diff --git a/domains/internet-finance/MetaDAO is the futarchy launchpad on Solana where projects raise capital through unruggable ICOs governed by conditional markets creating the first platform for ownership coins at scale.md b/domains/internet-finance/MetaDAO is the futarchy launchpad on Solana where projects raise capital through unruggable ICOs governed by conditional markets creating the first platform for ownership coins at scale.md
index af4a788c..4c8dded6 100644
--- a/domains/internet-finance/MetaDAO is the futarchy launchpad on Solana where projects raise capital through unruggable ICOs governed by conditional markets creating the first platform for ownership coins at scale.md	
+++ b/domains/internet-finance/MetaDAO is the futarchy launchpad on Solana where projects raise capital through unruggable ICOs governed by conditional markets creating the first platform for ownership coins at scale.md	
@@ -82,6 +82,12 @@ Futardio cult launch (2026-03-03 to 2026-03-04) demonstrates MetaDAO's platform
 
 (challenge) Areal's failed Futardio launch ($11,654 raised of $50K target, REFUNDING status) demonstrates that futarchy-governed fundraising does not guarantee capital formation success. The mechanism provides credible exit guarantees through market-governed liquidation and governance quality through conditional markets, but market participants still evaluate project fundamentals and team credibility. Futarchy reduces rug risk but does not eliminate market skepticism of unproven business models or early-stage teams.
 
+
+### Additional Evidence (extend)
+*Source: [[2026-03-05-futardio-launch-blockrock]] | Added: 2026-03-12 | Extractor: anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5*
+
+BlockRock launches as the first futarchy-governed asset management fund on MetaDAO's infrastructure, demonstrating the platform's expansion beyond meme coins and project fundraising into traditional financial services. The charter explicitly positions BlockRock as using 'MetaDAO's permissionless launchpad' which 'provides full-stack futarchy governance with legal enforcement, so that token value is tied to treasury value.' This represents a second-generation use case that learned from MtnCapital's failure (illiquid VC) by targeting liquid asset allocation instead. However, BlockRock's launch underperformed: $500K target, only $100 committed, refunding status as of 2026-03-06. This suggests MetaDAO's infrastructure may be necessary but not sufficient for asset management adoption.
+
 ---
 
 Relevant Notes:
diff --git a/domains/internet-finance/ai-agents-as-always-on-analysts-scale-fund-capability-with-compute-not-headcount-when-proposals-compete-on-equal-footing-with-human-submissions.md b/domains/internet-finance/ai-agents-as-always-on-analysts-scale-fund-capability-with-compute-not-headcount-when-proposals-compete-on-equal-footing-with-human-submissions.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..b0a924bb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/domains/internet-finance/ai-agents-as-always-on-analysts-scale-fund-capability-with-compute-not-headcount-when-proposals-compete-on-equal-footing-with-human-submissions.md
@@ -0,0 +1,52 @@
+---
+type: claim
+domain: internet-finance
+description: "BlockRock positions AI agents as proposal generators not executors creating permissionless competition between AI and human ideas judged purely by market pricing"
+confidence: experimental
+source: "BlockRock Charter, futard.io launch page, 2026-03-05"
+created: 2026-03-11
+---
+
+# AI agents as always-on analysts scale fund capability with compute not headcount when proposals compete on equal footing with human submissions
+
+BlockRock's architecture positions AI agents as continuous proposal generators that compete with human submissions on equal terms, judged purely by futarchy market pricing. This creates a permissionless meritocracy where AI capability growth directly translates to fund capability growth without adding operational overhead.
+
+**Three critical design constraints:**
+
+1. **Propose, never execute:** AI agents have no authority to force decisions. They submit proposals to the governance layer where conditional markets determine adoption. This eliminates the principal-agent problem and AI alignment risk — agents can suggest but not act.
+
+2. **Judged purely by market pricing:** No institutional bias filters AI proposals. If an AI-generated investment thesis attracts higher conditional token prices than competing proposals, it wins. No credentials required, no committee approval, no human gatekeeping.
+
+3. **Scale with compute, not headcount:** As AI capabilities improve (better models, more data, faster inference), the fund's analytical capacity grows automatically. Traditional asset managers must hire more analysts and build more infrastructure. BlockRock just upgrades the model.
+
+The charter frames this as inverting the traditional scaling problem: "As AI capabilities grow, the fund's capability grows too. With minimal overhead."
+
+**The resulting dynamic:** AI agents ingest live market data, macro signals, and onchain activity to generate a continuous stream of proposals. Human strategists submit competing theses. Traders price both sets of proposals in conditional markets. The best ideas win regardless of source. The fund's intelligence scales with AI progress rather than being bottlenecked by human hiring and organizational complexity.
+
+## Evidence
+
+- BlockRock charter explicitly positions AI agents as "always-on analysts, ingesting live data, market signals, and macro context to generate a continuous stream of proposals"
+- Design constraint: "They propose, never execute. AI agents have no authority to force decisions — only to submit ideas to the governance layer."
+- Meritocracy mechanism: "Their proposals compete with human submissions on equal footing" and "are judged purely by market pricing. No institutional bias filters their ideas."
+- Scaling claim: "They scale with compute, not headcount. As AI capabilities grow, the fund's capability grows too. With minimal overhead."
+
+## Caveats
+
+This is a design specification from BlockRock's charter, not yet proven in operation. The fund closed refunding after one day with only $100 committed against a $500K target, so the AI proposal mechanism has not been tested at scale. The claim describes intended architecture, not validated performance.
+
+## Relationship to Existing Claims
+
+This claim builds on [[LLMs shift investment management from economies of scale to economies of edge because AI collapses the analyst labor cost that forced funds to accumulate AUM rather than generate alpha.md]] by demonstrating a concrete implementation where AI analytical capacity is decoupled from organizational headcount.
+
+It also relates to [[agents create dozens of proposals but only those attracting minimum stake become live futarchic decisions creating a permissionless attention market for capital formation.md]] — BlockRock implements this proposal filtering mechanism for investment theses.
+
+---
+
+Relevant Notes:
+- [[LLMs shift investment management from economies of scale to economies of edge because AI collapses the analyst labor cost that forced funds to accumulate AUM rather than generate alpha.md]]
+- [[agents create dozens of proposals but only those attracting minimum stake become live futarchic decisions creating a permissionless attention market for capital formation.md]]
+- [[optimal governance requires mixing mechanisms because different decisions have different manipulation risk profiles.md]]
+
+Topics:
+- [[domains/internet-finance/_map]]
+- [[core/living-agents/_map]]
diff --git a/domains/internet-finance/asset-management-industry-underperforms-due-to-fee-misalignment-regulatory-drag-and-organizational-complexity-creating-negative-feedback-loop.md b/domains/internet-finance/asset-management-industry-underperforms-due-to-fee-misalignment-regulatory-drag-and-organizational-complexity-creating-negative-feedback-loop.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..e892323e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/domains/internet-finance/asset-management-industry-underperforms-due-to-fee-misalignment-regulatory-drag-and-organizational-complexity-creating-negative-feedback-loop.md
@@ -0,0 +1,44 @@
+---
+type: claim
+domain: internet-finance
+description: "Traditional asset managers earn revenue from management fees regardless of performance creating structural incentive misalignment that compounds with regulatory restrictions and organizational complexity"
+confidence: likely
+source: "BlockRock Charter citing BlackRock revenue structure and industry patterns, 2026-03-05"
+created: 2026-03-11
+---
+
+# Asset management industry underperforms due to fee misalignment regulatory drag and organizational complexity creating negative feedback loop
+
+The $120T+ asset management industry systematically underperforms benchmarks due to three reinforcing structural problems that create a negative feedback loop.
+
+**Fee Misalignment:** BlackRock earns ~73% of revenue from management fees collected regardless of performance, with performance fees accounting for just ~5% of revenue. This incentivizes asset accumulation over alpha generation, consensus-driven investing to minimize career risk, and narrative capture (e.g. shifting ESG stances to chase institutional flows rather than conviction-driven positioning).
+
+**Regulatory Restrictions:** Dense compliance requirements hinder performance through delayed action, fiduciary standards that prefer conservative allocations, and cross-border restrictions that fragment strategy. The gap between optimal capital allocation and legally permissible allocation drags returns.
+
+**Organizational Complexity:** Scale demands bureaucracy. BlackRock operates 20,000+ employees across 70+ global offices managing 1,700+ ETFs. Decisions pass through committees, internal politics shape strategy, and operational overhead reinforces the pressure to prioritize asset gathering over performance.
+
+**The Reinforcing Cycle:** Fee model incentivizes scale → scale demands complexity → complexity invites compliance burden → fee model + complexity + compliance = worse decisions → bad decisions reduce performance → fees come in anyway, removing pressure to fix the system.
+
+This creates the paradox where the largest, most established asset managers are structurally positioned to underperform while continuing to accumulate assets under management.
+
+## Evidence
+
+- BlackRock revenue: ~73% from management fees (AUM-based), ~5% from performance fees (source: BlockRock Charter citing BlackRock financials)
+- BlackRock scale: 20,000+ employees, 70+ global offices, 1,700+ ETFs (source: BlockRock Charter)
+- Industry pattern: "Most actively managed funds underperform their benchmarks, especially after fees" (widely documented, cited in BlockRock Charter)
+- ESG narrative shift example: BlockRock Charter cites BlackRock's changing ESG positioning as evidence of narrative capture over conviction
+
+## Challenges to This Claim
+
+Index funds and passive strategies have grown precisely because active management underperforms, suggesting the market has partially priced in this structural problem. However, passive strategies cannot generate alpha by definition, leaving a gap for performance-aligned active management. The claim does not explain why this gap persists if the incentive misalignment is as severe as stated.
+
+---
+
+Relevant Notes:
+- [[token economics replacing management fees and carried interest creates natural meritocracy in investment governance.md]]
+- [[ownership coins primary value proposition is investor protection not governance quality because anti-rug enforcement through market-governed liquidation creates credible exit guarantees that no amount of decision optimization can match.md]]
+- [[LLMs shift investment management from economies of scale to economies of edge because AI collapses the analyst labor cost that forced funds to accumulate AUM rather than generate alpha.md]]
+
+Topics:
+- [[domains/internet-finance/_map]]
+- [[foundations/teleological-economics/_map]]
diff --git a/domains/internet-finance/blockrock-demonstrates-futarchy-governed-asset-management-with-liquid-portfolio-allocation-replacing-illiquid-vc-bets.md b/domains/internet-finance/blockrock-demonstrates-futarchy-governed-asset-management-with-liquid-portfolio-allocation-replacing-illiquid-vc-bets.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..124c8784
--- /dev/null
+++ b/domains/internet-finance/blockrock-demonstrates-futarchy-governed-asset-management-with-liquid-portfolio-allocation-replacing-illiquid-vc-bets.md
@@ -0,0 +1,43 @@
+---
+type: claim
+domain: internet-finance
+description: "BlockRock applies futarchy to liquid asset allocation after MtnCapital's illiquid VC strategy failed to generate tradeable decision markets"
+confidence: experimental
+source: "BlockRock Charter, futard.io launch page, 2026-03-05"
+created: 2026-03-11
+---
+
+# BlockRock demonstrates futarchy-governed asset management with liquid portfolio allocation replacing illiquid VC bets
+
+BlockRock launches as a futarchy-governed ownership fund targeting liquid onchain assets (spot markets, perpetuals, lending, structured yield, RWAs) rather than private VC deals. This design choice directly responds to MtnCapital's failure, where illiquid private investments with asymmetric information and long timelines proved impossible to price efficiently in decision markets.
+
+The charter explicitly states: "Futarchy governance works by letting markets price competing outcomes, but private VC deals are difficult to price with asymmetric information, long timelines, and binary outcomes. Liquid asset allocation for risk-adjusted returns gives futarchy the pricing efficiency it requires."
+
+BlockRock's mandate is "moderate risk strategy to maximize Sortino ratio (penalizing downside volatility) by allocating the treasury into a portfolio of onchain positions." This creates continuous pricing signals that decision markets can evaluate, unlike binary VC outcomes that only resolve years later.
+
+The MtnCapital precedent demonstrates both the failure mode (illiquid assets) and the safety mechanism (protocol-enforced liquidation returned proportional treasury shares to holders even in failure). BlockRock builds on this lesson by restricting the investment universe to assets with deep liquidity and real-time pricing.
+
+## Evidence
+
+- MtnCapital launched as futarchy-governed VC fund in 2025, struggled to pass proposals, wound down with treasury returned to holders via protocol liquidation
+- BlockRock charter explicitly contrasts liquid asset allocation with "illiquid VC bets" as the design choice enabling futarchy pricing efficiency
+- Solana now offers "spot markets, perpetual futures, lending markets, structured yield products, and RWAs (tokenized stocks, bonds, commodities, etc.)" with "deep liquidity and composable infrastructure"
+- BlockRock targets Sortino ratio optimization through portfolio construction, creating continuous decision market pricing opportunities
+- BlockRock launch status: $500K target, $100 committed, refunding as of 2026-03-06 (launch closed after one day)
+
+## Relationship to Existing Claims
+
+This claim extends [[MetaDAO is the futarchy launchpad on Solana where projects raise capital through unruggable ICOs governed by conditional markets creating the first platform for ownership coins at scale.md]] by demonstrating a second-generation use case that learned from first-generation failures.
+
+It also relates to [[futarchy-excels-at-relative-selection-but-fails-at-absolute-prediction-because-ordinal-ranking-works-while-cardinal-estimation-requires-calibration.md]] — liquid markets provide the continuous calibration that illiquid VC deals cannot.
+
+---
+
+Relevant Notes:
+- [[MetaDAO is the futarchy launchpad on Solana where projects raise capital through unruggable ICOs governed by conditional markets creating the first platform for ownership coins at scale.md]]
+- [[futarchy-excels-at-relative-selection-but-fails-at-absolute-prediction-because-ordinal-ranking-works-while-cardinal-estimation-requires-calibration.md]]
+- [[futarchy-governed-meme-coins-attract-speculative-capital-at-scale.md]]
+
+Topics:
+- [[domains/internet-finance/_map]]
+- [[core/mechanisms/_map]]
diff --git a/domains/internet-finance/futarchy-governed liquidation is the enforcement mechanism that makes unruggable ICOs credible because investors can force full treasury return when teams materially misrepresent.md b/domains/internet-finance/futarchy-governed liquidation is the enforcement mechanism that makes unruggable ICOs credible because investors can force full treasury return when teams materially misrepresent.md
index 1e6b7f59..5e98386c 100644
--- a/domains/internet-finance/futarchy-governed liquidation is the enforcement mechanism that makes unruggable ICOs credible because investors can force full treasury return when teams materially misrepresent.md	
+++ b/domains/internet-finance/futarchy-governed liquidation is the enforcement mechanism that makes unruggable ICOs credible because investors can force full treasury return when teams materially misrepresent.md	
@@ -52,6 +52,12 @@ Critically, the proposal nullifies a prior 90-day restriction on buybacks/liquid
 
 MycoRealms implements unruggable ICO structure with automatic refund mechanism: if $125,000 target not reached within 72 hours, full refunds execute automatically. Post-raise, team has zero direct treasury access — operates on $10,000 monthly allowance with all other expenditures requiring futarchy approval. This creates credible commitment: team cannot rug because they cannot access treasury directly, and investors can force liquidation through futarchy proposals if team materially misrepresents (e.g., fails to publish operational data to Arweave as promised, diverts funds from stated use). Transparency requirement (all invoices, expenses, harvest records, photos published to Arweave) creates verifiable baseline for detecting misrepresentation.
 
+
+### Additional Evidence (confirm)
+*Source: [[2026-03-05-futardio-launch-blockrock]] | Added: 2026-03-12 | Extractor: anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5*
+
+BlockRock charter cites MtnCapital's wind-down as proof of safety: 'When MtnCapital wound down, holders received their proportional share of the treasury through the protocol's built-in liquidation mechanism. The system's guarantees worked as intended. Even in failure, no value is lost to extraction or mismanagement.' This provides a concrete example of the liquidation mechanism functioning as designed, returning treasury value to holders even when the project failed to achieve its investment objectives. MtnCapital launched in 2025 as a futarchy-governed VC fund, struggled to pass proposals, and successfully liquidated without value extraction.
+
 ---
 
 Relevant Notes:
diff --git a/domains/internet-finance/ownership coins primary value proposition is investor protection not governance quality because anti-rug enforcement through market-governed liquidation creates credible exit guarantees that no amount of decision optimization can match.md b/domains/internet-finance/ownership coins primary value proposition is investor protection not governance quality because anti-rug enforcement through market-governed liquidation creates credible exit guarantees that no amount of decision optimization can match.md
index 6c709071..91c23aa7 100644
--- a/domains/internet-finance/ownership coins primary value proposition is investor protection not governance quality because anti-rug enforcement through market-governed liquidation creates credible exit guarantees that no amount of decision optimization can match.md	
+++ b/domains/internet-finance/ownership coins primary value proposition is investor protection not governance quality because anti-rug enforcement through market-governed liquidation creates credible exit guarantees that no amount of decision optimization can match.md	
@@ -42,6 +42,12 @@ Proph3t's other framing reinforces this: he distinguishes "market oversight" fro
 
 Futardio cult's $11.4M raise against $50,000 target with stated use of funds for 'fan merch, token listings, private events/partys' (consumption rather than productive investment) tests whether futarchy's anti-rug mechanisms provide credible investor protection even when projects explicitly commit to non-productive spending. The 22,706% oversubscription suggests market confidence in futarchy-governed liquidation rights extends beyond traditional venture scenarios to purely speculative assets where fundamental value analysis is minimal, indicating investor protection mechanisms are the primary value driver regardless of governance quality or asset type.
 
+
+### Additional Evidence (confirm)
+*Source: [[2026-03-05-futardio-launch-blockrock]] | Added: 2026-03-12 | Extractor: anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5*
+
+BlockRock charter leads with ownership as the first pillar: 'Tokenholders are the primary beneficiaries of fund performance via treasury backing. Minimal management fees are funded transparently from the treasury and adjustable via governance. No percentage-based skimming.' The MtnCapital precedent is cited as proof that 'even in failure, no value is lost to extraction or mismanagement' because the liquidation mechanism returned proportional treasury shares. This confirms that investor protection through treasury backing is the foundational value proposition, with futarchy governance as the mechanism for optimizing that protected capital. BlockRock's charter positions the three pillars as Ownership (primary), Futarchy (decision mechanism), and AI (execution capability) — in that order of primacy.
+
 ---
 
 Relevant Notes:
diff --git a/domains/internet-finance/token economics replacing management fees and carried interest creates natural meritocracy in investment governance.md b/domains/internet-finance/token economics replacing management fees and carried interest creates natural meritocracy in investment governance.md
index 0bf51707..60992ccf 100644
--- a/domains/internet-finance/token economics replacing management fees and carried interest creates natural meritocracy in investment governance.md	
+++ b/domains/internet-finance/token economics replacing management fees and carried interest creates natural meritocracy in investment governance.md	
@@ -15,6 +15,12 @@ Living Capital replaces this with token economics that directly reward decision-
 
 The mechanism aligns with several core LivingIP principles. Since [[ownership alignment turns network effects from extractive to generative]], the token structure ensures that value flows to those who generate it rather than to intermediaries who merely facilitate access. Since [[blind meritocratic voting forces independent thinking by hiding interim results while showing engagement]], combining token-locked voting with blind mechanisms could further strengthen decision quality. Since [[gamified contribution with ownership stakes aligns individual sharing with collective intelligence growth]], the token emissions function as the ownership stakes that incentivize high-quality participation. The result is an investment governance model where authority is earned through demonstrated judgment rather than granted through capital contribution alone.
 
+
+### Additional Evidence (extend)
+*Source: [[2026-03-05-futardio-launch-blockrock]] | Added: 2026-03-12 | Extractor: anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5*
+
+BlockRock implements this principle explicitly: '95% of tokens are distributed to ICO participants at the same price. The remaining 5% is allocated to the founding team, which unlocks at 3-month TWAPs of 2X, 4X, 8X, 16X, and 32X the ICO price. A $5K allowance per month is allocated to the team for supporting infrastructure.' This creates extreme performance alignment where team compensation is entirely tied to token price multiples, with minimal fixed costs ($5K/month for infrastructure). The charter contrasts this with BlackRock's '~73% of revenue from management fees' collected regardless of performance. However, BlockRock's failed fundraise ($100 vs $500K target) means this token economics structure has not been tested in operation.
+
 ---
 
 Relevant Notes:
diff --git a/entities/internet-finance/blockrock.md b/entities/internet-finance/blockrock.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..52e7ea0c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/entities/internet-finance/blockrock.md
@@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
+---
+type: entity
+entity_type: company
+name: BlockRock
+domain: internet-finance
+status: fundraising
+founded: 2026-03-05
+website: https://blockrock.fund
+twitter: https://x.com/blockrockfund
+platform: futardio
+key_metrics:
+  raise_target: "$500,000"
+  total_committed: "$100"
+  token_symbol: "D9o"
+  token_distribution: "95% ICO participants, 5% team with performance vesting"
+  team_vesting: "Unlocks at 3-month TWAPs of 2X, 4X, 8X, 16X, 32X ICO price"
+  monthly_allowance: "$5,000 for infrastructure"
+tracked_by: rio
+created: 2026-03-11
+---
+
+# BlockRock
+
+**Futarchy-governed asset management fund on Solana targeting liquid onchain assets with AI-generated proposals and market-driven decisions.**
+
+BlockRock launches as an "ownership fund" using MetaDAO's futarchy infrastructure to manage a treasury-backed token through conditional decision markets. Unlike MtnCapital (which targeted illiquid VC deals), BlockRock focuses on liquid asset allocation (spot markets, perpetuals, lending, structured yield, RWAs) to enable efficient futarchy pricing. The fund combines three pillars: ownership (treasury-backed tokens with minimal fees), futarchy (market-governed decisions), and AI agents (continuous proposal generation judged purely by market pricing).
+
+The charter positions BlockRock as inverting traditional asset management's negative feedback loop (fee misalignment → bureaucratic bloat → regulatory drag → underperformance) by aligning incentives through token economics, eliminating committees through futarchy, and scaling capability through AI rather than headcount.
+
+## Timeline
+
+- **2026-03-05** — BlockRock launches fundraise on Futardio targeting $500K with 95% token distribution to ICO participants and 5% team allocation vesting at price multiples (2X, 4X, 8X, 16X, 32X)
+- **2026-03-06** — Fundraise closes in REFUNDING status with only $100 committed of $500K target
+
+## Relationship to KB
+
+- Implements [[MetaDAO is the futarchy launchpad on Solana where projects raise capital through unruggable ICOs governed by conditional markets creating the first platform for ownership coins at scale]]
+- Demonstrates [[token economics replacing management fees and carried interest creates natural meritocracy in investment governance]]
+- Tests [[AI agents as always-on analysts scale fund capability with compute not headcount when proposals compete on equal footing with human submissions]] <!-- claim pending -->
+- Learns from MtnCapital failure by targeting liquid assets per [[futarchy-excels-at-relative-selection-but-fails-at-absolute-prediction-because-ordinal-ranking-works-while-cardinal-estimation-requires-calibration]]
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/entities/internet-finance/futardio.md b/entities/internet-finance/futardio.md
index 3939e101..fd8b746c 100644
--- a/entities/internet-finance/futardio.md
+++ b/entities/internet-finance/futardio.md
@@ -46,6 +46,7 @@ MetaDAO's token launch platform. Implements "unruggable ICOs" — permissionless
 
 - **2026-03-07** — Areal DAO launch: $50K target, raised $11,654 (23.3%), REFUNDING status by 2026-03-08 — first documented failed futarchy-governed fundraise on platform
 - **2026-03-04** — [[seekervault]] fundraise launched targeting $75,000, closed next day with only $1,186 (1.6% of target) in refunding status
+- **2026-03-05** — [[blockrock]] launches $500K fundraise for futarchy-governed asset management fund targeting liquid onchain assets with AI-generated proposals; closes 2026-03-06 in REFUNDING status with $100 committed
 ## Competitive Position
 - **Unique mechanism**: Only launch platform with futarchy-governed accountability and treasury return guarantees
 - **vs pump.fun**: pump.fun is memecoin launch (zero accountability, pure speculation). Futardio is ownership coin launch (futarchy governance, treasury enforcement). Different categories despite both being "launch platforms."
diff --git a/entities/internet-finance/mtncapital.md b/entities/internet-finance/mtncapital.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..299080cb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/entities/internet-finance/mtncapital.md
@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
+---
+type: entity
+entity_type: company
+name: MtnCapital
+domain: internet-finance
+status: liquidated
+founded: 2025
+platform: metadao
+key_metrics:
+  investment_focus: "Early-stage VC fund"
+  outcome: "Wound down, treasury returned to holders via protocol liquidation"
+tracked_by: rio
+created: 2026-03-11
+---
+
+# MtnCapital
+
+**First futarchy-governed VC fund on MetaDAO that failed to pass proposals and wound down, proving the liquidation mechanism works while revealing futarchy's limitations for illiquid private investments.**
+
+MtnCapital launched in 2025 as an early-stage VC fund using MetaDAO's ownership coin infrastructure. The fund struggled to pass investment proposals through futarchy governance, likely because private VC deals with asymmetric information, long timelines, and binary outcomes proved difficult for conditional markets to price efficiently. The fund eventually wound down, with holders receiving proportional treasury shares through the protocol's built-in liquidation mechanism.
+
+While MtnCapital failed as an investment vehicle, it succeeded as a proof of safety — demonstrating that MetaDAO's liquidation guarantees work as intended even when the project fails. This precedent informed BlockRock's design choice to target liquid assets instead of illiquid VC deals.
+
+## Timeline
+
+- **2025** — MtnCapital launches as futarchy-governed early-stage VC fund on MetaDAO
+- **2025** — Fund struggles to pass proposals through futarchy governance
+- **2025** — MtnCapital winds down, holders receive proportional treasury shares via protocol liquidation mechanism
+
+## Relationship to KB
+
+- Demonstrates [[futarchy-governed liquidation is the enforcement mechanism that makes unruggable ICOs credible because investors can force full treasury return when teams materially misrepresent]]
+- Reveals limitations of [[futarchy-excels-at-relative-selection-but-fails-at-absolute-prediction-because-ordinal-ranking-works-while-cardinal-estimation-requires-calibration]] for illiquid private investments
+- Informed BlockRock's design choice to target liquid asset allocation instead of VC deals
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/inbox/archive/2026-03-05-futardio-launch-blockrock.md b/inbox/archive/2026-03-05-futardio-launch-blockrock.md
index ee523fcc..eabc36c0 100644
--- a/inbox/archive/2026-03-05-futardio-launch-blockrock.md
+++ b/inbox/archive/2026-03-05-futardio-launch-blockrock.md
@@ -6,9 +6,15 @@ url: "https://www.futard.io/launch/J7CmLqfMLVq67swRQa6xCWn7VcyfpyhFSiQdJYNwkP8k"
 date: 2026-03-05
 domain: internet-finance
 format: data
-status: unprocessed
+status: processed
 tags: [futardio, metadao, futarchy, solana]
 event_type: launch
+processed_by: rio
+processed_date: 2026-03-11
+claims_extracted: ["blockrock-demonstrates-futarchy-governed-asset-management-with-liquid-portfolio-allocation-replacing-illiquid-vc-bets.md", "asset-management-industry-underperforms-due-to-fee-misalignment-regulatory-drag-and-organizational-complexity-creating-negative-feedback-loop.md", "ai-agents-as-always-on-analysts-scale-fund-capability-with-compute-not-headcount-when-proposals-compete-on-equal-footing-with-human-submissions.md"]
+enrichments_applied: ["MetaDAO is the futarchy launchpad on Solana where projects raise capital through unruggable ICOs governed by conditional markets creating the first platform for ownership coins at scale.md", "futarchy-governed liquidation is the enforcement mechanism that makes unruggable ICOs credible because investors can force full treasury return when teams materially misrepresent.md", "token economics replacing management fees and carried interest creates natural meritocracy in investment governance.md", "ownership coins primary value proposition is investor protection not governance quality because anti-rug enforcement through market-governed liquidation creates credible exit guarantees that no amount of decision optimization can match.md"]
+extraction_model: "anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5"
+extraction_notes: "BlockRock is a significant conceptual contribution even though the fundraise failed — it demonstrates second-generation learning from MtnCapital by targeting liquid assets for futarchy pricing efficiency. The charter is a well-structured argument for futarchy-governed asset management that addresses three structural problems in traditional finance (fee misalignment, regulatory drag, organizational complexity) with three corresponding solutions (ownership coins, futarchy governance, AI agents). Created entities for BlockRock and MtnCapital (previously untracked). The fundraise failure (REFUNDING status, $100/$500K) suggests market skepticism but doesn't invalidate the architectural insights."
 ---
 
 ## Launch Details
@@ -193,3 +199,14 @@ BlockRock is designed to scale to trillions in assets under management. The toke
 - Token mint: `D9o2F3Pu7gowtZr1PjPFiQr4DwVPkNJhqPjpVRwjmeta`
 - Version: v0.7
 - Closed: 2026-03-06
+
+
+## Key Facts
+- BlockRock fundraise target: $500,000 (2026-03-05)
+- BlockRock total committed: $100 (closed 2026-03-06)
+- BlockRock token distribution: 95% ICO participants, 5% team with performance vesting at 2X/4X/8X/16X/32X price multiples
+- BlockRock team allowance: $5,000/month for infrastructure
+- BlackRock revenue structure: ~73% management fees, ~5% performance fees
+- BlackRock scale: 20,000+ employees, 70+ offices, 1,700+ ETFs
+- Asset management industry size: $120T+
+- MtnCapital wound down with treasury returned to holders via protocol liquidation (2025)