rio: extract claims from 2024-06-22-futardio-proposal-thailanddao-event-promotion-to-boost-deans-list-dao-engageme.md
- Source: inbox/archive/2024-06-22-futardio-proposal-thailanddao-event-promotion-to-boost-deans-list-dao-engageme.md - Domain: internet-finance - Extracted by: headless extraction cron Pentagon-Agent: Rio <HEADLESS>
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---
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type: claim
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domain: internet-finance
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description: "Offering contributors payment in tokens at a discount during lockup campaigns creates coordinated demand"
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confidence: experimental
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source: "Dean's List DAO ThailandDAO proposal (futard.io, 2024-06-22)"
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created: 2024-06-22
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---
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# Contributor payment in discounted tokens creates buy pressure when combined with token lockup campaigns
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The Dean's List DAO proposal demonstrates a mechanism where contributors can opt to receive payment in $DEAN tokens at a 10% discount during a governance power campaign. The proposal states: "For the duration of the promotional campaign, DL DAO contributors can opt-in to receive payments in $DEAN tokens at a 10% discount."
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This creates coordinated demand pressure by:
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- Offering contributors a 10% discount on market price as compensation incentive
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- Timing the discount period to coincide with the governance power leaderboard campaign
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- Converting operational expenses into token buy pressure
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- Incentivizing contributors to participate in the lockup mechanism for governance power
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The mechanism combines payment conversion with the broader campaign where locking tokens increases governance power and leaderboard rankings. Contributors receiving discounted tokens have incentive to lock them for multipliers, further reducing circulating supply.
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The proposal includes a specific implementation: "Introduce the option for DL DAO contributors to receive payments in $DEAN tokens at a 10% discount compared to the market price for three months."
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## Evidence
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From the proposal:
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- "For the duration of the promotional campaign, DL DAO contributors can opt-in to receive payments in $DEAN tokens at a 10% discount"
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- "Introduce the option for DL DAO contributors to receive payments in $DEAN tokens at a 10% discount compared to the market price for three months"
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- Campaign includes governance power leaderboard with exclusive perks for top holders
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- Token locking with multipliers increases governance power
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- Proposal allocated 5-7 million $DEAN tokens for the initiative
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- Proposal status: Failed (completed 2024-06-25)
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## Limitations
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This is a proposed mechanism that failed to pass. The actual effectiveness is unproven. The 10% discount may not be sufficient incentive if contributors prefer stable payment in other assets. The mechanism assumes contributors will lock tokens rather than immediately sell the discounted tokens for arbitrage profit. No data exists on contributor behavior or actual buy pressure generated.
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---
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Relevant Notes:
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- [[governance-power-leaderboards-with-exclusive-perks-create-token-lockup-incentives-that-reduce-circulating-supply]]
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- [[dynamic-performance-based-token-minting-replaces-fixed-emission-schedules-by-tying-new-token-creation-to-measurable-outcomes-creating-algorithmic-meritocracy-in-token-distribution]]
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Topics:
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- [[internet-finance/_map]]
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---
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type: claim
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domain: internet-finance
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description: "Futarchy implementations can require proposals to demonstrate measurable token price impact to pass"
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confidence: likely
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source: "Dean's List DAO ThailandDAO proposal on futard.io (2024-06-22)"
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created: 2024-06-22
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depends_on:
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- "MetaDAOs Autocrat program implements futarchy through conditional token markets"
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---
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# Futarchy proposals can condition passage on token price appreciation thresholds creating market-based approval gates
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The Dean's List DAO ThailandDAO proposal demonstrates a futarchy mechanism where proposal passage is explicitly conditioned on achieving a specific token price appreciation threshold. The proposal states: "For this proposal to pass, it must result in a 3% increase in the Time Weighted Average Price (TWAP) of The Dean's List DAO's Fully Diluted Valuation (FDV). The trading period for this proposal will be 3 days."
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This creates a market-based approval gate where:
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- Proposals must demonstrate measurable positive impact on token price (3% TWAP increase over 3 days)
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- The market's expectation of proposal value determines passage, not just token holder votes
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- The threshold is set relative to a specific metric (FDV TWAP) over a defined period
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- Current FDV of $123,263 required a $3,698 increase (3%) for passage
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This mechanism forces proposals to justify their value through market pricing rather than political coalition-building. The proposal failed, suggesting the market did not price in sufficient positive impact to meet the 3% threshold.
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## Evidence
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From the proposal:
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- "For this proposal to pass, it must result in a 3% increase in the Time Weighted Average Price (TWAP) of The Dean's List DAO's Fully Diluted Valuation (FDV)"
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- "The trading period for this proposal will be 3 days"
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- Current FDV: $123,263
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- Required increase: $3,698 (3% of FDV)
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- Proposal status: Failed
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- Completed: 2024-06-25
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- Proposal account: `DgXa6gy7nAFFWe8VDkiReQYhqe1JSYQCJWUBV8Mm6aM`
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- DAO account: `9TKh2yav4WpSNkFV2cLybrWZETBWZBkQ6WB6qV9Nt9dJ`
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- Autocrat version: 0.3
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The proposal was submitted through MetaDAO's futarchy infrastructure (futard.io platform, Autocrat version 0.3).
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---
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Relevant Notes:
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- [[MetaDAOs-Autocrat-program-implements-futarchy-through-conditional-token-markets-where-proposals-create-parallel-pass-and-fail-universes-settled-by-time-weighted-average-price-over-a-three-day-window]]
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- [[coin-price-is-the-fairest-objective-function-for-asset-futarchy]]
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- [[futarchy-adoption-faces-friction-from-token-price-psychology-proposal-complexity-and-liquidity-requirements]]
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Topics:
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- [[internet-finance/_map]]
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---
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type: claim
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domain: internet-finance
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description: "Real-time leaderboards offering exclusive rewards incentivize token holders to lock tokens for governance power multipliers"
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confidence: experimental
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source: "Dean's List DAO ThailandDAO proposal (futard.io, 2024-06-22)"
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created: 2024-06-22
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---
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# Governance power leaderboards with exclusive perks create token lockup incentives that reduce circulating supply
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The Dean's List DAO ThailandDAO proposal demonstrates a mechanism where exclusive real-world perks (travel, accommodation, event access) are awarded based on governance power rankings, creating incentives for token holders to lock tokens for extended periods to increase their governance power through multipliers. The proposal explicitly states that "members lock their $DEAN tokens to increase governance power and climb the leaderboard ranks" and projects this will cause "the circulating supply of the token will decrease significantly."
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The mechanism combines:
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- Real-time public leaderboard showing governance power rankings
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- Exclusive perks for top positions (top 5: airplane fares + 12-day accommodation; top 50: IRL events, airdrops, ongoing perks)
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- Token locking with multipliers to increase governance power
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- Time-based campaign creating urgency (ThailandDAO event Sept 25 - Oct 25)
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The proposal projects this will reduce circulating supply enough to drive a 15x price appreciation ($0.01 to $0.15) and increase FDV from $123,263 to over $2,000,000, though these specific projections are speculative and unvalidated.
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## Evidence
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From the Dean's List DAO proposal:
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- "Deposit your $DEAN tokens or even lock them for a multiplier to increase your governance power and receive awesome perks"
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- "As members lock their $DEAN tokens to increase governance power and climb the leaderboard ranks, the circulating supply of the token will decrease significantly. This reduction in supply will create upward pressure on the token price."
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- Top 5 governance power holders receive airplane fares and accommodation for 12 days
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- Top 50 members receive invitations to IRL events, parties, airdrops from partners
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- Campaign duration: Sept 25 - Oct 25, 2024 (ThailandDAO event)
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- Estimated allocation: 5-7 million $DEAN tokens for the initiative
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## Limitations
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This is a single proposed mechanism that failed to pass (proposal status: Failed, completed 2024-06-25). The actual effectiveness is unproven. The projected 15x price appreciation and $2M FDV are speculative projections from the proposers, not observed outcomes. No data exists on whether token holders actually locked tokens at the projected scale or whether the mechanism achieved the intended supply reduction.
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---
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Relevant Notes:
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- [[futarchy-governed-liquidation-is-the-enforcement-mechanism-that-makes-unruggable-ICOs-credible]]
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- [[MetaDAO-is-the-futarchy-launchpad-on-Solana-where-projects-raise-capital-through-unruggable-ICOs-governed-by-conditional-markets-creating-the-first-platform-for-ownership-coins-at-scale]]
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Topics:
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- [[internet-finance/_map]]
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@ -6,9 +6,15 @@ url: "https://www.futard.io/proposal/DgXa6gy7nAFFWe8VDkiReQYhqe1JSYQCJWUBV8Mm6aM
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date: 2024-06-22
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date: 2024-06-22
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domain: internet-finance
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domain: internet-finance
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format: data
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format: data
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status: unprocessed
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status: processed
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tags: [futardio, metadao, futarchy, solana, governance]
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tags: [futardio, metadao, futarchy, solana, governance]
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event_type: proposal
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event_type: proposal
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processed_by: rio
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processed_date: 2024-06-22
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claims_extracted: ["governance-power-leaderboards-with-exclusive-perks-create-token-lockup-incentives-that-reduce-circulating-supply.md", "futarchy-proposals-can-condition-passage-on-token-price-appreciation-thresholds-creating-market-based-approval-gates.md", "contributor-payment-in-discounted-tokens-creates-buy-pressure-when-combined-with-token-lockup-campaigns.md"]
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enrichments_applied: ["MetaDAOs-Autocrat-program-implements-futarchy-through-conditional-token-markets-where-proposals-create-parallel-pass-and-fail-universes-settled-by-time-weighted-average-price-over-a-three-day-window.md", "MetaDAO-is-the-futarchy-launchpad-on-Solana-where-projects-raise-capital-through-unruggable-ICOs-governed-by-conditional-markets-creating-the-first-platform-for-ownership-coins-at-scale.md", "futarchy-adoption-faces-friction-from-token-price-psychology-proposal-complexity-and-liquidity-requirements.md", "MetaDAOs-futarchy-implementation-shows-limited-trading-volume-in-uncontested-decisions.md"]
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extraction_model: "anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5"
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extraction_notes: "Extracted three novel claims about governance mechanisms (leaderboard-based lockup incentives, TWAP-conditioned proposal passage, discounted token payments) and four enrichments to existing MetaDAO/futarchy claims. The proposal failed, providing valuable negative evidence about futarchy adoption friction and market-based rejection mechanisms. The source demonstrates futarchy in production use for operational governance decisions beyond initial fundraising."
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---
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## Proposal Details
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## Proposal Details
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@ -165,3 +171,13 @@ This proposal to create a promotional event at ThailandDAO, incentivizing govern
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- Autocrat version: 0.3
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- Autocrat version: 0.3
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- Completed: 2024-06-25
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- Completed: 2024-06-25
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- Ended: 2024-06-25
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- Ended: 2024-06-25
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## Key Facts
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- Dean's List DAO ThailandDAO proposal failed (status: Failed, completed 2024-06-25)
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- Proposal required 3% TWAP increase in FDV over 3-day trading period
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- Current FDV: $123,263; required increase: $3,698
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- Proposal used Autocrat version 0.3
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- Estimated campaign costs: $15,000 ($10K travel for top 5, $5K events for top 50)
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- Token allocation: 5-7 million $DEAN tokens
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- ThailandDAO event dates: Sept 25 - Oct 25, 2024 in Koh Samui
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