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extract: 2024-07-18-futardio-proposal-enhancing-the-deans-list-dao-economic-model

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domains/internet-finance/futarchy-proposals-with-favorable-economics-can-fail-due-to-participation-friction-not-market-disagreement.md
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@ -61,6 +61,12 @@ Dean's List treasury proposal passed despite requiring active market participati
Dean's List DAO fee structure proposal passed despite requiring traders to actively migrate to new pools and accept 20x higher fees (0.25% to 5%). The proposal explicitly acknowledged potential 20-30% volume decrease but passed anyway, suggesting the market priced the net treasury benefit (~$19k-25k annual growth) as worth the migration friction. This demonstrates that futarchy can approve proposals with significant user friction when the economic benefit is clear. Dean's List DAO fee structure proposal passed despite requiring traders to actively migrate to new pools and accept 20x higher fees (0.25% to 5%). The proposal explicitly acknowledged potential 20-30% volume decrease but passed anyway, suggesting the market priced the net treasury benefit (~$19k-25k annual growth) as worth the migration friction. This demonstrates that futarchy can approve proposals with significant user friction when the economic benefit is clear.
### Additional Evidence (confirm)
*Source: [[2024-07-18-futardio-proposal-enhancing-the-deans-list-dao-economic-model]] | Added: 2026-03-16*
The Dean's List DAO proposal passed futarchy governance despite requiring complex economic modeling (FDV calculations, TWAP projections, multi-step cash flow analysis) to evaluate. The proposal included detailed scenarios showing 5.33% FDV increase exceeding 3% TWAP requirements, but this level of financial sophistication creates evaluation barriers for typical token holders.
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Relevant Notes: Relevant Notes:

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domains/internet-finance/treasury-buyback-model-creates-constant-buy-pressure-by-converting-revenue-to-governance-token-purchases.md
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@ -36,6 +36,12 @@ The model assumes consistent service demand (6 dApp reviews per month) and stabl
The proposal passed MetaDAO governance but represents a single implementation without long-term performance data. The 80% sell-off assumption is stated as "assumption" in the proposal itself, not empirically validated. No mechanism prevents citizens from selling more than 80% if they face liquidity pressure. The proposal passed MetaDAO governance but represents a single implementation without long-term performance data. The 80% sell-off assumption is stated as "assumption" in the proposal itself, not empirically validated. No mechanism prevents citizens from selling more than 80% if they face liquidity pressure.
### Additional Evidence (extend)
*Source: [[2024-07-18-futardio-proposal-enhancing-the-deans-list-dao-economic-model]] | Added: 2026-03-16*
The Dean's List DAO implemented a treasury buyback model where 80% of USDC revenue (2000 USDC per 2500 USDC dApp review) purchases $DEAN tokens distributed to DAO citizens, with 20% retained as USDC tax. The model assumes 80% of distributed tokens are immediately sold, creating net positive price action where 'buys exceeded sells by 20%' and 'the price will always achieve a higher low on each cycle.' With 400 USDC daily purchases against 500 USDC baseline volume (80% increase), they projected 24% upward price pressure offset by 15% downward pressure from citizen selling, yielding 5.33% FDV increase versus 3% TWAP requirement.
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Relevant Notes: Relevant Notes:

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inbox/archive/2024-07-18-futardio-proposal-enhancing-the-deans-list-dao-economic-model.md
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@ -6,9 +6,13 @@ url: "https://www.futard.io/proposal/5c2XSWQ9rVPge2Umoz1yenZcAwRaQS5bC4i4w87B1WU
date: 2024-07-18 date: 2024-07-18
domain: internet-finance domain: internet-finance
format: data format: data
status: unprocessed status: enrichment
tags: [futardio, metadao, futarchy, solana, governance] tags: [futardio, metadao, futarchy, solana, governance]
event_type: proposal event_type: proposal
processed_by: rio
processed_date: 2026-03-16
enrichments_applied: ["treasury-buyback-model-creates-constant-buy-pressure-by-converting-revenue-to-governance-token-purchases.md", "futarchy-proposals-with-favorable-economics-can-fail-due-to-participation-friction-not-market-disagreement.md"]
extraction_model: "anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5"
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## Proposal Details ## Proposal Details
@ -146,3 +150,15 @@ This way we create volume (3600 \$USDC volume) and the price action is always po
- Autocrat version: 0.3 - Autocrat version: 0.3
- Completed: 2024-07-22 - Completed: 2024-07-22
- Ended: 2024-07-22 - Ended: 2024-07-22
## Key Facts
- The Dean's List DAO charges 2500 USDC per dApp review
- The Dean's List DAO FDV was $337,074 at proposal time
- The Dean's List DAO daily trading volume was $500 at proposal time
- $DEAN circulating supply: 100,000,000 tokens
- $DEAN price at proposal: $0.00337
- Proposal assumed 6 dApp reviews per month generating 15,000 USDC monthly revenue
- Tax distribution: 20% to treasury (3,000 USDC), 80% to $DEAN purchases (12,000 USDC)
- Proposal account: 5c2XSWQ9rVPge2Umoz1yenZcAwRaQS5bC4i4w87B1WUp
- Proposal completed and ended: 2024-07-22