diff --git a/domains/ai-alignment/only binding regulation with enforcement teeth changes frontier AI lab behavior because every voluntary commitment has been eroded abandoned or made conditional on competitor behavior when commercially inconvenient.md b/domains/ai-alignment/only binding regulation with enforcement teeth changes frontier AI lab behavior because every voluntary commitment has been eroded abandoned or made conditional on competitor behavior when commercially inconvenient.md index 87548ba1..05beca38 100644 --- a/domains/ai-alignment/only binding regulation with enforcement teeth changes frontier AI lab behavior because every voluntary commitment has been eroded abandoned or made conditional on competitor behavior when commercially inconvenient.md +++ b/domains/ai-alignment/only binding regulation with enforcement teeth changes frontier AI lab behavior because every voluntary commitment has been eroded abandoned or made conditional on competitor behavior when commercially inconvenient.md @@ -7,10 +7,12 @@ source: "Stanford FMTI (Dec 2025), EU enforcement actions (2025), TIME/CNN on An created: 2026-03-16 related: - "UK AI Safety Institute" + - "Binding international AI governance achieves legal form through scope stratification — the Council of Europe AI Framework Convention entered force by explicitly excluding national security, defense applications, and making private sector obligations optional" reweave_edges: - "UK AI Safety Institute|related|2026-03-28" - "cross lab alignment evaluation surfaces safety gaps internal evaluation misses providing empirical basis for mandatory third party evaluation|supports|2026-04-03" - "multilateral verification mechanisms can substitute for failed voluntary commitments when binding enforcement replaces unilateral sacrifice|supports|2026-04-03" + - "Binding international AI governance achieves legal form through scope stratification — the Council of Europe AI Framework Convention entered force by explicitly excluding national security, defense applications, and making private sector obligations optional|related|2026-04-04" supports: - "cross lab alignment evaluation surfaces safety gaps internal evaluation misses providing empirical basis for mandatory third party evaluation" - "multilateral verification mechanisms can substitute for failed voluntary commitments when binding enforcement replaces unilateral sacrifice" diff --git a/domains/grand-strategy/ai-weapons-governance-tractability-stratifies-by-strategic-utility-creating-ottawa-treaty-path-for-medium-utility-categories.md b/domains/grand-strategy/ai-weapons-governance-tractability-stratifies-by-strategic-utility-creating-ottawa-treaty-path-for-medium-utility-categories.md index 1823545d..dc927aaa 100644 --- a/domains/grand-strategy/ai-weapons-governance-tractability-stratifies-by-strategic-utility-creating-ottawa-treaty-path-for-medium-utility-categories.md +++ b/domains/grand-strategy/ai-weapons-governance-tractability-stratifies-by-strategic-utility-creating-ottawa-treaty-path-for-medium-utility-categories.md @@ -12,6 +12,10 @@ attribution: - handle: "leo" context: "Leo (synthesis from US Army Project Convergence, DARPA programs, CCW GGE documentation, CNAS autonomous weapons reports, HRW 'Losing Humanity' 2012)" related: ["the legislative ceiling on military ai governance is conditional not absolute cwc proves binding governance without carveouts is achievable but requires three currently absent conditions"] +supports: + - "Binding international AI governance achieves legal form through scope stratification — the Council of Europe AI Framework Convention entered force by explicitly excluding national security, defense applications, and making private sector obligations optional" +reweave_edges: + - "Binding international AI governance achieves legal form through scope stratification — the Council of Europe AI Framework Convention entered force by explicitly excluding national security, defense applications, and making private sector obligations optional|supports|2026-04-04" --- # AI weapons governance tractability stratifies by strategic utility — high-utility targeting AI faces firm legislative ceiling while medium-utility loitering munitions and autonomous naval mines follow Ottawa Treaty path where stigmatization plus low strategic exclusivity enables binding instruments outside CCW diff --git a/domains/grand-strategy/international-ai-governance-stepping-stone-theory-fails-because-strategic-actors-opt-out-at-non-binding-stage.md b/domains/grand-strategy/international-ai-governance-stepping-stone-theory-fails-because-strategic-actors-opt-out-at-non-binding-stage.md index 199075e3..2583a89d 100644 --- a/domains/grand-strategy/international-ai-governance-stepping-stone-theory-fails-because-strategic-actors-opt-out-at-non-binding-stage.md +++ b/domains/grand-strategy/international-ai-governance-stepping-stone-theory-fails-because-strategic-actors-opt-out-at-non-binding-stage.md @@ -14,6 +14,9 @@ supports: - "AI governance discourse has been captured by economic competitiveness framing, inverting predicted participation patterns where China signs non-binding declarations while the US opts out" reweave_edges: - "AI governance discourse has been captured by economic competitiveness framing, inverting predicted participation patterns where China signs non-binding declarations while the US opts out|supports|2026-04-04" + - "Binding international AI governance achieves legal form through scope stratification — the Council of Europe AI Framework Convention entered force by explicitly excluding national security, defense applications, and making private sector obligations optional|challenges|2026-04-04" +challenges: + - "Binding international AI governance achieves legal form through scope stratification — the Council of Europe AI Framework Convention entered force by explicitly excluding national security, defense applications, and making private sector obligations optional" --- # International AI governance stepping-stone theory (voluntary → non-binding → binding) fails because strategic actors with frontier AI capabilities opt out even at the non-binding declaration stage diff --git a/domains/internet-finance/dutch-auction dynamic bonding curves solve the token launch pricing problem by combining descending price discovery with ascending supply curves eliminating the instantaneous arbitrage that has cost token deployers over 100 million dollars on Ethereum.md b/domains/internet-finance/dutch-auction dynamic bonding curves solve the token launch pricing problem by combining descending price discovery with ascending supply curves eliminating the instantaneous arbitrage that has cost token deployers over 100 million dollars on Ethereum.md index 02f91ea4..329da4d1 100644 --- a/domains/internet-finance/dutch-auction dynamic bonding curves solve the token launch pricing problem by combining descending price discovery with ascending supply curves eliminating the instantaneous arbitrage that has cost token deployers over 100 million dollars on Ethereum.md +++ b/domains/internet-finance/dutch-auction dynamic bonding curves solve the token launch pricing problem by combining descending price discovery with ascending supply curves eliminating the instantaneous arbitrage that has cost token deployers over 100 million dollars on Ethereum.md @@ -8,6 +8,10 @@ created: 2026-03-07 related_to: - "[[internet capital markets compress fundraising from months to days because permissionless raises eliminate gatekeepers while futarchy replaces due diligence bottlenecks with real-time market pricing]]" - "[[cryptos primary use case is capital formation not payments or store of value because permissionless token issuance solves the fundraising bottleneck that solo founders and small teams face]]" +related: + - "auction theory reveals that allocation mechanism design determines price discovery efficiency and revenue because different auction formats produce different outcomes depending on bidder information structure and risk preferences" +reweave_edges: + - "auction theory reveals that allocation mechanism design determines price discovery efficiency and revenue because different auction formats produce different outcomes depending on bidder information structure and risk preferences|related|2026-04-04" --- # dutch-auction dynamic bonding curves solve the token launch pricing problem by combining descending price discovery with ascending supply curves eliminating the instantaneous arbitrage that has cost token deployers over 100 million dollars on Ethereum diff --git a/domains/internet-finance/optimal token launch architecture is layered not monolithic because separating quality governance from price discovery from liquidity bootstrapping from community rewards lets each layer use the mechanism best suited to its objective.md b/domains/internet-finance/optimal token launch architecture is layered not monolithic because separating quality governance from price discovery from liquidity bootstrapping from community rewards lets each layer use the mechanism best suited to its objective.md index fcbc6a50..f9ab6a03 100644 --- a/domains/internet-finance/optimal token launch architecture is layered not monolithic because separating quality governance from price discovery from liquidity bootstrapping from community rewards lets each layer use the mechanism best suited to its objective.md +++ b/domains/internet-finance/optimal token launch architecture is layered not monolithic because separating quality governance from price discovery from liquidity bootstrapping from community rewards lets each layer use the mechanism best suited to its objective.md @@ -9,6 +9,10 @@ secondary_domains: [mechanisms] depends_on: - "[[early-conviction pricing is an unsolved mechanism design problem because systems that reward early believers attract extractive speculators while systems that prevent speculation penalize genuine supporters]]" - "[[token launches are hybrid-value auctions where common-value price discovery and private-value community alignment require different mechanisms because auction theory optimized for one degrades the other]]" +related: + - "auction theory reveals that allocation mechanism design determines price discovery efficiency and revenue because different auction formats produce different outcomes depending on bidder information structure and risk preferences" +reweave_edges: + - "auction theory reveals that allocation mechanism design determines price discovery efficiency and revenue because different auction formats produce different outcomes depending on bidder information structure and risk preferences|related|2026-04-04" --- # Optimal token launch architecture is layered not monolithic because separating quality governance from price discovery from liquidity bootstrapping from community rewards lets each layer use the mechanism best suited to its objective diff --git a/domains/internet-finance/token launches are hybrid-value auctions where common-value price discovery and private-value community alignment require different mechanisms because auction theory optimized for one degrades the other.md b/domains/internet-finance/token launches are hybrid-value auctions where common-value price discovery and private-value community alignment require different mechanisms because auction theory optimized for one degrades the other.md index 1bec47ed..e50f8628 100644 --- a/domains/internet-finance/token launches are hybrid-value auctions where common-value price discovery and private-value community alignment require different mechanisms because auction theory optimized for one degrades the other.md +++ b/domains/internet-finance/token launches are hybrid-value auctions where common-value price discovery and private-value community alignment require different mechanisms because auction theory optimized for one degrades the other.md @@ -6,6 +6,10 @@ confidence: experimental source: "rio, derived from Milgrom & Weber (1982) on common vs private value auctions, Wilson (1977) on winner's curse, applied to token launch mechanisms" created: 2026-03-07 secondary_domains: [mechanisms] +related: + - "auction theory reveals that allocation mechanism design determines price discovery efficiency and revenue because different auction formats produce different outcomes depending on bidder information structure and risk preferences" +reweave_edges: + - "auction theory reveals that allocation mechanism design determines price discovery efficiency and revenue because different auction formats produce different outcomes depending on bidder information structure and risk preferences|related|2026-04-04" --- # Token launches are hybrid-value auctions where common-value price discovery and private-value community alignment require different mechanisms because auction theory optimized for one degrades the other