diff --git a/inbox/queue/2026-04-29-cftc-anprm-comment-period-closes-april-30-2026.md b/inbox/queue/2026-04-29-cftc-anprm-comment-period-closes-april-30-2026.md
index 595df1319..072da8ca7 100644
--- a/inbox/queue/2026-04-29-cftc-anprm-comment-period-closes-april-30-2026.md
+++ b/inbox/queue/2026-04-29-cftc-anprm-comment-period-closes-april-30-2026.md
@@ -59,7 +59,7 @@ intake_tier: research-task
 **What I expected but didn't find:** Any ANPRM question or practitioner analysis addressing: (a) governance markets settling against token prices, (b) conditional markets where settlement is endogenous, (c) on-chain protocols vs. DCM-listed contracts. Zero.
 
 **KB connections:**
-- [[MetaDAO conditional governance markets may fall outside the CFTC event contract definition because TWAP settlement against internal token price is endogenous rather than an external observable event]] — the ANPRM scope implicitly excludes this question
+- MetaDAO conditional governance markets may fall outside the CFTC event contract definition because TWAP settlement against internal token price is endogenous rather than an external observable event — the ANPRM scope implicitly excludes this question
 - [[futarchy-based fundraising creates regulatory separation because there are no beneficial owners and investment decisions emerge from market forces not centralized control]] — the ANPRM's focus on DCMs reinforces this separation
 
 **Extraction hints:**
@@ -68,6 +68,6 @@ intake_tier: research-task
 **Context:** The NPRM will be the next major rulemaking step. Timeline is uncertain (6-18 months typical). The ANPRM results will shape what questions the NPRM addresses. Since governance markets are absent from the ANPRM, they will be absent from the NPRM unless a major enforcement action or political event forces them in.
 
 ## Curator Notes
-PRIMARY CONNECTION: [[MetaDAO conditional governance markets may fall outside the CFTC event contract definition because TWAP settlement against internal token price is endogenous rather than an external observable event]]
+PRIMARY CONNECTION: MetaDAO conditional governance markets may fall outside the CFTC event contract definition because TWAP settlement against internal token price is endogenous rather than an external observable event
 WHY ARCHIVED: The ANPRM's scope defines the regulatory perimeter for the next 2-5 years of prediction market regulation; its exclusion of governance markets from all 40+ questions is the most authoritative available evidence that the TWAP endogeneity distinction will not be tested in the near term
 EXTRACTION HINT: The extractor should note that "absence from the ANPRM" is not the same as "definitely legal" — it means the question hasn't been posed, not that the answer is clear. The claim should be scoped to "the upcoming regulatory framework will be structurally inapplicable absent a novel enforcement theory"
diff --git a/inbox/queue/2026-04-29-hyperliquid-hip4-kalshi-partnership-onchain-prediction-markets.md b/inbox/queue/2026-04-29-hyperliquid-hip4-kalshi-partnership-onchain-prediction-markets.md
index 3368dff17..f4084e94e 100644
--- a/inbox/queue/2026-04-29-hyperliquid-hip4-kalshi-partnership-onchain-prediction-markets.md
+++ b/inbox/queue/2026-04-29-hyperliquid-hip4-kalshi-partnership-onchain-prediction-markets.md
@@ -56,6 +56,6 @@ intake_tier: research-task
 **Context:** Bloomberg (April 29) treats Hyperliquid as a competitor to Kalshi/Polymarket. The institutional narrative is "crypto exchange vs. prediction market." The regulatory narrative is different: Hyperliquid is explicitly offshore, which is why it can offer prediction markets without CFTC oversight. MetaDAO has neither offshore structure nor DCM registration — its only regulatory defense is the structural distinction.
 
 ## Curator Notes
-PRIMARY CONNECTION: [[MetaDAO conditional governance markets may fall outside the CFTC event contract definition because TWAP settlement against internal token price is endogenous rather than an external observable event]]
+PRIMARY CONNECTION: MetaDAO conditional governance markets may fall outside the CFTC event contract definition because TWAP settlement against internal token price is endogenous rather than an external observable event
 WHY ARCHIVED: HIP-4 + Kalshi creates a natural contrast case: offshore decentralized event contracts (HIP-4) vs. on-chain governance contracts (MetaDAO) — two different structural strategies for avoiding DCM registration; the comparison clarifies why MetaDAO's TWAP endogeneity distinction is substantive, not cosmetic
 EXTRACTION HINT: The extractor should focus on the structural comparison between HIP-4 (offshore + external event settlement) and MetaDAO (US-accessible + endogenous TWAP settlement) — this contrast makes the TWAP endogeneity distinction legible to legal practitioners who understand why HIP-4 blocks US users
diff --git a/inbox/queue/2026-04-29-polymarket-seeks-cftc-main-exchange-us-reapproval.md b/inbox/queue/2026-04-29-polymarket-seeks-cftc-main-exchange-us-reapproval.md
index 95ba2489e..2713957b7 100644
--- a/inbox/queue/2026-04-29-polymarket-seeks-cftc-main-exchange-us-reapproval.md
+++ b/inbox/queue/2026-04-29-polymarket-seeks-cftc-main-exchange-us-reapproval.md
@@ -45,7 +45,7 @@ intake_tier: research-task
 
 **KB connections:**
 - [[futarchy-based fundraising creates regulatory separation because there are no beneficial owners and investment decisions emerge from market forces not centralized control]] — Polymarket's regulatory path (full DCM compliance) is the opposite of MetaDAO's structural separation argument
-- [[Teleocap makes capital formation permissionless by letting anyone propose investment terms while AI agents evaluate debate and futarchy determines funding]] — Teleocap is not competing with Polymarket; different use case entirely
+- Teleocap makes capital formation permissionless by letting anyone propose investment terms while AI agents evaluate debate and futarchy determines funding — Teleocap is not competing with Polymarket; different use case entirely
 
 **Extraction hints:**
 1. "Polymarket's path to US re-entry (DCM registration via $112M acquisition + regulatory approval) demonstrates the full compliance cost of the 'regulated event contract platform' model — a cost structure that forecloses this path for decentralized governance markets like MetaDAO" [confidence: likely]