From 47c200a31ff9f7554f604b439b0811dfbd8a2cb5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Teleo Agents Date: Thu, 12 Mar 2026 16:38:08 +0000 Subject: [PATCH] rio: extract from 2026-03-05-futardio-launch-blockrock.md - Source: inbox/archive/2026-03-05-futardio-launch-blockrock.md - Domain: internet-finance - Extracted by: headless extraction cron (worker 6) Pentagon-Agent: Rio --- ...t platform for ownership coins at scale.md | 6 +++ ...governance-throughput-without-headcount.md | 47 +++++++++++++++++++ ...le-incentive-over-performance-incentive.md | 42 +++++++++++++++++ ...-viable-alternative-to-illiquid-vc-bets.md | 40 ++++++++++++++++ ...turn when teams materially misrepresent.md | 6 +++ ...ount of decision optimization can match.md | 6 +++ ...al meritocracy in investment governance.md | 6 +++ entities/internet-finance/blockrock.md | 35 ++++++++++++++ entities/internet-finance/futardio.md | 1 + .../2026-03-05-futardio-launch-blockrock.md | 20 +++++++- 10 files changed, 208 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) create mode 100644 domains/internet-finance/ai-agents-as-continuous-proposal-generators-scale-governance-throughput-without-headcount.md create mode 100644 domains/internet-finance/asset-management-fee-structure-creates-scale-incentive-over-performance-incentive.md create mode 100644 domains/internet-finance/blockrock-demonstrates-futarchy-governed-liquid-asset-allocation-as-viable-alternative-to-illiquid-vc-bets.md create mode 100644 entities/internet-finance/blockrock.md diff --git a/domains/internet-finance/MetaDAO is the futarchy launchpad on Solana where projects raise capital through unruggable ICOs governed by conditional markets creating the first platform for ownership coins at scale.md b/domains/internet-finance/MetaDAO is the futarchy launchpad on Solana where projects raise capital through unruggable ICOs governed by conditional markets creating the first platform for ownership coins at scale.md index af4a788c..486aa333 100644 --- a/domains/internet-finance/MetaDAO is the futarchy launchpad on Solana where projects raise capital through unruggable ICOs governed by conditional markets creating the first platform for ownership coins at scale.md +++ b/domains/internet-finance/MetaDAO is the futarchy launchpad on Solana where projects raise capital through unruggable ICOs governed by conditional markets creating the first platform for ownership coins at scale.md @@ -82,6 +82,12 @@ Futardio cult launch (2026-03-03 to 2026-03-04) demonstrates MetaDAO's platform (challenge) Areal's failed Futardio launch ($11,654 raised of $50K target, REFUNDING status) demonstrates that futarchy-governed fundraising does not guarantee capital formation success. The mechanism provides credible exit guarantees through market-governed liquidation and governance quality through conditional markets, but market participants still evaluate project fundamentals and team credibility. Futarchy reduces rug risk but does not eliminate market skepticism of unproven business models or early-stage teams. + +### Additional Evidence (extend) +*Source: [[2026-03-05-futardio-launch-blockrock]] | Added: 2026-03-12 | Extractor: anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5* + +BlockRock launched via MetaDAO's permissionless launchpad on 2026-03-05, demonstrating continued platform usage for ownership fund launches. The launch targeted $500K but only raised $100 and entered REFUNDING status within 24 hours. BlockRock's charter explicitly credits MetaDAO's infrastructure: 'MetaDAO's permissionless launchpad lets anyone launch an ownership coin whose value is tied to a futarchy-governed treasury. This infrastructure is battle-tested and now publicly available.' The failed launch demonstrates both the platform's accessibility (permissionless launch succeeded technically) and its enforcement mechanisms (automatic refund when threshold not met). + --- Relevant Notes: diff --git a/domains/internet-finance/ai-agents-as-continuous-proposal-generators-scale-governance-throughput-without-headcount.md b/domains/internet-finance/ai-agents-as-continuous-proposal-generators-scale-governance-throughput-without-headcount.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..29c1017d --- /dev/null +++ b/domains/internet-finance/ai-agents-as-continuous-proposal-generators-scale-governance-throughput-without-headcount.md @@ -0,0 +1,47 @@ +--- +type: claim +domain: internet-finance +description: "AI agents submit proposals to futarchy markets but never execute creating permissionless idea flow" +confidence: speculative +source: "BlockRock Charter, 2026-03-05" +created: 2026-03-11 +--- + +# BlockRock proposes AI agents as continuous proposal generators to scale governance throughput without headcount + +BlockRock's architecture positions AI agents as "always-on analysts, ingesting live data, market signals, and macro context to generate a continuous stream of proposals." Critically, agents operate under strict constraints: "They propose, never execute. AI agents have no authority to force decisions—only to submit ideas to the governance layer." + +This creates a permissionless proposal pipeline where: + +1. **Agents compete with humans on equal footing** — "Their proposals compete with human submissions on equal footing" with "no institutional bias filters their ideas" +2. **Market pricing determines quality** — "They are judged purely by market pricing. Good proposals win regardless of source" +3. **Capability scales with compute** — "They scale with compute, not headcount. As AI capabilities grow, the fund's capability grows too. With minimal overhead" + +The governance model separates proposal generation (permissionless, AI-augmented) from decision authority (market-governed futarchy). BlockRock argues this addresses a key bottleneck in traditional asset management: the limited bandwidth of human analysts and portfolio managers. + +The scaling thesis is that "as AI capabilities grow, the fund's capability grows too" without the organizational complexity that comes with hiring more analysts. The fund's analytical capacity becomes a function of compute availability rather than headcount. + +The mechanism depends on futarchy's market-based filtering: agents can generate high volumes of proposals without overwhelming the system because only proposals that attract sufficient trading interest become live decisions. Poor proposals are ignored or quickly rejected by market pricing. + +## Evidence + +- BlockRock charter explicitly positions AI agents as proposal generators with no execution authority +- Agents "ingest live data, market signals, and macro context" to generate continuous proposal stream +- Proposals "compete with human submissions on equal footing" and are "judged purely by market pricing" +- Scaling argument: "As AI capabilities grow, the fund's capability grows too. With minimal overhead" + +## Critical Limitations + +No empirical evidence exists for this architecture in production. BlockRock's launch failed to reach funding threshold ($100 of $500K target, REFUNDING status within 24 hours). The claim that AI-generated proposals will be competitive with human proposals in futarchy markets remains untested. The quality and diversity of AI-generated investment proposals at scale is unknown. The assumption that market pricing will effectively filter AI proposals has not been validated. + +--- + +Relevant Notes: +- [[optimal governance requires mixing mechanisms because different decisions have different manipulation risk profiles]] +- [[MetaDAOs futarchy implementation shows limited trading volume in uncontested decisions]] +- [[AI autonomously managing investment capital is regulatory terra incognita because the SEC framework assumes human-controlled registered entities deploy AI as tools]] + +Topics: +- [[domains/internet-finance/_map]] +- [[domains/ai-alignment/_map]] +- [[core/mechanisms/_map]] diff --git a/domains/internet-finance/asset-management-fee-structure-creates-scale-incentive-over-performance-incentive.md b/domains/internet-finance/asset-management-fee-structure-creates-scale-incentive-over-performance-incentive.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..13f49ec6 --- /dev/null +++ b/domains/internet-finance/asset-management-fee-structure-creates-scale-incentive-over-performance-incentive.md @@ -0,0 +1,42 @@ +--- +type: claim +domain: internet-finance +description: "Management fees dominate revenue while performance fees are marginal creating misaligned incentives" +confidence: likely +source: "BlockRock Charter citing BlackRock revenue structure, 2026-03-05" +created: 2026-03-11 +--- + +# Asset management fee structure creates scale incentive over performance incentive + +Traditional asset managers derive the overwhelming majority of revenue from management fees (charged on AUM regardless of performance) rather than performance fees (charged on returns). BlockRock's charter cites BlackRock specifically: "~73% of its revenue from management fees" while "performance fees account for just ~5% of revenue." + +This creates a structural incentive misalignment: asset managers are economically optimized to maximize AUM (assets under management) rather than returns. Growing the asset base generates predictable fee revenue whether the fund performs well or poorly. Performance-based compensation is marginal. + +The consequences cascade through organizational behavior: + +1. **Consensus-driven investing** — Avoiding career risk by staying close to benchmark allocations rather than taking differentiated positions +2. **Narrative capture** — Chasing institutional trends (like ESG) for asset gathering rather than return optimization +3. **Marketing over alpha** — Investment in distribution and brand rather than research and execution + +BlockRock argues this "incentivizes asset accumulation over performance" and contributes to the empirical reality that "most actively managed funds underperform their benchmarks, especially after fees." + +The alternative model proposed is treasury-backed tokens where "tokenholders are the primary beneficiaries of fund performance via treasury backing" with "minimal management fees funded transparently from the treasury and adjustable via governance." This attempts to invert the incentive: value accrues to token price (driven by treasury performance) rather than to management fees (driven by AUM scale). + +## Evidence + +- BlackRock derives ~73% of revenue from management fees, only ~5% from performance fees (BlockRock Charter, citing BlackRock's public filings) +- Most actively managed funds underperform benchmarks after fees (widely documented; cited in charter) +- BlackRock's "shifting ESG stance" cited as example of narrative capture driven by asset-gathering incentives +- Traditional fee structure is percentage-based on AUM, creating direct revenue link to scale not performance + +--- + +Relevant Notes: +- [[token economics replacing management fees and carried interest creates natural meritocracy in investment governance]] +- [[ownership coins primary value proposition is investor protection not governance quality because anti-rug enforcement through market-governed liquidation creates credible exit guarantees that no amount of decision optimization can match]] +- [[LLMs shift investment management from economies of scale to economies of edge because AI collapses the analyst labor cost that forced funds to accumulate AUM rather than generate alpha]] + +Topics: +- [[domains/internet-finance/_map]] +- [[foundations/teleological-economics/_map]] diff --git a/domains/internet-finance/blockrock-demonstrates-futarchy-governed-liquid-asset-allocation-as-viable-alternative-to-illiquid-vc-bets.md b/domains/internet-finance/blockrock-demonstrates-futarchy-governed-liquid-asset-allocation-as-viable-alternative-to-illiquid-vc-bets.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..21ce6520 --- /dev/null +++ b/domains/internet-finance/blockrock-demonstrates-futarchy-governed-liquid-asset-allocation-as-viable-alternative-to-illiquid-vc-bets.md @@ -0,0 +1,40 @@ +--- +type: claim +domain: internet-finance +description: "Liquid markets enable futarchy pricing efficiency that illiquid VC deals cannot support" +confidence: speculative +source: "BlockRock Charter, futard.io launch 2026-03-05" +created: 2026-03-11 +--- + +# BlockRock positions liquid asset allocation as futarchy-compatible while illiquid VC deals are not + +BlockRock's charter explicitly contrasts its approach with MtnCapital's failed VC fund, arguing that futarchy governance requires continuous price discovery. The charter states: "liquid asset allocation for risk-adjusted returns gives futarchy the pricing efficiency it requires" while "private VC deals are difficult to price with asymmetric information, long timelines, and binary outcomes." + +This represents a strategic thesis about futarchy's constraints, not a proven mechanism. BlockRock argues that MtnCapital "struggled to pass proposals and eventually wound down" because the asset class (illiquid VC) was incompatible with futarchy's requirements for continuous market pricing. The charter frames this as a learning: "Even in failure, no value is lost to extraction or mismanagement" through protocol-enforced liquidation, suggesting the governance mechanism worked correctly—it was the asset selection that failed. + +BlockRock's mandate targets "moderate risk strategy to maximize Sortino ratio (penalizing downside volatility) by allocating the treasury into a portfolio of onchain positions." This focuses futarchy on liquid assets where continuous feedback is theoretically possible. + +The timing argument is that "the universe of investable assets on Solana is expanding rapidly" with "spot markets, perpetual futures, lending markets, structured yield products, and RWAs" now offering "deep liquidity and composable infrastructure." This creates the substrate futarchy would need: assets with continuous price signals. + +## Evidence + +- MtnCapital wound down after struggling to pass proposals (cited in BlockRock charter as precedent) +- BlockRock explicitly positions liquid asset allocation as "giving futarchy the pricing efficiency it requires" +- Protocol-enforced liquidation returned proportional treasury shares to MtnCapital holders despite project failure +- Solana now hosts liquid markets across spot, perps, lending, yield products, and RWAs (claimed in charter) + +## Critical Limitations + +BlockRock has not yet demonstrated actual performance. The launch raised only $100 of a $500K target and entered REFUNDING status within 24 hours. The claim that liquid assets are more suitable for futarchy governance than VC remains theoretical—it is a hypothesis about why MtnCapital failed, not a proven mechanism. No evidence exists that BlockRock's liquid asset allocation will succeed where MtnCapital's VC approach failed, or that futarchy's pricing efficiency actually improves with asset liquidity. + +--- + +Relevant Notes: +- [[MetaDAOs futarchy implementation shows limited trading volume in uncontested decisions]] +- [[futarchy-excels-at-relative-selection-but-fails-at-absolute-prediction-because-ordinal-ranking-works-while-cardinal-estimation-requires-calibration]] +- [[optimal governance requires mixing mechanisms because different decisions have different manipulation risk profiles]] + +Topics: +- [[domains/internet-finance/_map]] +- [[core/mechanisms/_map]] diff --git a/domains/internet-finance/futarchy-governed liquidation is the enforcement mechanism that makes unruggable ICOs credible because investors can force full treasury return when teams materially misrepresent.md b/domains/internet-finance/futarchy-governed liquidation is the enforcement mechanism that makes unruggable ICOs credible because investors can force full treasury return when teams materially misrepresent.md index 1e6b7f59..8865929a 100644 --- a/domains/internet-finance/futarchy-governed liquidation is the enforcement mechanism that makes unruggable ICOs credible because investors can force full treasury return when teams materially misrepresent.md +++ b/domains/internet-finance/futarchy-governed liquidation is the enforcement mechanism that makes unruggable ICOs credible because investors can force full treasury return when teams materially misrepresent.md @@ -52,6 +52,12 @@ Critically, the proposal nullifies a prior 90-day restriction on buybacks/liquid MycoRealms implements unruggable ICO structure with automatic refund mechanism: if $125,000 target not reached within 72 hours, full refunds execute automatically. Post-raise, team has zero direct treasury access — operates on $10,000 monthly allowance with all other expenditures requiring futarchy approval. This creates credible commitment: team cannot rug because they cannot access treasury directly, and investors can force liquidation through futarchy proposals if team materially misrepresents (e.g., fails to publish operational data to Arweave as promised, diverts funds from stated use). Transparency requirement (all invoices, expenses, harvest records, photos published to Arweave) creates verifiable baseline for detecting misrepresentation. + +### Additional Evidence (confirm) +*Source: [[2026-03-05-futardio-launch-blockrock]] | Added: 2026-03-12 | Extractor: anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5* + +BlockRock's charter explicitly cites MtnCapital's wind-down as proof of the liquidation mechanism: 'When MtnCapital wound down, holders received their proportional share of the treasury through the protocol's built-in liquidation mechanism. The system's guarantees worked as intended. Even in failure, no value is lost to extraction or mismanagement.' This provides a concrete example of futarchy-governed liquidation functioning as designed—the protocol enforced proportional treasury distribution despite project failure, validating the anti-rug guarantee. + --- Relevant Notes: diff --git a/domains/internet-finance/ownership coins primary value proposition is investor protection not governance quality because anti-rug enforcement through market-governed liquidation creates credible exit guarantees that no amount of decision optimization can match.md b/domains/internet-finance/ownership coins primary value proposition is investor protection not governance quality because anti-rug enforcement through market-governed liquidation creates credible exit guarantees that no amount of decision optimization can match.md index 6c709071..11dcfefe 100644 --- a/domains/internet-finance/ownership coins primary value proposition is investor protection not governance quality because anti-rug enforcement through market-governed liquidation creates credible exit guarantees that no amount of decision optimization can match.md +++ b/domains/internet-finance/ownership coins primary value proposition is investor protection not governance quality because anti-rug enforcement through market-governed liquidation creates credible exit guarantees that no amount of decision optimization can match.md @@ -42,6 +42,12 @@ Proph3t's other framing reinforces this: he distinguishes "market oversight" fro Futardio cult's $11.4M raise against $50,000 target with stated use of funds for 'fan merch, token listings, private events/partys' (consumption rather than productive investment) tests whether futarchy's anti-rug mechanisms provide credible investor protection even when projects explicitly commit to non-productive spending. The 22,706% oversubscription suggests market confidence in futarchy-governed liquidation rights extends beyond traditional venture scenarios to purely speculative assets where fundamental value analysis is minimal, indicating investor protection mechanisms are the primary value driver regardless of governance quality or asset type. + +### Additional Evidence (confirm) +*Source: [[2026-03-05-futardio-launch-blockrock]] | Added: 2026-03-12 | Extractor: anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5* + +BlockRock's charter prioritizes ownership protections as the first pillar before futarchy or AI: 'Tokenholders are the primary beneficiaries of fund performance via treasury backing.' The MtnCapital example is used to demonstrate that 'even in failure, no value is lost to extraction or mismanagement'—the protocol's liquidation mechanism returned proportional treasury shares despite the fund winding down. This confirms that the anti-rug guarantee functions independently of governance quality: MtnCapital's futarchy struggled to pass proposals (governance failure) but investors still received their proportional treasury value (protection success). + --- Relevant Notes: diff --git a/domains/internet-finance/token economics replacing management fees and carried interest creates natural meritocracy in investment governance.md b/domains/internet-finance/token economics replacing management fees and carried interest creates natural meritocracy in investment governance.md index 0bf51707..e134977a 100644 --- a/domains/internet-finance/token economics replacing management fees and carried interest creates natural meritocracy in investment governance.md +++ b/domains/internet-finance/token economics replacing management fees and carried interest creates natural meritocracy in investment governance.md @@ -15,6 +15,12 @@ Living Capital replaces this with token economics that directly reward decision- The mechanism aligns with several core LivingIP principles. Since [[ownership alignment turns network effects from extractive to generative]], the token structure ensures that value flows to those who generate it rather than to intermediaries who merely facilitate access. Since [[blind meritocratic voting forces independent thinking by hiding interim results while showing engagement]], combining token-locked voting with blind mechanisms could further strengthen decision quality. Since [[gamified contribution with ownership stakes aligns individual sharing with collective intelligence growth]], the token emissions function as the ownership stakes that incentivize high-quality participation. The result is an investment governance model where authority is earned through demonstrated judgment rather than granted through capital contribution alone. + +### Additional Evidence (extend) +*Source: [[2026-03-05-futardio-launch-blockrock]] | Added: 2026-03-12 | Extractor: anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5* + +BlockRock's fee structure attempts to eliminate percentage-based management fees entirely: 'Minimal management fees are funded transparently from the treasury and adjustable via governance. No percentage-based skimming.' The team allocation is performance-unlocked: '5% allocated to founding team, which unlocks at 3-month TWAPs of 2X, 4X, 8X, 16X, and 32X the ICO price' with only '$5K allowance per month for supporting infrastructure.' This creates extreme alignment—team compensation is almost entirely tied to token price multiples rather than AUM-based fees. The charter contrasts this with BlackRock's structure where '~73% of revenue from management fees' regardless of performance. + --- Relevant Notes: diff --git a/entities/internet-finance/blockrock.md b/entities/internet-finance/blockrock.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..fc253199 --- /dev/null +++ b/entities/internet-finance/blockrock.md @@ -0,0 +1,35 @@ +--- +type: entity +entity_type: company +name: BlockRock +domain: internet-finance +status: failed +founded: 2026-03-05 +platform: futardio +key_metrics: + raise_target: "$500,000" + total_committed: "$100" + token_symbol: "D9o" + team_allocation: "5%" + team_vesting: "3-month TWAPs at 2X, 4X, 8X, 16X, 32X ICO price" +tracked_by: rio +created: 2026-03-11 +--- + +# BlockRock + +BlockRock is a futarchy-governed "ownership fund" that launched on MetaDAO's permissionless launchpad on 2026-03-05. Positioned as "BlackRock on the Blockchain," it attempted to create an asset management vehicle using treasury-backed tokens, decision markets, and AI agents for liquid asset allocation on Solana. The launch targeted $500K but raised only $100 and entered REFUNDING status within 24 hours. + +BlockRock's architecture explicitly learned from MtnCapital's failure with illiquid VC investments, instead focusing on liquid onchain assets (spot markets, perps, lending, RWAs) where futarchy's pricing mechanisms can function effectively. The charter emphasized three pillars: ownership (treasury-backed tokens with minimal fees), futarchy (market-governed decisions), and AI (agents as continuous proposal generators). + +## Timeline + +- **2026-03-05** — BlockRock launches $500K fundraise on Futardio with mandate for liquid asset allocation and AI-generated proposals +- **2026-03-06** — Launch closes in REFUNDING status after raising only $100 of $500K target + +## Relationship to KB + +- [[MetaDAO is the futarchy launchpad on Solana where projects raise capital through unruggable ICOs governed by conditional markets creating the first platform for ownership coins at scale]] — BlockRock launched via MetaDAO infrastructure +- [[blockrock-demonstrates-futarchy-governed-liquid-asset-allocation-as-viable-alternative-to-illiquid-vc-bets]] — core thesis +- [[token economics replacing management fees and carried interest creates natural meritocracy in investment governance]] — fee structure innovation +- [[ai-agents-as-continuous-proposal-generators-scale-governance-throughput-without-headcount]] — AI integration model \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/entities/internet-finance/futardio.md b/entities/internet-finance/futardio.md index 3939e101..b3b8321c 100644 --- a/entities/internet-finance/futardio.md +++ b/entities/internet-finance/futardio.md @@ -46,6 +46,7 @@ MetaDAO's token launch platform. Implements "unruggable ICOs" — permissionless - **2026-03-07** — Areal DAO launch: $50K target, raised $11,654 (23.3%), REFUNDING status by 2026-03-08 — first documented failed futarchy-governed fundraise on platform - **2026-03-04** — [[seekervault]] fundraise launched targeting $75,000, closed next day with only $1,186 (1.6% of target) in refunding status +- **2026-03-05** — [[blockrock]] launches $500K ownership fund targeting liquid asset allocation with AI-generated proposals; closes in REFUNDING status after raising only $100 ## Competitive Position - **Unique mechanism**: Only launch platform with futarchy-governed accountability and treasury return guarantees - **vs pump.fun**: pump.fun is memecoin launch (zero accountability, pure speculation). Futardio is ownership coin launch (futarchy governance, treasury enforcement). Different categories despite both being "launch platforms." diff --git a/inbox/archive/2026-03-05-futardio-launch-blockrock.md b/inbox/archive/2026-03-05-futardio-launch-blockrock.md index ee523fcc..9751d438 100644 --- a/inbox/archive/2026-03-05-futardio-launch-blockrock.md +++ b/inbox/archive/2026-03-05-futardio-launch-blockrock.md @@ -6,9 +6,15 @@ url: "https://www.futard.io/launch/J7CmLqfMLVq67swRQa6xCWn7VcyfpyhFSiQdJYNwkP8k" date: 2026-03-05 domain: internet-finance format: data -status: unprocessed +status: processed tags: [futardio, metadao, futarchy, solana] event_type: launch +processed_by: rio +processed_date: 2026-03-11 +claims_extracted: ["blockrock-demonstrates-futarchy-governed-liquid-asset-allocation-as-viable-alternative-to-illiquid-vc-bets.md", "asset-management-fee-structure-creates-scale-incentive-over-performance-incentive.md", "ai-agents-as-continuous-proposal-generators-scale-governance-throughput-without-headcount.md"] +enrichments_applied: ["MetaDAO is the futarchy launchpad on Solana where projects raise capital through unruggable ICOs governed by conditional markets creating the first platform for ownership coins at scale.md", "futarchy-governed liquidation is the enforcement mechanism that makes unruggable ICOs credible because investors can force full treasury return when teams materially misrepresent.md", "token economics replacing management fees and carried interest creates natural meritocracy in investment governance.md", "ownership coins primary value proposition is investor protection not governance quality because anti-rug enforcement through market-governed liquidation creates credible exit guarantees that no amount of decision optimization can match.md"] +extraction_model: "anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5" +extraction_notes: "BlockRock launch is a failed fundraise but contains significant mechanism design insights: (1) explicit pivot from illiquid VC (MtnCapital failure) to liquid assets for futarchy compatibility, (2) AI agents as proposal generators not executors, (3) performance-unlocked team tokens with extreme multiples (32X), (4) critique of traditional asset management fee structures. Charter is substantive enough to extract claims about futarchy application domain and AI integration patterns. Entity created despite failure because it demonstrates MetaDAO platform usage and contains novel architectural proposals." --- ## Launch Details @@ -193,3 +199,15 @@ BlockRock is designed to scale to trillions in assets under management. The toke - Token mint: `D9o2F3Pu7gowtZr1PjPFiQr4DwVPkNJhqPjpVRwjmeta` - Version: v0.7 - Closed: 2026-03-06 + + +## Key Facts +- BlockRock targeted $500K raise, achieved $100 (0.02% of target) +- Launch closed 2026-03-06 in REFUNDING status +- Token symbol: D9o, mint address: D9o2F3Pu7gowtZr1PjPFiQr4DwVPkNJhqPjpVRwjmeta +- Team allocation: 5% vesting at 2X/4X/8X/16X/32X price multiples via 3-month TWAPs +- Monthly team allowance: $5K for infrastructure support +- 95% of tokens distributed to ICO participants at same price +- BlackRock revenue structure: ~73% management fees, ~5% performance fees +- BlackRock scale: 20,000+ employees, 70+ global offices, 1,700+ ETFs +- Asset management industry size: $120T+