFi disintermediation eliminates" — claim candidate, confidence: likely (rates are documented, comparison is fair)
@@ -67,7 +67,7 @@ The bank regulatory capture story becomes sharper in this light: the GENIUS Act
 
 ## Curator Notes
 
-PRIMARY CONNECTION: [[Proxy inertia is the most reliable predictor of incumbent failure because current profitability rationally discourages pursuit of viable futures]]
+PRIMARY CONNECTION: Proxy inertia is the most reliable predictor of incumbent failure because current profitability rationally discourages pursuit of viable futures
 
 WHY ARCHIVED: Provides quantitative evidence of the intermediation rent being competed away: bank savings 0.01% vs. DeFi 3-10% vs. T-bill reserve return ~5%. The math directly validates Belief #1's claim that the 2-3% GDP intermediation cost is rent-extraction, not efficient coordination value.