rio: extract from 2024-10-22-futardio-proposal-increase-ore-sol-lp-boost-multiplier-to-6x.md
- Source: inbox/archive/2024-10-22-futardio-proposal-increase-ore-sol-lp-boost-multiplier-to-6x.md - Domain: internet-finance - Extracted by: headless extraction cron (worker 2) Pentagon-Agent: Rio <HEADLESS>
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---
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type: claim
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domain: internet-finance
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description: "ORE community uses boost multiplier adjustment as deliberate futarchy testrun before considering integration into critical systems"
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confidence: experimental
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source: "futard.io, ORE-SOL LP boost multiplier proposal objectives, 2024-10-22"
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created: 2024-10-22
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---
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# Futarchy governance enables low-risk experimentation through small operational decisions before critical system integration
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The ORE community explicitly frames the boost multiplier proposal as a "low-risk testrun" for futarchy governance before considering integration into "critical systems such as the supply function." This represents a deliberate learning strategy where operational decisions serve as training ground for governance mechanisms that may later control core protocol parameters.
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The proposal lists three objectives, with the third being "Introduce futarchy to the ORE community" and explicitly states: "Futarchy is still a very nascent technology and before we can seriously consider integrating it into critical ORE systems, we need to understand it better." This positions the boost multiplier decision—which affects liquidity incentives but not core protocol security—as a safe testing environment.
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This approach contrasts with immediate deployment of novel governance mechanisms on high-stakes decisions. The progression from "small operational decisions" (boost multipliers) to "critical systems" (supply function) suggests a maturity model where governance mechanisms must prove themselves on lower-risk decisions before earning authority over protocol fundamentals.
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The timing is notable: futarchy is described as "recently emerged" and "very nascent," yet the community is already planning a multi-stage adoption path rather than treating it as experimental indefinitely.
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## Evidence
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- Proposal objective 3: "Introduce futarchy to the ORE community"
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- Explicit statement: "This proposal is intended to serve as a low-risk testrun for the ORE community to learn more about futarchy and how it works"
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- Future consideration mentioned: "before we can seriously consider integrating it into critical ORE systems, we need to understand it better"
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- Critical systems example given: "the supply function"
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- Futarchy described as "very nascent technology" and "recently emerged as a novel governance mechanism"
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- Proposal passed 2024-10-26, confirming community acceptance of this staged approach
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---
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Relevant Notes:
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- [[MetaDAO-is-the-futarchy-launchpad-on-Solana-where-projects-raise-capital-through-unruggable-ICOs-governed-by-conditional-markets-creating-the-first-platform-for-ownership-coins-at-scale.md]]
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- [[futarchy-adoption-faces-friction-from-token-price-psychology-proposal-complexity-and-liquidity-requirements.md]]
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- [[optimal-governance-requires-mixing-mechanisms-because-different-decisions-have-different-manipulation-risk-profiles.md]]
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Topics:
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- [[domains/internet-finance/_map]]
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- [[core/mechanisms/_map]]
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---
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type: claim
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domain: internet-finance
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description: "ORE protocol implements boost multipliers as staking mechanism where LP and native tokens generate mining reward multipliers"
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confidence: experimental
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source: "futard.io, ORE-SOL LP boost multiplier proposal, 2024-10-22"
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created: 2024-10-22
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---
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# ORE boost multipliers create virtual hashpower incentives by staking select tokens for mining reward multipliers
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ORE protocol implements "boosts" as a native incentive mechanism that converts staked capital into "virtual hashpower" multipliers on mining rewards. The system supports three token types with different multiplier rates: ORE-SOL LP (4x baseline, proposed 6x), ORE-ISC LP (4x), and native ORE (2x). This creates a tiered incentive structure where liquidity provision receives higher multipliers than simple token holding.
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The mechanism launched one week before this proposal (mid-October 2024) and immediately drove "significant rise in the total value of liquidity provided to the boosted trading pools." The proposal to increase ORE-SOL LP from 4x to 6x explicitly aims to "counterbalance the risks" that liquidity providers face from volatile trading pairs, suggesting the multiplier functions as risk compensation rather than pure yield enhancement.
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This represents a novel approach to protocol-owned liquidity incentives where the reward multiplier is the primary lever rather than direct token emissions or fee sharing. The three-tier structure (6x LP / 4x LP / 2x native) creates clear incentive gradients that direct capital toward specific protocol objectives.
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## Evidence
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- ORE protocol launched boost multipliers one week before 2024-10-22
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- Three token types supported: ORE-SOL LP (4x → proposed 6x), ORE-ISC LP (4x), ORE (2x)
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- Proposal explicitly states boosts "allow miners to stake select tokens and earn multipliers on their mining rewards"
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- Launch drove "significant rise" in TVL to boosted pools (specific numbers not provided in source)
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- Proposal objective: "By increasing the ORE-SOL LP multiplier to 6x, we can offer greater incentives for ORE-SOL liquidity providers and potentially increase the overall market depth"
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---
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Relevant Notes:
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- [[dynamic-performance-based-token-minting-replaces-fixed-emission-schedules-by-tying-new-token-creation-to-measurable-outcomes-creating-algorithmic-meritocracy-in-token-distribution.md]]
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Topics:
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- [[domains/internet-finance/_map]]
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---
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type: entity
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entity_type: decision_market
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name: "ORE: Increase ORE-SOL LP boost multiplier to 6x"
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domain: internet-finance
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status: passed
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parent_entity: "[[ore]]"
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platform: "futardio"
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proposal_url: "https://www.futard.io/proposal/A19yLRVqxvUf4cTDm6mKNKadasd7YSYDrzk6AYEyubAC"
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proposal_date: 2024-10-22
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resolution_date: 2024-10-26
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category: "mechanism"
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summary: "Proposal to increase ORE-SOL LP boost multiplier from 4x to 6x to enhance liquidity and test futarchy governance"
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tracked_by: rio
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created: 2026-03-11
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---
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# ORE: Increase ORE-SOL LP boost multiplier to 6x
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## Summary
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This proposal increased the boost multiplier for ORE-SOL liquidity providers from 4x to 6x, aiming to enhance liquidity in the trading pool, gather data on how multiplier changes affect markets, and serve as a low-risk introduction to futarchy governance for the ORE community before considering integration into critical protocol systems.
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## Market Data
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- **Outcome:** Passed
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- **Proposal account:** A19yLRVqxvUf4cTDm6mKNKadasd7YSYDrzk6AYEyubAC
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- **Proposal number:** 1
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- **DAO account:** 7XoddQu6HtEeHZowzCEwKiFJg4zR3BXUqMygvwPwSB1D
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- **Proposer:** proPaC9tVZEsmgDtNhx15e7nSpoojtPD3H9h4GqSqB2
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- **Autocrat version:** 0.3
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- **Completed:** 2024-10-26
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- **Ended:** 2024-10-26
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## Significance
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This represents the first multiplier change in the ORE boost system (launched one week prior) and was explicitly framed as a "low-risk testrun" for futarchy governance. The proposal demonstrates a deliberate learning strategy where operational decisions serve as training ground before applying futarchy to critical protocol parameters like the supply function. The three stated objectives—increase TVL, gather market data, and introduce futarchy—show the community treating governance mechanism adoption as a staged process rather than immediate deployment on high-stakes decisions.
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## Relationship to KB
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- [[ore]] - first boost multiplier adjustment
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- [[futardio]] - governance platform
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- [[MetaDAOs Autocrat program implements futarchy through conditional token markets where proposals create parallel pass and fail universes settled by time-weighted average price over a three-day window]] - mechanism used
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entities/internet-finance/ore.md
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entities/internet-finance/ore.md
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---
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type: entity
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entity_type: company
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name: "ORE"
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domain: internet-finance
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status: active
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tracked_by: rio
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created: 2026-03-11
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---
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# ORE
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## Overview
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ORE is a Solana-based protocol that implements a mining rewards system with "boost" multipliers, where users stake liquidity provider tokens or native ORE to earn multipliers on mining rewards. The protocol launched boost multipliers in mid-October 2024 and uses futarchy governance through Futardio for parameter adjustments.
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## Timeline
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- **2024-10-15** (approx) — Launched boost multiplier system with three tiers: ORE-SOL LP (4x), ORE-ISC LP (4x), ORE (2x)
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- **2024-10-22** — [[ore-increase-ore-sol-lp-boost-multiplier-to-6x]] proposed to increase ORE-SOL LP multiplier from 4x to 6x
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- **2024-10-26** — [[ore-increase-ore-sol-lp-boost-multiplier-to-6x]] passed, marking first multiplier adjustment
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## Relationship to KB
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- [[futardio]] - governance platform used
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- [[MetaDAOs Autocrat program implements futarchy through conditional token markets where proposals create parallel pass and fail universes settled by time-weighted average price over a three-day window]] - governance mechanism
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@ -6,9 +6,15 @@ url: "https://www.futard.io/proposal/A19yLRVqxvUf4cTDm6mKNKadasd7YSYDrzk6AYEyubA
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date: 2024-10-22
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domain: internet-finance
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format: data
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status: unprocessed
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status: processed
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tags: [futardio, metadao, futarchy, solana, governance]
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event_type: proposal
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processed_by: rio
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processed_date: 2026-03-11
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claims_extracted: ["ore-boost-multipliers-create-virtual-hashpower-incentives-by-staking-select-tokens-for-mining-reward-multipliers.md", "futarchy-governance-enables-low-risk-experimentation-through-small-operational-decisions-before-critical-system-integration.md"]
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enrichments_applied: ["MetaDAOs futarchy implementation shows limited trading volume in uncontested decisions.md"]
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extraction_model: "anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5"
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extraction_notes: "Extracted two mechanism-focused claims about ORE's boost multiplier system and futarchy adoption strategy. Created decision_market entity for the proposal and new company entity for ORE protocol. Enriched existing claim about futarchy trading volume with evidence of uncontested decision pattern. Source is primarily governance/mechanism documentation rather than market analysis."
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---
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## Proposal Details
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- Autocrat version: 0.3
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- Completed: 2024-10-26
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- Ended: 2024-10-26
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## Key Facts
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- ORE boost system launched approximately one week before 2024-10-22
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- Proposal A19yLRVqxvUf4cTDm6mKNKadasd7YSYDrzk6AYEyubAC was ORE DAO proposal number 1
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- ORE DAO account: 7XoddQu6HtEeHZowzCEwKiFJg4zR3BXUqMygvwPwSB1D
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- Proposer account: proPaC9tVZEsmgDtNhx15e7nSpoojtPD3H9h4GqSqB2
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- Used Autocrat version 0.3
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- Proposal completed and ended on 2024-10-26
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