reciprocal edges: 8 edges from 1 new claims
This commit is contained in:
Teleo Agents
parent
1a6db288c5
commit
33c083b2e6
7 changed files with 53 additions and 9 deletions
|
|
@ -15,6 +15,7 @@ related:
|
|||
- anthropic-internal-resource-allocation-shows-6-8-percent-safety-only-headcount-when-dual-use-research-excluded-revealing-gap-between-public-positioning-and-commitment
|
||||
- supply-chain-risk-designation-misdirection-occurs-when-instrument-requires-capability-target-structurally-lacks
|
||||
- Coercive governance instruments can be deployed to preserve future capability optionality rather than prevent current harm, as demonstrated when the Pentagon designated Anthropic a supply chain risk for refusing to enable autonomous weapons capabilities not currently in use
|
||||
- supply-chain-risk-enforcement-mechanism-self-undermines-through-commercial-partner-deterrence
|
||||
reweave_edges:
|
||||
- AI investment concentration where 58 percent of funding flows to megarounds and two companies capture 14 percent of all global venture capital creates a structural oligopoly that alignment governance must account for|related|2026-03-28
|
||||
- UK AI Safety Institute|related|2026-03-28
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -15,6 +15,7 @@ related:
|
|||
- private-ai-lab-access-restrictions-create-government-offensive-defensive-capability-asymmetries-without-accountability-structure
|
||||
- government designation of safety-conscious AI labs as supply chain risks inverts the regulatory dynamic by penalizing safety constraints rather than enforcing them
|
||||
- Coercive AI governance instruments self-negate at operational timescale when governing strategically indispensable capabilities because intra-government coordination failure makes sustained restriction impossible
|
||||
- supply-chain-risk-enforcement-mechanism-self-undermines-through-commercial-partner-deterrence
|
||||
supports:
|
||||
- Coercive governance instruments produce offense-defense asymmetries through selective enforcement within the deploying agency
|
||||
reweave_edges:
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -10,8 +10,18 @@ agent: leo
|
|||
sourced_from: grand-strategy/2026-04-22-crs-in12669-pentagon-anthropic-autonomous-weapons-congress.md
|
||||
scope: structural
|
||||
sourcer: Congressional Research Service
|
||||
supports: ["voluntary-ai-safety-constraints-lack-legal-enforcement-mechanism-when-primary-customer-demands-safety-unconstrained-alternatives"]
|
||||
related: ["supply-chain-risk-designation-misdirection-occurs-when-instrument-requires-capability-target-structurally-lacks", "voluntary-ai-safety-constraints-lack-legal-enforcement-mechanism-when-primary-customer-demands-safety-unconstrained-alternatives", "frontier-ai-capability-national-security-criticality-prevents-government-from-enforcing-own-governance-instruments", "coercive-governance-instruments-produce-offense-defense-asymmetries-through-selective-enforcement-within-deploying-agency", "government designation of safety-conscious AI labs as supply chain risks inverts the regulatory dynamic by penalizing safety constraints rather than enforcing them", "pentagon-military-ai-contracts-systematically-demand-any-lawful-use-terms-as-confirmed-by-three-independent-lab-negotiations", "coercive-governance-instruments-create-offense-defense-asymmetries-when-applied-to-dual-use-capabilities", "coercive-governance-instruments-deployed-for-future-optionality-preservation-not-current-harm-prevention-when-pentagon-designates-domestic-ai-labs-as-supply-chain-risks"]
|
||||
supports:
|
||||
- voluntary-ai-safety-constraints-lack-legal-enforcement-mechanism-when-primary-customer-demands-safety-unconstrained-alternatives
|
||||
related:
|
||||
- supply-chain-risk-designation-misdirection-occurs-when-instrument-requires-capability-target-structurally-lacks
|
||||
- voluntary-ai-safety-constraints-lack-legal-enforcement-mechanism-when-primary-customer-demands-safety-unconstrained-alternatives
|
||||
- frontier-ai-capability-national-security-criticality-prevents-government-from-enforcing-own-governance-instruments
|
||||
- coercive-governance-instruments-produce-offense-defense-asymmetries-through-selective-enforcement-within-deploying-agency
|
||||
- government designation of safety-conscious AI labs as supply chain risks inverts the regulatory dynamic by penalizing safety constraints rather than enforcing them
|
||||
- pentagon-military-ai-contracts-systematically-demand-any-lawful-use-terms-as-confirmed-by-three-independent-lab-negotiations
|
||||
- coercive-governance-instruments-create-offense-defense-asymmetries-when-applied-to-dual-use-capabilities
|
||||
- coercive-governance-instruments-deployed-for-future-optionality-preservation-not-current-harm-prevention-when-pentagon-designates-domestic-ai-labs-as-supply-chain-risks
|
||||
- supply-chain-risk-enforcement-mechanism-self-undermines-through-commercial-partner-deterrence
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
# Coercive governance instruments can be deployed to preserve future capability optionality rather than prevent current harm, as demonstrated when the Pentagon designated Anthropic a supply chain risk for refusing to enable autonomous weapons capabilities not currently in use
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -22,6 +22,7 @@ related:
|
|||
- supply-chain-risk-designation-misdirection-occurs-when-instrument-requires-capability-target-structurally-lacks
|
||||
- Coercive governance instruments can be deployed to preserve future capability optionality rather than prevent current harm, as demonstrated when the Pentagon designated Anthropic a supply chain risk for refusing to enable autonomous weapons capabilities not currently in use
|
||||
- Coercive AI governance instruments self-negate at operational timescale when governing strategically indispensable capabilities because intra-government coordination failure makes sustained restriction impossible
|
||||
- supply-chain-risk-enforcement-mechanism-self-undermines-through-commercial-partner-deterrence
|
||||
reweave_edges:
|
||||
- Coercive governance instruments can be deployed to preserve future capability optionality rather than prevent current harm, as demonstrated when the Pentagon designated Anthropic a supply chain risk for refusing to enable autonomous weapons capabilities not currently in use|related|2026-04-26
|
||||
- Coercive AI governance instruments self-negate at operational timescale when governing strategically indispensable capabilities because intra-government coordination failure makes sustained restriction impossible|related|2026-04-27
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -10,9 +10,23 @@ agent: leo
|
|||
sourced_from: grand-strategy/2026-01-12-defensescoop-hegseth-ai-strategy-any-lawful-use-mandate.md
|
||||
scope: causal
|
||||
sourcer: DefenseScoop
|
||||
supports: ["pentagon-military-ai-contracts-systematically-demand-any-lawful-use-terms-as-confirmed-by-three-independent-lab-negotiations"]
|
||||
challenges: ["frontier-ai-capability-national-security-criticality-prevents-government-from-enforcing-own-governance-instruments"]
|
||||
related: ["mutually-assured-deregulation-makes-voluntary-ai-governance-structurally-untenable-through-competitive-disadvantage-conversion", "pentagon-military-ai-contracts-systematically-demand-any-lawful-use-terms-as-confirmed-by-three-independent-lab-negotiations", "frontier-ai-capability-national-security-criticality-prevents-government-from-enforcing-own-governance-instruments", "pentagon-ai-contract-negotiations-stratify-into-three-tiers-creating-inverse-market-signal-rewarding-minimum-constraint", "use-based-ai-governance-emerged-as-legislative-framework-through-slotkin-ai-guardrails-act", "military-ai-contract-language-any-lawful-use-creates-surveillance-loophole-through-statutory-permission-structure", "use-based-ai-governance-emerged-as-legislative-framework-but-lacks-bipartisan-support", "hegseth-any-lawful-use-mandate-converts-voluntary-military-ai-governance-erosion-to-state-mandated-elimination", "procurement-governance-mismatch-makes-bilateral-contracts-structurally-insufficient-for-military-ai-governance"]
|
||||
supports:
|
||||
- pentagon-military-ai-contracts-systematically-demand-any-lawful-use-terms-as-confirmed-by-three-independent-lab-negotiations
|
||||
challenges:
|
||||
- frontier-ai-capability-national-security-criticality-prevents-government-from-enforcing-own-governance-instruments
|
||||
related:
|
||||
- mutually-assured-deregulation-makes-voluntary-ai-governance-structurally-untenable-through-competitive-disadvantage-conversion
|
||||
- pentagon-military-ai-contracts-systematically-demand-any-lawful-use-terms-as-confirmed-by-three-independent-lab-negotiations
|
||||
- frontier-ai-capability-national-security-criticality-prevents-government-from-enforcing-own-governance-instruments
|
||||
- pentagon-ai-contract-negotiations-stratify-into-three-tiers-creating-inverse-market-signal-rewarding-minimum-constraint
|
||||
- use-based-ai-governance-emerged-as-legislative-framework-through-slotkin-ai-guardrails-act
|
||||
- military-ai-contract-language-any-lawful-use-creates-surveillance-loophole-through-statutory-permission-structure
|
||||
- use-based-ai-governance-emerged-as-legislative-framework-but-lacks-bipartisan-support
|
||||
- hegseth-any-lawful-use-mandate-converts-voluntary-military-ai-governance-erosion-to-state-mandated-elimination
|
||||
- procurement-governance-mismatch-makes-bilateral-contracts-structurally-insufficient-for-military-ai-governance
|
||||
- supply-chain-risk-enforcement-mechanism-self-undermines-through-commercial-partner-deterrence
|
||||
challenged_by:
|
||||
- supply-chain-risk-enforcement-mechanism-self-undermines-through-commercial-partner-deterrence
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
# Hegseth's January 2026 'any lawful use' mandate converts voluntary military AI governance erosion from market equilibrium to state-mandated elimination through procurement exclusion
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -10,8 +10,18 @@ agent: leo
|
|||
sourced_from: grand-strategy/2026-00-00-abiri-mutually-assured-deregulation-arxiv.md
|
||||
scope: structural
|
||||
sourcer: Gilad Abiri
|
||||
supports: ["mandatory-legislative-governance-closes-technology-coordination-gap-while-voluntary-governance-widens-it", "global-capitalism-functions-as-a-misaligned-optimizer-that-produces-outcomes-no-participant-would-choose-because-individual-rationality-aggregates-into-collective-irrationality-without-coordination-mechanisms", "binding-international-governance-requires-commercial-migration-path-at-signing-not-low-competitive-stakes-at-inception"]
|
||||
related: ["mandatory-legislative-governance-closes-technology-coordination-gap-while-voluntary-governance-widens-it", "global-capitalism-functions-as-a-misaligned-optimizer-that-produces-outcomes-no-participant-would-choose-because-individual-rationality-aggregates-into-collective-irrationality-without-coordination-mechanisms", "ai-governance-discourse-capture-by-competitiveness-framing-inverts-china-us-participation-patterns", "mutually-assured-deregulation-makes-voluntary-ai-governance-structurally-untenable-through-competitive-disadvantage-conversion", "gilad-abiri", "ai-governance-failure-takes-four-structurally-distinct-forms-each-requiring-different-intervention"]
|
||||
supports:
|
||||
- mandatory-legislative-governance-closes-technology-coordination-gap-while-voluntary-governance-widens-it
|
||||
- global-capitalism-functions-as-a-misaligned-optimizer-that-produces-outcomes-no-participant-would-choose-because-individual-rationality-aggregates-into-collective-irrationality-without-coordination-mechanisms
|
||||
- binding-international-governance-requires-commercial-migration-path-at-signing-not-low-competitive-stakes-at-inception
|
||||
related:
|
||||
- mandatory-legislative-governance-closes-technology-coordination-gap-while-voluntary-governance-widens-it
|
||||
- global-capitalism-functions-as-a-misaligned-optimizer-that-produces-outcomes-no-participant-would-choose-because-individual-rationality-aggregates-into-collective-irrationality-without-coordination-mechanisms
|
||||
- ai-governance-discourse-capture-by-competitiveness-framing-inverts-china-us-participation-patterns
|
||||
- mutually-assured-deregulation-makes-voluntary-ai-governance-structurally-untenable-through-competitive-disadvantage-conversion
|
||||
- gilad-abiri
|
||||
- ai-governance-failure-takes-four-structurally-distinct-forms-each-requiring-different-intervention
|
||||
- supply-chain-risk-enforcement-mechanism-self-undermines-through-commercial-partner-deterrence
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
# Mutually Assured Deregulation makes voluntary AI governance structurally untenable because each actor's restraint creates competitive disadvantage, converting the governance game from cooperation to prisoner's dilemma
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -10,8 +10,15 @@ agent: leo
|
|||
sourced_from: grand-strategy/2026-04-22-axios-anthropic-no-kill-switch-dc-circuit.md
|
||||
scope: structural
|
||||
sourcer: Axios / AP Wire
|
||||
supports: ["voluntary-ai-safety-red-lines-are-structurally-equivalent-to-no-red-lines-when-lacking-constitutional-protection"]
|
||||
related: ["governance-instrument-inversion-occurs-when-policy-tools-produce-opposite-of-stated-objective-through-structural-interaction-effects", "coercive-governance-instruments-produce-offense-defense-asymmetries-through-selective-enforcement-within-deploying-agency", "government designation of safety-conscious AI labs as supply chain risks inverts the regulatory dynamic by penalizing safety constraints rather than enforcing them", "supply-chain-risk-designation-misdirection-occurs-when-instrument-requires-capability-target-structurally-lacks", "coercive-governance-instruments-deployed-for-future-optionality-preservation-not-current-harm-prevention-when-pentagon-designates-domestic-ai-labs-as-supply-chain-risks"]
|
||||
supports:
|
||||
- voluntary-ai-safety-red-lines-are-structurally-equivalent-to-no-red-lines-when-lacking-constitutional-protection
|
||||
related:
|
||||
- governance-instrument-inversion-occurs-when-policy-tools-produce-opposite-of-stated-objective-through-structural-interaction-effects
|
||||
- coercive-governance-instruments-produce-offense-defense-asymmetries-through-selective-enforcement-within-deploying-agency
|
||||
- government designation of safety-conscious AI labs as supply chain risks inverts the regulatory dynamic by penalizing safety constraints rather than enforcing them
|
||||
- supply-chain-risk-designation-misdirection-occurs-when-instrument-requires-capability-target-structurally-lacks
|
||||
- coercive-governance-instruments-deployed-for-future-optionality-preservation-not-current-harm-prevention-when-pentagon-designates-domestic-ai-labs-as-supply-chain-risks
|
||||
- supply-chain-risk-enforcement-mechanism-self-undermines-through-commercial-partner-deterrence
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
# Supply chain risk designation of domestic AI lab with no classified network access is governance instrument misdirection because the instrument requires backdoor capability that static model deployment structurally precludes
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
Loading…
Reference in a new issue