From 3cbf43494ccd6112fe903c3b722ff792ccfb8a24 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Teleo Agents Date: Tue, 24 Mar 2026 13:38:32 +0000 Subject: [PATCH] auto-fix: strip 11 broken wiki links Pipeline auto-fixer: removed [[ ]] brackets from links that don't resolve to existing claims in the knowledge base. --- decisions/internet-finance/metadao-create-futardio.md | 4 ++-- .../internet-finance/metadao-develop-saber-vote-market.md | 4 ++-- .../metadao-increase-meta-liquidity-dutch-auction.md | 6 +++--- decisions/internet-finance/metadao-migrate-meta-token.md | 4 ++-- decisions/internet-finance/metadao-release-launchpad.md | 4 ++-- 5 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-) diff --git a/decisions/internet-finance/metadao-create-futardio.md b/decisions/internet-finance/metadao-create-futardio.md index e6a00934..5a6186b0 100644 --- a/decisions/internet-finance/metadao-create-futardio.md +++ b/decisions/internet-finance/metadao-create-futardio.md @@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ last_updated: 2026-03-24 ## Summary & Connections -**Second attempt to create Futardio — also failed.** After the Memecoin Launchpad proposal ([[metadao-develop-memecoin-launchpad]], Aug 2024) was rejected, this was a second attempt. It too failed. +**Second attempt to create Futardio — also failed.** After the Memecoin Launchpad proposal (metadao-develop-memecoin-launchpad, Aug 2024) was rejected, this was a second attempt. It too failed. **Outcome:** Failed (~2024-11-25). @@ -52,6 +52,6 @@ last_updated: 2026-03-24 ## Relationship to KB - [[metadao]] — parent entity -- [[metadao-develop-memecoin-launchpad]] — first attempt (Aug 2024, failed) +- metadao-develop-memecoin-launchpad — first attempt (Aug 2024, failed) - [[metadao-release-launchpad]] — third attempt that finally passed (Feb 2025) - [[futarchy can override its own prior decisions when new evidence emerges because conditional markets re-evaluate proposals against current information not historical commitments]] — the market eventually approved what it twice rejected diff --git a/decisions/internet-finance/metadao-develop-saber-vote-market.md b/decisions/internet-finance/metadao-develop-saber-vote-market.md index 4f8c8fdb..79fece3b 100644 --- a/decisions/internet-finance/metadao-develop-saber-vote-market.md +++ b/decisions/internet-finance/metadao-develop-saber-vote-market.md @@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ last_updated: 2026-03-24 ## Summary & Connections -**Proposal 2 — pivot from Marinade to Saber vote market.** After Proposal 0 ([[metadao-develop-lst-vote-market]]) passed for a Marinade bribe platform, Marinade started building internally. Proph3t pivoted to Saber, which wanted MetaDAO to build their vote market instead. $150K funded by ecosystem consortium (UXD, BlazeStake, LP Finance, Saber). MetaDAO owns majority of platform. $62K budget for 2-month build. +**Proposal 2 — pivot from Marinade to Saber vote market.** After Proposal 0 (metadao-develop-lst-vote-market) passed for a Marinade bribe platform, Marinade started building internally. Proph3t pivoted to Saber, which wanted MetaDAO to build their vote market instead. $150K funded by ecosystem consortium (UXD, BlazeStake, LP Finance, Saber). MetaDAO owns majority of platform. $62K budget for 2-month build. **Outcome:** Passed (~2023-12-22). @@ -69,4 +69,4 @@ It looks like things are coming full circle. Here, I propose that we build a vot ## Relationship to KB - [[metadao]] — parent entity, early product pivot -- [[metadao-develop-lst-vote-market]] — Proposal 0 that led to this pivot +- metadao-develop-lst-vote-market — Proposal 0 that led to this pivot diff --git a/decisions/internet-finance/metadao-increase-meta-liquidity-dutch-auction.md b/decisions/internet-finance/metadao-increase-meta-liquidity-dutch-auction.md index 2e219f21..ae23c0e7 100644 --- a/decisions/internet-finance/metadao-increase-meta-liquidity-dutch-auction.md +++ b/decisions/internet-finance/metadao-increase-meta-liquidity-dutch-auction.md @@ -33,8 +33,8 @@ last_updated: 2026-03-24 **Outcome:** Passed (2024-03-02). **Connections:** -- The sealed-bid auction for multisig compensation is remarkable mechanism design: 10 candidates, sealed bids, lowest 4 selected. Ben H and Nico bid 0 META, joebuild bid 0.2, Dodecahedr0x bid 0.25. This is [[the Vickrey auction makes honesty the dominant strategy by paying winners the second-highest bid rather than their own]] applied informally to governance roles. -- The Dutch auction mechanism (descending price until filled) is the precursor to the more sophisticated Dutch-auction dynamic bonding curves discussed in [[dutch-auction dynamic bonding curves solve the token launch pricing problem by combining descending price discovery with ascending supply curves]] +- The sealed-bid auction for multisig compensation is remarkable mechanism design: 10 candidates, sealed bids, lowest 4 selected. Ben H and Nico bid 0 META, joebuild bid 0.2, Dodecahedr0x bid 0.25. This is the Vickrey auction makes honesty the dominant strategy by paying winners the second-highest bid rather than their own applied informally to governance roles. +- The Dutch auction mechanism (descending price until filled) is the precursor to the more sophisticated Dutch-auction dynamic bonding curves discussed in dutch-auction dynamic bonding curves solve the token launch pricing problem by combining descending price discovery with ascending supply curves - "There is currently strong demand for META, with an oversubscribed raise, proposals from notable parties attempting to purchase META at below market price, and a well-known figure DCAing into META" — context: this is during the Feb-Mar 2024 period when Ben Hawkins and Pantera were also trying to buy META - Moving all liquidity to the 1% fee pool after the auction addresses the [[futarchy adoption faces friction from token price psychology proposal complexity and liquidity requirements]] — protocol-owned liquidity reduces the friction @@ -113,4 +113,4 @@ This proposal will significantly increase Meta DAO's protocol-owned liquidity as ## Relationship to KB - [[metadao]] — parent entity, liquidity bootstrapping - [[futarchy adoption faces friction from token price psychology proposal complexity and liquidity requirements]] — addresses liquidity friction -- [[dutch-auction dynamic bonding curves solve the token launch pricing problem by combining descending price discovery with ascending supply curves]] — early manual implementation of Dutch auction concept +- dutch-auction dynamic bonding curves solve the token launch pricing problem by combining descending price discovery with ascending supply curves — early manual implementation of Dutch auction concept diff --git a/decisions/internet-finance/metadao-migrate-meta-token.md b/decisions/internet-finance/metadao-migrate-meta-token.md index 81178ae2..1e1703f4 100644 --- a/decisions/internet-finance/metadao-migrate-meta-token.md +++ b/decisions/internet-finance/metadao-migrate-meta-token.md @@ -35,7 +35,7 @@ last_updated: 2026-03-24 **Outcome:** Passed (~2025-08-10). **Connections:** -- This was FORCED by the treasury exhaustion from [[metadao-otc-trade-theia-3]] — "this sale will exhaust the DAO treasury of META holdings. It is therefore critical that we plan for the eventual token migration." The Theia deal explicitly flagged this would happen. +- This was FORCED by the treasury exhaustion from metadao-otc-trade-theia-3 — "this sale will exhaust the DAO treasury of META holdings. It is therefore critical that we plan for the eventual token migration." The Theia deal explicitly flagged this would happen. - Validates [[futarchy-daos-require-mintable-governance-tokens-because-fixed-supply-treasuries-exhaust-without-issuance-authority-forcing-disruptive-token-architecture-migrations]] — MetaDAO lived through exactly this failure mode - The [[metadao-burn-993-percent-meta]] (Proposal 11) started the path: burn 99.3% → thin treasury → OTC deals deplete remainder → forced migration to mintable token - "Futarchy is market-driven decision making. To stay true to that principle, it also requires market-driven issuance" — Proph3t's framing makes mintability a philosophical commitment, not just a practical fix @@ -98,6 +98,6 @@ Work on the migration is already underway and should take up to 1 week. Migratio ## Relationship to KB - [[metadao]] — parent entity, token architecture change -- [[metadao-otc-trade-theia-3]] — treasury exhaustion that forced this migration +- metadao-otc-trade-theia-3 — treasury exhaustion that forced this migration - [[metadao-burn-993-percent-meta]] — started the path to treasury depletion - [[futarchy-daos-require-mintable-governance-tokens-because-fixed-supply-treasuries-exhaust-without-issuance-authority-forcing-disruptive-token-architecture-migrations]] — MetaDAO is the canonical case diff --git a/decisions/internet-finance/metadao-release-launchpad.md b/decisions/internet-finance/metadao-release-launchpad.md index bf5e9c26..f1ea9d2e 100644 --- a/decisions/internet-finance/metadao-release-launchpad.md +++ b/decisions/internet-finance/metadao-release-launchpad.md @@ -30,7 +30,7 @@ last_updated: 2026-03-24 **Outcome:** Passed (~2025-03-01). Led directly to the Avici, Umbra, Solomon, OmniPair, and subsequent launches. **Connections:** -- This is the successor to the twice-rejected memecoin launchpad idea ([[metadao-develop-memecoin-launchpad]] failed Aug 2024, [[metadao-create-futardio]] failed Nov 2024). The market approved the infrastructure version but not the speculative version. +- This is the successor to the twice-rejected memecoin launchpad idea (metadao-develop-memecoin-launchpad failed Aug 2024, [[metadao-create-futardio]] failed Nov 2024). The market approved the infrastructure version but not the speculative version. - "If the team walks away on day #1, anyone would be able to raise a proposal to the DAO to liquidate the treasury and return all money to the funders. This is also true on day #30, day #365, and day #1083." — this is the thesis behind [[futarchy-governed liquidation is the enforcement mechanism that makes unruggable ICOs credible because investors can force full treasury return when teams materially misrepresent]] - The "permissioned by us at start" → "transition to permissionless" is what became the MetaDAO (curated) vs futard.io (permissionless) two-tier system - "Bag bias is real, and in this system it works for you as a founder" — Proph3t's insight on community-from-day-one as a feature, not a compromise @@ -100,5 +100,5 @@ We would also have discretion to change the mechanics of launches (e.g. to adopt - [[metadao]] — parent entity, launchpad creation - [[MetaDAO is the futarchy launchpad on Solana where projects raise capital through unruggable ICOs governed by conditional markets creating the first platform for ownership coins at scale]] — this proposal is the origin - [[futarchy-governed liquidation is the enforcement mechanism that makes unruggable ICOs credible because investors can force full treasury return when teams materially misrepresent]] — the liquidation mechanism described here -- [[metadao-develop-memecoin-launchpad]] — earlier rejected version of this idea +- metadao-develop-memecoin-launchpad — earlier rejected version of this idea - [[futarchy-governed permissionless launches require brand separation to manage reputational liability because failed projects on a curated platform damage the platforms credibility]] — "permissioned at start, permissionless later"