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theseus: add evaluator self-review prevention section

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- What: Codifies that Leo cannot evaluate his own proposals
- Why: Leo flagged the gap — integrity layer must be constrained by the same principle it enforces
- Details: Min 2 domain agent reviews, second-model pass still runs, Cory has veto authority

Pentagon-Agent: Theseus <46864DD4-DA71-4719-A1B4-68F7C55854D3>
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m3taversal 2026-03-31 10:47:40 +01:00
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ops/multi-model-eval-architecture.md
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@ -171,6 +171,17 @@ From NLAH paper (Pan et al.): verification layers can optimize for locally check
5. **Multi-model eval integration** — OpenRouter connection, rubric sharing, disagreement queue.
6. **Self-upgrade eval criteria** — codified in eval workflow, triggered by 3-strikes pattern.
## Evaluator Self-Review Prevention
When Leo proposes claims (cross-domain synthesis, foundations-level):
- Leo cannot be the evaluator on his own proposals
- Minimum 2 domain agent reviews required
- Every domain touched must have a reviewer from that domain
- The second-model eval pass still runs (provides the external check)
- Cory has veto (rollback) authority as final backstop
This closes the obvious gap: the spec defines the integrity layer but doesn't protect against the integrity layer's own blind spots. The constraint enforcement principle must apply to the constrainer too.
## Design Principle
The constraint enforcement layer must be **outside** the agent being constrained. That's why multi-model eval matters, why Leo shouldn't eval his own proposals, and why policy-as-code runs in CI, not in the agent's own process. As agents get more capable, the integrity layer gets more important, not less.