extract: 2024-07-18-futardio-proposal-enhancing-the-deans-list-dao-economic-model

Pentagon-Agent: Ganymede <F99EBFA6-547B-4096-BEEA-1D59C3E4028A>
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Teleo Agents 2026-03-16 11:24:11 +00:00
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@ -61,6 +61,12 @@ Dean's List treasury proposal passed despite requiring active market participati
Dean's List DAO fee structure proposal passed despite requiring traders to actively migrate to new pools and accept 20x higher fees (0.25% to 5%). The proposal explicitly acknowledged potential 20-30% volume decrease but passed anyway, suggesting the market priced the net treasury benefit (~$19k-25k annual growth) as worth the migration friction. This demonstrates that futarchy can approve proposals with significant user friction when the economic benefit is clear.
### Additional Evidence (confirm)
*Source: [[2024-07-18-futardio-proposal-enhancing-the-deans-list-dao-economic-model]] | Added: 2026-03-16*
The Dean's List proposal passed with detailed economic modeling showing 5.33% FDV increase versus 3% TWAP requirement, yet required extensive documentation (detailed price impact analysis, FDV projections, worked examples) to achieve passage. The proposal's complexity—explaining tax distribution, purchase mechanics, sell pressure calculations, and multi-step price impact scenarios—suggests that even economically favorable proposals face adoption friction from comprehension barriers.
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Relevant Notes:

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@ -36,6 +36,12 @@ The model assumes consistent service demand (6 dApp reviews per month) and stabl
The proposal passed MetaDAO governance but represents a single implementation without long-term performance data. The 80% sell-off assumption is stated as "assumption" in the proposal itself, not empirically validated. No mechanism prevents citizens from selling more than 80% if they face liquidity pressure.
### Additional Evidence (extend)
*Source: [[2024-07-18-futardio-proposal-enhancing-the-deans-list-dao-economic-model]] | Added: 2026-03-16*
The Dean's List DAO proposal demonstrates buyback mechanics with specific parameters: 20% DAO tax retained in USDC for treasury stability, 80% of revenue used to purchase governance tokens, with 80% of distributed tokens expected to be sold by recipients. The model projects net positive price action because buys exceed sells by 20% per cycle, creating 'higher lows' through systematic buy pressure that outweighs predictable sell pressure from token recipients liquidating for operational expenses.
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@ -6,9 +6,13 @@ url: "https://www.futard.io/proposal/5c2XSWQ9rVPge2Umoz1yenZcAwRaQS5bC4i4w87B1WU
date: 2024-07-18
domain: internet-finance
format: data
status: unprocessed
status: enrichment
tags: [futardio, metadao, futarchy, solana, governance]
event_type: proposal
processed_by: rio
processed_date: 2026-03-16
enrichments_applied: ["treasury-buyback-model-creates-constant-buy-pressure-by-converting-revenue-to-governance-token-purchases.md", "futarchy-proposals-with-favorable-economics-can-fail-due-to-participation-friction-not-market-disagreement.md"]
extraction_model: "anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.5"
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## Proposal Details
@ -146,3 +150,12 @@ This way we create volume (3600 \$USDC volume) and the price action is always po
- Autocrat version: 0.3
- Completed: 2024-07-22
- Ended: 2024-07-22
## Key Facts
- The Dean's List DAO had FDV of $337,074 and daily trading volume of $500 at proposal time
- The Dean's List DAO charges 2,500 USDC per dApp review
- Proposal modeled scenario of 6 dApp reviews per month generating 15,000 USDC monthly revenue
- Proposal projected 5.33% FDV increase versus 3% TWAP requirement for passage
- Proposal assumed 80% of distributed $DEAN tokens would be sold by recipients
- Circulating supply was 100,000,000 $DEAN tokens at $0.00337 price